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kōenkai personal support machines at the constituency level.
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Contested governance in Japan:
modes, sites and issues
Glenn D. Hook
Whilst a veritable avalanche of research has appeared in English on topics ranging
from ‘global governance’ down to ‘corporate governance’ in different parts of the
world, especially the Anglo-American world, the amount of work in the Japanese
language is far more limited. Except for a burgeoning literature on corporate
governance and to a lesser extent local governance, for the most part governance
in Japan is simply viewed as what governments do, and, as the years since 1955
have been dominated by governments led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
except for a brief period in the mid-1990s, governance has been viewed as pre-
dominately a question of how the LDP governs. Thus overwhelming interest 
has been focused on the balance between and amongst what are viewed as the key
actors in the classic tripartite elite model of policymaking in Japan, the LDP,
bureaucracy and big business, or how things have changed in the era of coalition
governments in the 1990s and early 2000s. Other analysts have sought to broaden
the understanding of how policy is formulated by examining actors outside of 
this triumvirate. This has expanded the range of actors seen to be involved in the
policymaking process beyond the so-called ‘iron triangle’, as suggested by the term
‘patterned pluralism’ (Muramatsu and Krauss 1987), or ‘bureaucracy-led, mass
inclusionary pluralism’ (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987: 5–7; also see Stockwin 1999: 221).
Despite such a broadening in the way the actors playing a role in the governance
of Japan is understood, however, the main focus has remained on how Japan is
governed in terms of the actors involved in the policymaking process at the central
government level. 
This view of governance as a question of how the government and other 
actors govern Japan through the policies implemented is represented by the most
recently available volume on governance in Japan published in English (Amyx and
Drysdale 2003). The authors of Japanese Governance. Beyond Japan Inc. accordingly
focus their attention on the policymaking process in Japan and do not attempt to
examine the Japanese meaning of governance nor grapple directly with a defini-
tion of governance. Instead, their aim is to shed light on governance in the field of
political economy, to go beyond ‘Japan Inc.’ as a metaphor for understanding the
structures of governance in Japan, and to inquire into the changes, both political
and economic, that have increased transparency and openness in the policymaking
process. This view of governance is linked to the global, especially American,
pressures on Japan to adopt more of a neo-liberal, market-based, mode of
governance, and the authors tend to view Japan in the context of these types 
of yardsticks.
Hence, whilst the volume adds to our understanding of governance in relation
to political economy and the policymaking process in Japan, it does not seek 
to question the specific political project promoting neo-liberal governance nor 
deal with the manifold meanings of the term ‘governance’ and governance of and
by the Japanese more broadly. The chapters in the present volume aim to move
the discussion of Japanese governance forward by going beyond an examination
of the role of the government and other actors in the policymaking process at 
the national level, and to analyse the sites and issues of governance both above and
below the state. Although the contributors approach governance differently
depending on the topic addressed in their own chapter, all share a common per-
spective on governance as taking place in different sites of activity, and as involving
a range of issues related to the norms and rules for the management, coordination
and regulation of order, whether within Japan or on the regional or global levels.
In other words, governance is seen as being practised both above and below the
state as well as inside and outside of it. By adopting this approach, the book aims
to draw attention to the contested nature of governance in Japan and the ways in
which a range of actors is involved in different sites and issues of governance at
home, in the region and the globe. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to highlight a number of insights 
into governance in general, and then to proceed to a more detailed discussion 
of governance in Japan before introducing the chapters included in this volume.
The aim is to identify different meanings of and approaches to governance as well
as to examine how governance is understood in Japan. More particularly, if we
accept the argument of certain broad typologies of capitalism (Coates 2000), such
that governance in a late developmental state like Japan might well be different
from governance under Anglo-American capitalism, then an important question
to ask is what is distinctive about Japanese governance? In short, a central aim of
examining governance in terms of sites and issues is to determine whether anything
distinctive can be said about it.
Modes of governance
A useful starting point is an understanding of governance as involving a potential
contestation between and amongst authority, legitimacy and competency in the
management of political, economic and social order. This order can be achieved
by three basic modes of governance – that by hierarchies, markets or networks 
(see Chapter 5). The balance between and amongst these three ways of governing
differs over space and time, but the process of American-led globalization and 
the promotion of neo-liberal market answers to questions of economic growth 
and efficiency are creating a greater role for the market and networks, although
often complemented by state-based hierarchies. The spread of pressures for de- or
re-regulation and a small state has led commentators to pay increasing attention
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to how the state is making use of non-state private actors and quasi-governmental
organizations as a means to achieve public goals. This changes the balance between
the public and private spheres of activities and prioritizes a market-based or
network-based mode of governance over hierarchical governance through the
agencies of the state. 
Essentially, this change in the balance between and amongst these three modes
of governance reflects a re-ranking or re-ordering of the norms at the core of the
governance of the state, economy and society. This changes the balance between
governance through public or private actors, as can be seen in the increased
involvement of non-state actors in carrying out erstwhile public tasks. The ‘off-
loading’ of tasks by the British state, for instance, as seen in the way deregulation
has created opportunities for non-state actors or quasi-governmental organizations
to carry out tasks once the preserve of the state, as in health, education and the
prison service, has thereby changed the mode of governance in the United
Kingdom. The implication of the impact this has on the wider role of the state,
however, is not clear-cut. Rhodes (1994), for instance, sees this change as leading
to the ‘hollowing out’ of the state, whereas others, such as Pierrie (2000), view this
rather as the state adopting strategies to ensure its continuing control (Bache 2003:
301). Whichever position is taken, however, it is clear that the hierarchical mode
of governance characteristic of the state is being increasingly complemented by
governance based on markets and networks.
Governance in Japan
The above discussion has provided a context for us to now move on to the case 
of Japan. Is there a particularly Japanese form of governance? The word for
governance in Japanese is tōchi. As Naya has pointed out, however, the concept of
tōchi gives a strong sense of ‘actions to govern’, as when the supreme court rules a
matter such as the constitutionality of the Self-Defence Forces as the government’s
‘tōchi ’ and not within the competency of the court to pass judgment, reflecting 
the dictionary definition of tōchi as ‘the sovereign control of the land and people’
(Naya 1997a: 194–5. Also see the Japanese dictionary, Kojien). It was precisely in
order to try to provide a more nuanced meaning of governance, including the idea
of ‘autonomy or society forming a consensus, and participation in the development
or shaping of order by these means’, that Naya and Wessels proposed the term
kyōchi (Naya 1997a: 201), ‘governance’ or, more precisely, ‘co-governance’. Here
governance is understood as ‘the pattern of rule creation through the participation
and cooperation of a variety of actors’ (Naya 1997b: 9). 
Rather than this neologism, however, the rendition of the English term ‘gover-
nance’ in the katakana script as, gabanansu, is increasingly being employed in Japan,
as in the case of a new magazine concerned with local affairs, entitled Gabanansu.
Thus, tōchi and gabanansu now exist side by side, with the latter expression tending
to be used in order to capture this broader meaning of governance than seems
possible by the use of tōchi, or to refer to specific sites or modes of governance, 
as in ‘local governance’. In this latter case, as Yorimoto points out, the Japanese
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term tōchi does not convey the interrelationship between public and private bodies,
with local authorities working together with non-governmental organizations
(NGO), non-profit organizations, corporations and local citizens (Yorimoto 2004:
61). In this sense, gabanansu is being employed in order to capture this wider
meaning of the term, although kigyō tōchi (corporate governance) continues to 
be used.
It seems clear from the above discussion that the Japanese ‘tōchi’ is narrower in
meaning than the English ‘governance’, which points to the need to pay attention
to how governance is understood in different political cultures. Whilst a rational
choice approach would no doubt wish to jettison this brief excursion into the
linguistic differences in the meaning and usage of governance, in particular, and
governance in the cultural context of Japan, in general, the approach taken here
suggests instead the importance of looking beyond a view based on the maximizing
interests of the individual, which leads to the expectation of a similar pattern of
behaviour in the governance of Japan as in other polities. Thus, although Ramseyer
and Rosenbluth find politicians in control in Japan by adopting a rational choice
approach (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993), this view is more congruent with the
mode of governance found in the United States than the mode of governance in
Japan (Curtis 1999: 59).The point is that, due to differences in the sphere of the
public and private, the state, market and society, governance can and does indeed
differ in Japan, though this is not to suggest that the Japanese mode of governance
or indeed political culture are hermetically sealed from outside pressures. 
The mode of governance adopted in Japan, therefore, results from a combination
of both internal and external pressures. For instance, Chalmers Johnson, a strident
critic of rational choice theory, has highlighted the dominant role of the bureaucrats
not politicians, in line with his view of Japan as a ‘developmental state’ where the
state’s intervention in the market is viewed as legitimate (1982). This leads to a
highly regulated political economy and, indeed, society, where governance takes
place through informal as well as formal regulation based on a range of practices,
as in the case of administrative guidance (gyōsei shidō ). In short, governance does
not rely on politicians or the market economy to function effectively but rather
takes place in the context of a different relationship amongst the state, market and
society and with a greater role for the state than under Anglo-American capitalism.
Rather than politicians being in sole charge, then, the actual power of those 
who have been elected to carry out ‘actions to govern’ is not as it may at first 
appear. Van Wolferen, for instance, talks about ‘kings without power’ (1990: 27),
the lack of strong political leadership, and a system bereft of a political centre 
(1990: 49). However, this is a ‘system’ which ‘almost always succeeds in bringing
antagonistic groups within its fold’ (1990: 49), indicating a range of different groups
and networks are involved in governance. This is a view of ‘governance from above’
dominated by a hierarchical mode of governance under bureaucratic control – a
view shared by others (Beeson 2003: 32–3). Haley, in contrast, sees the bureaucracy
forced into negotiation and compromise with the politicians, where ‘[c]onsensus
was necessary to achieve compliance and compromise was necessary to achieve
consensus’ (1987: 351). In this view, crucial to the Japanese system of governance
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is ‘a separation of power from authority’ where officials ‘participate in the processes
of governance as mediators, brokers, cajolers, and above all, presiding officials
responsible for bargained-for, negotiated policymaking and implementation by
reciprocal consent’ (Haley 1991: 167). It is a view of governance which is quite
different from governing ‘in any Western sense of the word’ (1991: 167): nego-
tiation, rather than coercive power, is central to the mode of governance practiced
in Japan.
Yet the above views of governance are in danger of placing too much emphasis
on governance by consensus and ignoring the deep political divisions and
contestation in Japanese society. As Stockwin has continued to point out, Japan
remains a ‘divided polity’, as illustrated by the political battles of the 1960s and
early 1970s, the factional clashes within the LDP during the rest of the 1970s, 
and divisions over the response to global pressures in the 1980s (Stockwin 1999:
3–7; 221). In the 1990s, despite the changes engendered by the short-term loss 
of power by the LDP, what emerged was not so much the end of a divided polity,
but divisions engendered by a different coalescence of forces than at a time when
the conservative and progressive forces were at loggerheads. Now, ‘[p]owerful
sectional coalitions, combining political, bureaucratic, commercial, industrial and
even religious interests confront other sectional coalitions made up of different
combinations of similar elements’ (Stockwin 1999: 221). In other words, conflict as
well as consensus are at the basis of governance in Japan, and hence its contested
nature.
What the above suggests is at least a different if not distinctive mode of
governance in Japan, which appears to be more widespread in East Asia (Cheung
and Scott 2003: 13–14), although there is a lack of agreement on the particular
role of politicians and bureaucrats in governing at the national level. This mode 
of governance, with a central role for the state in the economy, has been under
attack from supporters of the market-oriented, liberal model of capitalism. Indeed,
whilst the closed nature of the Japanese political economy and the role of the 
state in the market has been at the heart of criticism by the United States from the
1960s onwards, and reached a peak during the 1980s, when trade conflicts and a
burgeoning trade surplus put the Japanese model under attack, US-led global-
ization has increased pressure for convergence in the mode of governance along
neo-liberal lines.
This has made governance in Japan a point of contestation in terms of 
how to govern the political economy and society at large. Although many in the
LDP have resisted the thrust towards deregulation, privatization and a free-
market model of the economy, a large number of policies supporting neo-liberal
governance have been introduced from the 1980s onwards. Then, with the
economic downturn following the bursting of the bubble at the end of the decade,
the strong, interventionist state at the heart of the ‘economic miracle’ has been
increasingly looked upon as inappropriate for a globalized economy. In this sense,
Johnson’s developmental state is viewed as being in crisis. Instead of the extensive
development characteristic of the developmental state, a more intensive form, 
able to promote growth and maintain international competitiveness, is seen to 
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be necessary in order to revive Japan’s fortunes (Katz 1998: 2003). Whether
American-style capitalism and Silicon-valley type networks of hi-tech entrepreneurs
funded by venture capitalists are the salvation for the Japanese economy or not is
a moot point (Werner 2004), but the domestic champions of reform are clearly
aiming to dismantle many aspects of the developmental state and move in this
direction. In short, economic stagnation has intensified questions about the model
of development and governance Japan should pursue in a globalized political
economy.
Thus, in the mid-1990s, following the administration of Japan New Party 
leader Hosokawa Morihiro, the LDP-dominated Hashimoto Ryūtarō coalition
government and especially the first and second Koizumi Junichirō coalition
governments have pushed ahead with ‘structural reform’ aimed at moving the
political economy in a neo-liberal direction. Indeed, the November 2003 election
was fought and won by Koizumi on the basis of his continuing commitment to
reform. The Democratic Party emerged as the number two party, with many
commentators viewing this as the sign for the future emergence of a two-party
system in Japan. From the perspective of governance, a choice between the norms
of efficiency and equity as the basis for a two-party system seems to be emerging,
with the Koizumi administration seen as the champion of efficiency and the
Democratic Party as the champion of equity. Although a gender analysis illustrates
a more nuanced view of governance than a clear dichotomy between these two
positions, as discussed in Chapter 6, the Koizumi reformist agenda is nevertheless
viewed by critics as an attempt to change the relationship between the state and
the market in favour of the market, whereas the Democratic Party, whilst sup-
portive of the market, seems to place greater emphasis on equitable redistribution:
equality of results over equality of opportunity. Thus, even though pressures from
globalization and support for the norms of neo-liberalism may be driving Japan in
that direction, such forces are being mediated by Japanese political parties,
institutions and practices, thereby limiting the degree of convergence. 
Sites and issues of governance
The above discussion of governance has focused on a review of the modes of
governance especially at the national level in Japan, but the purpose of this book
is to examine governance in the context of Japan’s involvement in global and
regional governance and the Japanese political economy and society more widely.
By focusing on both the sites and issues of governance, moreover, we aim to provide
the reader with a much broader and deeper understanding of the contested nature
of governance in Japan than is presently available.
Thus, although the mode of governance may differ in terms of the sites of
operation (Part I) and issues dealt with (Part II), the contributors provide a fuller
picture of Japanese governance in these terms. Sites of governance may be con-
tested, as when the competency to address a political, economic or social issue 
is located in one site of governance, but the authority, and with it the legitimacy,
to deal with the issue is located in another site of governance; or, indeed, as when
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new issues of governance arise, social and political forces may contest ‘siting’ the
problem as their own (e.g. as a way to gain resources) or someone else’s (e.g. as a
way to avoid responsibility for the problem). 
Issues can be contested, too, in the sense of understanding them as issues 
of governance, rather than say of narrow issues of competency. For instance, 
when the competency to deal with a transborder issue of pollution is ‘sited’ at 
the level of a subnational political authority (city or prefecture), but the authority
and legitimacy to negotiate internationally is ‘sited’ at the level of the state, then
contestation between agents with competency and those with authority and
legitimacy might well ensue: is competency sucked up, to the level of the state; is
authority and legitimacy pushed down, to the subnational level; or, does the site of
competency and the site of authority and legitimacy remain contested, and if so,
what does that tell us about governance in Japan? An interest in questions such as
these explains the structuring of the book in two parts, sites and issues.
Structure of the book
As seen above, Part I of the book focuses on governance in different sites of 
activity and Part II on issues of governance. The first site of activity dealt with is
the metaphorically highest level of global governance, with a particular focus on
Japan’s role in the G7/8 summit. Here Dobson paints a mixed picture of Japanese
activities, with the frequent change of political leaders limiting the effectiveness of
Japan in shaping the mechanisms of G7/8 governance. However, the dominant
image of Japan as a ‘reactive state’ (Calder 1988) does not capture the role policy-
makers have gradually been able to play in the exercise of global governance. We
thus find a more nuanced picture of the part Japan plays in governance in 
this site of activity through an examination of the way policymakers have influenced
the summit process. Not only has Japan sought, albeit not always successfully, to
expand the number and range of participants involved in G7/8 global governance,
‘reaching out’ to other states in East Asia as well as to NGOs, it has similarly
brought issues of East Asian governance to the attention of the G7/8, as in the
discussions revolving around the resolution of the Cambodian conflict during the
1980s.
The next chapter by Hook moves down a level to focus specifically on the 
region as a site of governance in East Asia. What is of interest here is how the 1997
financial and wider economic crisis has influenced the governance of the regional
political economy and finance, and the implications of this for domestic governance
in Japan. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) response to the crisis high-
lights how governance in East Asia is contested, with the IMF set on changing the
domestic governance of the affected economies, eliminating ‘crony capitalism’ and
promoting a neo-liberal mode of governance, despite local sentiment that the crisis
was engendered by the rapid withdrawal of short-term foreign capital. Within
Japan, those forces favouring a market economy are promoting neo-liberal norms
and are working to change domestic governance, using such mechanisms as the
Free Trade Agreement with Singapore to try to erode the power of those resisting
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reform. At the same time, Japanese policymakers have taken steps to maintain an
East Asian model of governance with a central role for the state. Thus, efforts have
been made to promote new sites of regional governance, as in the creation of the
Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three, as well as to institutionalize
new mechanisms of financial governance in the wake of the New Miyazawa
Initiative. In this chapter, too, Japan appears to be actively shaping governance in
this site of activity.
In Chapter 3 Stockwin examines the national level of governance in Japan and
asks why a system that was lauded from the 1950s to the 1980s is now found to be
wanting. There are two different answers to this question: the first places emphasis
on the need for the reform of the system of governance, suggesting that, due to
domestic resistance from supporters of the old system, the sort of root-and-branch
reform needed to revive the economy and enhance global competitiveness has 
not been carried out, partly as a result of weak political leadership from the top. 
In contrast, the second answer finds the problem precisely in tampering with a 
well-tested system: of course, governance under the ‘1955 system’ may not have
been transparent regarding the location of power, as seen in Van Wolferen’s
criticism touched on above, but it did perform relatively well in terms of governance
functions, as seen in the fairly equitable distribution of the economic pie. In the
face of these two contested approaches to national governance, Stockwin advocates
the modernization of the old system in order to maintain its merits, such as the
ability to create and distribute surpluses fairly equitably, but to respond to global
pressures to eliminate the corruption it engendered and to make the system of
governance more transparent. This issue of corruption is returned to in the second
part of the book.
Local governance centring on the political economy of public works and 
pork-barrel politics has been facing increasing criticism from the voters at the local
level in Japan, as Chapter 4 by Lam clearly shows. In the face of governance by
pork, citizen movements have taken political action through the use of referenda,
as in the case of protests against dam construction in Tokushima city. Local
democracy through referenda and the promotion of greater transparency is being
used to challenge public works projects and spur decentralized governance. At the
same time, non-partisan voters at the grassroots level have used their voting power
to upset the local political establishment by electing independent governors, as 
in the case of governor Tanaka Yasuo of Nagano prefecture. These governors 
are mounting a challenge to local pork-barrel politics where political leaders act as
a conduit for public works, thereby stimulating the local economy, and winning
re-election as payback. The contested nature of governance at the local level and
the difficulties faced in seeking to bring about reform is well documented in this
chapter, as seen in the case of Tanaka himself, who has been at loggerheads with
the conservative members of the prefectural assembly. The resulting gridlock has
clearly demonstrated how the forces of resistance remain powerful at the local level
and impede the transformation of the system of governance in Japan. 
Chapter 5 on finance examines how the domestic system of governance is 
being put under increasing pressure to change due to the spread of neoliberal,
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market-oriented economic globalization, on the one hand, and the failure of the
government to stimulate a domestic economic revival following the bursting of 
the ‘bubble economy’ at the end of the 1980s, on the other. As the success of the
Japanese developmental state was based on maintaining domestic barriers to 
full integration into the global economy at the same time as the internationally
competitive corporations took advantage of global markets, such pressure is posing
a fundamental challenge to the governance of the political economy. Cerny argues
that the globalization of finance has put even greater pressure on the developmental
state to move away from the credit-based system of finance at the heart of the
Japanese model towards a market-based system. Whilst there are forces of
resistance to the pressure for change arising from globalization as well as to the
pressure for change brought about by the transformation in the structure of the
domestic political economy, these forces may nevertheless be unable to counter
these global and domestic pressures, especially as internationally competitive
corporations are generally in support of change.
The final chapter in Part I discusses the welfare-employment regime in Japan
and the impact this has on the family as a site of governance in terms of gender
relations and the reproduction of human resources. As Osawa points out, with
Japan facing issues of pension reform, an ageing population, and declining 
birth rates, the division of labour between the sexes is an important issue for the
welfare employment regime. Many now recognize the need to examine the division
of labour based on the ‘male breadwinner model’, that is, the male’s participation
in the labour market and the female’s care for the members of the family through
unpaid labour at home. What the new balance should be between the sexes and
the government and the family, however, is contested. For instance, the Economic
Strategy Council of Japan is keen to move the balance in the direction of neo-
liberal, small government, believing in providing equality of opportunity more than
equality of results. On the other hand, the author, herself the chair of a specialist
committee of the government’s Council for Gender Equality, places more emphasis
on creating a gender neutral society in order to provide women with more choices,
including the choice to be gainfully employed. How the Koizumi administration
deals with these issues will exert a significant impact on the roles men and women
play in the future governance of the domestic political economy.
Part II of the book focuses on key issues in the above sites of governance, 
from the ‘higher’ level site of the globe to the ‘lower’ level site of the family, with
the chapters in the second part ‘talking back’ to the sites of governance in the first
part of the book. To start with, Chapter 7 by Schreurs examines environmental
governance on the global level. What this chapter demonstrates is the Japanese
government’s high degree of involvement in promoting global environmental
governance, unlike in the 1960s when popular action was needed to galvanize
action from a government reluctant to become involved in environmental issues
at all. In the 1990s and early in the twenty-first century, in contrast, environmental
governance is a central plank of Japanese foreign policy and both the government
as well as NGOs are involved in the policymaking process, moving away from the
highly bureaucratic policymaking of the 1980s. What Japanese policymakers have
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achieved over the years is a leadership role in providing official development
assistance (ODA) for the protection of the environment and technology to control
air pollution in especially developing East Asia. Its leadership role in global
environmental governance can also be seen in the promotion of the Kyoto Protocol
on Global Warming, although differences between the Europeans and Americans
on the protection of the environment and the US’s unwillingness to join the
protocol means environmental governance at the international level remains highly
contested. Nevertheless, Japan has sought to bring the two sides closer together,
acting as an ‘international broker’ despite differences within the Japanese bureau-
cracy over how best to implement environmental governance.
Chapter 8 focuses on the issue of migration and foreign residents in Japan,
drawing attention to the way migrants and non-national residents, both ‘old’ Asian
residents from Japan’s imperial past as well as ‘new’ residents from recent immi-
gration, are treated. Hatsuse’s chapter shows how the tension between the needs
of the Japanese economy for labour and those of the state to control immigration
and resident foreigners leads to contradictions in the way the immigration control
regime actually functions as a tool of governance. We thus find the needs of the
Japanese economy for particularly unskilled labour in contest with the needs of 
the state to control immigration. The end result is a system of governance which
leads to foreigners over-staying their visas and becoming ‘illegal’ immigrants. What
happens to the human rights of these illegal as well as legal ‘old’ and ‘new’ foreigners
is a particular point of concern to a range of NGOs in Japan. The position of legal
foreign residents has certainly improved as a result of the Japanese government
joining a number of international human rights regimes, as with the decision to
allow foreigners to live in public housing following the 1978 signing of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but Japan has
still not signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. In this situation, NGOs have
become increasingly important as agents of governance, working to improve the
rights and conditions of foreigners living in Japan.
The following chapter adopts a hermeneutic approach to investigate the
contested issue of corruption in the governance of Japanese national politics. This
approach leads Babb to trace the way corruption has been understood over history,
examining the roots of the different terms used to refer to corrupt behaviour 
and how individual politicians view such ‘corrupt’ acts. What becomes clear from
this analysis is that the general stance of the politicians who discuss the issue is not
to see their own actions as corrupt, but rather as a means to protect weak groups
in Japanese society, who in return provide political support for the politician. 
In short, Chapter 9 illustrates the contested moral stance of those who view the
politicians as corrupt and the morals of the politicians themselves, who view their
action as a perhaps necessary evil to get things done. The contest over what is 
and is not corruption is a particular point of concern in this chapter. Is the case of
pork-barrel public works projects, for instance, systematic corruption, or a means
of redistribution for the rural areas of Japan generating some of the same kinds of
benefits as government policy aimed at supporting the rural population? Whilst
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rejecting cultural relativism, Babb seeks to avoid setting up an unnamed ‘West’ as
somehow morally superior to Japan and examines how these practices are under-
stood by the participants themselves.
Chapter 10 by Gill discusses the issue of Japan’s homeless people as an issue of
governance and illustrates how, despite a dominant image of Japan as a central-
ized state, the national government was unwilling, until the 1990s, to even deal
with the issue, preferring instead to leave it in the hands of sub-national political
authorities: prefectures, cities and local wards. The sheer increase in the number
of homeless people following the bursting of the economic bubble, however, has
meant that the central government has been forced to take action, albeit reluctantly,
making governance of homeless people a contested issue between the local and
national levels, with no one taking overall responsibility – there is no ‘czar’ for the
homeless in Japan. As the issue of homelessness caught popular attention, the
Ministry of Health and Welfare in 2000 adopted a national policy to deal with
homelessness, but this has been implemented by a range of bodies, national as well
as sub-national, with responsibility as diffuse as the different ministries, bureaux,
prefectures, cities and wards involved in taking care of the homeless. The shelters
that have been set up for homeless people do not necessarily respond to their needs,
and they remain few and far between. In this sense, the contest over where to ‘site’
homelessness is likely to remain an outstanding issue between national and local
actors in the governance of homeless people.
Chapter 11 on corporate governance deals with an issue of central concern 
to Japanese companies in an increasingly globalized political economy. Calls for
transparency, the introduction of external monitors, and other mechanisms of
corporate governance based on the Anglo-American model of capitalism are
frequently heard in early twenty-first century Japan. Rather than accept these calls
for the transformation of Japanese companies at face value, however, Hasegawa
seeks to deal with them in the wider context of the need for capitalist rationalization
and the contest between ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘Japanese’ modes of corporate
governance. What this leads him to conclude is that, behind the corporate gov-
ernance rhetoric, Japanese companies have in fact been pursuing large-scale
restructuring. How companies have dealt with this issue is clarified by a number
of case studies from both the manufacturing and service sectors of the economy,
with the former seen as more subject to the pressures of globalization than the latter.
Despite this difference, however, the case studies suggest ‘good governance’ in
Japan is not so much viewed as a question of transparency and the role of external
monitors, as in the Anglo-American type of corporate governance, but rather the
healthy growth and profitability of the company. Given the wider contest between
different models of capitalism, the author concludes that Japanese companies may
not in fact converge along the lines of Anglo-American corporate governance.
The final chapter of Part II examines the governance of the family as an issue
central to the maintenance of a healthy political economy. Casting aside the
premise of the family as a private sphere of activity, Takeda shows how the public/
private spheres are contested, with the governance of the family taking place via
the government and the economy. Chapter 12 illustrates the point by analyzing
Introduction 11
the way the management of the household economy is part of both the macro-
economy of the nation as well as the micro-economy of the family. It provides a
historical as well as contemporary discussion of household management, detailing
the various efforts made by women to survive in different historical situations. 
At a time in the late 1990s and early twentieth century when couples often opt 
not to have off-spring, the low birth rate is forcing the government to rethink the
governance of gender relations and the family in the context of the revival of the
national political economy. What emerges from Takeda’s analysis is not simply a
picture of the way the government intervenes in family affairs, but also the way in
which the family is potentially able to challenge the system of governance and make
decisions on the reproductive activities at the centre of family and economic life.
In this way, Contested Governance in Japan draws on the expertise of both Japanese
and outsiders to present a fuller picture of the different modes, sites and issues of
governance in Japan.
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1 Global governance, the 
G7/8 summit and Japan
Hugo Dobson
This chapter comprises three sections that proceed from the general to the specific.
With reference to the extant literature, the first section establishes a definition of
global governance. With this definition in mind, the second section explores the
changing nature of the G7/8 summit process – from an ad hoc and informal ‘fireside
chat’ of international solons into an incremental, institutionalized, year-long process
of negotiations that serves as one of the many mechanisms of global governance.
It also locates where the G7/8 summit process fits in and functions as one of the
sites of global governance alongside the United Nations (UN), International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and World Trade Organization (WTO). Finally, the third
section explores the Japanese government and its people’s role and contribution in
shaping the structures and mechanisms of global governance, in particular through
the G7/8 as one site of activity.
Global governance: definitions and discourse
During the 1990s, two phrases reached the level of ubiquity in the extant liter-
ature on international relations (IR): globalization and global governance. Despite,
or possible because of, being so widely debated, both terms display a high degree
of definitional fuzziness. The Commission on Global Governance does nothing to
elucidate the confusion surrounding the latter term by stating that ‘[i]t is a broad,
dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving
and responding to changing circumstances’ (Commission on Global Governance
1995) – a definition that is about as easy to pin down as mercury is with a fork. The
‘global’ part of the term does not present too many problems; ‘governance’, in its
broadest sense, has been defined as ‘the sum of the many ways individuals and
institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated 
and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes
empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people
and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest’
(Commission on Global Governance 1995).
However, in spite of appearances, global governance does not refer to the
amplification of a domestic national government to an international level in order
to create a future world government based upon the UN, or any other global
institution. Global governance is, rather, a process in reaction to both the positive
and negative impacts of the decline in state sovereignty and the processes of
globalization. As James Rosenau puts it:
During the present period of rapid and extensive global change, however, 
the constitutions of national governments and their treaties have been 
undermined by the demands and greater coherence of ethnic and other sub-
groups, the globalization of economies, the advent of broad social movements,
the shrinking of political distances by microelectronic technologies, and 
the mushrooming of global interdependencies fostered by currency crises,
environmental pollution, terrorism, the drug trade, AIDS, and a host of trans-
national issues that are crowding the global agenda. These centralizing and
decentralizing dynamics have undermined constitutions and treaties in the
sense that they have contributed to the shifts in the loci of authority.
(Rosenau 1993: 3)
Traditionally, governance has been an attempt to create order out of a system of
anarchy and shape the actions of those governed. Within sovereign state borders,
governments were able to provide this order through governance in a top-down,
hierarchical fashion. Yet, with the opportunities, confusion and chaos created 
by globalization, governments are seen to have failed to provide order both in the
international and domestic spheres. As a gamut of previously marginalized
transnational issues vie for the attention of policymakers, it has become evident
that traditional state structures of governance are unable to cope with this increased
demand and have been forced to: (1) venture into new areas of governance tradi-
tionally outside the remit of the state; (2) outsource responsibilities and duties to a
range of state-centred and non-state organizations; and/or (3) have been usurped
by these actors in the provision of governance. In this light, Rosenau argues that
governance is not synonymous with governments and that ‘it is possible to conceive
of governance – of regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function
effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority’ (Rosenau
1993: 5). Rather than a single, world government borne of the same state-centred
thinking that dominated the discourse of IR in the Cold War period, global gov-
ernance suggests an uneven mesh, or patchwork quilt, of state and non-state,
national and transnational actors seeking a suitable division of labour in addressing
a panoply of issues. Thus, we reach the idea of ‘governance without government’.
Rosenau suggests normatively that ‘given the noxious policies governments pursue
. . . governance without government is in some ways preferable to governments
that are capable of governance’ (Rosenau 1993: 5).
Nevertheless, care should be taken not to underestimate the lingering importance
of traditional sovereign state actors and we may need to regard the appearance of
new actors with suspicion. It is a standard rider in the literature, but the role of the
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state is still crucially important because, more often than not, it is the state to 
which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) direct their appeals and it is the
state that will ultimately implement policy (Sally 2001: 56). Global governance 
only goes so far as to suggest that states’ ability to cope with the issues engendered
by globalization has diminished and provides few guarantees that the policies of
the new actors will be any less ineffective or noxious. As the provision of gover-
nance on a global scale still requires the involvement of traditional state actors 
in addition to international organizations and regimes, social movements and 
non-governmental organizations, transnational organizations and corporations, a
more accurate (although clumsy) sound bite may be ‘governance not only with
government’.
The G7/8
The G7/8 is one of many sites and mechanisms in this constantly evolving mesh
of global governance and the focus now turns to an exploration of exactly what
kind of entity the G7/8 is and how it contributes to the provision of global gover-
nance – a question far from readily agreed upon in the extant literature. The G7/8
first met as the G6 (France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom [UK], United States
[US] and West Germany) in November 1975 at the château of Rambouillet in
France. This first meeting found its origins in an informal meeting of the French,
German, UK and US finance ministers in the White House library in March 1973,
later joined by Japan, to discuss the state of the international monetary system
(Smyser 1993: 15–16). The impetus behind the meeting at Rambouillet was ‘to
recreate at the highest level the same sort of direct and informal exchange’ (Hunt
and Owen 1984: 658). Unlike traditional international organizations, which are
the result of an international agreement or formal treaty, the G7/8 was ostensibly
intended as an impromptu, never-to-be-repeated, informal meeting in reaction to
both the 1973 oil crisis and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates. However, the realization of this forum’s utility as a unique meeting
place for the world’s leaders led to a second conference being held in San Juan,
Puerto Rico in June 1976 at which Canada was added to form the G7. Since that
time, other members, with varying levels of status, have joined – the European
Community (EC)/European Union (EU) participated from May 1977 at London,
and Russia’s position has evolved from guest in 1991 through a range of statuses
to a fully enfranchized member of the G8 by 2003. In tandem, the remit of
discussion at the summit has expanded from chiefly economic issues to encompass
political issues. In addition, the composition of summit delegations has developed
from the original idea of solely the leaders, accompanied by foreign and finance
ministers, to embrace regular ministerial-level meetings on education, employment,
energy, the environment, justice and trade. As a result, the administration and
preparation for the annual summit, directed by the leaders’ personal represen-
tatives, or sherpas, in turn supported by sous-sherpas, who meet regularly during the
year preceding a summit, has led to an ever-increasing bureaucratic load that has
become one of the main rods with which to beat the summit process over recent
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years. Yet, this has also led to a reconsideration of the purpose of the summit process
and numerous calls to return to the simplicity of informal meetings of prime
ministers and presidents (Whyman 1995).
The G7/8 is neither an international organization in the traditionally understood
sense, nor does it display the characteristics of a fully formed institution. It does not
possess any of the ‘clear organizational centers’ of institutions. No permanent
headquarters, flag, elected executive head, means of enforcement or secretariat to
provide administrative support, and attempts to provide any degree of formality
or bureaucracy have been strongly resisted (Hajnal 1999: 1; Hodges 1999: 69).
Bayne has even gone so far as to state that ‘[t]he G7 summit is at the same time an
institution and an anti-institution’ (Bayne 1995: 494). Nevertheless, an instructive
precedent for understanding the nature of the summit does exist in the form of 
the Concert of Europe that was utilized to varying degrees as part of great power
diplomacy from the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of the First
World War: both are extemporaneous groupings borne of crisis; both are founded
on agreed principles – the Concert emphasized the right of the great powers to
intervene in the affairs of smaller states, whilst the G7/8 has reiterated in its com-
muniqués its own principles, chiefly the promotion of democracy and the free
market economy; both are able to address broader issues in an iterative fashion 
but also capable of adding issues of the day to the agenda; both are groupings
flexible and amorphous enough to respond to changes in the balance of power;
both emphasize the role of the individual and their success depends upon the ability
and cooperation of the individuals involved; both groupings only work when core
national interests are sacrificed or left untouched; both essentially preserve the right
of the powerful – in 2001 the summit members accounted for roughly two-thirds
of global gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank 2002) – to take decisions on
behalf of the rest of the world.
In this light, the G7/8 clearly represents a point at which actors’ expectations
converge over a given issue – an attempt to navigate through the choppy waters 
of an increasingly globalized world and provide ‘the control tower of global
governance’ (gurōbaru gabanansu no shireitō ) (Takase 2000: 176). It seeks to set the
agenda, tone or mood for global governance whilst conscious of its position in
relation to other mechanisms of global governance. If anything it is the international
community’s mouthpiece, a global catalyst and consciousness-raiser, and ultimately
the world’s biggest think-tank. In other words:
The G7/8 is a forum, rather than an institution. It is useful as a closed
international club of capitalist governments trying to raise consciousness, set
an agenda, create networks, prod other institutions to do things that they
should be doing, and, in some cases, to help create institutions that are suited
to a particular task.
(Hodges 1999: 69)
Thus, the G7/8’s position in the patchwork quilt of global governance can only 
be truly understood in relation to other institutions and mechanisms of global
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governance. The G7/8 recognizes ‘that strong and effective international insti-
tutions . . . help . . . to resolve the tensions of globalization, between domestic and
international pressures’ (Bayne 1995: 500), and it was to this end that French
President Jacques Chirac proposed inviting the executive heads of the UN, IMF,
World Bank and WTO to the 1996 Lyon Summit (Bayne 2001: 5).
The main diplomatic tool and mouthpiece of the summit used to coordinate
these institutions is the summit communiqué and related documents (for a detailed
review of the summit’s promotion of international organizations through com-
muniqués and declarations, see Hajnal 1999: 45–55). For example, the work of the
UN has been repeatedly praised and encouraged in the final summit communiqués,
which have sought to galvanize its functions by encouraging: (1) reform of its
institutions (Bayne 2000: 125); (2) the evolution of a concerted anti-terrorist policy
(Belelieu 2002); and (3) preventive diplomacy and its peacekeeping functions
(Inoguchi 1994: 27–8). In addition to this ‘gentle prodding’, the G7/8 has replaced
the UN at times as the international institution of choice. It was the G8, not the
UN, which played a central role in coordinating Germany and Japan’s financial
support of the Gulf War of 1991, in addition to ending the Kosovo conflict of 1999.
Furthermore, it has been argued that the G7/8 is more representative than the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) due to the inclusion of Germany and Japan (Smyser
1993: 19–20). However, rather than being a zero-sum game, the G7/8 and the
UN can be seen to complement each other – the G7/8 was intended to provide
an opportunity for national leaders to meet informally and discuss chiefly economic
issues; whereas the UNSC is a highly formalized meeting of ambassadors concerned
chiefly with security issues. In this light, proposals have been put forward for a
much closer dialogue between the members of the two groupings.
Equally, the G7/8 has sought to promote both the work of and coordination
with other international institutions. At the 1995 Naples Summit and the 1996
Halifax Summit, the summit agenda focused on international financial issues and
recommended a number of reforms in the functioning of the IMF, especially in
early-warning mechanisms, and the World Bank, in particular the concentration
of resources on poorer countries. Within the framework of the G7/8, institutional
depth is also evident: for instance, a significant achievement was the creation of the
Group of 20 finance ministers and central bank governors (G20) in September 1999
as a permanent grouping including several important developing countries to
address financial and monetary reform in cooperation with the IMF and World
Bank (Kirton 2001a). This again suggests that the G7/8 has not eclipsed other
international institutions, but rather created a mutually reinforcing division of
labour, and that G7/8 member states have sought ‘to protect the existing system
and make it work better’ rather than pursue radical reform (Putnam and Bayne
1984: 141). To this end, the G7/8 has unwaveringly supported the work of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO by: (1) regularly
emphasizing in its communiqués the rapid conclusion of ongoing (or the inception
of new) multilateral trade negotiations – an issue the Japanese government and its
people have been particularly supportive of; and (2) creating the Trade Ministers’
Quadrilateral (more commonly known as the ‘Quad’) at the 1981 Ottawa Summit
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to meet three to four times a year. These initiatives have been credited with some
success, particularly in exerting pressure on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
(Hajnal 1999: 35; Bayne 2001: 11). In addition, formal and informal techniques
have been used to link the G7/8 with the OECD, the most salient example being
the practice from 1976 of holding the OECD Council just prior to the annual
summit meeting (Bayne 2000: 53–4).
Regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the Organization of American States (OAS), have also taken up the
guidance and political will displayed by the G7/8 in combating issues, such as
terrorism (Belelieu 2002: 24–5). Other participants brought into the summit process
have included business groups such as the International Chamber of Commerce,
the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and the Trade Union Advisory
Committee of the OECD (Bayne 2000: 217). Moreover, not only state actors but
also the participation of NGOs has been sought. At the 1995 Halifax Summit, the
G7 recognized the importance of both an active civil society and the NGOs that
constitute it, and thereafter instituted a policy of ‘outreach’ to include these groups.
This interest has been reciprocated and the 1998 Birmingham Summit was billed
by Jubilee 2000 (an NGO dedicated to resolving debt issues in developing nations)
as the People’s Summit in an attempt to construct a system of global governance
from the bottom up, rather than from the top down.
What the G7/8 does best is offer a blueprint for global governance through 
its communiqués and declarations in order ‘to provide political will and direc-
tion’ (Hunt and Owen 1984: 659), and thereafter delegates to more traditional
international institutions to furnish the necessary specialization and implemen-
tation. Ultimately, most observers seem to agree that that the G7/8 represents 
‘a recognition of the growing need for coordination of policy and behavior on a
number of fronts’ (Falk 1995: 216–17). If the formal institutions of global
governance can be regarded as spinning plates, the G7/8 is best thought of as the
showman who keeps them all spinning in unison.
Japan and the G7/8
The G7/8 has completed four cycles of seven summits, each hosted by the original
seven member states – France, the US, the UK, Germany, Japan, Italy and
Canada. In 2002, the fourth cycle of rotation came to an end and in June 2003 
the fifth cycle began at Evian-les-Bains in France, the instigator of the original 
G7 meeting. However, this time Russia is factored into the cycle and is scheduled
to host its first summit in 2006. Not only through directly hosting of the summit,
but also through regular participation since its inception, the Japanese government
has been in a position to contribute to both the functioning of the G7/8 process
specifically and global governance in general, although it has not always instru-
mentalized this position effectively. The purpose of the remainder of this chapter
is not to examine the importance of the summit to Japan or the economic, political
and social issue-areas it has promoted or addressed in this forum, as has been the
focus of much research (Sakurada 1988; Saitō 1990; Inoguchi 1994; Watanabe
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1999; Katada 2001; Dobson 2004a). It can be taken for granted that the G7/8 is
important to the Japanese government in providing both access to a high-level,
multilateral grouping, and recognition of its position as one of the contemporary
great powers. Rather, the focus is placed upon Japan’s contribution to the structure
and functioning of the summit as a site of global governance. Sir Nicholas Bayne,
the master grader of G7/8 summits, has annually evaluated the success of each
summit using the following criteria: leadership, effectiveness, durability, accept-
ability and consistency. In this light, the factors considered here as facilitating 
the successful functioning of the summit process are: membership as a means of
securing legitimacy; leadership through the participating personnel; the ability to
set a relevant summit agenda; the efforts made as chair and host nation to ensure
a successful summit; and compliance with the G7/8’s pronouncements as a
manifestation of their effectiveness and acceptability.
Membership
Membership of the summit, alongside the remit of its agenda, is one of the core
issues that divides opinion on the merits and legitimacy of the summit process. The
non-invitation of Canada, Italy and Japan (despite being G7 members) to the
special Guadeloupe summit of January 1979 to discuss European security issues
demonstrates the sensitivity and pride that goes with membership of this executive
club (The Japan Times, 16 January 1979; Putnam and Bayne 1987: 104–5). Thus,
the current and future issue commanding attention is whether to expand the
number of participants. Many regard an expanded G7/8 as a betrayal of the
original spirit of the summit that it should be an informal forum for discussion
between the top political leaders (Bayne 1995; Weilemann 2000: 19). As touched
upon above, the summit was intended to be a ‘personal encounter of the leaders
of the world’s most powerful economies’ (Bayne 2001: 3). Others bemoan its
exclusivity and regard expansion of the membership as a necessary condition to
providing legitimacy and effective global governance (Smyser 1993). To this end,
Russia and China’s membership have been most controversial, but also the
participation of middle powers like Australia and representatives of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), such as Indonesia, have been discussed, in addition to
the potential role of business groups and civil society.
G7/8 leaders are wary of expanding the membership of the summit and
membership has been contested for fear that its meaning and utility will be diluted
and the process will end up replicating the UN. Yet they have sought to supplement
the core membership by sporadically inviting specific representatives. To this 
end, the Japanese government was extremely supportive of including Canada to
form the G7 at the 1976 San Juan Summit, having given the Canadian government
a detailed report of discussions at Rambouillet the previous year (Kirton 1998:
306–7). Furthermore, it has actively used its position as chair and host of the summit
to sponsor the participation of other Asia-Pacific states, namely Australia and
Indonesia in the Tokyo Summits of 1979 and 1993 respectively, and China, India,
Indonesia and South Korea in the Okinawa Summit of 2000. Coupled with the
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encouragement extended to NGOs to participate, this has been cast as part of the
policy of ‘outreach’ to non-G8 countries as outlined in the Okinawa Communiqué
(Kojima 2001: 102). Although in many of these cases it was ultimately frustrated
and had to shape a compromise, this is one aspect of the Japanese government’s
greater objective of attempting to use its position in the summit to ‘bat’ for Asia
and promote wider ‘Asian issues’.
The Japanese government’s attempts to invite Australia to the 1979 Tokyo
Summit were met with European opposition. In the case of Indonesia, Japanese
policymakers responded to a request from President Kemusu Argamulja Suharto
to attend the 1993 Tokyo Summit (Eguchi 1993: 42–3); but similarly in the end
capitulated to European protests and invited Suharto, as chair of the NAM, not to
the summit itself but to a pre-summit meeting on 5 July 1993 with President Bill
Clinton and Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi at which he expressed dissatisfaction
with the progress of the Uruguay Round and the G7’s handling of debt relief (Far
Eastern Economic Review, 15 July 1993; Kirton and Kokotsis 1997–8: 52).
In the case of China, the Japanese government used the 1989 Paris Summit 
in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre in order to prevent China’s
isolation from the international community through overly severe sanctions (Takagi
1995). Prior to the Okinawa Summit, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō declared that
‘China is a major power in Asia and therefore I would like to have China’s voice
reflected in the summit’ (Kirton 2001b: 189). To this end, a concerted effort along-
side German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was made to approach the Chinese
government. On the Japanese part, this effort to invite China either officially or
unofficially was led by government coalition partner and Kōmeitō leader Kanzaki
Takenori (The Japan Times, 16 February 2000). Yet, despite debate as to the pros
and cons of inviting China to join (Hajnal 1999: 30–2), the Chinese leadership
demonstrated little interest in an invitation as demonstrated in its rejection of the
proposed wording of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) statement welcoming 
the successful conclusion of the Okinawa Summit (Soeya 2000). Eventually, the
Japanese government was keen not to alienate any of its summit partners by
unilaterally inviting China and the issue was dropped.
There are three crucial problems in embracing Chinese participation: (1) the
democratic principles of the G7/8 would be compromised as within the G7/8
‘there is a deep, tacit consensus that China does not play by the rules of democ-
racy and free trade’ (Kirton and Kokotsis 1997–8: 51); (2) the existence of other
candidates with economic clout and democratic systems that are able to provide
deeper regional coverage in the summit’s membership and, therefore, legitimacy
(for example, Brazil or India); and (3) the G7/8 has never expelled or downgraded
a member state and it is unclear how it would go about doing so if, say, an incident
similar to the Tiananmen Square massacre were to occur. However, at the outset
of the fifth cycle of summitry, China’s traditionally antagonistic attitude towards
the summit process began to alter. Chinese President Hu Jintao was extended, and
readily accepted, an invitation to participate in an enlarged dialogue meeting
between the leaders of G8 and developing nations on the first day of the 2003 Evian
Summit. Although this limited participation was officially welcomed by the
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Japanese government, China’s possible full participation in the G8 and the creation
of a future G9 pose a number of additional problems to those mentioned above
and could threaten Japan’s traditional role of representing Asia (Dobson 2004b).
A similar contradiction can be witnessed in the Japanese government’s attempts
to include a variety of other participants in the summit process. On the one hand,
the Japanese government has introduced a number of successful initiatives: for
example, arranging a meeting before the 2000 Okinawa Summit in Tokyo between
most G7/8 leaders, representatives of the World Bank, World Health Organization
(WHO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the leaders of a
range of developing countries (Bayne 2001: 14; Kojima 2001: 102). Equally, whilst
preparing the information technology (IT) agenda for this summit, the Japanese
government enlisted the participation of a number of multinational corporations
and Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō held a roundtable discussion with international
business leaders in Tokyo three days prior to the summit (Bayne 2001: 14; Ullrich
2001: 235). Finally, at this summit the opinions of a range of NGOs were sought
and the government constructed an NGO centre to provide these groups with
necessary facilities, symbolic of the first time that the importance of NGOs had
been recognized by the host prime minister. Both NGOs and businesses were
involved in the follow-up to the summit including the creation of a Digital Oppor-
tunities Taskforce (DOT force) to address the ‘digital divide’, another task force on
renewable energy and a programme to combat infectious diseases (Bayne 2001:
15). Thus, the Japanese government has recognized that governance cannot simply
be furnished by the most developed economies and has sought to supplement their
efforts through a policy of ‘outreach’ to the governmental and non-governmental
institutions that constitute the patchwork quilt of global governance.
However, on the other hand, the sincerity of the Japanese government’s attempts
to ‘reach out’ has been doubted. In particular, its management of the above-
mentioned NGO centre was characterized as coercive. The centre was under-used
possibly because it was a considerable distance from the press centre from which
the NGOs were barred, cost ¥10,000 (US$91) per NGO to use, and involved regis-
tration procedures such as submitting individual photographs and registering
individuals’ details such as address and height, implying Japanese government
surveillance (The Japan Times, 25 July 2000; Toyoda 2000: 21). Moreover, many of
the preparatory meetings conducted in the run-up to a summit with various groups,
especially the opposition parties, have been cosmetic and perfunctory at best.
Furthermore, the Japanese government has also sought actively at times to limit
membership of the summit. In the 1990s, it came close to alienating its G7/8
partners over the issue of the reconstruction of the former Soviet Union after initial
reluctance to extend aid to Russia and include it as a summit member; Japan was
even cited as the major obstacle to G7 support for President Boris Yeltsin by
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (Miyashita 2001: 51). On the one hand,
the Japanese position was that ‘Russia is not an advanced economy [and should
not join the G7]’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1992). On the other hand, the
Japanese government would not contemplate extending either aid or summit
membership to Russia until the Northern Territories’ dispute had been resolved
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(the Northern Territories are a group of islands – Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan
and Habomai – off the northern tip of Hokkaidō occupied by the Soviet Union 
in the last days of the Second World War, see deVillafranca 1993; Kimura and
Welch 1998). Thus, although a policy of ‘outreach’ is, in general, clearly visible,
the Japanese government has not been consistent in realizing this key strategy for
legitimizing the summit process.
Personnel
Let me just quickly – because I know time is important – point something out.
Sitting at that table in this Summit were the representatives – the heads of state
– of nations that not too many years ago were deeply engaged in a hatred-
filled war with each other. And here we are, sitting as closely as we’re sitting
with a really warm, personal friendship that had developed between us, but
more than that, with a friendship between our peoples.
(Ronald Reagan after the 1983 Williamsburg Summit 
(quoted in Hajnal 1989: 250))
The connection between the role of the individual, fostering an esprit de corps,
and the successful outcome of the summit is probably more amplified in the G7/8
process than in any other mechanism of global governance. However, as mentioned
above, the steady institutionalization of the summit process led to an expansion 
in its remit and participation that, in the eyes of some, compromised the original 
goal of the summit process: the creation of an informal and intimate forum for
policy coordination. In an attempt to streamline the work of the summit and 
return it to these roots, at the 1998 Birmingham Summit UK Prime Minister Tony
Blair separated the ministerial meetings from the leaders’ meeting and was widely
applauded for focusing the minds of the summit leaders on that year’s agenda. The
Japanese government continued this trend in 2000 when the foreign ministers’
meeting took place in Miyazaki, the finance ministers’ meeting in Fukuoka, and
the leaders’ meeting in Okinawa.
However, within a concert-like mechanism of global governance as heavily
personalized as the summit, both having to conduct diplomacy in a foreign lan-
guage and the domestic political system of Japan – with its emphasis on consensus
and the kind of political leaders thereby selected – have tended to exert a negative
influence on the Japanese government’s ability to play a proactive role at the
summit. The Japanese government, like the German government, has added to
the increasing number of personnel involved in the summit by dispatching its trade
minister on occasions to accompany the finance minister. In addition, the nature
of factional politics in Japan (and coalition politics in Germany) has been suggested
as one reason why solely the prime minister, without attending ministers, was not
invited to the summit in the first place and, thus, the summit process expanded in
remit. Another way in which Japan has inadvertently contributed to the expanded
number of personnel involved in summitry is through the high turnover rate of
Japanese prime ministers compared to other countries. Admittedly, Japan has been
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more unfortunate than other states in the longevity of its leaders – both Prime
Minister Ōhira Masayoshi and Obuchi passed away not long before summit
meetings (Foreign Minister Ōkita Saburō replaced Ōhira only ten days before the
1980 Venice Summit, whereas Mori was in place more than two months before
the 2000 Okinawa Summit). Yet this is problematic in that the summit was
intended to be an intimate forum. In contrast to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
who attended sixteen summits from Williamsburg (1983) to Birmingham (1998),
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro holds the Japanese record by attending a total
of five consecutive summits from Williamsburg (1983) to Venice (1987). During
this time a level of camaraderie was created amongst the world leaders due in 
part to his active participation and the perception of him as the least Japanese 
of Japanese prime ministers (Saitō 1990: 80). It is this consistency in personnel 
that has been widely credited with facilitating any successful working of the 
summit process (Bergsten and Henning 1996: 78–9). However, both before 
and after Nakasone and up until the end of the millennium, the Japanese prime
minister was regarded as a transient figure, ‘the odd man out, tongue-tied if not
completely speechless’, on the sidelines of the official summit photograph (Hook 
et al. 2001: 19).
Another obstacle to successful participation in the summit from the Japanese
point of view has been the language barrier. The lingua franca of the summit is 
first and foremost English, and thereafter French. One Japanese newspaper
speculated with reference to the Guadeloupe Summit that ‘[i]f our Prime Minister
[Fukuda Takeo] had attended this conference wearing a polo shirt, he would have
had to discuss the whole range of world problems in English, with only a notebook
or two in his hands. It is easy to imagine what would have happened. Perhaps it
was fortunate that he had not been invited’ (The Japan Times, 16 January 1979).
Furthermore, Fukuda Takeo described participation at the 1978 Bonn Summit as
‘a trying experience . . . [and] . . . not as easy an exercise in diplomacy for him 
as it must have been for his colleagues from America and Europe’ (The Japan 
Times, 16 January 1979). Miyazawa Kiichi stands out as the exception due to his
proficiency in English, and possibly Nakasone Yasuhiro having used French at the
summit in conversation with French President François Mitterand.
Although this is an accurate representation up to a point, there is one way in
which participating Japan delegations have demonstrated consistency in their
personnel; namely, most Japanese prime ministers have attended the summit before
at the ministerial level. Take the example of Miyazawa Kiichi again, who attended
the first summits in Rambouillet (1975) and San Juan (1976) as foreign minister,
then the Venice (1987) and Toronto (1988) summits as finance minister, Munich
(1992) and Tokyo (1993) as prime minister, and then Cologne (1999) and Okinawa
(2000) as finance minister again. Few of the western participants can boast such 
a veteran of the summit process. Other individuals have attended a number of
summits in various capacities, for example Hashimoto Ryūtarō (seven times),
Takeshita Noboru (six times) and Abe Shintarō (five times). Moreover, in June
2004, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō attended his fourth summit at the Sea
Island resort in the US and looks set to equal, if not better, Nakasone’s record.
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More importantly for the G7/8, in the new millennium it has achieved an
unprecedented level of consistency in its membership with only one change (Paul
Martin replacing Jean Chrétien as Canadian prime minister) since the 2001 Genoa
Summit.
Agenda-setting
As regards the agenda of each summit and its expansion into political affairs, the
Japanese government was initially reluctant to see the summit used in this way; for
example, it contested the discussion of terrorism at the 1978 Bonn Summit (Belelieu
2002: 10). Nevertheless, this attitude has been shed over the years and often as the
host nation the Japanese government has shown the ability and influence to
promote topical and relevant issues or policies in regional, international and
bilateral terms.
In particular, the Japanese government has specifically set out to bring Asian
issues to the attention of the international community and the prime minister of
the day has regularly visited other Asian leaders prior to the summit in order to
sound them out as to the topics they wish to see discussed. Thus, a number of ‘Asian
issues’ credited to Japan’s insistence have regularly appeared in the final com-
muniqués, political declarations or chairman’s summaries issued by the summit:
Indo-Chinese refugees were discussed at the 1979 Tokyo Summit and the 1980
Venice Summit; Cambodia was a regular topic at the 1981 Ottawa, 1988 Toronto
and 1989 Paris Summits; the importance of the Asian Pacific region was stressed
at the 1986 Tokyo Summit; aid to the Philippines and the hosting of a successful
Olympic Games in South Korea were called for at the 1988 Toronto Summit; 
in the aftermath of the East Asian economic and financial crisis of 1997, Japan
promoted a new international financial architecture (Katada 2001); and deep
concern was expressed over North Korea’s nuclear programme at the 1999
Cologne Summit. In addition, the Japanese government has acted as more than a
simple mouthpiece and has sought to connect the summit process more closely with
the region. Thus, Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao succeeded in persuading US
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to jointly attend an ASEAN dialogue meeting after
the 1979 Tokyo Summit (Saitō 1990: 64–5).
At the 2004 Sea Island Summit and with the focus placed on Iraq, Japan’s role
as a ‘bridge’ between regions was expanded to embrace the Middle East. Regarded
by representatives of the region as ‘ . . . the only [G8] leader who can listen to the
opinions of both the United States and the Arab World’ (International Herald
Tribune/The Asahi Shimbun 4 June 2004), Koizumi successfully inserted expressions
of respect for ‘uniqueness’ and ‘diversity’ in the G8’s statement on social and
economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MOFA 2004).
The Japanese government has also attempted to demonstrate its commitment
and contribution to international society more broadly through shaping the G8’s
agenda. Okinawa was, for better or worse, remembered as the IT summit that tried
to address the ‘digital divide’ – a personal proposal of Obuchi before his sudden
death, and subsequently taken up by his successor Mori. However, this did not go
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to plan. Despite the efforts mentioned above to embrace NGOs, their reaction was
not wholly positive to the results of the Okinawa Summit and the NGO Jubilee
2000 symbolically burned a laptop computer in protest at the perceived vacuity 
of the IT-led agenda, the lack of attention paid to debt issues in the developing
world, and the cost of the summit, stating that: ‘ . . . the Japanese misjudged 
public opinion. They thought information technology was a sexy new theme 
for the year 2000’ (The Gazette, 23 July 2000). Despite the opprobrium heaped 
upon the Japanese government, the digital opportunity task force initiative was
followed through at subsequent summits, in similar fashion to Nakasone’s Human
Frontier Science Programme announced at the 1987 Venice Summit, and has been
accorded a degree of praise.
Finally, the Japanese government has demonstrated a readiness to instru-
mentalize the G7/8 as a multilateral site to promote bilateral issues, although
ultimately with little success. Although its G7 colleagues responded to Japanese
lobbying and expressed support for the rapid resolution of the above-mentioned
Northern Territories’ dispute at three consecutive summits (Houston 1990, London
1991 and Munich 1992), the bilateral territorial dispute remained the thorn in the
side of Russo-Japanese relations. Undeterred, at the 2003 and 2004 summits, the
Japanese government continued to instrumentalize this multilateral forum to secure
successfully G8 support for another intrinsically bilateral issue: the resolution 
of the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by the North Korean government (see
Dobson 2004a: 84–96; Dobson 2004b).
Hosting
After the ‘battle of Seattle’ at the WTO meeting in December 1999 and the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, providing security for the summit and the choice of venue have
become increasingly important. The Japanese government has always taken its
hosting of the summit very seriously as a sign of its commitment to international
society and it has been credited by the University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group
as the only host of consistently successful summits (Dobson 2004a: 180–1). Japan’s
ability in hosting the summit has been captured in a diplomatic quip that rather
than rotating the summit venue every year, Japan should simply be allowed to host
it every year (The Financial Times, 23 July 2000). This importance of the summit to
Japan was manifested in the fierce resistance displayed by Hashimoto in reaction
to Yeltsin’s attempt at the 1998 Birmingham Summit to wrest the role of host for
the 2000 summit from Japan (Bayne 2000: 155). The domestic impact of the
summit is also significant and the impact of a successful summit upon a prime
minister’s electoral chances has never been underestimated. Thus, being seen in
the eyes of both the Japanese electorate and the world to have hosted a successful
summit, more than promoting the summit as an effective and central mechanism
of global governance, is a strong motivation for the Japanese government.
Japan has hosted four summits, three in Tokyo (1979, 1986 and 1993) and one
in Okinawa (2000). Okinawa is the exception and deserves greater attention as this
summit ‘ . . . was in retrospect more notable for the fact that it was held in Nago
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[City, Okinawa] than for anything it decided’ (McCormack and Yonetani 2000).
Despite being regarded as a clear outsider in the bidding for the host venue due to
the lack of infrastructure and the difficulty in providing security (it should be
remembered that rocket attacks by left-wing Japanese radicals on US military bases
and the summit venue itself had taken place at previously Japanese-hosted summits
in 1986 and 1993), Okinawa was eventually chosen at the end of April 1999,
allegedly as the personal preference of Obuchi (The Japan Times, 29 April 1999). It
has been argued that Okinawa was chosen as a potent reminder of both the Second
World War and Japan’s diversity, a chance to publicize the inequitable burden
shouldered by the prefecture in hosting the continuing presence of US bases in a
post-Cold War world, a geo-political crossroads of Asia illustrative of Japan’s role
in the region, and finally as an attempt to expedite the issue of the relocation of the
US airbase in Futenma and quash any opposition (Yonetani 2001).
One result of choosing Okinawa was that extra expense was incurred to the tune
of ¥81.4 billion (US$750 million) in order to provide the island with the infra-
structure to host an international summit. Thus, the Okinawa Summit became 
the most expensive summit in the history of the process, roughly 100 times more
expensive than its predecessor, the 1999 Cologne Summit. Preparations included
the construction of a new conference centre, a press centre, and the above-
mentioned NGO centre. The cost of the summit and the heavy security presence
came in for a great deal of criticism as did Mori’s pre-summit gaffes and these issues
tended to overshadow the content of the summit’s discussions and final commu-
niqué. In addition to the expense, the Okinawa Summit was characterized by 
a high degree of festivity: a competition to design the summit’s logo made open to
the public, a new ¥2000 banknote carrying an image of Shuri Castle located in
Naha, the penning of a summit theme song for the first time and an unnecessary
focus upon the food to be served at the formal summit banquets (Abe 2000;
Nishikawa 2000). All this served only to trivialize the summit into nothing more
than a frivolity in the eyes of some observers and thereby soil its reputation as an
effective mechanism of global governance.
Compliance
Compliance with G7/8 statements and pledges is one indicator of the influence 
of the summit process and has the effect of legitimizing its work. With specific
reference to the Okinawa Summit, a cartoon in a Japanese newspaper hinted at
the difficulties Mori might encounter in honouring pledges made at the summit by
depicting him as a mountaineer finding the way down from the summit peak more
difficult than the ascent (Asahi Shimbun, 25 July 2000). However, in the aftermath
of this summit, a number of meetings of G8 and non-G8 members were held before
the end of the year in both Tokyo and Okinawa to promote the discussions con-
ducted and pledges made at the summit on the ‘digital divide’, disposal of Russian
weapons-grade plutonium, drugs, infectious diseases and transnational organized
crime, helping to make Okinawa ‘the most credible G7/8 summit ever held’
(Kirton et al. 2002: 269).
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In more general terms, the Japanese delegation has never threatened to walk 
out of the summit as the French did over multilateral trade negotiations at the 
1985 Bonn Summit (Sakurada 1988: 102). According to the G8 Research Group,
Japan’s performances in the summit from 1996 to 2002 have been averaged as 
a ‘B plus’, ranking it above Italy and Russia and on a par with Canada, the EU,
France, Germany, the UK, and the US (G8 Research Group 2004: 219). In
addition, Japan’s level of compliance with G7/8 pledges has been rated as a
middling power. Its level of compliance in the G7 from 1975 to 1989 was rated at
26.2 per cent – ranked fifth out of the seven summit members, above France and
the US and below the average compliance score of 30.7 per cent. From 1996 to
2001, its level of compliance had risen to 48 per cent – still ranked fifth out of the
now eight summit members, above France, Germany and Russia, but also above
the average compliance score of 45 per cent (Kirton et al. 2002: 272). Although
Japan lost ground to France in the compliance assessments after the 2003 Evian
Summit, this can be understood as France responding actively to its role as host,
and Japan’s continued role as a middling power in terms of upholding G8 pledges
is still evident (Kirton and Kokotsis 2004: 3).
Conclusion
As Fred Halliday argues, the pressing question is how our systems of global
governance can be made ‘more effective, more just, and more responsive to 
the changing international situation’ (Halliday 2000: 19). In light of this question
and what we know about the G7/8’s position as a site of governance in this
patchwork quilt of global governance, what has the Japanese government done to
facilitate its effective functioning? As regards the legitimacy of the summit as
manifested in its membership, the Japanese government has attempted to ‘reach
out’ and include a variety of state and non-state actors from Japan and East Asia
in line with the broadening range of actors involved in the provision of global
governance. However, as seen above, in the case of the NGOs that constitute civil
society, the degree of sincerity has been questioned; and, in the case of Russian
participation, a long-running bilateral dispute, rather than the international public
good, meant the participation was contested. As regards fostering intimacy amongst
summit personnel – almost akin to a founding principle of the summit process 
– the Japanese government, hampered by regularly changing prime ministers, 
has contributed little to the intended camaraderie of summit proceedings. In 
fact, in a forum where the role of the executive head is pivotal, Japan has been
decidedly handicapped despite a few notable exceptions. As regards agenda-setting,
Japan has been more successful in responding to an East Asian norm, ‘batting’ 
for the region at the summit and introducing an expanded range of timely and
pressing issues for the summit’s consideration. As regards hosting the summit, it
has been stated that the Japanese government ‘considers staging a successful summit
to be a matter of such national pride that the event has assumed remarkable
domestic political significance . . . ’ (The Financial Times, 24 July 2000). This,
alongside a mixture of individual actors’ preferences and East Asian, bilateral and
Global governance, the G7/8 summit and Japan 31
internationalist norms, shaped the decision to hold the summit in Okinawa. Yet,
as a result of near obsession with hosting a successful summit the Japanese govern-
ment has done a great deal, with Okinawa as emblematic, to reinforce the image
of the summit as a moribund political show, and very little to communicate the
achievements and meaning of the summit to the world as an important mechanism
of global governance. Finally, as regards compliance, the Japanese government 
has demonstrated the importance it places on the G7/8 through a middling, but
increasing, willingness and ability to honour its summit pledges.
In its thirtieth year, the summit process is now an established and central mech-
anism of global governance. At the 2004 Sea Island Summit a record-breaking
number of commitments, mandates and funding projects were announced. In short,
the summit appears to be in good health. It has been argued that within the G7/8,
‘both Japan and Canada have shared a strong interest in having it and its associated
institutions develop as the primary instrument through which to pursue their foreign
policy priorities and to shape international order’ (Kirton 1998: 292, emphasis
added). However, notwithstanding the unique and important position the G7/8
occupies in Japan’s foreign policy, it is unlikely to ever assume a position of primacy.
Equally, although Japan’s commitment to the summit process is much clearer than,
say, the fickle relationship the US has with this multilateral forum, in reality and
as demonstrated above, it has a decidedly mixed record of ensuring the effective
functioning of the summit as a site of global governance.
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Sakurada, Daizō (1988) Japan and the Management of the International Political Economy: Japan’s
seven power summit diplomacy, Country Study Number 6, Centre for International Studies:
University of Toronto. Available on-line at:
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/sakurada1988, accessed 23 June 2003.
Sally, Razeen (2001) ‘Looking askance at global governance’, in John J. Kirton, Joseph P.
Daniels and Andreas Freytag (eds) Guiding Global Order: G8 governance in the twenty-first
century, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 55–76.
Smyser, W. R. (1993) ‘Goodbye, G7’, Washington Quarterly 16, 1: 15–28.
Soeya, Yoshihide (2000) ‘No view from the summit’, Look Japan 46, 535: 23.
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2 Japan’s role in emerging 
East Asian governance 
Regional and national 
implications
Glenn D. Hook
The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate Japan’s role in the governance of the
East Asian political economy. Its main focus is on the Japanese role in subregional
institutions, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus
Three as an emerging site of governance, as well as on the policies the government
has adopted in the wake of the 1997–8 East Asian financial and wider crises. As it
stands, a number of articles have appeared on the Japanese policy response to the
crises (e.g. Hughes 2000; Hook et al. 2002), but work on Japan’s role in East Asian
governance is particularly sparse (Kikuchi 2003), with attention tending to be
directed at the impact of the crises on national governance within the affected
economies (e.g. Jomo 1998; Kim 2000; Haque 2002). 
Thus, whilst much has been said about the way the crises exposed weaknesses
in the affected economies’ national systems of governance, this chapter focuses
rather on how the crises have strengthened the impulses towards establishing 
a system of governance on the East Asian level and the implications for the 
governance of the Japanese political economy. The central argument can be
summarized in three points: first, the demands placed on the affected economies
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the wake of the crises – namely, trade
liberalization, deregulation, privatization and the general shrinking of the role of
the state in the national economy – was part of a political project to promote a neo-
liberal system of governance in East Asia. Second, in reaction to the IMF’s national
prescriptions, Japanese policymakers have in a number of ways contested this
system of governance and sought to promote a new system of governance at the
level of the subregional political economy (on subregionalism, see Hook and Kearns
1999). And third, the policies these officials have promoted at the subregional 
level have national as well as international implications, suggesting a close con-
nection between the governance of the regional and national political economies
of East Asia.
Before turning directly to examine Japan and East Asian governance, however,
let us first elucidate the meaning of governance, per se, as this will facilitate our
understanding of the different ways in which Japan is playing a crucial role in the
governance of the East Asian subregion.
What is governance?
As intimated above, a useful distinction can be made between theories aiming to
explain governance, on the one hand, and a political project championing a specific
system of governance, as with the IMF’s and World Bank’s promotion of ‘good
governance’ and ‘global governance’, on the other (Payne 2005). When examining
governance in East Asia, then, attention needs to be paid to the political role played
by particular projects of governance in reshaping actual systems of governance as
well as the Japanese role in them. Given our interest in both regional and national
governance, we here regard governance as a form of regulatory ‘system’ for main-
taining order through different mechanisms of ‘steering’ and ‘control’ at both the
regional and national levels (Payne 2005; Rosenau 1997). 
In seeking to achieve order, governance entails both material and normative
regulation. In terms of material power, military capability is at the heart of a system
of regional governance based on the balance of power, even though threats to its
stability can emerge from outside the system, as with terrorism. In governance of
the national political economy the state may still maintain the authority to respond
to cross-border activities, as with the authority to control intrusions across a border,
but often lacks the competency to do so: it may be lacking or have moved out of
the hands of the state into those of other actors, above the state as in the European
Union (EU), below the state, as in the expanded role of local governments in inter-
national affairs, or ‘sideways’ to corporations and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) (Breslin and Hook 2002; Rosenau 2000: 23). In this way, the state may no
longer enjoy the ability to deploy its material capabilities in order to exert control
over a range of outside actors.
In terms of norms, governance as the codification of binding rules of normative
preferences in law is seen as a key element of governance by some commentators
(Young 1994), but compliance does not necessarily rely on law. Indeed, non-
codified norms can and do emerge based on non-binding forms of interaction and
cooperation, that is, new rules of governance emerge to replace other rules of
governance as well as to co-exist with them. In the case of the balance between the
private and the public sphere in a system of governance for the orderly conduct of
national or regional economic affairs, for instance, the spread of neo-liberal norms
placing greater weight on the role of market principles has challenged norms
supporting a dominant role for the state in the economy. In this way, systems of
governance are subject to change at both the international and national levels.
This brief discussion suggests that, in examining governance on both the regional
and national levels of analysis, we need to bear in mind difference between
governance projects and the analysis of governance, the role of both state and non-
state actors, and the material as well as normative aspects of governance as a system.
Governance in East Asia: from Cold War to post-Cold
War
During the Cold War era, the material elements of East Asian governance were
symbolized by the US–Japan alliance and the ‘hub and spokes’ security system the
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US set in place through the regional deployment of military power following the
defeat of Japan in the Second World War. This was a classic ‘balance of power’
system of governance aimed at maintaining order and preventing the expansion
of communism. It was at the heart of a system of governance which allowed the
capitalist, authoritarian regimes of East Asia to develop economically, taking
advantage of the liberal trading order maintained by the US’s ‘hub and spokes’
alliance system. For Japan, which the US established as the bastion against
communism in the Far East, this system provided the stability needed in order to
rebuild the economy and emerge as the most important economy in East Asia: on
the one hand, it imported resources from Southeast Asia and further afield; on the
other, it pursued an export-oriented trade policy dependent on access to especially
US markets.
Politically and militarily, respective Japanese governments supported the US’s
global and regional strategies by providing the bases the former occupier required
in order to be able to deter or prosecute both conventional and nuclear wars,
acquired weapons from the US, and gradually built up the Self-Defence Forces
(SDF) into a highly sophisticated military establishment. From the end of the 1970s,
moreover, the government additionally started to provide financial support for US
deployments in Japan through ‘sympathy payments’ (host-nation support) and over
the years increasingly took on a military role in the region as part of the wider
confrontation with the communist threat. This is illustrated by the 1981 decision
of Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō to take on responsibility for patrolling the sea lines
of communication up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan. In this way, the Cold
War era split the regional political economy between the capitalist and communist
camps, with the system of governance maintained overtly by military power under
a ‘balance of power’ system, with Japan playing a crucial supportive role in this
US-dominated order.
The norms at the base of this system of governance supported an understanding
of the world as composed of two antagonistic camps, the communist East and the
capitalist West, and the need for the US deployment of military forces to maintain
order in the region. Within this externally maintained system of governance, the
East Asian region was criss-crossed with a web of relationships, in political economy
and, to a lesser extent, security and culture. The division of East Asia between 
East and West and the anti-Japanese sentiments arising from the legacy of the 
war acted as structural impediments to the emergence of a new system of sub-
regional governance during the Cold War period. Nevertheless, as a result of the
Japanese government’s policy of separating politics and economics (seikei bunri),
the division of the region was not as complete as the balance of power system
implied. Whilst the Cold War stand-off limited the amount of trade carried out
with communist countries, for instance, Japan was still able to make strategic use
of war reparations and official development assistance (ODA) elsewhere, and this
provided opportunities for Japanese companies to develop a range of economic
links with the developing East Asian economies. With the rise in the value of the
yen following the Nixon shocks in the early 1970s, and the Plaza Accord in the
mid-1980s, Japanese manufacturers moved increasingly offshore, particularly to
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East Asia, gradually knitting the region together as a cross-border production
system. In this way, Japanese firms, first in textiles, later in automotives, electronics
and electrical goods, moved offshore in order to maintain international
competitiveness, taking advantage of cheaper factors of production, such as the
cost of labour, available in developing East Asia, as well as the rise in the value of
the yen. This created the basis for the emergence of greater regional cooperation,
but the history of Japanese imperialism meant that, until the end of the Cold War,
the government faced resistance, both on the policymaking and mass levels in East
Asia, to any type of leadership role in the region. The role of Japan’s conservative
political leaders in resisting the demands for an apology for the war was crucial in
this respect (Wakamiya 1995). 
Cold War’s ending
With the ending of the Cold War, the potential for deeper economic cooperation
and integration, and the potential to supplement a system of governance reliant on
an external power with a greater role for the states in the region, started to emerge.
The regionalization of Japanese capital and production which occurred during the
Cold War period had provided a base for the strengthening of intra-regional trade
relations between Japan and the other East Asian economies in the years following
the end of the Cold War. This can be seen from the import and export figures 
for the period 1991–2000: East Asian (NIES 4, ASEAN 4 and China) exports to
Japan rose from 9.7 per cent to 11.6 per cent of the total, and exports from Japan
to East Asia grew from 30.2 per cent to 37.9 per cent. Illustrative of intra-industry
trade and the close ties between manufacturers, parts made up 42.9 per cent of the
total exports in 2000 (JETRO various years). This regionalization of Japanese
manufacturing production strengthened the need for a system of governance for
the East Asian political economy beyond the architecture set in place through the
US–Japan security treaty and the wider US military presence in the region. 
From the perspective of the emergence of new sites of governance in East 
Asia, the ending of the Cold War provided an opportunity for Japanese policy-
makers to move forward with the institutionalization of regional level meetings 
of East Asian states. Especially in the early post-Cold War years, however, the
boundaries of the region remained contested, with proposals made to establish
regional institutions linking Asia and the Pacific, on the one hand, and those to
establish East Asian subregional groupings, on the other. As seen in the role Japan
played in establishing a forum for economic dialogue, the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum (Krauss 2000), Japanese policymakers sought at first
to join together the Asian and Pacific wings of the Cold War order, thereby supple-
menting the system of governance set in place by the US during the confrontation
with communism. Over the years the Japanese and US attitudes towards APEC
have differed, however, particularly in regard to two points: its function and the
opening of domestic markets. Whereas Japan and many other East Asian states
prefer APEC to play a role as a loose forum for building consensus on issues, the
US has increasingly sought to institutionalize APEC as a forum for negotiating 
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the liberalization of trade and finance and introducing market principles to the
region (Ravenhill 2002).
Indeed, especially after the 1993 meeting of APEC in Seattle, when the US took
on more of a leadership role, the forum has gradually emerged as the core regional
organization for promoting neo-liberal economic policies and norms, with the US
seeking to lower barriers to trade and more generally promote the principles of 
the free-market economy in East Asia. Japanese policymakers, along with those 
of many other East Asian states, have nevertheless resisted opening up their
domestic markets in internationally non-competitive sectors, especially agriculture,
as seen at the November 1998 meeting of APEC in Kuala Lumpur, when Japan
baulked at US pressure to open its markets in fish and forestry products. Thus,
whilst Japanese policymakers remain engaged with APEC, the goal of achieving
complete liberalization of trade and services for Japan and the other developed
members of the organization by 2010, has continued to meet with strong resistance
from agricultural interests in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia. The enormous 
sums involved in agricultural public works projects has meant that, whereas some
sections of the Japanese state favour opening up the domestic market, others remain
opposed. Indeed, the consolidation of interests among agricultural voters, the
Liberal Democratic Party, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
(MAFF), makes the agricultural lobby a formidable obstacle to the reform of the
national system of governance in Japan.
At the same time as a new organization linking Asia and the Pacific was being
established, however, moves were afoot to establish an East Asian regional grouping
of states. As seen in the 1991 proposal by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of
Malaysia to establish the East Asian Economic Grouping, later East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC), the ending of the Cold War had also provided an
opportunity for East Asian states to take the initiative in establishing a subregional
grouping of East Asian states, linking ASEAN with the Northeast Asian states of
China, Japan and South Korea (for details, see Hook 1999). The US, along with
Australia and New Zealand, were explicitly excluded from the EAEC proposal,
whereas Mahathir viewed Japan as the potential ‘voice of Asia’ in global institu-
tions. Whilst certain elements in the Japanese government were more sympathetic
to the Malaysian proposal than others, fear of damaging the US–Japan relationship
remained the overriding concern of key policymakers in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, making the government initially unwilling to support the Malaysian
proposal. In the intervening years, however, Japan has come to accept, and even
play an active role in promoting, an East Asian grouping of states, the ASEAN plus
Three. In all but name, this grouping of states can be regarded as the institu-
tionalization of the Malaysian proposal for the EAEC.
As the announcement of this proposal makes clear, the resistance to a greater
Japanese role in the region had waned considerably by the end of the Cold War.
In the interim, Japanese policymakers have increasingly come to play a key role in
representing East Asia outside of the region, as in G7/8 meetings or meetings 
in international institutions, as discussed in Chapter 1. The launch of the first Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, moreover, gave substance to the EAEC proposal
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in terms of developing an ‘East Asia’ to meet with the ‘Europeans’ (Gilson 2002).
In short, ASEM has served a normative function in providing a forum for shaping
an East Asian identity, which appeared concretely in the need to negotiate a
common ‘East Asian’ position for dialogue with the members of the EU.
The institutionalization of the ASEAN plus Three meetings from 1997, which
took on increasing importance in the wake of the East Asian financial and wider
crises, now provides a forum to supplement, if not directly contest, the system of
governance set in place during the Cold War. Certainly, the US was central to the
governance architecture set in place during this period, and even with the Cold
War’s ending, it remains as the core of the ‘hub and spokes’ security system. In the
realm of political economy, however, the East Asian financial and wider crises have
provided the impetus for East Asian states to question the role of outside actors and
to search for regional answers to regional questions. 
East Asian crisis
Whilst the changes in the system of financial governance at the global level
represented by the move to the floating exchange rate in the early 1970s, the rise
in the value of the yen following the Plaza Accord in the mid-1980s, and the ending
of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s all served to engender changes in the
Japanese role in the regional political economy, the Japanese response to the East
Asian crises has more fundamentally transformed Japan’s role in the regional
system of governance. To start with, the East Asian crises made Japanese policy-
makers clearly aware of the close links Japanese business had developed with East
Asia, especially during the previous decade, on the one hand, and the importance
of maintaining regional stability and order, on the other. It served to highlight the
degree to which the Japanese economy was intertwined with others in the region
and that, despite the existence of the US ‘hub and spokes’ security system, the
stability of the region could be threatened in non-military ways, as illustrated by
the spread of the financial crisis to the non-financial sectors of East Asia’s economy
and society.
To summarize briefly (for details see Pempel 2000), the East Asian crises started
with the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, and spread to other East Asian
economies, with Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea being especially affected.
The dramatic fall in the value of local currencies against the dollar, to which they
were in effect pegged, brought chaos to local banking and business, with many
banks unable to service their foreign loans and corporate debt rising rapidly.
Foreign investors, once assured of the security of their assets by the close link
between local currencies and the dollar, responded to the crises by withdrawing
their short-term holdings, compounding the problem. What started as a currency
crisis soon developed into a wider financial and economic, and especially in
Indonesia, social and political crises. As a result of the severity of these crises,
indeed, the ‘miracle’ economies of East Asia touted by the World Bank (1993) 
now seemed to have gone from being a ‘miracle’ to needing one (McLeod and
Garnaut 1998).
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Responses to the crisis
The failure of APEC to pursue a regional answer to the problems faced by the 
East Asian economies underlined the weakness of this institution as a site of
governance for dealing with East Asian problems. The response to the crises instead
came most significantly from the IMF and Japan, with the 1997 meeting of APEC
in Vancouver, held just after the outbreak of the currency crisis, simply endorsing
the IMF rescue package for the affected economies. In essence, the IMF viewed
the crises as resulting from the nature of the political economies of the East Asian
states. Its response thus included pointed criticism of macroeconomic policies as
well as weaknesses in the financial system, but most importantly focused on the
close relationship between government and business. In short, the IMF viewed 
the close-knit links between government and business, lack of transparency, 
and the central role of the state in the economy, as the fundamental causes of the
crises.
Its recipe for the affected East Asian economies can be understood in a variety
of ways, but here let us focus on the role of the IMF as a vehicle for promoting a
governance project; that is, a political project with both material and normative
elements aimed at changing the system of governance in the affected East Asian
political economies. The IMF’s remedy was to offer loans and other material
support to help the affected economies out of the crises, but to do so based on
‘conditionalities’. These in effect disciplined the affected East Asian economies in
terms of neo-liberal norms, changing the balance between the public and private
sectors of the domestic political economy. The pressure to conform to international
(US) norms meant that the issue of governance emerged in relation to the nature
of governance within regional states, with ‘crony capitalism’ viewed as an issue of
corporate governance and the balance between the public and private sector 
or, more broadly, ‘good governance’. That is, a governance project to change the
nature of the model of capitalism pursued by the East Asian states and reform 
the systems of governance in these states, was introduced by the IMF as part of the
rescue package. In this way, the normative issue of ‘good governance’ was put at
the centre of the material crisis the East Asian economies faced, illustrating the
earlier point we made about understanding governance as a political project. 
The IMF adopted a stabilization programme that called for the restructuring of
the national political economies of Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea, whereas
Malaysia refused to seek IMF assistance. It included a wide range of measures such
as the introduction of ‘global standards’ for the banking industry, which led to 
the collapse of a number of institutions and the creation of an environment 
for takeovers to be launched by outside financial institutions from the US and
elsewhere. A significant rise occurred in the interest rates charged to corporate
clients, which forced many to restructure or fail. Helped by the drafting of new
legislation to deal with the problem of workers being laid off as part of corporate
restructuring, large numbers of employees moved from positions of secure
employment to temporary work or even to the dole queues of the unemployed.
With the general cutting back of the state, which fundamentally limited the amount
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of public provision for those in need, along with the privatization of public services,
the IMF’s measures fundamentally altered the balance between the state and the
market within the affected economies.
Its intervention in East Asia was symbolic of the IMF’s role in the governance
of the international financial system. To put it another way, the mechanisms 
of governance for dealing with the East Asian financial and wider crises were 
‘sited’ at the global, not regional, level. The measures it took to combat the East
Asian crises, however, cannot be understood simply as a means to restore order to
the financial system, but need to be understood more broadly as a way to bolster
a specific system of governance in the affected economies. Thus, the policies
adopted in response to the crises implied the greater consolidation of a neo-liberal
system of governance for the affected economies through deregulation and the
implementation of a range of corporate, administrative and structural reforms. 
In essence, the IMF’s policies implied pushing East Asia away from the state-centric
system of governance championed by Japan, with the heavy hand of the state felt
in the industrial and financial systems, and replacing it with one favouring the
market. This policy accelerated the move within the national political economies
towards a market-led mode of governance. 
The IMF’s response to the crises was a clear challenge to the role Japan had
been playing in the regional political economy in both a material and normative
sense. As a wide range of research testifies, Japan has been pivotal in knitting the
regional political economy together, through ODA, foreign direct investment (FDI)
of approximately US$15 billion between 1986–90 and the creation of subregional
and microregional cross-border production systems, especially in the automotive,
electronics and electrical industries (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995; Hatch and
Yamamura 1996; Hook 2002). In this way, the affected economies had been able
to stave off the ‘structural adjustments’ (trade liberalization, deregulation,
privatization) the IMF and the World Bank had been imposing on Latin America
and elsewhere (Bello 1998). 
Whilst investments from elsewhere, especially US pension funds, helped to
replace the decline in Japanese FDI which followed the bursting of the Japanese
‘bubble economy’ in the 1990s, these were mainly short-term portfolio invest-
ments and were not for the creation of production bases as in the case of much
Japanese investment. Not only did Japan play a role in a material sense, but also
normatively: the Japanese model of catch-up development, with a key role for the
state in the industrial and financial sectors of the economy as well as a focus on
export-orientated growth, had been followed to varying degrees by policymakers
in other parts of East Asia. Whilst from the perspective of the IMF this model was
seen to give rise to a problem of governance in the national political economy, from
the perspective of Japan the model’s more important element was East Asia’s role
as part of the ‘flying geese’ pattern of development. This provided a normative
framework for understanding the governance of the regional political economy as
hierarchical, and centring on Japan. 
In the flying geese model, originally proposed in the 1930s by Akamatsu Kaname
and developed by disciples such as Kiyoshi Kojima (2000) (Korhonen 1994), Japan
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is viewed as the lead goose in a v-shaped flock of geese, followed by the NIES 4 
of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, then the ASEAN four of
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, and finally China (for problems
with the model, especially related to Japan’s current economic difficulties, see
Ozawa 2001). The idea is that, as the lead goose loses comparative advantage in
the production of a particular product, the follower goose next down the v-shaped
flock takes up that production. Even with the change in the site of production and
the emergence of Japan’s role in a range of cross-border production systems, where
Japanese multinational corporations have established production sites and processes
in other parts of East Asia, this normative mapping of the governance system
remains central to Japanese policymakers’ views of the region.
The IMF’s role in promoting a neo-liberal answer to the East Asian financial
and wider crises acted as a catalyst for Japanese policymakers to take a more
proactive role in introducing, shaping and seeking to control the regional system
of financial governance with the aim of achieving medium- and long-term stability.
Given that the threat to regional stability emerged in the financial, rather than the
real, sector of the economy, Japanese efforts have been made first and foremost 
to prevent a re-occurrence of financial turmoil. The regional system of financial
governance gradually being set in place does not replace the architecture of
governance established during the Cold War period under the US–Japan security
system, nor challenge fundamentally the role of the IMF, but it does represent the
emergence of a new site of governance with the potential to supplement if not
replace the role of outside actors in the overall governance of the East Asian
regional political economy. 
More specifically, in the wake of the crises Japanese policymakers faced a 
twofold question: materially, how to ensure the essential ingredients for sustaining
the development of the Japanese economy, such as energy, raw materials, markets,
and sites for capital investment in East Asia; and, normatively, how to ensure
support for a Japanese or, more broadly, East Asian model of capitalism, with a
continuing interventionist role for the state and the continued flight of the follower
‘geese’. As argued elsewhere (Hook et al. 2002), the Japanese response to the crises
evolved in a number of stages. To start with, Japan had already, in July 1996, hosted
the first Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP),
suggesting a growing awareness of the need to develop financial dialogue with
regional partners. The group excludes the US, but as its eleven members do include
representatives from Australia and New Zealand, the membership is not coter-
minous with the ASEAN plus Three. It functions as a forum for officials from
central banks and monetary authorities to hold dialogue on regional financial issues,
especially the operation of central banks and wider economic policy. Although by
the time of the first official meeting in Tokyo Japan had made agreements to supply
liquidity to a number of the economies affected by the crises, the final decision
remained in the hands of the central government, not the central banks. In terms
of governance the crucial point is that, unlike the IMF, EMEAP cannot impose
discipline on member economies through conditionalities. In the end, however,
the EMEAP did not play a direct role in combating the crises.
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More significantly, Japanese policymakers put forward a proposal to establish
an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). Although the AMF was not realized due to US
and IMF as well as Chinese opposition, the proposal is a clear illustration of the
pro-active role Japan is attempting to play in shaping regional financial governance.
Of particular concern to the US and IMF was the potential for the AMF to establish
different ‘rules of the game’ in offering assistance to the affected economies, as in
allowing softer conditionalities than the IMF for those receiving material assistance.
Despite this initial set back, and following Japan’s cooperation with the US 
in establishing the Manila Framework – a surveillance mechanism harking 
back to the AMF proposal – Finance Minister Miyazawa Kiichi in October 1998
announced the ‘New Miyazawa Initiative’ package of bilateral financial support
for the affected economies to the tune of $US30 billion. As these funds did indeed
offer softer conditionalities than the IMF, they in effect served to support the
domestic system of governance in the affected economies. This is clearly illustrated
by Japanese financial assistance to Malaysia, which had challenged neo-liberal
orthodoxy by clamping down on the free flow of short-term capital and refusing
IMF assistance. In this way, Japanese policymakers, whilst not contesting it directly,
did adopt policies at odds with the ones pursued by the IMF.
ASEAN plus Three as an emerging site of governance
Thus, faced with the IMF’s challenge to the governance of their national political
economies, which seemed to put the interests of outsiders above those of the region,
East Asian policymakers sought a way to deal with any future crisis without having
to rely as heavily on the IMF. The failure of APEC to offer an effective response
to the East Asian crisis, along with concern over the way the IMF medicine would
impact nationally, highlighted the importance of Japanese material and normative
support in dealing with future crises. In a sense, the weakness of APEC in the face
of the crisis acted as a spur for the further integration and institutionalization of
the region as ‘East Asia’. 
Following the East Asian crises, a new system of governance is gradually 
being put in place as a means to control or steer the regional political economy.
Intra-regional cooperation, with Japan strengthening its links with other parts of
East Asia, has been manifest most concretely in terms of the closer cooperation
between Southeast and Northeast Asia symbolized by the ASEAN plus Three
meetings. As FDI remains as an essential tool for the relocation of Japanese
manufacturers, a system of governance to ensure financial stability in the region
remains crucial to Japan. In effect, East Asian policymakers need to find a means
to protect their economies from the sort of turmoil experienced at the time of the
1997–8 crises. 
As a regional grouping bringing together the developed and developing
economies of Asia and the Pacific (APEC) was unable to respond effectively to the
crises, the need to establish an East-Asia wide subregional grouping became
increasingly recognized among policymakers. What has surfaced in the intervening
years is indeed a subregional grouping centring on East Asia, as envisioned by
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Mahathir’s proposal for EAEC. Its institutionalization started with the attendance
of the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea at the annual summit of ASEAN
leaders in Kuala Lumpur in November 1997. Annual summit meetings of the
ASEAN plus Three leaders have taken place since then: in Hanoi in December
1998, in Manila in November 1999, in Singapore in 2000, in Brunei in November
2001 and in Phnom Penh in 2002. What is more, as illustrated by the first meeting
of the Agriculture and Forestry Ministers in Sumatera (Indonesia) in October 2001
and the fifth meeting of finance ministers in Shanghai in May 2002, ASEAN plus
Three meetings are taking place among a range of East Asian policymakers. In 
this way, the institutionalization of regular meetings among the leaders and other
officials of East Asia suggests how, in the context of the need to combat the negative
influences generated by outside forces following the crises, the ASEAN plus Three
is emerging as a new site of governance for addressing a range of issues at the
subregional level of East Asia.
The actions Japan has taken in the years after the crises have been particularly
important as steps towards strengthening financial governance in East Asia. 
To start with, following the failure of the proposal to establish the AMF and the
announcement of the Miyazawa Initiative, Miyazawa announced the Chiang-Mai
Initiative (CMI) at the 2000 ASEAN plus Three meeting of finance ministers in
Chiang-Mai, Thailand (MOF 2002). The CMI aims to strengthen and expand 
the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA), established among members of ASEAN 
in 1977. The new Bilateral Swap Agreements (BSAs) set in place will be used in
particular to tackle difficulties in balance of payment and short-term liquidity and
more generally to prevent a future systemic crisis. Although the BSAs have been
the main focus of attention in the CMI, it also set in motion the systematic exchange
of data on short-term capital movement, which can act as an early warning system
for potential crises. Similarly, the CMI aims to train personnel in fiscal, financial
and banking areas, with South Korea and China, but most importantly, Japan,
centrally involved in providing the technical training needed to upgrade Southeast
Asian human resources.
The ASEAN plus Three finance ministers, who meet annually in order to
exchange views, particularly in regard to economic development and financial 
cooperation, have taken the lead role in moving the CMI forward. At the Shanghai
meeting in 2002, for instance, the ministers discussed issues related to implementing
the CMI, noting that by that year seven countries – Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, 
South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam – had begun to share data
on short-term capital flows on a bilateral basis. As far as the BSAs are concerned,
the Japanese government has taken the lead in signing agreements, and had 
by 2002 set in place BSAs with the following five countries: a US$2 billion won
swap with South Korea agreed in July 2001, which builds on the US$5 billion swap
arrangement made under the New Miyazawa Initiative; a US$3 billion baht swap
with Thailand agreed in July 2001; a US$3 billion peso swap with the Philippines
agreed in August 2001; a US$1 billion ringit swap with Malaysia in October 2001,
which is further to the US$2.5 billion arrangement made under the New Miyazawa
Initiative; and a US$3 billion yen–renmin swap with China agreed in March 2002.
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In addition, the Japanese government is negotiating swap arrangements with
Indonesia and Singapore. Finally, other swap agreements have been made or are
under negotiation by other members of the ASEAN plus Three, as in the case of
the agreement made between China and Thailand.
In essence, the Chiang-Mai Initiative has bolstered the ability of the East Asian
economies to respond to any future crisis without the need to rely totally on the
IMF. As it stands, only 10 per cent of a swap can take place without an IMF
agreement being in place or being negotiated, which in effect means the IMF is
still in a position to establish the conditionalities for the swaps to take place. Despite
the earlier rejection of the AMF proposal, moreover, the IMF has become more
sympathetic to East Asian cooperation and now regards the emergence of this
regional mechanism as ‘useful’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 July 2002: 24). It 
is nevertheless important to note that, irrespective of the potential for the IMF to
continue to play a central role in the financial governance of East Asia, the BSAs
represented a significant change in the potential role of East Asian states in another
crisis.
To start with, the ability of an affected economy to call on a number of BSAs
simultaneously (or one after the other), together with its rights under the original
ASAs, means that once all BSAs have been negotiated a substantial sum, upwards
of US$35 billion, will be available through the combination of ASAs, the New
Miyazawa Initiative and the BSAs. Second, as can be illustrated by the case of
Thailand, the combined borrowing can amount to more than four times the sum
available through its IMF quota of US$1.36 billion, with other East Asian countries
also being able to draw on amounts several times their IMF quota. And third, once
the BSAs are formally in place, the amounts can be readily changed, as has hap-
pened in swap agreements between members of the G10 (Institute of International
Economics 2002: 11–13). 
Finally, whilst the future of the CMI remains unclear, it is important to note the
potential for these new BSAs to be linked, thereby creating a system of financial
governance in East Asia similar to Japan’s original AMF proposal. There is also
the possibility that, in an actual crisis situation, the ASEAN plus Three will move
away from IMF conditionalities and establish its own conditions for the swaps. At
the very least these new financial arrangements are ‘pathbreaking’ and ‘provide a
focus for concrete negotiations, periodic reviews among officials within the region,
and the basis for building serious policy dialogue’ (Institute of International
Economics 2002: 19). In this way, the ASEAN plus Three is emerging as a new
site of governance for the regional political economy, with the ASA, New Miyazawa
Initiative and the CMI providing the basis for strengthening multilateral, regional
cooperation, enhancing the ability of East Asian economies to withstand a future
crisis without relying as heavily on the IMF. 
The impact of free trade agreements on governance
At the same time as Japan is using the ASEAN plus Three as an emerging site of
governance at the regional level in East Asia, the signing of a Free Trade Agreement
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(FTA) with Singapore in January 2002, and the ongoing negotiations to sign FTAs
with Mexico, South Korea and others now taking place (Dent 2003), symbolize
how Japanese policymakers are deploying international agreements to reshape the
governance of the regional and national political economies. The ‘Agreement
Between Japan and the Republic of Singapore for a New-Age Economic
Partnership’, as the FTA is formally known, was the first FTA signed by Japan, and
represents a major change from the previous policy of promoting multilateral trade
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its newly created successor,
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Singapore and Japan are important trade
partners, with Japan standing as Singapore’s third most important partner in 1999,
and Singapore ranked as Japan’s ninth most important partner in 1999, suggesting
the FTA is expected to strengthen these links even further. Given that Singapore
is not a significant exporter of agricultural products, the FTA has only limited
implications for the agricultural sector, with a small increase in Japan’s commit-
ments to zero-tariffs above those made under the WTO. As Munakata (2002)
argues, however, the inclusion of agriculture is nevertheless significant:
In essence, the Singapore deal created a ‘pinhole’ for Japan’s policymakers in
the barriers surrounding Japan’s agricultural ‘sanctuary’. Traditionally, the
Japanese farm lobby would never have allowed any concessions on agriculture,
no matter how small.
The goal was clear: the Japanese negotiators wanted to establish a principle
that entire sectors of the economy can no longer be placed off limits by
domestic interests fundamentally opposed to free trade agreements.
Specifically, the Japan–Singapore FTA aims to bring down barriers to economic
interactions and to facilitate trade in goods, eliminating all tariffs on Japanese
exports to Singapore and tariffs on 94 per cent of Japan’s imports from Singapore;
facilitate the movement of people, in business, science and tourism; develop human
resources; facilitate trade in services, moving beyond the two countries’ commit-
ment under the WTO; facilitate the flow of capital and information, including
investments, intellectual property (e.g. patents), financial services, information and
communication technology; and the development of cooperation among small 
and medium size enterprises. As the above makes clear, the agreement is a
comprehensive attempt to develop a wide range of economic relationships between
the two countries (MOFA 2002b). 
MOFA suggests Japan gains both economic and political advantages by signing
FTAs (MOFA 2002a): 
(1) Economic advantages
FTAs lead to the expansion of import and export markets, the conversion to
more efficient industrial structures, and the improvement of the competitive
environment. In addition, FTAs help reduce the likelihood of economic
frictions becoming political issues, and help expand and harmonize existing
trade-related regulations and systems.
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(2) Political and diplomatic advantages
FTAs increase Japan’s bargaining power in WTO negotiations, and the results
of FTA negotiations could influence and speed up WTO negotiations. The
deepening of economic interdependence gives rise to a sense of political trust
among countries that are parties to these agreements, expanding Japan’s global
diplomatic influence and interests.
Similarly, Keidanren (the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations), which
has played a particularly active role in promoting FTAs, points to a number 
of advantages for Japan in signing FTAs. As illustrated by the organization’s,
‘Urgent Call for Active Promotion of Free Trade Agreements’ issued in July 2000,
Keidanren sees FTAs as useful to expand business opportunities, eliminate the
competitive disadvantage suffered by Japanese companies compared to those of
Europe and North America, promote intraregional competition and domestic
reform in Japan, and complement WTO trade and investment liberalization 
and rule-making (Keidanren 2000). As pointed out in Keidanren’s earlier ‘Report
on the Possible Effects of a Japan–Mexico Free Trade Agreement on Japanese
Industry (Keidanren 1999), moreover, Japan’s exclusion from membership in the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU disadvantages
Japanese firms: whereas North American firms as a result of NAFTA and European
firms as a result of the FTA between Mexico and the EU can export both products
to the Mexican market and parts to production plants for export from maquiladoras
to the North American and wider world market, Japanese firms face substantial
tariff charges on parts and finished products (10–20 per cent for automobiles and
household electrical appliances), making them less competitive internationally.
Thus, eliminating such disadvantages is a major goal of the proposed FTA with
Mexico. Even if Japan does not succeed in signing an FTA with Mexico, however,
the FTA with Singapore may provide the possibility of entry into Mexico for
Japanese firms, as Singapore and Mexico have already signed an FTA. In other
words, if the opposition to opening up the Japanese agricultural market cannot 
be overcome in negotiating the agreement with Mexico, depending on the origins
of the product in question, the FTA with Singapore might serve as a means to
transform the island state into a regional export hub for Japanese manufacturers
in Southeast Asia targeting the Mexican market or supplying parts to Japanese
production sites in Mexico for export to the North American and wider market. 
As far as the implications for the governance of the regional and national 
political economies are concerned, two points deserve mention. First, as Keidanren
recognizes in the above report, ‘Urgent Call for Active Promotion of Free Trade
Agreements’, FTAs provide an opportunity for Japan to ‘disseminate Japanese
standards internationally’. In the agreement with Singapore, for instance, the move
to promote e-commerce between the two countries, as seen in the mutual recog-
nition of digital signatures, is a step towards institutionalizing a Japanese standard
for e-commerce in East Asia. The spread of Japanese standards will provide the
basis for the creation of common regulatory procedures and the governance of
aspects of the regional economy based on Japanese ‘global standards’ rather than
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American ‘global standards’. At the least, the regional dissemination of Japanese
standards will strengthen Japan’s negotiating position in any contestation over
‘ruling making’ at the WTO and in agreeing global standards in international
negotiations.
As far as the governance of the national political economy is concerned, MOFA
is clearly aware of the role FTAs can play in promoting efficiency and competition,
suggesting its support for moving Japan in the direction of a greater role for market
principles. The same Keidanren report similarly recognizes the utility of FTAs for
promoting deregulation, restructuring and the promotion of market competition
in Japan. Given the strength of the agricultural lobby, the proposed FTAs with
Mexico and South Korea may not succeed. Nevertheless, the role that FTAs are
seen to play in promoting deregulation and market principles demonstrates how
both state and non-state actors view them as a means to help to change the balance
between the state and the market in the governance of the national economy. In
short, Japan’s recently acquired interest in FTAs illustrates the close connection
between the governance of the regional and the national political economies in
East Asia.
Conclusion
The above discussion of Japan’s role in emerging East Asian governance has sought
to clarify how Japanese state and non-state actors have been involved in reshaping
the governance of the East Asian and Japanese political economies. The regional
and national implications of the discussion can be summarized as follows. 
First, as far as the regional level is concerned, whilst the role of the IMF at the
time of the 1997–8 crises demonstrates how material assistance from an inter-
national institution was accompanied by the promotion of neo-liberal norms as the
longer term answer to East Asia’s problems, both state and non-state actors have
in the intervening years taken action to contest the IMF formula and sustain a
pivotal role for Japan in the region, in both a material and normative sense. More
specifically, not only has the financial assistance under the New Miyazawa Initiative
contributed to restoring the health of the East Asian ‘miracle’ economies, with the
affected economies by 1999 enjoying comfortable GDP growth rates – South Korea
10.9 per cent, Malaysia 6.1 per cent, Thailand 4.4 per cent (Takahashi 2003: 
132) – policymakers have also placed Japan at the centre of the ASEAN plus Three,
as seen in the proactive role the government has taken in signing the new BSAs.
Whilst the ASEAN plus Three’s importance should not be exaggerated, the
potential for the BSAs to be linked together demonstrates a regional answer to East
Asian problems may emerge in future as a direct challenge to the conditionalities
of the IMF. At the least, this new ‘East Asian’ grouping of states can be expected
to play an increasingly important role as an emerging new site for the governance
of the regional political economy.
As far as the national level is concerned, the above discussion has demonstrated
how both MOFA and Keidanren are clearly aware of the potential for FTAs to
play a role in restructuring the Japanese political economy. The signing of the FTA
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with Singapore can thus be viewed as integral to the attempt to undermine the
power of the agricultural lobby as part of the reshaping of the system of national
governance in Japan. It is true that, in the case of Singapore, only a small amount
of trade in agricultural products takes place, but as we have seen a small increase
in Japan’s commitment to the elimination of agricultural tariffs has been made with
the signing of the agreement. The extent to which FTAs can be effectively used to
undermine the power of the agricultural lobby and promote national restructuring
will become clearer if the other FTAs presently under negotiation with Mexico and
South Korea are completed. Thus, whilst resistance to new FTAs can be expected,
especially from the agricultural lobby, the role of both state and non-state actors
in either promoting or contesting the institutionalization of neo-liberal norms
suggests Japan remains split over the role of the state and the market in the political
economy, as illustrated by the contrastive case of MOFA and MAFF. But whatever
the outcome of the struggle over national reform, the balance between the role of
the state and the market in the governance of the Japanese political economy will
be struck not only in the national, but also the regional, context. In this can be seen
the close connection between the international and national levels of governance
in East Asia.
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3 Governance, democracy 
and the political economy 
of the Japanese state
J. A. A. Stockwin
A political system and mechanisms of governance that appeared to work well –
even spectacularly well – from the 1950s to the 1980s are now widely castigated as
the source of Japan’s economic malaise and other policy problems. 
There are, however, two different approaches to an understanding of what 
has happened. The first, and most widely canvassed, argument is that attempts
from the early 1990s to reform the system have not been sufficiently followed
through, essentially because of resistance from vested interests, and lack of leader-
ship. The second, by contrast, says that policy failures from the early 1990s result
from the partial breakdown of the existing governance system, rather than from 
a failure to reform it. According to this view, the old system contained within it a
great deal of flexibility in its ease of communication throughout the system. Even
though the location of ultimate responsibility within the system may not always
have been evident, decisions taken were on the whole reasonably sensible and far-
sighted. The allocative mechanisms may not have been ideally transparent,
accountable or fair, but they facilitated dynamic and often effective outcomes for
the Japanese political economy as a whole.
In the course of this chapter my aim is to tease out the contested and contrasting
– though to some extent also overlapping – logic of these two positions. They are
not, of course, merely descriptive analyses, since they suggest equally contrasting
prescriptions for how such a system of governance might be beneficially reformed. 
Describing the Japanese political system
Many attempts have been made to describe analytically the Japanese political
system, and any comprehensive account will contain substantial abstraction from
a complex and changing reality. Most descriptions start with an account of the
formal, constitutional structures and proceed to delve into the workings of politics
in practice – with particular emphasis on the location of power. Moreover, without
giving a historical understanding of the evolution of the system, any attempt to
describe it is likely to be too static and formal (for recent accounts, see Curtis 1999;
Stockwin 1999; Neary 2002; Stockwin 2003: especially xii–xxi).
The formal constitutional structures that emerged from the Allied Occupation
(1945–52) were constructed in reaction against the structures embedded in the
Meiji Constitution of 1889, but also embodied certain continuities with it. The two
principal aspects of the 1889 Constitution that were targeted for revision were
executive dominance (particularly the institution of the Tennō, or Emperor), and
lack of democratic accountability. The second of these two problems had been
compounded by a conspicuous lack of civilian control over the military, a phenom-
enon sometimes referred to as ‘dual government’. The 1946 Constitution therefore
sought to strengthen the role of a parliament (National Diet), directly elected by
universal suffrage, and to entrench the institution of cabinet government, essentially
on the Westminster model. Although the Tennō institution had been a source of
great power, and the focus of a cult of personality, under the 1889 Constitution,
the Tennō had been only marginally a personal ruler. After the war, however, Japan
became a constitutional monarchy, and both the person and the institution were
deprived of all political power, leading to a system where the key site of governance
was different from that under the Meiji Constitution.
Under the 1946 Constitution, the electorate elects members of the House of
Representatives and the House of Councillors, the former essentially determining
the shape of the ensuing government and the latter having important powers 
of scrutiny and veto. In Japan, as in Britain, the vast majority of members of 
parliament belong to political parties. Parliament elects the prime minister,
normally from the party holding a majority of seats. The prime minister appoints
members of cabinet, who are in charge of the ministries of government, and under
article 66 the prime minister and all other ministers of state must be civilians. 
This constitutes a major difference from the pre-war days, when the military
predominated.
Up to this point, the system closely resembles the British model of cabinet
government. In practice, however, it has come to differ from it in two crucial
respects. First of all, from 1955 political party competition settled into a pattern of
single-party dominance, with the broad-church conservative Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) winning every election for both houses of parliament until 1989, and
from 1994 (after a few months out of office) remaining the dominant party in
coalition governments of varying composition. As with the dominant party in other
single-party-dominant systems, the LDP evolved into the central focus of patronage
networks that eventually encompassed a great part of the political economy.
Second, and in part for historical reasons, the central ministries of government
retained substantially more power of policy initiative than is normally the case in
systems based on the Westminster model. The result was the emergence of what
in American parlance are called ‘iron triangles’, in the Japanese case linking power-
ful networks of influence that embrace sections of the ruling party, ministries of the
bureaucracy and associated interest groups. Perhaps the most famous example of
such a triangular relationship is to be found in the area of agriculture (George
Mulgan 2002) but they exist to a greater or lesser extent throughout the political
economy.
An important area of continuity between political practice under the 1889 and
1946 constitutions was precisely this close linkage between the political centre, the
government bureaucracy and interest groups (particularly business interest groups).
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The cooperation between them had become particularly intense during the 1930s,
stimulated by the government’s need for procurement of munitions. After a short
break during the early Occupation period, this was revived from the late 1940s in
the interests of facilitating and promoting rapid economic growth. Most observers
would agree that, in terms of results, this worked spectacularly well between the
1950s and the 1970s, the period of Japan’s ‘economic miracle’, suggesting that the
system of governance set in place in the post-war period was able at least to deliver
on the economy.
The disadvantages of this system, however, were becoming apparent even during
the earlier post-war period, when political argument between the party in power
and parties in opposition was couched in highly ideological terms, focusing in
particular on the peace clause of the 1946 Constitution (article 9) and on the
security relationship with the United States. These were indeed most important
issues, but it seems arguable that undue concentration on matters of this kind had
the effect of de-emphasizing national policy debate on fundamental economic and
other issues between cohesive, policy-oriented political parties. Parties themselves
became patronage organizations rather than competitive policy aggregators. This
tendency was accentuated by a feature of the electoral system for the House of
Representatives that pitted candidates of the same party against each other in the
same multi-member electoral districts. Factional divisions (not only for this reason)
were entrenched within at least the larger parties, and locally-oriented candidate-
centred campaigning became the norm, to the detriment of party-centred, policy-
oriented campaigning. Largely because of the patronage aspect, elections were also
inordinately expensive for candidates and their backers. Revision of the lower house
electoral system in 1994 has only partially solved this problem (Stockwin 2003:
49–57. For a more optimistic view, see Reed 2003).
The ways in which politics is conducted in Japan in the early twenty-first century
are not entirely the same as they were up to the end of the 1980s. Economic stag-
nation that set in during the 1990s has subjected the political system as a whole to
considerable strain. Moreover, the ideological polarization of the past gave way to
party fragmentation, even though to a considerable extent the LDP has managed
to retain its cohesiveness. What had been the principal party of opposition, the
Japan Socialist Party (later Social Democratic Party), split in 1996 and was reduced
to the status of a minor party. Apart from the communists, parties of opposition
were either joining in coalitions with the LDP or actively positioning themselves
so that the coalition option might come their way. The Democratic Party, formed
in 1996 and the principal party of opposition from 1998, was both internally divided
and ambiguous in its attitudes to the LDP. Policy-based competition between
evenly matched parties each contending realistically for power remained as far
away as ever. This might not have mattered so much had the economy been in a
healthy state, but neither did the LDP-based government appear able to mount
effective policies to lift the economy out of its stagnation, nor did opposition policies
have a realistic chance of replacing it in power. This was partly because of the
strength of LDP patronage networks, but also because no opposition party could
come up with convincing alternative economic strategies. 
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On the other hand, the lower house general elections of November 2003
produced the best result for a single opposition party since the formation of 
the LDP in 1955. The Democratic Party, strengthened by its recent amalgama-
tion with the Liberal Party led by Ozawa Ichirō, won 177 out of 480 seats, on 
the basis of 36.9 per cent of the total vote. While the Democrats were still far 
short of winning a majority (or even a plurality) of seats, they had improved 
their performance at every general election since their foundation. On the other 
hand, the party’s ‘Representative’ (leader), Kan Naoto, had to resign in May 2004,
having missed paying pension contributions some years previously, so that the
immediate future of the Democratic Party seemed uncertain (Asahi Shimbun, 11 May
2004).
The ‘failure of reform’ argument
The ‘failure of reform’ argument is generally quite specific in prescribing changes
to make governance and decision making substantially more accountable. Thus
central leadership must be strengthened and lines of responsibility clarified.
Specifically, the role of the prime minister should be enhanced, with the central
power position of the British prime minister (Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair)
seen as a desirable model. Specifically also, the lines of responsibility should be
made clearer. The prime minister and cabinet should be answerable to the elec-
torate through elected politicians. In other words, the role of politicians within the
system ought to be enhanced vis-à-vis the role of government officials. The way
politics works should be restructured to create a situation in which government
officials implement decisions taken by politicians with the backing of the electorate,
rather than shaping or determining, in large part, the decisions themselves. This
is a view which places emphasis on the need for reform to create accountability
and transparency throughout the decision making process. Perestroika requires
glasnost.
If the principal purpose of reform is to make politics more accountable 
and more transparent, a closely linked purpose is to make the economy more
subject to the competitive rigours of the market. As Macpherson (who liked neither
liberal democratic politics nor a capitalist economy) pointed out several years 
ago, you cannot have the one without the other (Macpherson 1972: 4). It has
become fashionable among some observers to describe the contemporary Japanese
politico-economic system as ‘quasi-socialist’, as in the case of David Pilling (Financial
Times, 7 January 2003), so that the kinds of prescription earlier applied to 
Eastern European systems are now applied to Japan. According to this view, 
Japan is at a crossroads: ‘It must now decide whether it wants to be like a European
welfare state, with everyone getting an equal share of a gradually shrinking pie; or
whether it wants to be like the US or the UK, more unequal but more dynamic,
with a pie that is growing’ (Mark Chiba, of UBS Warburg, Tokyo, quoted in Pilling
ibid.).
The principal complaints of liberal-capitalist reformers concerning the Japanese
system boil down to the following:
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1 There is too much concern with equality, and with the strong protecting 
the weak. Japan is one of the most equal countries in the world in terms of
income and wealth distribution, even though the inequalities may be somewhat
increasing.
2 There is over-reliance on group solidarity, whereby group effort is privileged
over individual effort. For instance the Nobel Prize for Chemistry was recently
awarded to a mid-ranking employee of a company that did not appear to
recognize his individual talents (Pilling ibid.). But some change is emerging, in
part because of the example of foreign firms operating in Japan, including
those linked with Japanese companies.
3 Competition only operates within restricted limits. In particular the ‘convoy
system’ ensures that many companies are allowed to survive that should go 
to the wall if true capitalist competition were applied. The banks have played
a crucial role in this system’s perpetuation, lending to companies whose 
long- term prospects may in hard-nosed terms be dubious. (In fact, of course,
the convoy approach to regulation is now far less prevalent than before, even
though banks have presented a serious obstacle to radical change in this
practice.)
4 Companies traditionally ‘hoard’ workers, many of whom are on permanent
or semi-permanent contracts, and are reluctant to release them when eco-
nomic times are bad. As a result, unemployment has been low and company
solidarity has been remarkably high. But increasing economic pressures are
making this system more difficult to sustain. 
5 In politics, there has been a diffusion of responsibility and it is often difficult
to ascertain where decision making is actually taking place.
6 Central power (especially the power of the prime minister) needs to be
strengthened to enable the blocking position of manifold vested interests to 
be effectively combated. Koizumi Junichirō, the present prime minister, has
had some limited success in achieving this, but on many issues entrenched
vested interests are proving too powerful for him to overcome (for an elegant
exposition of this view, see George Mulgan 2002). 
7 Among the most significant concentrations of power constituting a barrier to
political accountability are the well organized and internally loyal policymak-
ing machines of government ministries. The apparently radical reorganization
of the ministries that took place in January 2001 substantially reduced the
numbers of ministries, but had rather limited effect on the strength and scope
of bureaucratic power. 
The long recession in the economy, which has persisted for much of the 
period since 1991, has tarnished the lustre of the Japanese system of political
economy. The much more rapid growth of the Chinese economy over the past 
two decades has created a sense internationally that China is ‘dynamic’ whereas
Japan is ‘static’ or ‘stagnant’ economically. Even though this may be belied by the
continuing strength of foreign investment in Japan, concern both with failings in
the Japanese system of political economy and with long-term demographic trends
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in Japan (the ‘ageing society’) have tended to create a general sense of pessimism
about economic prospects. 
‘Good old system’ arguments
The Japanese system of governance, however, used to be regarded with respect
and admiration by observers outside Japan as well as within it, during the periods
in which it was seen to be succeeding. 
Perhaps the best known example of this kind of literature was Ezra Vogel’s Japan
as Number One: Lessons for America, published in 1979. In retrospect, it seems likely
that a principal motivation for writing the book was to provide a ‘wake up call’ for
the United States, demoralized by defeat in Vietnam and suffering from a sluggish
economy. If there is one perception that appears to underlie the argument of the
book, it is that the Japanese approach to political economy is better organized, and
more consciously thought through, than that of the United States. The following
extract makes this clear:
Japan, unlike Western countries, has consciously examined and restructured
all traditional institutions on the basis of rational considerations. America’s
political system was designed almost two hundred years ago for a pre-modern
agricultural society, and it has not undergone any consciously designed major
reorganizations since then. New organizations have grown up piecemeal, 
with no overall conceptualization of their desirability. Japanese institutions
have undergone two major explicit reexaminations in the past 110 years to
determine which institutions are desirable. . . . no country is more experienced
in evaluating the effectiveness of existing institutions and in creating or
reshaping institutions by rational planning to meet future needs.
(Vogel 1979: 4–5)
Vogel recommends that the United States adopt a similar approach, and it is
instructive to note which Japanese institutions he thinks (or thought in 1979) the
US might take on board. In his concluding chapter, he lists four of these:
1 An industrial and trade policy. In Vogel’s view: ‘Japan accepts the ultimate value
of market forces, but aims to hasten institutional adjustment to long-term
trends while easing the human readjustments necessitated by changing
economic forces’ (Vogel 1979: 232).
2 A small core of permanent high-level bureaucrats. He argues: ‘Great issues require long
time horizons and great continuity before solutions are found; it is not possible
to pursue long-term policies when all key personnel change every two to four
years . . . bright, noncareer outsiders . . . cannot match a small core of highly
able, dedicated professionals . . . who have been given the best possible training,
have been exposed to the most progressive thinking of private and governmen-
tal groups . . . and have been seasoned as junior officials working on problems
they will face as they acquire greater responsibilities’ (Vogel 1979: 233).
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3 A communitarian vision. Inveighing against excessive application of adversary
relations and regulation by outside bodies lacking responsibility for the organi-
zations they regulate, he argued: ‘The Japanese have been in the forefront of
making large organizations something that people enjoy. Americans tend to
think of the organization as an imposition, as an outside force restraining the
free individual. Japanese from an early age are taught the values of group life’
(Vogel 1979: 235).
4 Aggregation of interests. He admires the ways in which interests in Japan cooperate
with each other. As he puts it: ‘Aggregation of interests works well when
representatives of different groups meet frequently without immediate business
in order to build up friendship and trust which become invaluable at the time
of difficult negotiations. . . . When various groups send representatives to
negotiate, they do not use attorneys but ‘go-betweens’, intermediaries who are
known for their capacity to gain the trust and confidence of all groups because
of their personal reputation and social position. . . . Americans may more easily
win an argument, but the Japanese more easily win an agreement’ (Vogel
1979: 237).
With the benefit of hindsight, certain comments, positive and negative, seem
relevant to Vogel’s four favoured Japanese characteristics. On the first, his advocacy
of industrial and trade policy has become deeply unfashionable since the 1980s,
but we should remember how powerful it seemed in its day. British experience
since 1997 suggests that there may be innovative ways of combining market
economics with government-led planning for key national aims. On the second,
since Vogel wrote, high profile scandals and policy failures have dented the prestige
of the Japanese bureaucracy. Even so, sections of it have been impressive by most
international comparisons. Replacing officials every time that the central govern-
ment changes is a characteristic of the US system, but not of the British, which is
based on the practice of a permanent civil service. Even this, however, has recently
suffered erosion with the introduction of short-term and contract positions, and a
great increase in the number of separately appointed ministerial advisers. The
advantages of a permanent civil service, professionally equipped to serve govern-
ments of different ideological colouring, have come to be underestimated, and are
due for renewed appreciation. The problem with the Japanese civil service has been
its symbiotic relationship with a single ruling party, and the network of interests it
represents. The most powerful stimulus to bureaucratic efficiency is the knowledge
that the political masters may really be replaced as the result of elections, and that
a new government, with new thinking and a clear mandate from the electorate,
will be examining critically the performance of its civil servants. 
Vogel’s third and fourth recommendations are less persuasive from our current
perspective, but not entirely without merit. Concerning the third, there is a core
of truth in his argument that organizational dynamism rather than self-centred
individualism drive performance in Japanese organizations, and that the system
works. This model, however, has suffered some erosion in the past two decades.
The view that large organizations in Japan are ‘enjoyable’ is given a jaundiced
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examination by Kamata, in his account of life in a car factory (Kamata 1983).
There is some truth even now in his fourth recommendation, about aggregation
of interests, but even he admits that minority groups, women, foreigners and 
non-conformist Japanese citizens tend to lose out in such a system (Vogel 1979:
238–45).
A number of other scholars have seen merit in the political economy of Japan
as it emerged from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. One of these is David Williams,
who in his book Japan: Beyond the end of history (1994), argued that the Japanese system
was both theoretically and in practical terms distinct from that of any Western state.
He traced it back to the ideas of the nineteenth-century German writer, Friedrich
List, who argued that the state had a vital role to play in the promotion of devel-
opment. Japan, Williams maintained, had put into practice the Listian prescriptions
with spectacular success. 
The Japanese model, however, was more than just a successful version of a state-
led political economy. In Ronald Dore’s terms, whereas in an American-type
system transactions are mostly contract-based, in Japan contracts are less important
since transactions tend to be ‘relational’. Dore went so far as to see advantages in
the practice of dangō (usually translated into English as ‘rigged bidding’), whereby
local authorities would award contracts to bidders favoured because of long
personal relationships. This was because, at least in a society that carefully fostered
relationships, transactions emerging from the rich soil of personal contact and
knowledge were likely to be more satisfactory than those based on cold contract or
impersonal scrutiny of sealed bids (Ronald Dore, Lecture, Oxford, 8 November
2001).
Dore’s view has much in common with the arguments of Bouissou and Pombeni,
comparing the political systems of Japan and Italy. They argue that in both
countries a dominant party has shared the benefits of economic growth among
‘historically closed sectors of society’. They call this ‘redistributive regulated party-
rule’, and argue that in both countries such a system has contributed to economic
growth and to social cohesion (Bouissou and Pombeni 2001: 545–67). 
Both Dore and the Bouissou/Pombeni duo admit that the system is either
changing, or is likely to change, in the direction of contract and ‘Western-style’
accountability. But they separately admit this with a tinge of regret for a system
they believe was both original and had merit. 
Many contemporary observers, influenced by the US-based globalization model,
are inclined to dismiss such views as anachronistic. Indeed, scathing commentary
on the proponents of any kind of socialistic or corporatist model of political
economy (e.g. Jospin in France or Schröder in Germany) has become extremely
widespread (see Vernon Bogdanor, obituary of Roy Jenkins, Observer, 12 January
2003. Bogdanor sees Tony Blair and Charles Kennedy as contenders for Jenkins’
mantle of modernized liberalism, which he appears to admire). On a recent stay
in Tokyo the present writer was told by a senior university political scientist that
any scheme of political reform in Japan needed to be ‘adjusted to an American
standard’ (Itō Daiichi, private conversation, September 2002). 
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‘Unnecessary (and botched) reform’ arguments
It is therefore interesting to note the appearance of a contesting set of views, holding
that rather than the failure of reform, it is the partial breakdown of the old system
that is to blame for current problems. On the face of it, it might seem that this is
merely an exercise in reactionary conservatism, motivated by nostalgia or by loss
of advantages caused by undesired change. The argument, however, has some
substance, and may be broken down into the following elements:
1 The era of coalition government since 1993 has created political instability
and rendered party politics less comprehensible to the electorate. In an
unstable political situation many politicians have been clearly revealed as
venal, opportunistic and self-serving. This in turn has contributed to increasing
political apathy and declining turnout at elections. The era of LDP monopoly
of governmental office at least had the advantage of presenting the electorate
with clear choices between parties with differing policy perspectives and
backers, even though many electors voted on personality, rather than party,
lines.
2 The reform of the House of Representatives electoral system put in place in
1994 has been largely a failure in terms of its aims. The numerically predomi-
nant single-member constituencies were expected to give the electorate a clear
choice, based on party policy rather than personality and pork-barrel. Policy
aggregation, centred on large parties having a national and clearly articu-
lated vision, would contest elections. Kōenkai (personal support machines at
constituency level) would be a thing of the past. The residual seats elected by
proportional representation from regional blocs, would permit representation
from minority parties, but without allowing them to overwhelm the system. 
In practice, little of this has been realized. The new system has not produced
competitive party politics of the type envisaged, as parties other than the 
LDP have found effective policy aggregation largely beyond them. Elections
continue to be fought on personality grounds and if there is a reduction in
money politics (in any case an uncertain proposition) it is more a result of
tightened anti-corruption laws than of single-member electoral districts. Kôenkai
remain as prevalent as ever, and have increased in size with the need to gain
at least a plurality in order to win in a single-member constituency. Attempts
have been made to preserve the interests of sitting members by making it
possible for the results in proportional representation blocs to depend on
candidates’ scores in single-member districts (for details, see Stockwin 1999:
130–1). Finally, even though in the redrawing of constituency boundaries the
notorious malapportionment problem had been addressed, the discrepancy in
the value of votes remains substantially more than two to one at the extremes,
seriously disadvantaging the cities over the countryside. 
3 Under the old system the opposition parties had little chance of coming to
power (though there was a window of opportunity during the 1970s), but
despite their many weaknesses and divisions, they contrived to present an
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alternative vision of society that was recognizable by the electorate. In
particular, they succeeded over a long period in elevating issues of peace and
security to a central position in political debate. While they could not exercise
political power as such at central level, they were able to exert significant veto
power over constitutional revision, and at times over other policy initiatives
emanating from government. In 1994, however, Murayama Tomiichi, the first
socialist prime minister since 1948, abandoned his party’s opposition to the
Self-Defence Forces and the Japan–US Mutual Security Treaty, as well as to
the compulsory use of national symbols (anthem and flag) in schools. After
‘selling the pass’ on these issues, the socialists then disintegrated and re-formed
in such a fashion that it was difficult to distinguish any of the non-communist
opposition from the LDP. 
4 The weakening of the government bureaucracy was billed as necessary in 
order to enhance political accountability by placing more power in the hands
of politicians. During the 1990s, however, it actually led to a reduction in
policymaking efficiency in some areas of policy. With the political confusion
prevalent in that period, communication between the LDP and government
ministries ran less smoothly than previously, without a concomitant improve-
ment in the policymaking capacity of ruling party politicians (Hori 2003). 
On the other hand, since the amalgamation of ministries into ‘super-ministries’
in January 2001, and the formation of the Koizumi administration in April 
of the same year, communication between politicians and bureaucrats has
further evolved, arguably towards greater efficiency.
Taking these arguments together, they add up to a general sense that the
economic and other difficulties faced by Japan since the early 1990s may plausibly
be attributed to the efforts made to reform the system rather than to the failure of
such reform efforts. In this view, it would have been better to stick to the old system,
fine tuning it rather than seeking to scrap it and start again according to new
principles (for instance, Dore, ibid., although Dore does not subscribe to all elements
in this picture. See also Bouissou and Pombeni 2001). In this reading of the ‘old’
political system, its key elements were single-party dominance, bureaucratic
initiative, dispersed leadership combined with continuous and intensive efforts 
to seek consensus, and a complex network of inter-relationships linking politi-
cians, government officials and interest groups of all kinds. The principal role of
opposition was not to provide an alternative government but to keep a check on
government excesses through the use of veto power. In terms of political economy,
government played a role of strategic guidance in an economy characterized by 
a combination of fierce competitiveness and readiness to conform. By a variety of
mechanisms (cross-shareholding, exclusive sub-contracting relations, etc.), the
private sector behaved in ways reminiscent of a controlled economy, but with 
the crucial difference that commitment to the firm and competitive drive were
relentlessly fostered. 
Among these characteristics, single-party dominance is one that has proved most
difficult to change. Even though the Democratic Party did well at the November
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2003 elections, its ascent is fragile, and being severely tested as of May 2004.
Whatever the reality may be, the assumption that it is advantageous for the health
of the polity for one large catch-all party to remain continuously in power over 
long periods is deeply entrenched. Related to this is the perceived advantage that
long-term tenure of office creates dynamic synergies throughout the politico-
economic system. Government ministries, knowing that they can rely on essentially
the same set of politicians being in power up to and beyond any realistic planning
horizon, can arguably construct plans envisaged for years and even decades ahead.
Interest groups, knowing that the structure of politics is unlikely to change, readily
understand where to plug into the system, and can plan accordingly. Given the
dynamic elements in the economy (loyalty to the organization, an intense drive to
maximize market share, etc.), dangers of systemic sclerosis are allegedly minimized.
It must be added, however, that the preservation of such a system always depended
on the LDP remaining firmly in power. When the LDP was out of office briefly in
1993–4, it found some of its parliamentarians moving to other parties, and civil
servants had little difficulty in establishing links with the non-LDP politicians that
were (temporarily) in power. Civil servants were also busy making contact with the
Democratic Party after the November 2003 general elections. 
On the other hand, there is a serious weakness inherent in such a set of
arrangements. Long-term planning may be facilitated by stability and predictability
in the domestic system, but may be thrown off course by unexpected changes in
the external (international) environment. Although precise causal connections are
difficult to establish, it seems highly plausible that the ending of the Cold War and
collapse of the Soviet Union around the beginning of the 1990s constituted a
change in external circumstances that upset some of the long-term planning mecha-
nisms and expectations of government. Among other things it led to a marked
increase in the international dominance (both economic and strategic) of the United
States, leaving Japan more exposed and less able to project her own model of
political economy. The Gulf crisis and war of 1990–1 was a famous example 
of Japanese government failure to respond adequately (according to international
expectations) to a significant change in the external environment. To some
considerable extent the breakdown in the established party system that occurred
from the early- to mid-1990s took place as a result of the disappearance of the
Soviet ‘enemy’ and the inadequacy of the Japanese response to international
demands over the Gulf conflict. The thinking of Ozawa Ichirō was deeply affected
by his reflections on the Gulf conflict experience, although domestic political issues
and factional conflict within the LDP were of great importance also in explaining
his group’s defection from the ruling party in 1993. More recent examples include
the panic induced in 1998 by the firing of a North Korean missile across Japan,
political pressures in 2002–3 brought about by the prospect of a North Korean
nuclear weapons programme, and widespread policy paralysis in the face of
increasingly insistent globalizing trends. Response to the impact of a resurgent
Chinese economy may also perhaps be significant.
Other writers have convincingly argued that the various attempts at reform so
far have been rather inadequate and ineffectual, where not actually misguided
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(George Mulgan 2002). The reforms since Koizumi became Prime Minister in
April 2001 have attracted widespread interest, but they actually follow on from
reforms initiated during the time in office of his predecessors Hashimoto Ryūtarō
and Obuchi Keizō. The result is that the Prime Minister and Cabinet have
somewhat enhanced capacity to affect policy, the bureaucracy has been reshuffled
with mixed results, but the political opposition, despite the advance of the
Democratic Party in November 2003, is still remote from office, with the two parties
constituting the coalition government having established an effective system of
electoral pacts to sustain their collective parliamentary majority. Moreover, decision
making within a coalition government is more complex than in the period of single-
party rule. 
A proposal for reform
How, then, might the Japanese politico-economic system be reformed so as to
overcome the problems of recent years, and what might these reforms imply for
governance?
The following proposal may possibly be seen as idealistic, but is put forward 
as an attempt to describe the outlines of a modernized and essentially liberal 
system, adapted to a Japanese context and maintaining the positive aspects of
Japanese political economy as it has developed in modern times (but especially
since 1945). The perspective underlying this proposal rejects the globalizing
principle of ‘one size fits all’, while at the same time being disinclined to accept the
more radical propositions of Japanese exceptionalism. If exceptionalism, in the
shape of Nihonjinron, was a favourite butt of criticism in the self-confident 1980s, 
it may be globalization as applied to Japan that merits concerted critical scrutiny
in the problematic 2000s. 
There are, of course, clear advantages in a strategy of conforming to global-
izing trends, or testing proposals ‘to an American standard’. The efficiencies and
dynamism associated with clear lines of political accountability, strong leadership
by individual political leaders, free market economics, Schumpeter’s principle of
‘creative destruction’, free trade across international boundaries, flexible hiring and
firing of labour, and so on, are impressive. (It has to be admitted, however, that
not even the United States follows all of these principles all of the time.). 
On the other hand, it needs to be recognized that in Japan we are not dealing
with a Soviet-style system of state monopoly of the means of production, with
ubiquitous central control over people’s lives. Policies were nowhere near as
socialistic as, for instance, in India. The Japanese system had socialist and
corporatist features, and was also in its heyday impressively dynamic, competitive
and socially responsible. It managed to combine rapid economic growth with a
capacity to distribute the fruits of that growth in an equitable fashion. It combined
loyalty to the goals of the enterprise with a high level of job security. Provision 
of social welfare and education presented problems, but came to compare well 
with that of many other industrially advanced countries. For the most part job
security (especially among the ‘shock troops’ of permanently employed workers
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and managers in large firms) did not erode – perhaps even enhanced – economic
dynamism. This appears to be contrary to the precepts of classical economics, 
but this was the kind of dynamic that operated. The system was indeed ruthless in
certain ways (for instance in relation to casual workers and to firms in exclusive
sub-contracting relationships with larger firms), but in terms of creating an eco-
nomic surplus over a sustained period it was highly successful. 
We therefore accept that merits existed (and exist) in the Japanese system of
political economy, but also find a pressing need to modernize it, taking into account
globalizing pressures. Whereas most commentary hitherto has taken a stand either
for or against ‘reform to an American standard’, we suggest that the way forward
is to combine features of both. The following are our specific proposals:
1 A capable, professional, self-confident, even elitist, government bureaucracy
has been one of the strengths of the Japanese system, and though it needs to
be made more accountable, it should not be emasculated. Its reputation since
the 1990s has been harmed by a number of corruption scandals and by
manifest policy failures, particularly in relation to the banking system. Parts of
it suffer from too close (sometimes corrupt) relationships with interest groups,
resulting in colossal waste of public funds on such things as construction
projects and subsidies for inefficient industries, firms and farming enterprises.
Plainly, a scalpel needs to be taken to such problems, and wielded effectively,
though there may be areas here where the social welfare aspect should be taken
into account. It seems unlikely that the scalpel will be wielded to much effect
by an LDP-dominated government, which will take us to our fourth proposal.
2 An important aspect of the system has been networks of interests through-
out the system. These may have at times a corrupt aspect, but at the same 
time they have been rapid and effective transmitters of information and ideas.
As creators of consensus between different groups and interests (including
government interests) they play an extremely valuable role. On the other hand,
they sometimes come together to form obstructive nodules of veto power
against needed reform. Networks, in other words, can be highly valuable and
constructive, but adequate countervailing power to their excessive influence
needs also to be fostered in order to contest any veto power (Amyx 2004). 
3 For this reason, among others, central leadership needs to be strengthened,
including in its capacity to overrule obstructive interest networks. To some
extent this is happening under Koizumi, with his enhancement of the powers
of prime minister and cabinet. On this point we strongly support the efforts of
the reformers, though accountability is also crucial, and this can best be
provided by the prospect of a change of party or parties in power.
4 This is perhaps our most controversial proposal, though some, even in Japan,
would see it as a natural progression. Against the views of much elite opinion
in Japan at the present time, we believe that the era of single-party dominance
(even in coalition arrangements) ought to be brought to an end. The most
valuable contribution of the LDP to the health of the Japanese political
economy would be to dissolve itself. Rather than a competitive political party,
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the LDP over its decades in power has become an entrenched political
machine with its tentacles extending throughout the system. It is a permanent
‘guiding force’ in politics, rather on the model of the Communist Party of the
former Soviet Union (CPSU). Even though the nature of the political econ-
omy is such that it controls far less than did the CPSU, it is widely regarded
as the political power centre. Perhaps the greatest missed opportunity of recent
Japanese politics is the premature resignation of the Hosokawa Cabinet in
April 1994. With the LDP out of power, it suffered a spate of defections by its
parliamentarians, and to its horror, government officials were quick to establish
links with the parties of the Hosokawa coalition government. In retrospect it
seems clear that had the Hosokawa cabinet lasted for, say, three to four years,
with the LDP kept out of power, that would have resulted in the gradual
atrophy of its machine. Starved of the oxygen of power, it would have lost
members, lost enthusiasm and perhaps split. 
The most problematic part of this package is its final item. What would (or
should) replace a system of governance based centrally on LDP single-party
dominance? In broad terms our answer is that it should be replaced by a system
that would readily permit the substitution of one set of politicians by another.
Rather than saying ‘alternating party politics’, the idea of sets of politicians able to
replace each other in power encapsulates the essence of the proposal. This could
be a system centred on two major parties competing with each other, or it could
be alternative coalitions (for the complexities of LDP alliance politics, see George
Mulgan 2003: 172–4). It should not be the current situation where minor parties
join with the single major party (LDP) as marginal participants in power, and where
there are occasional shifts in the identity of these participants. 
What is the rationale for such a package? It would be designed to ensure two
desiderata: on the one hand, continuity and long-term planning (in which a
reformed bureaucracy would play a key role, but with proper political direction),
and on the other accountability and renewal. By building on the long-established
skills of the government bureaucracy, a long-term vision and essential systemic
stability would be preserved. By revamping the party system into one where
changes of party or parties in power were not only possible but also expected by
the electorate, the current power holders would be constantly on notice that they
had to perform effectively and accountably or the electorate would collectively
decide to replace them in power. Thus the strengths of the bureaucracy would be
harnessed to parties whose tenure of office could not be expected to be permanent,
thus inhibiting the formation of stagnant (and sometimes corrupt) linkages.
The second and third prerequisites – maintenance of smooth communica-
tion networks, and effective central leadership structures – would be necessary
conditions to make the first and fourth items work. We need to recognize, however,
that they are not easy to achieve. A party (or parties) in power on a limited expected
tenure would need access to strong central leadership structures to effect its
programme, for which it would be responsible and accountable in a real, as well
as a legal, sense. In order to put its programme into practice it would need to use
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effective communication channels with the bureaucracy, interests and society in
general. For the most part, these channels and networks exist already, but have
often been misused for corrupt or semi-clandestine purposes. 
The final question is a practical one: what might be an effective strategy for
realizing this package, and especially for creating a realistic likelihood of alternative
sets of politicians replacing each other in power? This is a difficult and perplexing
question. Japan, since 1945, has seen repeated failure of efforts to create a viable
party of opposition or coalition of opposition parties (for the best analysis of these
efforts, see Johnson, 2000). For many years the Japan Socialist Party (later Social
Democratic Party) was much the largest party of opposition to the LDP, but after
its heyday in the late 1950s when briefly it seemed it might break the mould of
politics, it stagnated and showed little sign of really working to come to power 
at national level. In the 1990s the most promising attempt to form a viable party
of opposition was the New Frontier Party (Shinshintō), formed by Ozawa Ichirō
in December 1994, which appeared to be mounting a serious challenge to the 
LDP in 1995. But it was merely a coalition of disparate elements, including the
former Clean Government Party (Kōmeitō), which never fully merged its organi-
zation into this composite party. Riddled by internal contradictions and personality
squabbles, it flew apart at the end of December 1997. Since then the Democratic
Party has in some senses replaced what used to be the JSP/SDP (though this is 
a slight simplification of a more complex situation). It has made substantial elec-
toral progress, as we have seen, but it suffers from internal difficulties and has a
way to go before it could replace the LDP. The Japan Communist Party (Nihon
Kyōsantō), is a constant element on the political scene. Its great advantage is that 
it has a platform that is clearly distinct from that of the major parties, including 
the LDP, and is a generator of policy ideas. But it continues to be supported 
by less than 10 per cent of the electorate, so that in so far as it will not join coali-
tions with other parties (an attitude that may be changing), it does not constitute 
a viable alternative. It suffered a severe reverse at the general elections of 
November 2003.
The LDP, aided by the electoral system for the House of Representatives,
continues to win close to a majority of seats, which it can then supplement by the
addition of those of its minor coalition partners, to form a clear majority. This
situation seems unlikely to change, barring some catastrophe. Therefore, the best
chance to arrive at a system based on the possibility of changing the party or parties
in power would be a major split in the LDP. Manifestly, the LDP is a coalition of
disparate interests and views. The Koizumi regime has deeply split the party
between Koizumi-style reformers and protectionist conservatives. The possibility
of Koizumi being frustrated in his reform programme by the conservatives and
breaking away to form a new party together with elements from other parties has
been present since the start of his government. The fact that it has not happened
may reflect the fact that he thought he could realize his programme by dominating
the existing LDP, or it may reflect a lack of wholehearted commitment to reform.
Koizumi has consolidated his leadership since September 2003, so that splitting
the LDP seems an unlikely option for the near future. 
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More generally, it would be important that the new parties that emerged from
a radical party realignment should reflect genuine divisions on policy and on type
of electoral backing. Most of the current parties are as much divided internally 
as they are between themselves and other parties. The types of division most 
easy to envisage are between cities and the countryside, between open economy
and protectionism, between redistribution to create equality and allowing the
market free rein on distribution, between what Ozawa calls a ‘normal state’ defence
policy (similar to that of European NATO members) and pacifism/defence of the
1946 Constitution, and between young and older age groups. The male/female
divide could hardly constitute the basis of a division between major parties, but it
no doubt correlates with divergence of attitude on some of the issues mentioned
above. Feminism emerges sporadically as a force in Japanese politics, particularly
in circumstances of substantial unemployment and economic recession. The
popularity of the outspoken Tanaka Makiko, for instance, led to her appointment
as foreign minister in the first Koizumi cabinet, although scandals and policy
misjudgements produced her dismissal. 
The strongly personalistic machine politics that has characterized much election-
eering practice since the war is an obstacle to the kinds of outcome adumbrated
above. This is also a part of the explanation for both intra-party factionalism 
and for the inherently fissiparous nature of parties, particularly those out of power.
This, however, may perhaps give us a clue to the secret of creating the politics of
alternation in power. It is one of the paradoxes of Japanese politics that whereas
until the early 1990s opposition parties fragmented and proliferated with little
apparent sense of the advantages of solidarity, the LDP, despite organized internal
factionalism, scarcely ever split. The splits of 1993 changed that situation, but it
suggests that power is a great unifier, in Japanese political conditions. 
Perhaps the creation of rough electoral parity between two parties (or close
coalitions of parties) would impose the kind of discipline of power (or discipline of
the anticipation of power) that would be needed for the creation of a stable party
system having a real possibility of alternation. Admittedly, political history since
1993 is not particularly encouraging in this regard, but the transformation of con-
servative politics after the LDP was formed in 1955 might suggest the potency of
power possession in stabilizing a party. The 2003 amalgamation of the Democratic
and Liberal parties may be significant in this regard. 
The current paradox of Japanese politics is that disillusionment with the 
LDP (as distinct from its current leader) is widespread, but the assumption that it
will remain in power is still strong. But while it stays in power in its present form,
the prospects for a healthy reconstruction of Japanese politics, and still more, 
of the political economy, are dim. The Republic of Korea and the Republic of
China (Taiwan) have both experienced changes of party in power since they
established democratic politics in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Discussions between
the present writer and senior members of the Kuomintang (KMT) of Taiwan, and
the Hannaradang (Grand National Party) of South Korea, in 2001 and 2002,
showed that they scarcely regarded their having being removed from power in a
general election as a natural part of the political process! Nevertheless, if these two
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young democracies, similar in their political culture to Japan, can achieve this, why
cannot Japan, a much more mature democracy, follow their example?
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4 Local governance
The role of referenda and the rise 
of independent governors
Lam Peng Er
The rise of referenda and the new wave of independent governors have ushered
in greater contestation among the sites of governance in Japan (national, prefectural
and city/village), and also enhanced local democracy. This trend of referenda and
independent governors threatens to strike at the very heart of Japan’s political
economy: the struggle over the appropriate site of authoritative decision making,
especially over massive public works. At issue are the competing modes of local
governance in Japan today. 
Hitherto, the dominant mode of governance has been traditional machine
politics where governors, mayors and conservative Diet members act as brokers to
obtain public works funding from the political and bureaucratic centre in Tokyo
to stimulate the local economy, reward their supporters with business contracts 
and jobs, and win re-election. Building a ‘pipe’ from the locality to the centre was
deemed necessary because local governments could raise around only one-third 
of their own tax revenues. Construction companies would provide jobs to retired
bureaucrats (amakudari) and funds, organizational and manpower support to the
election campaigns of pro-public works politicians. Many conservative politicians
would also become ‘policy tribesmen’ (zoku giin) in the construction division of the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) policymaking body, the Policy Affairs
Research Council. These politicians would forge close ties with bureaucrats for
influence and information, and lobby for construction companies and public works
in their electoral districts.
Especially pervasive is the practice of ainori (riding together) where all non-
communist political parties support a single candidate for governor or mayor,
become the local ruling coalition and renege on their ‘checks-and-balance’ roles
in the local assemblies. While ainori often ensures a smooth relationship between
local executives and legislatures, it has also led to collusion, structural corruption
(see Chapter 9) and political alienation among citizens. 
Challenging this traditional mode is the advent of local referenda and governors
who rely on grassroots, non-party partisan support. These local executives and
activists are often self-conscious about their roles in transforming their localities
and then Japan through a decentralized, bottom-up approach. Simply put, they
are contesting and hope to change national governance by first changing local
governance. While direct democracy (referenda) and independent governors have
revitalized grassroots democracy, they have also resulted in tension and gridlock
in local governance. Local assemblies and mayors of cities and villages are often
suspicious of local referenda and populist governors whom they perceive as threats
to the system of representative democracy.
This chapter will first explain why the phenomena of referenda and non-partisan
governors have emerged. Next, it will examine two case studies: (1) the anti-dam
movement of Tokushima city that not only won a referendum but also co-opted 
the city mayor and governor of Tokushima to take a stance against the central
government, and (2) Governor Tanaka Yasuo of Nagano and his struggle against
the majority of mayors and prefectural assembly members in Nagano, thereby
bringing into focus two different systems of governance: centralized, on the one
hand, decentralized, on the other. Following that is an assessment of the battle sites
where governance is contested: Have new modes of contestation resulted in
additional gridlock in local and national governance? Has local democracy been
enhanced? In essence, the chapter examines the extent to which these two phenom-
ena have challenged a deeply rooted domestic political economy  based on wasteful
public works spending that keep the LDP in power at the national level, and create
jobs to benefit interest groups, bureaucrats/ex-bureaucrats and voters.
My central argument is that the advent of referenda and the wave of independent
governors are challenging the prevailing mode of local governance based on ainori
and the pork barrel politics of public works. However, challenges to collusive
governance in certain prefectures do not necessarily lead to a checks-and-balance
mode of local governance between the governor and the prefectural assembly but
‘fragmented governance’, as evidenced by the Nagano and Tokushima cases, when
confrontational politics between governors and local assemblies have led to political
gridlock. Nevertheless, political disharmony and friction are not necessarily bad
when they block pork barrel projects which lead to fiscal distress for the national
and local governments, not to mention environmental destruction.
A new wave of independent governors
These independent governors have sought to change Japan by first changing
governance in their prefectures. They include: Asano Shirō (Miyagi), Kitagawa
Masayasu (Mie), Hashimoto Daijirō (Kōchi), Fukuda Akio (Tochigi), Ishihara
Shintarō (Tokyo),1 Dōmoto Akiko (Chiba), Tanaka Yasuo (Nagano), Ōta Tadashi
(Tokushima) and Matsuzawa Shigefumi (Kanagawa). They appear as harbingers
of political change in Japan. The title of Governor Dōmoto Akiko’s political
autobiography reflects this bottom-up approach to governance and change in Japan
– Revolution of the Non-Party Affiliates: Change Chiba, change Japan (Dōmoto 2001). The
distribution of governors according to their political affiliation immediately after
the April 2003 Local Elections was: ainori (26), ruling parties (7), opposition parties
(2) and independents (11). The governorship of Tokushima was vacant in April
2003 (Sankei Shimbun, 15 April 2003). 
Just after the April 1991 local elections, the distribution of governors was: ainori
(18), exclusively LDP (5), coalitions including LDP (14), exclusively left and
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coalitions including left parties (5) and independents (5) (Asahi Shimbun, 9 April
1991). A comparison between these two local elections over twelve years reveals
that both ainori governors and independents have actually increased since the early
1990s.
Independent governors tend to share at least three characteristics. First, they
reject support from the established political parties and attract voters who do not
otherwise support any established parties. Second, they emphasize transparent local
governance where residents have access to information disclosure. Third, they
reject the political economy of wasteful public works in their prefectures. 
While unique local issues, the charisma and the policies of these indepen-
dent governors might have contributed to their rise, they also benefited from two
trends among Japanese voters since the 1990s. Just after the 1995 local elections,
the media highlighted the rising phenomenon of non-party affiliated voters (mutōha),
many of whom were well educated and interested in public policies (Asahi Nenkan
1996: 234). Moreover, the national and local governments’ attempts to spend their
way out of Japan’s lingering economic stagnation since the early 1990s through
massive public works projects led to a ballooning fiscal problem. Many non-party
affiliated voters were attracted to independent candidates who opposed wasteful
public works which would lead to a looming fiscal crisis and environmental
destruction.
Governors and mayors not associated with the ruling LDP are by no means a
recent phenomenon in Japan. Some of them emerged as early as the 1960s and
appealed to voter demands for environmental protection and social welfare. Known
as ‘progressive’ governors or mayors, they received support from the socialist and
communist parties. However, the new wave of governors disavowed endorsement
from established parties and are known as governors of the non-party aligned
voters.
A forerunner of this new wave is Governor Asano of Miyagi who was first 
elected in 1993. In that year, both the governor of Miyagi and the mayor of Sendai
(the prefecture’s capital) were arrested for corruption. Not surprisingly, this 
event enraged local residents. Some politicians, local residents and activists then
approached Asano (then a section chief with the then Ministry of Health and
Welfare) to run for election. His clean image, and association with social welfare
and services for the disabled, appealed greatly to a disillusioned local electorate.
Asano’s election for governor and the policies he adopted for his administration
became the prototype for the new wave of governors. He conducted an inexpensive
election campaign and relied on volunteers, ordinary citizens and the mutōha for
campaign support rather than on interest groups, political machines, and the
network of national and local politicians (Satō, 1998; author’s interview with Asano,
24 May 2002). His ‘100 yen’ campaign established itself based on contributions
from local residents and he refused financial support from business groupings and
other interest groups. Once in office, he advocated a clean government and full
disclosure of public information to citizens whenever requested. Asano also abol-
ished the practice of local government bureaucrats regularly wining and dining
central government bureaucrats in order to garner political support.
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Asano also formed horizontal links with other prefectures to strengthen local
governance. In June 2002, for instance, the governors from Miyagi, Iwate, Mie,
Wakayama and Fukuoka, and Keio University established Bunken kenkyūkai
(Association for the Decentralization of Authority) to promote local autonomy and
decentralization. These prefectures are committed to assigning their local
bureaucrats to the association in order to study issues including centre-local
relations, reform of the tax structure, public works, welfare and education (Kahoku
Shimpō, 23 May 2002).
Although non-party affiliated governors like Asano and Hashimoto had already
won their elections in the early 1990s, it was the victories of independent governors
in the most populated areas of Japan that caught the nation’s attention. In the 1995
local elections, Aoshima Yukio and Yokoyama Knock, buoyed by the support of
non-party affiliated voters, captured the governorships of Tokyo and Osaka
respectively. Less than a year and a half after the elections of these two independent
governors, another political milestone was made when the very first referendum
took place in Japan.
Local referenda 
The first referendum was held in the town of Maki, Niigata prefecture in August
1996 where residents voted overwhelmingly against the building of a nuclear facility
in their village (Niigata Nippō Hōdōbu 1997). In rapid succession, local referenda were
conducted on a range of controversial issues: the construction of rubbish incin-
erators and nuclear facilities, American bases and a proposed military heliport in
Nago city, Okinawa, and massive public works, especially dams (Imai 1997; Shindō
1999; Ishikawa 2003). The Tokushima city referendum in January 2000 was the
tenth plebiscite in Japan and the first that canvassed the views of local residents
about the desirability of public work projects (Jain 2000).
Why did local referenda remain a latent instrument of grassroots democracy
until 1996? A few plausible reasons spring to mind. The system of referenda was
originally imposed from above by the US Occupation authorities based on the
American model. Until the Maki referendum, there were no Japanese precedents;
activists and voters in Japan were unfamiliar with the procedures and political
benefits of launching a referendum. Once the Maki referendum set a precedent
and amidst widespread coverage by the national media, a ‘referenda contagion’
took place in various localities. Citizens are encouraged to use referenda to express
their political preferences and shape policies that impact on them. If the momentum
of citizens resorting to referenda were to continue, this mode of direct democracy
will surely impact on governance in Japan, local and national.
Hitherto, social movements have relied on local elections, opposition parties
especially the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), demonstrations, and law suits to exert
political pressure. By the 1990s, around half of Japanese voters neither identified
with nor supported any established party, the JSP faced oblivion, and law suits
remained a protracted process. Not surprisingly, non-partisan local activists
believed that referenda offered them a viable alternative to pursue their goals. 
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Initially, a referendum did not appeal to activists because it appeared politically
toothless. Conservative politicians in the Diet watered down the system of referenda
in 1948 (The Japan Times, 1 January 1999). First, the local assembly must approve
an ordinance for a referendum. Even if a majority of voters support a referendum,
the local assembly can still reject their petition for a referendum. Second, the results
of referenda are legally non-binding in Japan. Even if citizens were to overwhelm-
ingly vote against a proposition, the local and national governments are not legally
obliged to honour the results. Nevertheless, referenda do carry political weight
because local and national politicians might lose reelection if they were to reject
the preferences of the citizens, and fierce criticism from the media. Conservative
politicians, to maintain their hold on power and to prevent local anti-pollution
movements from coalescing into national ones, responded promptly and effectively
to local concerns by introducing a tougher regime of anti-pollution laws since the
early 1970s. Such responsiveness to local concerns helped to obviate the use of a
referendum among social movement activists in the 1970s and 1980s.
Another reason for the absence of referenda until 1996 was the Herculean efforts
required to organize them. Activists must surmount many hurdles in the political
process before a referendum can be held. The first hurdle is organizing a signature
campaign. While the law requires at least 2 per cent of total eligible voters to sign
a petition for a referendum to be held, activists in various referenda movement
sought to obtain at least 50 per cent of total eligible voters to strengthen their bid
politically and morally. 
The next hurdle is to seek a majority of assembly members to support an
ordinance for a referendum. This is by no means an easy task, especially when
many assembly members believe that referenda undermine representative
democracy and simplistically cast governance into a stark yes or no proposition. 
If the mayor and local assembly members are uncooperative, the activists pushing
for a referendum will face the difficult task of either launching a recall or nomi-
nating their own candidates for mayor and assembly seats against entrenched
politicians in the next local election.
Even after forging a majority in the local assembly to approve an ordinance for
a referendum, the activists must next mobilize a high turnout of voters in support
of their preference. At the final hurdle, they need to secure the sympathy of the
mass media, national public opinion, the main opposition parties and even groups
within the ruling parties to make the referendum result politically binding.
Tokushima city referendum 
At issue in this referendum is the construction of a dam spanning 720 metres across
the Yoshino, the third longest river in Japan. The dam, to be located 13 kilometres
from the Yoshino river mouth, has dual functions: a road spanning the dam, and
also ten electronically controlled sluice gates to prevent massive flooding. Costing
an estimated 103 billion yen (around US$950 million) to build, the proposed dam
will replace Daijūzeki, the name of the stone weir built around 250 years ago during
the Tokugawa Shogunate. 
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According to the Ministry of Construction (MOC, from January 2001 part of
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport), Daijūzeki is already worn out
and needs to be replaced as it is no longer able to prevent a massive flood that 
is predicted to occur once every 150 years. If the anticipated flood were to take
place before the new dam is built, lives and property would be lost. However, the
anti-dam activists pointed out that the new dam is a waste of taxpayers’ money and
will damage the environment including the Yoshino’s water quality, wetlands,
endangered species and migratory birds. The activists argued that Daijūzeki has
served Tokushima well for two and a half centuries and is also a cultural heritage
that should not be destroyed. The activists believed that repairing the old weir and
strengthening the embankments will be adequate to prevent any serious flooding,
and that it is unnecessary to build a dam for an imaginary flood that is supposed
to occur only once in 150 years. Besides the 103 billion yen to construct the new
dam, it will cost 700 million yen annually to maintain the dam. Moreover, citizens
who would be affected by the new dam have no say in the policymaking process
for building the dam.
In 1982, the MOC deemed it necessary to repair Daijūzeki. Six years later, it
conducted research on the old weir. In 1992, the MOC announced a totally new
plan: a new dam with a road atop would replace Daijūzeki. In 1995, the MOC
established an advisory council (shingikai) comprising a panel of experts to examine
the feasibility of the plan and its impact on the environment. The panel, handpicked
by the MOC, declared in July 1998 that the plan for the new dam was appropriate. 
This triggered off a signature campaign by Tokushima city residents to seek 
an ordinance for a referendum on the new dam. By January 1999, a group of non-
party affiliated citizens (Daijūzeki jūmin tōhyō no kai/Association for Daijūzeki
referendum) spearheaded the signature campaign and collected 101,535 signatures
or 48.8 per cent of Tokushima city’s eligible voters in favour of a referendum.
However, in the following month, the Tokushima city assembly turned down the
request for a plebiscite.
The founding father and leader of Daijūzeki jūmin tōhyō no kai was Himeno
Masayoshi. He was born in a village next to Tokushima city, educated at Chūō
University and was a student activist against the Vietnam War and the US–Japan
Security Treaty in 1970. In 1992, Himeno noticed that the MOC had set aside 
a budget for the proposed dam at Yoshino (author’s interview: 28 June 1999). 
In 1993, he formed the Yoshinogawa Symposium to seek greater information
disclosure and citizen participation in the MOC’s deliberations on Yoshino (Kankyō
Shimbun, 26 August 1998). Himeno subsequently organized the Daijūzeki jūmin
tōhyō no kai on a horizontal network style based on amateurs and volunteers who
were mutōha; almost two-thirds were women. Although the group had interaction
with other referenda groups in Maki, Kobe, Mitake and Nago, it was independent
from all other organizations.
In the April 1999 Local Elections, the pro-referendum group sponsored five
candidates for city assembly and succeeded in winning three seats. This was
sufficient to tilt the balance of power within the city assembly to twenty-two in
favour and eighteen against the referendum. In the Tokushima city assembly, the
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Democratic Party (DP), Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Japan Communist
Party (JCP) were against the dam and in favour of a referendum; Kōmeitō (Clean
Government Party) supported both dam and referendum while the LDP-affiliated
conservatives supported the dam and opposed a referendum. 
In June the same year, the Tokushima local assembly passed an ordinance 
for a referendum but no timetable was specified, much to the dismay of the 
pro-referendum citizens. In a separate memorandum of understanding, the pro-
referendum groups in the assembly agreed to meet within six months after the
ordinance was in place and the timing of the plebiscite would be decided by 
the majority of those in favour of the move. They met in December 1999 and 
fixed a date in January 2000. The assembly also attached a condition that was
unprecedented in Japanese referenda. If voter turnout were less than 50 per cent
of all eligible voters in Tokushima city, the votes (yes or no) would not even be
tallied. This was no easy task. In the last mayoral election held in February 1997,
voter turnout was only 30.68 per cent (The Japan Times, 13 January 2000). 
Nevertheless, the voter turnout was 55.00 per cent and 91.6 per cent of voters
cast their ballots against the new dam. Mayor Kōike Masakatsu of Tokushima 
city made a turnaround and declared that he would abide by the referendum’s
anti-dam results. He was previously an MOC official and, as mayor, had supported
the dam. Himeno earlier had reflected on the significance of the referendum: 
‘If the majority of residents opposed the scheme, then the MOC’s claims that the
project stems from the strong appeal of the locality will be shattered’ (Asahi Shimbun,
8 December 1999). Himeno also intimated that Kōike changed his stance because
the mayor was probably afraid that the pro-referendum group might launch a recall
against him (Author’s interview, 28 June 1999).
In February 2000, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō, in Diet interpellations with
opposition leaders Hatoyama Yukio (DP), Fuwa Tetsuzō (JCP) and Doi Takako
(SDP) concerning the Tokushima city referendum, remarked that the residents
lacked understanding and cautioned against making referenda legally binding
(Tokushima Shimbun, 10 February 2000). In May the same year, Construction
Minister Nakayama Masaaki retracted his promise to meet the residents of
Tokushima to discuss the Yoshino issue. His excuse was that he had no desire to
meet the head of the anti-weir group who was arrested as a student during protests
against the Vietnam War. (Nakayama was probably referring to Himeno because
he intimated that the leader had attended his same alumni, Chūō University.) The
mentality of Obuchi and Nakayama revealed the mode of top-down, centralized
governance which they deemed suitable for Japan. 
Nevertheless, the Tokushima referendum acted as a catalyst for the national
government’s rethinking on public works to ensure its electoral interests: ‘The
referendum prompted a decision later in the year by the three central government
ruling parties that the government “go back to the drawing board” on the project
in a sweeping review of all big public work projects’ (Asahi Shimbun, Asahi.com,
13 June 2002).
In July 2000, the LDP established a committee to radically review public works
projects (Jimintō Kōkyō Jigyō Bappon Minaoshi Kentōkai). In the next month,
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Kamei Shizuka, the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) Chairman, led
a team comprised of policymakers from the three ruling coalition parties to visit
Tokushima and study the Yoshino issue. Apparently, the LDP sought to improve
its image after suffering heavy losses in metropolitan Japan at the June Lower House
Elections (Sankei Shimbun, 29 August 2000 and 25 October 2000, Daily Yomiuri 
On-line, 5 August 2000). Amidst prolonged economic stagnation, disgruntled urban
voters had become more critical of their tax money being wasted on pork-barrel
projects in rural Japan (Mainichi Shimbun Interactive, 14 July 2000). Reviewing the
new dam at Tokushima along with other planned public works was a strategy 
to ensure that the LDP would not be punished again at the 2001 Upper House
Elections (Asahi Shimbun, Asahi.com, editorial, 9 August 2000). The decision to review
public works was also made against the backdrop of the Mori Yoshirō admin-
istration’s plunging popularity, and the LDP’s desire to win back the mutōha with
conservative tendencies.
In August 2000, the committee recommended that the national government
should cancel 233 public works projects,2 and that plans for a new dam at Yoshino
be sent back to the drawing board. Originally, the decision was to cancel (chūshi)
the dam but after intense lobbying from the pro-dam supporters (Tokushima
Governor Endō Toshio, the LDP Tokushima prefectural chapter and local
politicians), the eventual decision was to freeze (tōketsu) the project (Tokushima
Shimbun, 25 August 2000). An ambiguity was ensured when the expression ‘hakushi
ni modori’ (return to a clean slate) was used to address the Yoshino issue (Tokushima
Shimbun, 12–14 September 2000). The anti-dam activists wanted the new dam
proposal to be unequivocally scrapped based on the referendum results while the
proponents of the new dam insisted that their pre-existing plan must still be
considered. The MOC remained adamant that the new dam proposal is the best
option. To the MOC, public works is the ministry’s raison d’être. It also creates jobs
for retiring MOC bureaucrats in construction firms.
A LDP member from the Tokushima Prefecture Chapter remarked: ‘It is strange
to abandon the dam in Tokushima just because the LDP is worried about losing
the Upper House Election’ (Tokushima Shimbun, 17–20 August 2000). Ironically,
abandoning the dam was precisely what the Tokushima LDP Prefecture Chapter
did after losing the Tokushima mayoral election in February 2001 (Tokushima
Shimbun, 18 March 2001). Mayor Kōike, who won a landslide victory, soon estab-
lished a window in a city government office to accept alternative plans to dam
construction from the local citizens (Tokushima Shimbun, 13 March 2001). This was
his approach to promote democratic and local governance, and win the support
of Tokushima voters. Indeed, both the local LDP and the mayor of Tokushima
were driven by electoral considerations to stop championing the dam.
In April 2002, Ōta Tadashi won his election to become governor of Tokushima
prefecture after his predecessor Endō Toshio was indicted for accepting bribes over
public works project. Ōta’s victory was a turning point in Tokushima’s political
history because it ended half a century of conservative executive rule (Tokushima
Shimbun, 29 April 2002). Ōta’s core supporters in his election campaign were the
anti-dam, pro-referendum activists. The new governor then pledged to scrap the
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controversial plan to dam the Yoshino after his victory. Less than two and a half
years after the Tokushima city referendum, the anti-dam activists finally succeeded
in coopting both mayor and governor to oppose the MOC’s plan for a dam. 
While the central government and MOC have not officially scrapped the dam,
the proposal appears politically dead though not buried (Asahi Shimbun, Asahi.com,
13 June 2002). The shift in the national mood against mega public works projects,
which have exacerbated Japan’s fiscal crisis, and the ascendance of Prime Minister
Koizumi Junichirō, who insisted on capping the budget for public works, make it
unlikely that a dam will be built across the Yoshino.
The Tokushima city referendum has indeed raised a number of issues concerning
local governance. These include: the tension between representative democracy
and direct democracy, bureaucratic/technocratic governance versus democratic
governance, differences among local governments, and between the national and
local governments.
Prior to the referendum, the Tokushima city and prefectural assemblies had
already passed resolutions supporting a new dam. In addition, the local assemblies
of another two cities and eight villages along the Yoshino supported the plan. Critics
argued that the referendum challenged the decisions of the local assemblies whose
members have been duly elected by the people. Then LDP Secretary General Mori
Yoshirō said: ‘If every decision is based on the outcome of a referendum, then there
will be no need for legislatives’ (The Age, 29 January 2000). Moreover, why should
one city veto the interests of other pro-dam cities and villages in a referendum?
Proponents of the dam also collected 316,003 signatures from residents living along
the Yoshino (but beyond Tokushima city too) who were in favour of the new plan
to bolster their claims of representing the people’s will.
The MOC also sought to rationalize its plans on the basis of its scientific and
technical expertise. An MOC official in Tokushima remarked: ‘The appropri-
ateness of public works cannot be judged by amateurs’ (Asahi Shimbun, 18 December
1998). The MOC manager in charge of public works in Tokushima opined: 
‘In general, local residents lack analytical ability, and tend to be swayed by the
emotions of the moment rather than reason, and because they are moved by
feelings, there is a danger that they will produce an irrational result’ (TBS News
23, 16 February 1998).
Then Construction Minister Nakayama Masaaki also said that the dam for
Tokushima is not suitable for a plebiscite because decisions on such projects require
technical and scientific knowledge (The Japan Times, 13 January 2000). After the
referendum results were known, Nakayama remarked that the Tokushima
referendum was representative of the ‘flaw of democracy’. He also praised the
mayor of Nago who ignored his city’s referendum results for doing the right thing
(Tokushima Shimbun, 14 January 2000). The Minister then backtracked after facing
criticism of his comments on referenda: ‘For an elected politician, votes are like a
revelation from God’ (Mainichi Shimbun, 26 January 2000).
Both pro- and anti-dam groups would marshal ‘scientific’ data from different
sets of simulations to support their positions. The press reported: ‘According to
simulation, the water level would exceed the safety level of the embankments by
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42 cm at a point 16 km from the mouth of the river, according to the ministry.
Dam opponents argue that the ministry’s simulation over estimates the levels and
that the proposed dam would only lower the water level by a mere 50 cm which is
not sufficient to deal with major floods’ (The Japan Times, 18 April 2000). Convinced
of its own bureaucratic expertise, the MOC would not budge from its position that
the dam is best even after the referendum. The ministry repeatedly said that it
would seek the understanding of local residents that the dam is necessary. Implicit
in the MOC’s concept of governance is the need to educate the people; it is the
understanding of the masses and not the ministry that has to change.
Conceivably, the Environment Agency (from January 2001 Ministry of
Environment) and the 1997 New River Law could have shaped decision making
towards the Yoshino. But the reality was that the Environment Agency did not
even play a peripheral role in the Yoshino case. This reveals the bureaucratic
weakness of the Environment Agency vis-à-vis the MOC. The New River Law has
two key features: the views of residents in the river’s vicinity should be considered
in decision making and that the impact of public works on the environment must
be examined. Between July 1998 (when the MOC shingikai rubber-stamped the
plan for a new dam) and August 2000 (when Policy Affairs Research Council
Chairman Kamei Shizuka visited Tokushima city), there was virtually no mention
of the New River Law by the national and local governments. Apparently, the
MOC believed that the governor, mayors and assembly members represented the
voices of the people while the anti-dam activists insisted that local residents must
be directly consulted (Daily Yomiuri on-line, 12 December 2001). Moreover, experts
from the pro- and anti-dam groups have conflicting opinions about environmental
damage. It appears that the 1997 New River Law was legally binding only when
the central and local governments chose to honour it. While the intent of the New
River Law was laudable, the legislation was subjected to different interpretations.
It was really grassroots activism that stopped the proposed dam at the Yoshino and
not an ambiguous piece of legislation. The implication for governance in Japan is
that policy outcomes are often framed by political contests and local resistance
rather than a formal piece of legislation.
After the referendum, decision making concerning the Yoshino became dead-
locked among local governments, and between local and national governments.
When mayor Kōike switched his position to an anti-dam stance, the city of
Tokushima was pit against Governor Endō and the prefectural assembly, and the
national government (the ruling LDP and the MOC). Then Prime Minister Obuchi
affirmed that the dam project will proceed despite the referendum results (Mainichi
Shimbun Interactive, 25 January 2000). After Ōta became governor, Tokushima’s
executive and legislature split over public works and an investigation into public
works corruption. The prefectural assembly refused to endorse Ōta’s nominee for
Vice-Governor and forced him to abandon some of his campaign pledges including
a review of public works projects around Tokushima airport. 
In March 2003, the prefectural assembly passed a motion of no-confidence
against Ōta and he was forced to resign. (Tokushima was politically rudderless,
especially when there was no Vice-Governor to stand in until the election for a new
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Governor. In the absence of a Governor, as well as a Vice-Governor and Chief
Treasurer, the prefectural government was run by a bureaucrat [chief of the
planning and general affairs department] as a stop-gap measure.) Supported by
civic groups, Ōta announced that he would seek re-election in May the same 
year. In the April 2003 local elections, Ōta’s supporters in the Tokushima pre-
fectural assembly made gains. The political cleavage in the 42-seat assembly 
was: 16 pro-Ōta members versus 26 anti-Ōta members. By controlling more than
40 per cent of the assembly, the supporters of Ōta would be able to defeat a second
no-confidence motion (which needs more than 32 votes to pass) if Ōta were to
capture the governorship again (Daily Yomiuri Online, 15 April 2003).
Unfortunately for Ōta and his grassroots supporters, he lost his reelection bid in
May 2003 by a small margin: 47.7 per cent to LDP-supported Iizumi Kamon’s
49.7 per cent. Ironically, Ōta actually won 197,732 votes, far more than the
160,656 he won in April 2002 (Daily Yomiuri Online, 22 May 2003). The national
LDP mobilized its entire organizational apparatus to support Iizumi, a former
home affairs ministry official, and sent forty-five Diet members (including ministers
and party chiefs) to Tokushima to drum up support for him, particularly among
businesses. Moreover, Iizumi had strong support from many mayors and other
local politicians in the prefecture.
The Asahi Shimbun noted: ‘Concerned about the growing opposition to public
works projects and stung by a series of lost governorships, as in Nagano, the LDP
pulled out all the stops to win in Tokushima’ (Asahi Shimbun, Asahi.com, 20 May
2003). Moreover, Tokushima’s construction companies, which were hit by some
arrests in connection with the Endō bribery case, openly campaigned for Iizumi
this time after laying low in 2002 (Asahi Shimbun, editorial, 19 May 2003). Iizumi
did not support building a dam across the Yoshino during his campaign and also
pledged that he would respect the findings of a committee established earlier by
Ōta to investigate public works corruption in Tokushima. Thus Iizumi shrewdly
avoided any major policy differences with Ōta. Further controversies on the dam
issue and public works scandals during the campaign might well have cost Iizumi
some votes and tipped the electoral victory over to Ōta.
Iizumi’s main appeal to many Tokushima voters was his promise to restore nor-
malcy to governance in the prefecture. An Iizumi victory would mean a smoother
relationship with the conservative-dominated prefectural assembly; an Ōta victory
would surely guarantee fragmented governance in the prefecture. Even if Ōta had
won his reelection with sufficient legislative support to defeat another no-confidence
motion, he would still have faced difficulties implementing his campaign promises
because a majority of assembly members remained hostile to him. 
After winning his governorship, Iizumi ruled out reviving the controversial
project to build a dam across the Yoshino. The new governor proposed to repair
the existing old weir on the river instead and remarked that he has no right to
overturn the results of the Tokushima referendum (The Japan Times, 20 May 2003,
Asahi Shimbun, Asahi.com, 18 May 2003). However, the saga of Tokushima’s public
works controversy does not end with the election of Governor Iizumi. Once the
corruption investigation panel Ōta appointed has presented its report, a number
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of local politicians might well be implicated in various scandals leading to further
political turmoil and voter alienation in the prefecture. Although the pro-
referendum activists at the heart of Ōta’s campaign were deeply disappointed by
the election result, they pledged to watch the new Iizumi administration and
affirmed that this setback would not fundamentally change the new epoch of
citizen-centered democracy in Tokushima. 
Despite Ōta’s loss, the anti-dam activists benefited from two further devel-
opments. First, in the November 2003 Lower House Elections, the DP’s manifesto
fiercely criticized the proposed dam at Tokushima as a prime example of the LDP’s
wasteful public works policy. (The DP did well in that election to the extent that
many analysts believe that a two-party system is emerging in Japan.) Second,
Governor Iizumi in March 2004 requested the MOC to consider other options
first rather than to build a sluice-gate dam on the Yoshino. The media noted: 
‘In an apparent change of heart, Iizumi hints that the project should be abandoned
– although he stopped short of clearly stating so, probably in fear of stepping on
central government toes and losing the support of local proponents of the project’
(Editorial, Asahi Shimbun, 6 April 2004).
Tokushima prefecture was led by three governors in less than two years.
Governance over public works in the prefecture was also robustly contested by 
local and national politicians, bureaucrats from the MOC, interest groups
(especially construction companies) and pro-referendum activists. Against the
backdrop of a prolonged economic stagnation and a local administration saddled
with accumulated debts of more than 800 billion yen, Governor Iizumi would 
have to consider carefully whether Tokushima can still depend on public works to
boost the local economy (Daily Yomiuri Online, 22 May 2003). The term ‘fragmented
governance’ might well be apt to describe the decision-making process towards
public works in Tokushima. This concept of fragmented governance is also applic-
able to our next case study: Governor Tanaka Yasuo’s anti-dam policy in Nagano.
The Nagano model of local governance
Just before the Tokushima referendum took place, the local media reported that
novelist Tanaka Yasuo came to Tokushima city to bring out the votes (Tokushima
Shimbun, 10 and 16 January 2000). Obviously, widely known for his novel Nan to
naku kurisutaru (Somewhat Like Crystal which described the hedonistic lifestyle of young
Japanese in a materially affluent society) he was a national celebrity even before
he became governor of Nagano the same year. Tokushima’s media also mentioned
that Tanaka was prominent in the signature campaign to launch a referendum
against the construction of an airport in Kobe city. Subsequently, Tanaka as
governor would consider initiating a referendum to canvass the views of Nagano’s
residents on the desirability of constructing new dams (Sankei Shimbun, 13 November
2002).
Before Tanaka became governor in October 2000, Nagano prefecture was con-
tinually led by only two governors (who were ex-bureaucrats and vice-governors)
for 41 years and both sought to handpick their vice-governors (also ex-bureaucrats)
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to become their successor. However, a number of local residents, including the
president of Nagano’s largest local bank (Hachijūni), local businessmen, intellectuals
and civic groups, were against the practice of another bureaucrat occupying 
the office of governor. They chose instead to look for an attractive alternative
candidate.
Moreover, they were also unhappy with the local administration over the
corruption surrounding the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics, the massive fiscal
deficit the Olympics placed on Nagano citizens, and the local economic downturn
after the Olympic bubble economy in Nagano had burst. Citizens were also
enraged when the Olympics organizing committee burnt their accounts to prevent
citizens from auditing them for misappropriation of funds. Opponents to Nagano’s
traditional bureaucratic governance picked Tanaka (who lived in Nagano for many
years as a student) as their candidate.
When Tanaka agreed to run for election, many local residents volunteered to
campaign for him. The only established organizational support he received was
from Rengō, a trade union in Nagano. Running against him was a candidate
supported by almost all the established parties, mayors and prefecture assembly
members. Campaigning on environmental protection and greater transparency 
in local government, Tanaka chalked up a victory with over 100,000 votes over 
his rival.
Even though most prefectural assembly members and many local bureaucrats
supported his political opponent, Tanaka was not deterred. Drawing support from
an unprecedented 91.3 per cent support in December 2000 (Shinmai Nenkan, 2002:
30) from Nagano’s residence, he launched his Nagano model of local governance
(Nagano ken 2001; author’s interview, 22 May 2002). The features of this model
included:
• a glass office for the governor that can be viewed by the public to symbolize
transparency and closeness to local residents;
• e-governance where the governor and his staff welcome and answer e-mails
from residents;
• regular town hall meetings (kuruma shūkai) with citizens in different areas of
Nagano;
• an anti-dam declaration committing Nagano not to accept wasteful public
works (Uchiyama 2001);
• dismantling the press club system in Nagano to rid the prefecture of
information cartels; and
• a weekly press conference by the governor with question and answer sessions.
The national media gave wide-spread coverage to Tanaka’s anti-dam declaration
which challenged the political economy of public works and governance in Japan.
An editorial noted: ‘Nagano Governor Tanaka Yasuo’s announcement of a no dam
policy opened the floodgates to a torrent of debate on dams throughout Japan’
(Mainichi Interactive, 17 April 2001).
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Fragmented governance in Nagano
Armed with only a popular mandate, Governor Tanaka had to face a hostile
prefectural assembly, and other city and village governments that support public
work projects. With the exception of the communists, every single political 
party in Nagano was against his anti-dam declaration (datsu damu sengen). Even the
DP, the main opposition party at the national level, joined the LDP assembly
members to oppose the governor. Apparently, many DP local politicians were
former LDP members who left with ex-Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu when he
joined the Shinshintō (New Frontier Party) and then the DP.3 In this regard, many
DP politicians in Nagano shared the same conservative background and values 
as the LDP. Ironically, the DP at the national level officially opposed wasteful 
public works.
Prefectural assembly members blasted Tanaka for being dictatorial in his style
of governance. They questioned the appropriateness of Tanaka unilaterally
stopping the construction of dams without seeking an understanding with the
prefectural assembly and other city and village governments. To circumvent 
the governor’s anti-dam policy, the prefectural assembly passed a budget that
included money for public work projects that Tanaka had opposed, and passed an
ordinance to set up a committee to consider whether more dams should be built
in Nagano.
When Tanaka announced the cancellation of the Asakawa and Shimosuwa 
dam projects on 25 June 2002, Nagano’s prefectural assembly soon passed a 
no-confidence motion against him on 5 July 2002. This act was unprecedented in
the history of post-war, local governance in Japan. Never before had a prefectural
assembly sought to dismiss a governor over policy disputes (there was only one prior
case of a prefectural assembly passing a no-confidence motion against a governor
for corruption). Tanaka had two choices: either dissolve the prefectural assembly
for new elections or run for reelection as governor. Tanaka opted to let the citizens
of Nagano decide on his suitability as governor.
In September 2002, Tanaka won a landslide victory. Running as an independent
again, he garnered 822,897 votes while his main contender (supported by most
assembly members, and city, town and village mayors) obtained only 406,559 votes.
Despite his overwhelming victory, Tanaka still is confronted by a hostile prefectural
assembly. It is difficult to break the impasse between the executive and legisla-
ture in Nagano prefecture unless citizen groups supportive of Tanaka succeed in
winning seats in the prefectural assembly or Tanaka were to step down as governor.
In the April 2003 local elections, Tanaka and his supporters had hoped to put
at least fifteen pro-Tanaka assembly members in office, a number large enough to
veto any future no-confidence motions against the governor in the 58-seat assembly.
The result was a grave disappointment for Tanaka: only ten pro-Tanaka assembly
members were elected. Even though an Asahi Shimbun exit poll found 67 per cent
of those who voted in Nagano’s 2003 Elections proclaimed support for Tanaka,
the governor’s own popularity does not necessarily extend to the candidates he
supports (Asahi Shimbun, Asahi.com, 16 April 2003). 
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Another obstacle to Tanaka’s leadership is an unsupportive local bureaucracy
with a vested interest in public works. Bureaucratic hostility towards Tanaka is
evidenced by the arrest of some local bureaucrats who broke election laws when
they campaigned for his rival, and also the notorious ‘business card bending’
incident. This incident occurred when Tanaka gave his business card to the division
chief of public works during his first day as governor. The bureaucrat defiantly
folded Tanaka’s business card in front of the media and the public. Outraged by
the bureaucrat’s rudeness and insubordination, 25,000 residents phoned the
prefectural office to criticize his behaviour (Shinmai Nenkan, 2002: 30).
The high indebtedness of Nagano prefecture and the stagnant economy of 
both prefecture and country are further obstacles to Tanaka’s vision of local gov-
ernance. The prefecture has a debt of US$12.5 billion, about half of it stemming
from the Olympics (International Herald Tribune, 22 May 2001). Indeed, Nagano’s
level of indebtedness is the second worst among all prefectures in Japan. The
governor is against pump-priming of the local economy based on wasteful public
works. However, it remains unclear what the environmentally friendly policies are
that could possibly revitalize the economy of Nagano.
Assessing the battle sites of local governance
The phenomena of referenda and the new wave of independent governors have
taken place even in rural Japan, a bastion of conservative rule. A key reason why
some rural prefectures have become contested battle sites of local governance is
the issue of wasteful public works and environmental destruction in those localities.
(Public works are less critical to boosting the economy of and vote gathering in
metropolitan Japan.) In a number of pitched battles, non-partisan activists had
routed their seemingly entrenched conservative opponents. While victories in
localities like Tokushima and Nagano might seem dramatic and impressive, the
reality is that referenda in Japan are no easy task and independent governors still
remain a minority among their counterparts in the nation’s 47 prefectures.
Have referenda been a boon or bane to local governance? Referenda have
certainly given ordinary citizens the opportunity to directly voice their preferences
in public policy issues. From a democratic, ethical point of view, national and local
governments should not go against the people’s will when they formulate and
implement policies. Though plebiscite is relatively new to Japan, ordinary citizens
have clearly embraced the spirit of referenda. According to public opinion polls,
the Japanese support referenda as a guide to local and national governance (see
Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
However, critics have pointed out that local referenda often focus on issues that
have ramifications beyond their immediate vicinity. Is it appropriate for the little
town of Maki to decide on nuclear facilities which impact on national energy policy?
Should Okinawa prefecture and Nago town decide on US military bases which are
central to the US–Japan alliance? After all, foreign relations are the responsibility
of the central government. Why should Tokushima city override the preferences
of Tokushima prefecture, two cities and eight villages along the Yoshino? 
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While the phenomena of local referenda and the new wave of independent
governors have enhanced grassroots democracy, such trends have also led to frag-
mented governance in certain localities of Japan. In the cases of Tokushima and
Nagano, there were gridlocks among village, city, prefecture and national govern-
ments over public work projects. Governors Ōta and Tanaka were confronted 
by hostile prefectural assemblies. As mentioned above, however, fragmented
governance may not necessarily be bad if it blocks wasteful and environmentally
destructive public works. Smooth governance among governors, mayors, pre-
fecture, city, town, village assemblies, the national bureaucracy and ruling parties
is not necessarily good if it merely promotes pork barrel politics and corruption,4
and excludes local residents from policymaking that impacts directly on their lives
and environment.
To what extent have these twin phenomena of referenda and indepen-
dent governors challenged the political economy based on wasteful public works
spending? Despite fragmented governance in Tokushima and Nagano, massive
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Table 4.1 Referendum and local governments
Question: Do you think local governments and local assemblies should follow the results
of a local referendum, they should respect the results as much as possible, or should the
results be only used as a reference?
Responses Per cent
Should follow the results 23
Should respect the results as much as possible 58
Use the results as a reference 13
No response/others 6
Table 4.2 Roles of referenda
Question: Which of the following opinions about local referenda is close to your own?
Responses Per cent
Local referenda should be held often in order to reflect local 
residents’ opinion in local politics 61
Local referenda should be held only when there is a serious issue 29
Local referenda are not necessary because they can be replaced by 
local assemblies 5
Others/no responses 5
N = 1,567 
Asahi Shimbun, 16 February 1999, J-Poll: US-Japan Foundation & Roper Center for public opinion
research.
dam projects have been checked by grassroots democracy. The media have paid
much attention to the anti-dam movements in Tokushima and Nagano. They have
also highlighted the extent to which Tokyo’s relentless construction of dams runs
against the grain of other developed countries’ dam policies (Asahi Shimbun, 20 May
2001 and 21 November 2002). Indeed, the US is proceeding to destroy some dams
to allow rivers to flow naturally and fish to spawn again. Increasingly, the national
mood is shifting against the construction of dams and other public works after
Japan’s attempts to spend its way out of economic stagnation have failed. 
A ballooning fiscal problem and perhaps another decade of economic stagna-
tion will probably place tremendous stress on Japan’s political economy of the
construction state (doken kokka) and LDP rule (Social Science Japan, December 1999).
Japan is already the biggest spender on public works among the G-7 countries
(Table 4.3). The episode of PARC Chairman Kamei visiting Tokushima city and
jūdaizeki in August 2000 captured the dilemma and contradictions of LDP rule. 
The party sought to appease the urban voters by ostensibly scaling back on some
public works projects in rural Japan but was severely criticized by its politicians
and supporters in rural Japan who have grown dependent on public works. How
is the LDP going to square the circle by placating both urban and rural voters at
the same time? 
Conclusion
Local governance based on the political economy of public works may still be
business as usual in many prefectures. Nevertheless, it is probably not sustainable
in the long run. Cognizant of this, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s admin-
istration has rejected the hitherto approach of massive public works spending to
stimulate economic recovery. This seems to suggest that Koizumi’s anti-public
works stance and the stance of anti-reform local politicians and bureaucrats are 
in contestation. While Koizumi has boosted his mass popularity by adopting a
reformist image, we should be reminded that the electoral successes of Tanaka 
and the new wave of reform-minded independent governors contributed to the
sense of crisis among LDP rank and file and party chapters which led to an
unprecedented grassroots party revolt which catapulted Koizumi into power. The
shifting national mood against wasteful public works and Koizumi’s structural
reforms which emphasize fiscal austerity and a cap on public works have given
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Source: Bank of Japan, International Comparative Statistics in Social Science Japan, December 1999.
greater legitimacy and a political boost to local anti-public works movements
including referenda.
An editor asked: ‘Is Tanaka’s insistence that we consider the burdens public work
projects impose on society a manifestation of a revolt whose impact will be felt only
in Nagano or has he started a revolution that will eventually spread throughout the
country?’ (Mainichi Interactive, 24 February 2001). Trying to tap into Governor
Tanaka’s popularity, the DP appointed him to its shadow cabinet as minister in
charge of decentralization just before the November 2003 Lower House elections. 
The anti-dam movements in Nagano and Tokushima might well become a
catalyst for other local challenges to a centralized system of governance based on
public works and pork-barrel politics. Conceivably, these challenges would intensify
if referenda were to become legally binding. While there is a nationwide network
that advocates legally-binding plebiscite, the national ruling parties are unlikely to
strengthen the system of referenda (The Japan Times, 2 June 1999). The economic
rise of China (which has contributed to the hollowing out of industries in various
localities of Japan), a looming fiscal crisis for both national and local governments,
weak coalition governments at the national level and voter dealignment from
political parties will pose major challenges to both national and local governance
in Japan. Amidst such ferment, local referenda and independent governors might
well play a larger role in governance in the next decade than might appear at first
sight.
Moreover, the rural vote has become less than solid for the LDP especially in
areas where referenda and the new wave of governors have emerged. In 1998,
Tokushima prefecture received 550 billion yen (US$4.41 billion) from the national
coffers, the second most generous outlay among Japan’s 47 prefectures (Asian Wall
Street Journal, 2 July 2001). That Tokushima, the second largest beneficiary of the
central government’s public works largesse, could turn against Tokyo confirms that
there is a greater contestation among the sites of governance and that cracks are
appearing in the very structure of local and national governance in Japan. 
Interviews
Governor Asano Shirō, 24 May 2002.
Himeno Masayoshi, 28 June 1999.
Governor Tanaka Yasuo, 22 May 2002.
Hata Jirō, 23 December 2002.
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Notes
1 Ishihara may not fit comfortably into this group because he is a right-wing nationalist;
most of the other independent governors are not. Nevertheless, he does not depend on
the established parties for support. Besides Governor Tanaka, he is the only governor
to hold a weekly question and answer session.
2 ‘However, most of the projects mentioned in the report had already been suspended by
the relevant government ministries for a variety of reasons’ (Asahi Shimbun, Asahi.com, 29
August 2000). A scholar noted that in reality less than 0.5 per cent of the 8,000
development projects examined have been cancelled (McCormack 2002).
3 Hata Tsutomu was the LDP bigwig in Nagano. According to his son and personal
assistant, Hata Jirō, the local DP in Nagano was not necessarily against Tanaka’s anti-
dam policy but his style of governance (Author’s interview, 23 December 2002).
However, the media did report a split between the national DP and the Nagano DP
over the issue of dam construction. Moreover, Tokushima DP and Nagano DP have
different orientations towards dams. It also shows how incoherent the main opposition
party is, a feature which contributes to its inept image and inability to displace a ruling
party in decline, the LDP.
4 The collusion between the LDP and the construction industry can be seen from the
fact that two Ministers of Construction were indicted for bribery in recent years:
Nakamura Kishirō in 1994 and Nakao Eiichi in 2000. Nakao belonged to the Kamei
faction whose leader, Kamei Shizuka, sought to refurbish the LDP’s image as a party
that does not support wasteful public works. Nakao’s corruption case was linked to the
Yamaguchi gumi, the largest Yakuza group in Japan.
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Jain, Purnendra (2000) ‘Jumin tohyo and the Tokushima anti-dam movement in Japan’,
Asian Survey 40, 4 (July/August): 551–70.
McCormack, Gavan (2002) ‘Breaking the Iron Triangle’, New Left Review 13, January–
February: 5–23.
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The governance of the financial system in Japan – especially the relationship
between governments and banks – has been at the core of the way the develop-
mental state has worked over the past half-century. In the age of ‘Japan, Inc.’, how
money, especially investment capital, was allocated between different uses involved
a largely closed shop of bureaucrats, politicians, banks, stock markets and firms,
insulated from international financial markets and locked into government-backed,
quasi-oligopolistic competition at home. However, with increasing international
economic interdependence and openness – especially the huge upsurge in inter-
national capital mobility since the 1970s and the global integration of financial
markets and price sensitivity across borders – that closed shop is being contested
from both outside and inside. Financial governance in Japan has been on the
threshold of fundamental restructuring for at least a decade, probably two or 
three. Yet, despite a wide range of particular measures having been adopted since
the 1970s, particularly the ‘big bang’ reforms of the mid-1990s, that restructuring
is still to a large extent on hold while academics, politicians, bureaucrats, the media
and a range of interest and pressure groups debate how, and how far, to change
long-entrenched practices and relationships focused on both the site and mecha-
nisms of financial governance. 
Specific changes over the past ten years or so include:
• interest rate deregulation;
• opening financial markets to international integration;
• financial innovation;
• restructuring key aspects of the banking system;
• reshaping financial control structures of both financial and non-financial firms;
• reforming corporate governance arrangements;
• introducing new forms of arm’s-length prudential regulation to replace earlier
forms of direct bureaucratic interventionism; and
• reforms to the tax system, and much more.
Nevertheless, analysts are agreed that these changes do not yet add up to the kind
of full-scale system reform that would be required to drag the Japanese financial
system – and the Japanese economy – into the twenty-first century. Whether, if,
and how such fundamental restructuring might take place is at the core of debates
about governance in Japan. More than that, however, what is at stake is not merely
what happens in Japan but involves the centrality of finance and money to gover-
nance in general, combined with the dramatic impact of financial globalization
everywhere. Fundamental change in Japan would indicate that globalization is
reshaping governance even in the most deeply embedded ‘developmental state’ in
the contemporary world.
The concept of governance cuts across the familiar antinomies of ‘govern-
ment’ and ‘society’, of ‘state’ and ‘market’, of formal institutions and informal
practices, to focus on fundamental modes of structuring power and outcomes on
both sides of the public/private divide, enmeshing the two in a multidimensional
system of allocating values and resources. The three core ‘modes’ of governance
are (1) hierarchies, where outcomes are the result of power and authority orga-
nized vertically, (2) markets, where outcomes are determined through horizontally
organized economic exchanges between autonomous buyers and sellers setting
mutually acceptable prices, and (3) networks, where ongoing, interdependent social
interactions over time create habits, norms and accepted ways of doing things
(‘practices’) that often seem to trump both hierarchies and markets (see Thompson
et al., 1991).
The so-called ‘Japanese model’, while formally capitalist in economic terms 
and liberal democratic in governmental terms, has involved a strong predominance
of both formal and informal hierarchies and networks – although in different
admixtures depending on the author, with Chalmers Johnson (1982), for example,
emphasizing hierarchies and Karel van Wolferen (1990) emphasizing rather
convoluted networks. In both of these authors’ views, however, a mix of hierarchy
and network is in control – rather than market forms of governance as such. This 
is true for both economic markets – where competitiveness rather than cartels,
profitability rather than market share, transparency rather than behind-the-
scenes deals, and price-setting in the market rather than by fiat are seen to be 
both necessary and desirable for economic efficiency – and political markets –
where pluralism, accountability, transparency and competitive democracy, rather
than vague consensus, corporatism, cronyism and one-party control, are seen to
be crucial to ‘good governance’ and effective public policy.
Nowhere is this more important than with regard to the financial system. For as
John Zysman (1983) has argued (see also Cerny 1994), the creation and allocation
of money and credit are the underlying elements that make other activities and
outputs possible. They determine who has the resources to ‘get what, when and
how’ (the ‘medium of exchange’), they permit the comparative measurement of
value (the ‘unit of account’), and they create the possibility of future investment
and growth (the ‘store of value’). Indeed, the financial system is the heart and
circulatory system of the Japanese model. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese
model – or ‘developmental state’ (Johnson 1982) – was thought not only to be a
uniquely successful, exceptional approach to the problems of advanced capitalist
society, but also to embody a different potential approach for others to copy in the
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future – one which might indeed be applicable to one extent or another not only
in various Asian ‘tigers’ but also to the ‘British disease’, the American ‘rust bowl’
and other cases where the post-long boom recession was undermining the postwar
settlement.
Since that time, however, a combination of the post-1989 crisis of the Japanese
economy and polity along with the further expansion of neo-liberal, market-
oriented economic globalization has undermined what is now seen as the myth 
of Japanese prowess and caused some key Japanese policymakers increasingly 
to attempt to pursue basic structural reforms. The core of this uneven and
underdeveloped process concerns the Japanese financial system – which lies at the
heart of the Japanese model – despite huge entrenched barriers to such reform. 
In contrast, today’s international financial system is often seen as involving the
extension of actual market structures and extrapolation of market-like practices
across the world. With financial liberalization, pro-market re-regulation and the
reduction of capital controls, it is no longer primarily governments that determine
what states and economic actors are able to do in the way of allocating capital,
although they may play a facilitating role. Nor is it the cosy insider trading cliques
of old-style banks and stock markets nor the collaboration of neo-corporatist social
partners that determines prices and market outcomes. Rather, it is changing,
globally linked financial market governance structures themselves which constitute
the principal steering mechanism of the new international financial architecture
(Cerny 2002).
The structural challenge: from institutions to markets
The postwar Japanese model was predicated on two things: on the ability of 
Japan to resist the kind of competitive marketization, globalization and neoliberal
laissez faire that was later to be embodied in Thatcherism and Reaganism; and 
on the ability of Japanese firms, backed up by the state, to exploit that very global-
ization and marketization in order to expand their world market shares. The
combination of these two factors permitted Japanese firms to use others’ openness
to their own advantage by exporting or establishing overseas operations while not
having to face foreign competition at home. At the core of the model was the
financial system, the ‘infrastructure of the infrastructure’, which seemed capable
of squaring the circle. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, a
combination of ongoing domestic financial crises within Japan plus the spread of
globalizing financial market practices is currently leading to the partial collapse
and extensive restructuring of the Japanese financial system. The globalization of
finance – itself a combination of accelerating international capital flows, growing
cross-border price sensitivity, and the restructuring of the financial services sector
around a market-based model – impinges upon and penetrates national models
everywhere, forcing fundamental changes which must be absorbed and integrated
into national institutions and practices if economies are to keep up with the evolving
practices of the Competition State (Cerny 2000) and the ‘post-Fordist’, ‘new
economy’-based Third Industrial Revolution.
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In this context, financial globalization is a particularly powerful and pivotal
process in driving political as well as economic change. More specifically, some
national economic systems are a priori more open and vulnerable to the ‘imper-
atives’ of financial globalization than others. Some systems, especially those of the
United States and the United Kingdom, can be classified as financial market economies
(Coudrat 1986; Loriaux 1991). In such systems, the key to money and finance lies
in how ‘negotiable’ financial instruments known as ‘securities’ – such as stocks,
shares, bonds, and, more recently, a multiplicity of innovative instruments including
‘derivatives’, ‘asset-backed securities’, and so on – are traded amongst relatively
autonomous buyers and sellers. Governments in these systems – if they wish to
promote the expansion of financial markets in the name of general economic
growth and development, and therefore if private market actors are effectively to
provide capital to the economic system as a whole – must therefore keep themselves
at arm’s length from the ostensibly sacrosanct market relationship between buyers
and sellers. Of course, such relationships are open to abuse, as the Enron and 
other recent scandals in the United States have reminded us. Indeed, pro-market
regulation – i.e., regulation intended to make markets more competitive and
transparent and less collusive, for example traditional anti-trust legislation and
prohibitions on insider trading – has always been at the core of the financial market
model. Those sorts of regulation are meant to make markets work better, to ‘com-
modify’ rather than to ‘decommodify’ economic activities (Cerny 1990).
Financial globalization, too, is driven by just this sort of financial market trading
and therefore raises the same sort of regulatory issues on a wider, transnational
level. This is the case precisely because governments, while they can and do regulate
such markets – i.e., set the rules of the game and shape basic aspects of market
design – are far less able to shape and control the actual outcomes of market trans-
actions. They instead attempt to make the system as a whole work more smoothly
by providing nurturing environmental conditions such as ‘sound’ monetary and
fiscal policy, an effective legal system to adjudicate disputes, a market-friendly set
of regulatory institutions and processes, and so on. International finance is thus
particularly able to escape the clutches of the state in significant ways, especially
through ‘regulatory arbitrage’ or the playing off of different regulatory jurisdictions
against each other to get the best, most international-finance-friendly, deal (Cerny
1993: 51–85; Lütz 2002). Regulatory arbitrage, it must be emphasized, like policy
responses to perceived ‘footloose capital’ in general, is not merely the product of
specific firms pressurizing governments by shifting (or refusing to shift) their capital
around; rather, it usually involves a wider process of policy transfer triggered by
policymakers’ anticipation of a need for regulatory change in response to ‘global
realities’ (Evans 2004). Thus the whole ‘big bang’ programme of the mid-1990s
can be seen as an attempt by the Hashimoto government to attract reluctant
international investors and financial firms into Japan.
Many late nineteenth- and twentieth-century national financial systems such as
that of Japan, however, were based on very different structures and practices.
Several key nation-states were ‘late industrializers’, wishing not to see capital
flowing freely across borders, but rather to keep it at home. While protecting
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domestic infant industries from destructive foreign competition, such countries in
addition adopted what are called credit-based financial systems (Zysman 1983) – also
called ‘debt-based economies’ (Renversez 1986) or ‘overdraft economies’ (Loriaux
1991). Such systems were aimed at (1) keeping capital at home in order to promote
the development of the domestic economy in order to escape the financial market
dominance of London and (later) New York, and (2) ensuring that investment
flowed to industries that would come to constitute an autonomous, even self-
sufficient, economic base for rapid ‘catch-up’ with (a) earlier industrializers (i.e.
Britain) and/or (b) countries with large, practically self-sufficient domestic resources
and large-scale domestic markets (mainly the United States).
In finance as in other sectors of these economies (and, indeed, closely interlinked
with those sectors), governments fostered the development of monopolistic or
oligopolistic cartels. In other words, they promoted systematic attempts to prevent
too much competition amongst producers and traders in order to resist external
domination. Regulated competition was the norm at home. Relations between
firms were organized around not competition but market sharing and price fixing.
Investment capital in such systems is normally provided not through open market
transactions between buyers and sellers, but from negotiated – usually called ‘inter-
mediated’ – relationships between closely intertwined institutions, with the amount
of capital provided, and its cost (mainly the rate of interest paid by borrowers) based
on collaboration and bargaining amongst institutional actors and not on prices
determined through trading on relatively open markets. In this case, it has generally
been governments, using resources taken from taxes and/or borrowing, that have
provided key backing. 
This backing has taken a number of forms, especially in terms of raising
investment capital: whether directly by providing subsidies to firms; indirectly
through guarantees and the subsidization of interest rates and payback conditions
for bank loans to industry; or even more indirectly through anti-competitive
regulations and supportive practices which often permit or even encourage firms
and cartels to manipulate financial markets themselves in order to ensure a
substantial and liquid supply of capital at rigged prices. Development came through
the provision of this kind of cheap, long-term capital (sometimes called ‘patient
capital’), especially in the context of Second Industrial Revolution-type develop-
ment where extremely large investments were needed in order to achieve viable
economies of scale and scope (Chandler 1990). This approach enabled Germany,
Japan and at (a later stage) France and East Asian economies such as South Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand to develop rapidly. It also fostered the development of
political coalitions, interest group collaboration and bureaucratic practices which
gave these governments at various times a potential strategic role in promoting
development – what Zysman (1983) called the ‘strategic state’ and Chalmers
Johnson (1982) the ‘developmental state’.
This is not to say that such systems did not possess capital markets as such, 
but rather that the dominant mode of capital provision and price-setting was 
through banks – especially those banks with close, entrenched linkages with par-
ticular firms and sectors as well as with key government ministries and agencies.
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Financial markets played a secondary role – for example in Japan, by providing a
forum wherein established financial and industrial firms could carry out deals
amongst themselves in order to manipulate the supply and cost of capital through
prearranged share transactions. Intermediaries sought to manipulate, and/or
authoritatively to restrict the growth of, competitive, shareholder-oriented financial
markets – especially where it was felt that foreign capital needed to be kept out 
in order to focus on domestically generated priorities. But at the same time banks
(and the state) had to provide enough finance for the massive investments required 
for Second Industrial Revolution firms, something financial markets were often
unwilling or unable to do except in the United States with its huge domestic market
(Chandler, 1990; Chernow, 1990). Large investments required large institutions
with deep pockets, whether private or public.
The Japanese intermediary-led system under pressure
Nowhere was the cartellized, intermediary-led model more fully imposed and
entrenched than in Japan. It has been at the heart of the post-Meiji approach 
in the nineteenth century; it was entrenched in the private sector through the big
zaibatsu trading companies (the forerunners of today’s keiretsu); it was forcibly
imposed by the military regime prior to and during the Second World War; it
survived the American Occupation; and it formed the basis of the Japanese
developmental state model until recent years. Katz (2003) argues strongly that 
this sense of historical continuity is largely a myth manipulated and reshaped 
in the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, the way the Japanese financial system
has been governed over a long period of time, took on a particular form in the
1960s–1980s, and is solidly ‘embedded’, as institutional analysts say, through several
interlocking foundations – the following six in particular (Johnson 1982; Zysman
1983; Horne 1985; Suzuki 1987; Wright and Pauli 1987; Brown 1994 and 1999;
Vogel 1996 and 1999; Hartcher 1997; Katz 1998 and 2003; Carlile and Tilton
1998; Pempel 1998a, 1998b; Morishima 2000; Malcolm 2001; Mikuni and
Murphy 2002). These dimensions vary over time, of course, and analysts disagree
about details, but their broad parameters are well known and are merely
summarized here. 
The first foundation was the insulation of the system itself from outside capital.
Both the availability of foreign exchange and its use were closely regulated 
and rationed by the government, particularly by the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
Dependence on domestic bank financing has thus been the major method by which
public–private networks and influence relationships have been signed and sealed.
Nevertheless, the restructuring process since the mid-1990s has to a large extent
been driven by a combination of a crisis of domestic institutions and an influx of
foreign financial firms and investors, increasingly welcomed even by sectors of the
government and bureaucracy. The cartellized financial system may not yet be fully
open to foreign capital – market share abroad is still widely seen as the key measure
of Japanese economic strength – but it is increasingly so, and sometimes in quite
spectacular fashion in particular instances. Despite major withdrawals of foreign
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firms in 2000–2, foreign investors have been the overwhelming (indeed almost the
only) driving force of the stock market rebound in mid-2003 (International Herald
Tribune, 9 July 2003; Financial Times, 11 July 2003). 
The second foundation was the rationing of domestic capital, too, through both
direct and indirect control by MOF. Large loans, especially those above ceilings
set by MOF, had to be approved, and MOF (and other ministries) kept a close
watch on their uses to ensure that they went to the appropriate infant industries,
especially the competitive and highly promoted export sector. Such loans were also
usually at discounted, non-market rates in order to keep capital costs low and
encourage investment; in this the Japanese model was extremely successful, and it
is here that the country gained its reputation as ‘Japan Inc.’. These private sector
loans were supplemented by public sector financing funded primarily by savings
held in the postal savings system (zaito funds) and carried out via the MOF’s
purchase of private sector bank debentures (as well as public sector debentures)
through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme (FILP; see Wright 2001).
However, as Katz (1998 and 2003) and Carlile and Tilton (1998) argue, from
the 1970s onwards such low cost, long-term loans went increasingly not to successful
export sector firms, but to the non-competitive, protected sector. Competitive firms
found their own sources of capital from export profits. Indeed, much of today’s
‘bad loans crisis’ is said to result from banks having too much to lend in recent
decades, leading to a sharp increase in ‘nonperforming’ loans, i.e. to bad (and
under-supervised) credit risks (see also Mikuni and Murphy 2002). The ability 
of banks to obtain guarantees, regulatory approval, rediscounting facilities and 
the like for such loans has not only ensured their availability but also implied state
approval for the activities subsidized. This second characteristic was exacerbated
from the 1970s onwards as the special interest politics fostered by the Tanaka gov-
ernment drew the Liberal Democratic Party more closely into a much wider range
of quasi-corrupt, clientelistic cartel arrangements mainly for electoral purposes
(Pempel 1998a).
A third foundation, much debated in the literature (contrast Hartcher 1997;
Brown 1999; and Mikuni and Murphy 2002), has been so-called ‘administrative
guidance’. Administrative guidance refers to a mix of formal and informal practices
whereby banks and other firms regularly consult with their supervising ministries
(broadly speaking, the MOF for financial institutions, the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry for the competitive exporting sector, the Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications for the telecoms sector,
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport for the construction sector, etc.)
and are basically told how to run their businesses, at least at certain times and in
ways deemed important by the bureaucracy and (some) politicians. Mikuni and
Murphy (2002) argue that administrative guidance was never really just guidance
but actually an authoritative command system that firms not only could not dis-
regard but also saw as crucial to their survival and success. Nevertheless, the actual
influence of administrative guidance in particular circumstances and issue areas
has been variable, is widely debated and is to some extent changing under the sorts
of pressures discussed in this chapter.
96 Philip G. Cerny
Brown (1999) argues that administrative guidance has to a large extent been a
two-way street. Financial businesses supplied the MOF with extensive information
on their operations because they trusted the bureaucrats not to give away their
proprietary competitive secrets; non-transparency was actually a source of strategic
effectiveness, co-ordinative capacity and competitive expansion. They also trusted
the bureaucrats to take the national interest into account. Such a role can only be
played in a system of governance co-ordinated through hierarchical interme-
diary institutions like banks, operating in close network relationships with equally
hierarchical bureaucracies. Market-led systems demand the opposite, especially
transparency and competition. But the uncertain future of administrative guidance
is a complex feature of the current reform process. It is often argued that the MOF
and other ministries, agencies and political groupings today are divided on how far
to change the system, with some younger cadres in particular concerned to promote
practices compatible with marketization and competitiveness in a more open,
global context.
Mikuni and Murphy (2002) argue that bureaucracies and large firms are just 
as hierarchical and intertwined today as ever. These networks, they say, are still
hidden by the lack of transparency and disclosure that continue to exist despite
ostensible corporate governance reforms, the huge amount of discretion bureau-
crats can call upon in deciding whether actually to enforce existing rules or not,
the relative dearth of auditors and accountants and their cosy relationship with
firms, and the small size of the legal profession and its lack of an adversarial
tradition. Nevertheless, the large extent of piecemeal reforms in all of these areas
and their prominence in political debate and the economic and financial press
suggests that an internal struggle is taking place within the traditional hierarchies
and networks as to how to ‘modernize’ financial governance in Japan. My own
interviews in the late 1990s suggest that indeed there are significant ‘modernizing’
elites within major bureaucratic hierarchies such as the Ministry of Finance, the
Bank of Japan, the Financial Supervisory Agency, and so on, especially among
younger bureaucrats with experience abroad, seeking to promote regulatory reform
and liberalization.
The fourth foundation, already alluded to, involves institutionalized networks
of interlocking personnel between politicians, bureaucrats and business elites,
cutting across public and private sectors. Although these networks operate at 
many levels, probably the best known has been the practice of amakudari (‘descent
from heaven’), although the practice is ostensibly in decline in recent years. Top
Japanese bureaucrats rise more quickly in their respective career ladders and retire
remarkably young by Western standards, allowing them a long second career 
in the industries they have often supervised. Although practised in other sectors as
well, this phenomenon has been particularly notable in the financial sector – with
former MOF officials heading the list in 1999 – thus sealing the web of personal
and professional relationships between the bureaucracy and financial institutions.
Some stronger institutions, such as former zaibatsu banks, have always rejected such
parachuting, and in today’s context when institutions increasingly want to be seen
to be independent in a more open financial marketplace, amakudari seems to be
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losing much of its influence and legitimacy, although Mikuni and Murphy (2002)
disagree strongly.
The fifth foundation also represents a cultural and ideological attitude more than
an economic calculus: the so-called ‘convoy system’. This phrase means that change
in the financial system is only allowed to proceed at the speed of the slowest ship
in the convoy, in order to protect the whole system from being undermined bit by
bit. The convoy system led for many years to (among other things) government-
managed mergers of unprofitable institutions with (usually) larger institutions with
deeper pockets. MOF-sponsored merger activity has often sought to maintain the
size, market share, loan portfolio and sometimes even the distinct internal structures
of the failing institutions, including jobs. This seemed to work well when the larger
Japanese banks were profitable and apparently internationally competitive prior
to the bursting of the bubble, but the extent of the bad loans crisis of the 1990s and
early 2000s has meant that many mergers are now recognized to have undermined
the soundness of the institutions doing the absorbing.
More recent intervention by the MOF and the newer agencies spun off from it
such as the Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC) and the Financial
Supervisory Agency (FSA) has at least ostensibly been predicated upon the condi-
tion that major restructuring should take place but this has been extremely limited.
Analysts have generally been highly critical of the practice of pushing troubled
banks to merge with more sound ones, on the basis that rather than the sound bank
successfully restoring the weak one to health, the result has often been a weakening
of the previously sound bank. Weak auditing practices resulting from close links
between bureaucrats, banks and accounting firms have also been criticized. For
example, controversy in 2003 over the failure of the newly merged Resona Bank
and its (ostensibly temporary) quasi-nationalization, for example, has involved a
dispute over whether regulators attempted to intervene to stop newly-tough
auditors Shin Nihon from declaring Resona bankrupt because of the way it assessed
its capital base. Indeed, the head of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public
Accountants believes that auditors ‘should take on the role of serving the public
interest’ in identifying and pursuing more such cases and that ‘the kind of admin-
istrative guidance which gave rise to the convoy system is over’ (Financial Times,
21 May 2003). Nevertheless, other cases of intervention to save failing banks and
‘zombie companies’ are continually being discussed in the media and it is still
unclear whether Resona constitutes an exception or is evidence of broader changes
in attitudes and approach.
At least three aspects of recent restructuring are notable. In the first place,
government bailouts of failing institutions have sought to restructure the latters’
loan portfolios, for example selling off bad loans at highly discounted market 
prices or having government agencies take over such loans while seeking partners
willing to restructure their own activities in order to ensure both safety and
profitability. Indeed, the MOF’s approach has involved an uneven blend of old
and new Japanese practices, on the one hand, with methods used by the first Bush
Administration in the United States during the later stages of the Third World debt
crisis (the Brady Plan) and in the Savings and Loans crisis of the late 1980s. Second,
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the big banks no longer have such deep pockets, being highly vulnerable to the bad
loans crisis themselves, and have since the mid-1990s increasingly been forced into
so-called ‘megamergers’, reducing the number of major commercial banks (called
‘city banks’) from eleven to five, four or possibly three in the near future.
Furthermore, firms outside of the traditional banking sector – foreign banks 
and financial firms, on the one hand, and certain non-financial firms, too – are
playing an increasing role, especially as the ‘big bang’ reform process has made it
possible for financial holding companies to be set up to cut across these boundaries.
However, the convoy approach, like much of the cartellized financial system (and
other sectors of industry too), has also often been justified not only for its role in
ensuring the safety and soundness of the banking system but also as a kind of social
policy to protect jobs – both in the banks themselves and in the firms with which
they are linked through their loan portfolios. It is this ‘stakeholder’ facet that is 
most under threat from financial globalization, because international investors and
foreign firms are interested only in ‘shareholder value’ –  i.e. return on capital –
and not in subsidizing loss-making activities. Mikuni and Murphy (2002) argue that
these restructurings, while more thoroughgoing than previous arranged mergers,
are still decided upon and carried out in non-transparent ways through admin-
istrative guidance. Nevertheless, there is a growing level of public scrutiny both
from the media and from some more active shareholders that makes it more and
more difficult to undertake restructurings if they are not justified by market criteria
– in other words, if they do not involve real cost-cutting, structural streamlining,
labour flexibilization, efficient investment and profit maximization.
The sixth foundation derives from the organizational structure of Japanese
industry in general, especially the keiretsu system. This is analogous to an endogenous
private sector version of the government-industry links discussed earlier. Modelled
on the big pre-war zaibatsu trading houses, partially dismantled by the postwar
occupation authorities, the keiretsu are basically very diverse conglomerates made
up of firms which are sometimes formally merged, but more often held together by
extensive cross-shareholdings. At the core of each of these conglomerate networks
has been a main bank which has played various coordinating roles with regard to
inter-firm relationships (Horne 1985; Suzuki 1987). These internal governance
processes involve not only the supply of investment capital but also other cartel-
like inter-firm arrangements on pricing, cross-subsidization of profitable and loss-
making activities, dealings with internal and external suppliers, wholesale and even
retail distribution, the manipulation of share prices for cross-held shareholdings,
and so on.
Although there has been considerable restructuring of the keiretsu system because
of the bad loans crisis and new government regulations, the outcome has not been
so much to unwind shareholdings, spin off subsidiaries and create a more
competitive environment as to continue to reshuffle corporate control and to create
new, sometimes more powerful oligopolies.
Indeed, this aspect of the Japanese system is one variation on a theme found
across East Asia, where complex and loosely coordinated conglomerates are 
often valued not for their profit potential but rather for their ability to underpin
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wide-ranging and deeply embedded systems of social control and political influence
(Backman 2001).
Restructuring governance: marketization from above
and below, or continuing deadlock?
Financial globalization not only threatens the very cohesion of the state–bank–
industry nexus at the heart of its capacity to act as a cartel, but also provides a
powerful, globally expanding alternative source of capital and transnational
systemic organization. At one level, the challenge stems from the sheer amount of
highly mobile international capital that is available today, dwarfing the capacities
of bank-led systems to provide cheap, liquid capital for investment in general. Not
only do international capital flows free industry from dependency on bank loans,
but state actors find themselves constrained by transnational financial market 
forces too with regard to macro-economic and micro-economic policymaking, thus
limiting available policy alternatives (Cerny 1996). At a time when the Japanese
government is becoming more and more indebted, up to 150 per cent of GDP 
(by far the highest level among developed countries), especially to Japanese banks
– the market for Japanese government bonds still being quite restricted, as there is
little individual ownership and therefore little liquidity and not much of a secondary
market for pricing purposes – government debt, far from being inflationary, is
actually taking more out of the money supply than it puts back in, through new
spending on politically opportunistic projects and the growing ‘structural deficit’
stemming from interest payments on that debt. Indeed, should interest rates rise
from the current near-zero policy, the government’s structural deficit could quickly
become crippling.
At a second level, however, the challenge comes from changes that are required
in the structure of the governance of the financial system itself – that is to say, the
process of marketization. For capital to be made available, both foreign market
actors and internationally linked domestic market actors must be confident that
their money will gain a market rate of return and that the financial instruments
they have bought can be sold again at market prices (‘liquidity’). And finally,
investment must be able to flow into uses that are determined in the markets, 
not by state planners, ‘relationship’ bankers or oligopolistic industrialists. In the
current Third Industrial Revolution, sometimes called the ‘new economy’, volatile
and rapidly metamorphosing high technology industries have been compared with
the coming of electricity or the automobile. This process involves a redirection of
investment away from older industries and towards newer, more flexible, ‘post-
Fordist’ industries.
Indeed, this is exactly what was happening, however unevenly and sporadically,
in Japan at the end of the twentieth century (Katz 1998, 2003). The internationally
competitive export sector – the product of the era of intermediary-led catch-up –
is still crucial, but international competitiveness has drawn many of these industries
to produce in other parts of East Asia and the world (including the United States
and Europe) rather than in Japan. At the same time, the increasingly loss-making
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protected sector – today including many banks as well as agriculture, distribution,
construction and a range of other uncompetitive industries – is still being protected,
although it is under increasing pressure to restructure, driven by the need to seek
capital from outside traditional channels as well as by growing government deficits.
However, the third sector, the so-called ‘new economy’, while extremely dynamic
at the recent turn of the century, has suffered from a severe credit crunch. Banks
still do not lend sufficiently to smaller firms despite MOF and Bank of Japan 
(BOJ) pressure to do so (Financial Times, 12 June 2003), venture capital has dried
up, initial public offerings (IPOs) of shares are more and more difficult to arrange,
and there is a shrinking of new financial markets originally set up to service this
sector. Particularly striking is the way the recently established ‘Mothers’ market
has stagnated and Nasdaq Japan has shut down.
As noted earlier, the internationally competitive export sector has for some 
years grown steadily more independent from its bureaucratic sponsors because it
no longer needs their capital. Such firms are in a position to finance many of their
investment needs from retained profits, and they have been increasingly willing to
direct these investments to production facilities outside of Japan. On the other hand,
their very competitiveness, increasing profitability and internationalization mean
that they have easy access to international capital, too, without the constraints of
bureaucratic ‘administrative guidance’. Nevertheless, many firms in this sector also
need to restructure, and that restructuring increasingly comes through international
channels, as has been the case with Nissan since its effective takeover by Renault.
The protected sector, meanwhile, has, if anything, become more dependent on tradi-
tional domestic channels of support. Restructuring of vast swathes of unprofitable
subsectors and firms would lead to extreme consequences for production and
employment (Katz 1998, 2003).
At the same time, the volatility of political coalitions in the 1990s made the
predominant Liberal Democratic Party much more dependent on support from
the protected sector – especially from agriculture and those rural areas where
agriculture is declining and which are increasingly dominated by employment in
construction – as its urban base has eroded (Pempel 1998a; Kerr 2001; George
Mulgan 2002). The level of unemployment, having grown in 2003 to around 5.6
per cent (although it has fallen back in 2004) – less than in much of Europe, but
near rapidly rising American levels (although the lack of a social safety net arguably
makes Japan’s unemployment rate more socially damaging) – would be badly 
hit by closures in the protected sector, as employment has already carried the
burden over the past couple of decades for the hollowing out of the export sector.
In this situation, governments around the turn of the century have relied on regular
reflationary packages and a very loose, near-zero interest rate monetary policy.
However, with the public debt burden far higher than in other industrialized
countries, such an approach is unsustainable in the medium term.
In this context, the role of the state and the role of the private sector are both
problematic. The state is a split between the political imperatives of maintain-
ing the protected sector (both financial and industrial), on the one hand, and the
imperatives – economic and political – of restructuring that sector and promoting
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the development of an internationally penetrated, marketized financial system.
Evidence of schizophrenic reactions to this dilemma abound. The ‘big bang’ pro-
gramme initiated by the Hashimoto government in 1996 has for the most part been
legislated for (Cunanan and Dowling, 1998), but parts of it are variously accelerated
and postponed depending on the balance of influence at different times among and
within political coalitions and factions, bureaucratic agencies and competing private
firms and sectoral interests. At the same time, the stagnation of the Japanese
economy through the rest of the 1990s and up to 2003 has made it difficult to
implement the reforms. Economic crisis sometimes reinforces reforms, while in
good times reforms seem less necessary, like the old saying about how it is easy to
forget to fix a leaky roof on a sunny day. Japan’s problem throughout the 1990s
has been that it has neither been in crisis nor have there been many sunny days,
so the reform process has merely stuttered along.
In particular, the high level of non-performing loans in the banking sector 
– mainly loans to chronically unprofitable firms (‘zombie companies’) – means 
that banks have undermined their own performance by sustaining such firms 
while attempts to confront the issue have stagnated until recently. Although public
awareness and disclosure are rapidly increasing, Mikuni and Murphy (2002) among
others argue that, given the general stagnation of the Japanese economy over the
past decade, nonperforming loans are a major prop and that to take them away
would create a ripple-effect crisis across the whole economy. The reform plans of
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and Financial Services Minister Takenaka
Heizō have been watered down and resisted by politicians, bureaucrats and banks
alike (George Mulgan 2002).
Nevertheless, the possibility of progress seems greater in 2004 than in the mid-
1990s – when, of course, it petered out, to be undermined more comprehensively
by the world slump of 2000–3. Even the big banks’ declaration of huge losses in
the 2002–3 financial year ‘are seen in some quarters as a positive development
because they reflect a new-found ability to admit to the true scale of their problems
after years of obfuscation’ (Financial Times, 26 May 2003). At the time of writing in
mid-2004, a surge of growth in the Japanese economy produced by rapid export
expansion (mainly to China) has led to a profit rebound for three of the four largest
banks, both permitting a rise in loan loss provisions and alleviating the position 
of some of the companies in trouble (International Herald Tribune, 25 May 2004). 
It remains to be seen, however, whether this is just a sunny day and the leaky roof
still needs fixing. In contrast, UFJ Holding, the fourth of the big banks, recently
declared larger loan loss provisions and decided to sell its trust bank operations,
but, in the words of Financial Times correspondent David Ibison: ‘The management
changes at UFJ and its decision to admit to worse-than-expected non-performing
loans are, however, signs that the bank is accelerating its reform drive’ (21 May
2004).
The state, although it initiated the ‘big bang’ programme in order to try to control
the process of financial deregulation liberalization (Vogel 1996), is increasingly
being whipsawed by accelerating trends in the financial markets and the Third
Industrial Revolution themselves. Some of those trends have come from abroad 
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– from what the Japanese call gaiatsu, or external pressures from both the United
States government and international markets themselves. However, many of the
most important changes have come from internal pressures – what has sometimes
been called naiatsu (in a neologistic response to gaiatsu: cf. Brown 1994; Kusano
1999). At one level, naiatsu comes from within the political system and the bureau-
cracy, from the growing intergenerational differences noted earlier between more
internationalist and more domesticist bureaucrats, especially within the MOF 
and the Bank of Japan. Second, there are the political calculations which led the
Hashimoto government in 1996 to initiate the ‘big bang’ reforms for fear of missing
the liberalization boat altogether as the post-bubble recession dragged on – and
which are continuing to dominate both the rapidly changing internal politics of the
LDP and the fractionating coalition politics of the Japanese party system.
Third, although the full impact of the recent break-up of the MOF itself has not
yet shaken out, there have been growing inter-agency and intra-agency disputes as
functions have been spun off through organs such as the FRC and the FSA. Indeed,
Katz (2003) argues that although such agencies seemed keen on reform at the 
start, officials have been discouraged by the depth and breadth of internal resis-
tance from firms as well as from entrenched bureaucratic and political practices.
Scepticism about the restructuring of ministries and agencies is rife. For example,
Mikuni and Murphy (2002) argue that these bodies are merely spinoffs from the
MOF and BOJ and have not changed their practices with regard to poor disclosure,
discretionary application of rules, attempts to control outcomes (mergers, etc.), 
and desire to rescue as much of the existing system as possible. Nevertheless, 
their work is increasingly in the media spotlight, comparisons are increasingly made
with experiences and institutional structures in other countries, intra-agency
struggles abound, and the outcomes they seek to impose and control are increas-
ingly market-oriented. Recent progress by the major banks in the reduction of non-
performing loans suggests that changes in governance have grown more successful
over time.
Finally, there have been political pressures from new constituencies. Individual
as well as institutional savers and lenders increasingly seek to invest at market rates
and are put off bank or postal savings deposits by the combination of low (virtually
zero) interest rates and fear of loss of savings through bank failure as a result of the
bad loans crisis. Furthermore, many urban voters are said by analysts to resent 
the practice of government subsidies for protected sectors. Indeed, the Liberal
Democratic Party, out of power for a brief phase in the early 1990s and now only
ruling through a volatile coalition, has been losing much of its already weak urban
support and today is overwhelmingly a rural party. The LDP is increasingly split
between those who see further liberalization as inevitable and those who seek to
backtrack on reform for electoral purposes. The ousting of Prime Minister Mori
in favour of the current incumbent, Koizumi Junichirō, was squarely rooted in the
reform issue. Koizumi has been forced to tack and pull back in many areas. The
key issue here is whether reform can be combined with (1) preventing a further
credit crunch crisis that will plunge Japan into much deeper recession while banks
and unprofitable firms restructure, and (2) dealing with the internal politics of the
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LDP, which increasingly seem to entangle Koizumi and his supporters despite their
pledges of reform (George Mulgan 2002).
Decompartmentalization, price competition, new
technology and the advent of the financial market
economy in Japan
Thus although change has been partly leveraged through particular ‘big bang’
reforms, those reforms are not leading the process but lagging it. Doors set ajar at
all levels – by gaiatsu, by the ‘big bang’ reforms, and by the globalization of financial
markets themselves – are being levered further both by international firms and 
by domestic naiatsu from Japanese firms seeking to compete for investment funds
on a wider international playing field as well as the day-to-day interactions and
growing linkages between those international and domestic firms. The key actors
here are therefore (1) foreign firms and investors seeking to enter or expand within
the Japanese market, (2) domestic firms and investors seeking to get out of the
vicious circle of the protected sector, (3) new entrepreneurs seeking to expand
venture capital activities especially in new technology sectors such as the internet
or to import practices such as hostile takeovers, (4) old firms restructuring and
downsizing in the face of international competition whether in industrial sectors
like the automobile industry (Nissan) or through bank megamergers, (5) young
consumers turning to fashionable high-tech products that are often not reflected
in official statistics, and the like.
Comparative analysts of financial system change are likely to identify two specific
kinds of public policy reforms as generally crucial for the political management 
and promotion of financial system restructuring in such a globalization-driven
context (for France, see Cerny, 1989), and so it is proving to be in Japan. The first
is the decompartmentalization of financial markets themselves. One of the major
ways that governments across the developed world have attempted to prevent
market failure has been to legally separate different kinds of markets from each
other so that the kind of contagion or domino effect across markets like those
characteristic, for example, of the 1929 Wall Street crash and its aftermath can be
prevented. In Japan, via Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948,
as in the American Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the main regulatory barrier to be
erected was the prohibition of commercial banks from dealing in securities and 
of securities firms and investment banks from engaging in commercial banking
activities, i.e. those that involve taking deposits from the public.
It was not until the mid-1990s, especially with the ‘big bang’ programme, that
significant progress began towards lowering compartmental barriers within Japan.
As in the United States, a major means to this end has been to allow different firms
to merge into federalized holding companies made up of partially or wholly owned
subsidiaries operating in different market sectors. Holding companies were the basis
of the pre-war zaibatsu and as such were prohibited in order to prevent their
renascence, although that prohibition was easily bypassed in various ways. Today,
holding companies have once again been legalized and indeed are the basis for
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much of the inter-firm restructuring taking place within the Japanese financial
sector. Today, in Japan as elsewhere, however, such subsidiaries increasingly have
to be characterized by certain levels of internal compartmentalization, what the British
call ‘Chinese walls’ and the Americans call ‘firewalls’ among different market sector
activities. Mikuni and Murphy (2002) argue that such Chinese walls in Japan are
still a fiction.
However, the acceleration of changes to accounting rules and corporate gover-
nance rules, as with other issues, has created a public and media awareness of the
problems and specific cases of conflict of interest, and so on, are being targeted.
For example, one widely discussed development has been the recent adoption of
rules which permit listed companies to adopt American-style corporate governance
regimes, including the establishment of separate committees to conduct audits,
nominate the board of directors and set executive pay. These changes have come
from a combination of indirect gaiatsu – the American Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 in particular, with its effectively extraterritorial auditing requirements – and
naiatsu – including the government-led unwinding of cross-shareholdings within
the keiretsu, greater foreign ownership of Japanese companies, demands for greater
shareholder participation in corporate management, and changing attitudes among
managers in the more internationalized Japanese companies. Although originally
met with scepticism, thirty-six major companies will adopt these proposals in the
near future (Financial Times, 16 June 2003). As with the Resona affair, it is difficult
to predict whether this is a cosmetic change or represents a broader structural 
shift. Nevertheless, as with the Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen and New York
analyst research issues in the United States – all of which have raised awareness
levels across the world, putting corporate governance issues at the forefront of
debate in new ways – the links between these questions and ongoing processes 
of reform are altering patterns of financial system governance.
With different markets opened up to arbitrage, the second key structural reform
is to enable market actors to fully compete on price and quality of service across
those markets. The first stage of this type of reform was to deregulate interest rates.
Although limited forms of interest rate deregulation began in the late 1970s, this
was generally restricted to certain sectors of the bond market, and a combination
of administrative guidance and the convoy system ensured that Japanese banks
basically charged the same interest rates until the mid-1990s. Indeed, the cultural
inhibition against breaking ranks is still strong in traditional banking sectors.
However, a combination of the bad loans crisis, financial innovation primarily in
the securities field, the lack of compartmentalization in global financial markets,
and the rapid pace of change in Japanese securities markets has put such tradi-
tional practices very much on the defensive, and it is highly likely that they are on
their way out except in certain kinds of financial institutions catering to special
constituencies such as small regional banks, agricultural cooperatives, credit unions
and the like – although even here changes are proceeding surprisingly rapidly
because such institutions have also been severely affected by non-performing loans
and lack of profitability. At the same time, the question of financing the public
sector deficit and the limited scope of the Japanese Government Bond (JGB) market
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may well be not only crowding out private sector spending and investment but also
holding back change through deflation.
Perhaps the most important reform leading to extensive price competition across
the entire system is the deregulation of brokerage commissions in securities markets.
Given that the most important financial innovations in recent decades have been
those in the securities markets – most notably the huge expansion of innovation
and trading in so-called ‘derivatives’ such as futures, options and swaps, originally
developed for agricultural commodities and foreign exchange trading – freedom
of market actors to negotiate commissions is probably the ultimate means of
undermining cartel-like price fixing in the financial services sector. After brokerage
commissions were completely liberalized in October 1999 (after having been
progressively deregulated over the previous two years), Japanese financial markets
were hit by a veritable avalanche of change. Much of it is still inchoate, but it bears
a remarkable resemblance to wider trends in financial markets around the world.
The first and most striking manifestation of these changes at the time was the
increasingly visible entry of foreign financial firms into Japan. Foreign investors
and firms are now welcomed by a growing range of market actors and the business
media, as reflected, for example, in the pages of the English-language Nikkei Weekly.
Even more impressive has been the rush of Japanese financial institutions to take
advantage of these firms’ experience and skills through joint ventures and the 
like in areas such as mergers and acquisitions. These developments have also helped
catalyse the rapid growth of the venture capital industry in Japan, a sector which
virtually did not exist a few years ago, as well as the investment trust and mutual
funds sector. Although many joint ventures have been limited in scope (Malcolm
2001), they are increasingly ubiquitous and entrenched, impacting on the way the
Japanese financial system itself operates.
However, the stagnation of the Japanese economy along with the financial 
slump across the developed world has undermined this trend since 2000, with
foreign capital rapidly withdrawing from the country, only returning in Spring
2003 – and on a basis which many observers believe may constitute just another
fragile and temporary ‘bear market rally’. Nevertheless, there has grown an
awareness that change will only come when such firms – and their practices – return
on a more solid footing. This influx has even had a visible impact on the cultural
context of the financial system. Foreign firms have become very fashionable as
employers of high-flying Japanese graduates. Changing jobs is more respectable
and desired. And in the markets themselves, new forms of demand mushroomed
for a while and are beginning to return. However, the new economy boom is still
mainly in limbo. Japanese firms, which once dominated new sectors of consumer
electronics as they came along, are far less competitive today. Their only tech-
nological edge seems to be in the booming domestic mobile phone industry, but
the fact that Japanese cell phone technology is not fully compatible with systems
in other countries has severely limited their penetration of export markets. In
contrast, US cell phone technology, which is also incompatible with other countries
(especially the European GSM standard), benefits from a huge internal market that
Japan lacks.
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Nevertheless, Japanese financial system governance is being increasingly
marketized, if at an uneven pace. In the first place, despite a string of politically
motivated delays, many of the ‘big bang’ reforms promised and partially legislated
for in 1996–8 are now finally coming on stream of their own accord. Furthermore,
at the same time, Koizumi and Takenaka are apparently committed to further,
ostensibly far-reaching, measures. However, these measures are being unevenly
implemented, with a major (if somewhat watered down) programme presented at
the end of October 2002. At the same time, opposition to some of these measures
by the powerful Hashimoto faction and others in the LDP – paradoxically led by
the man who as Prime Minister in 1996 initiated the ‘big bang’ programme – has
not coalesced around an alternative. Sub rosa guerrilla political warfare has been
the order of the day. Splits in the opposition parties have played into the hands of
the resisters. Public and media opinion, as well as pressures from modernizing
sectors amongst some party politicians, bureaucrats and private sector groups has
grown stronger in favour of continuing the reform process, and there seems to be
a growing momentum for reform and anger at resisters. Whether the current return
to rapid economic growth will accelerate or mute the pressure for reform is still 
to be seen.
Conclusion
Although private sector-led changes have been enabled by bureaucratic shifts 
and the ‘big bang’ programme, pressures for them have not come so much from
the state per se as from a combination of international market developments and
changes in technological and market structure working through the private sector
and altering the basis of public–private network relationships. Closed public–
private and private–private networks based on trust are being overlaid and at 
least partially contested and replaced by more individualistic and competitive
relationships based on marketization. The state, still deeply embedded in and
constrained by the practices comprising the failing traditional Japanese model, has
made many false starts since the mid-1980s and is still floundering. But those false
starts have included and kicked off many real policy and bureaucratic changes that
have a life of their own, however contested, in the evolving dialectic of financial
market globalization and regulatory liberalization.
Can Japan continue to resist the restructuring pressures coming from the
‘structural gaiatsu’ of the global financial marketplace (Pempel 1998b) and the
‘structural naiatsu’ of rapidly mutating domestic economic and political interests?
Part of the price to pay may be the ‘creative destruction’ of the protected sector,
further political instability, and growing social dissatisfaction. In this context, 
the current rapid growth of the economy in 2004 may have contradictory conse-
quences. On the one hand, growth may simply soak up pressures for change.
Export-led growth, after all, was the core of the developmental state. Additional
growth may permit more firms with non-performing loans to start to pay some 
of them back, ostensibly heading off the need for further structural changes in 
the banking system. Growing trade surpluses may undercut the credit crunch that
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has made financial system reform seem urgent. At the same time, reduced
unemployment and the revival of consumer spending may decrease potential social
dissatisfaction, diminishing political pressure for reform.
On the other hand, recovery, if sustained, may attract more foreign capital,
bolster securities markets and venture capital, and reinforce transnational link-
ages – capital mobility and price sensitivity – in the more dynamic sectors of 
the economy. Regulatory reform may appear more a political opportunity than 
a threat, strengthening pro-reform naiatsu. In the latter scenario, as the current
uneven global recovery gains momentum, neo-liberal norms and practices are 
likely to become more and more deeply embedded. The Koizumi government 
is apparently committed to further reform of the financial system and the opposition
Democratic Party of Japan seems to favour it, too, although with some differences
of emphasis. Changes elsewhere in East Asia, too, are broadly in the direction of
neo-liberal re-regulation, even in China. Japan is not yet a ‘financial market econ-
omy’, but it is unlikely that the developmental state can be resurrected; the earlier
‘credit-based economy’ and the sites of governance that have gone along with that
are in structural decay. In a world of financial market globalization and neo-liberal
marketization in general, it may no longer be a question of whether Japan becomes
a ‘financial market economy’, but when – and with what consequences for the
wider economy, politics and society.
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6 Koizumi’s ‘robust policy’
Governance, the Japanese welfare 
employment regime and 
comparative gender studies 
Osawa Mari
This chapter discusses the type, and a possible shift in the type of governance 
of the welfare-employment regime in Japan, the structures and processes of 
which are determined by the perceived relative competency, authority and
legitimacy of the state, market and family in supporting the reproduction of the
labour force at micro, meso and macro levels, as the very basis of any political
economy.
What various sides in the current debate on the type of governance agree on is
that the Japanese welfare-employment regime belongs to the ‘male breadwinner’
model. This model entails two fundamental assumptions about the division of labour
between the sexes: first, that resources to support livelihood and labour repro-
duction every day and inter-generationally, in terms of monetary income, are 
and should be secured by the man as the husband/father of the family primarily
through participating in the labour market and earning a ‘family wage’ as a full-
time, long-term employed worker, and exceptionally through receiving social
security benefits in unemployment, sickness or retirement; and second, that
resources in terms of personal services (care) and readily consumable goods (cooked
food and washed clothes, for instance) are and should be supplied primarily by the
woman as the wife/mother of the family through unpaid work as a homemaker,
and only exceptionally through social welfare services. It is the family assumed as
such that has been the fundamental site of governance in the Japanese welfare-
employment regime since the rapid economic growth period as the very basis of
societal reproduction, and gender relations crosscutting the family, labour and 
other markets and state institutions are one of the most important elements of 
its governance.
What should be kept in mind is that the male breadwinner- full-time housewife
households have never been an overwhelming majority of families in Japanese
society even in its heyday in the late 1970s. The type of governance of the welfare-
employment regime is not a mere reflection of the reality of family life or the
dominant mode of labour reproduction, but assumptions in and design of the social
policy and employment system do condition individual women and men to choose
a particular style of work and family life rather than other ways. Governance should
therefore be seen as having been practised in both bottom up and top down ways,
and as a result is contested.
The performance as well as legitimacy of this type of governance started to 
be questioned and explicitly contested in the early 1990s, as the recession after 
the bursting of the ‘bubble economy’ continued and population ageing, hand in
hand with a declining birth rate, accelerated. After the various attempts made 
by successive administrations to reform the political, social and more generally 
the governing institutions and structures of Japan, the coalition cabinet of Prime
Minisiter Koizumi Junichirō took office in April 2001, calling for an overall struc-
tural reform of Japanese society. 
Thus, on 26 June 2001, soon after taking office, the Koizumi cabinet launched
the so-called Honebuto no Hōshin (‘Robust Policy’) that laid down the fundamentals
for a structural overhaul of Japanese society. This 2001 ‘Robust Policy’ was actually
based on a proposal, with a blueprint of its own, drafted by the Naikakufu Keizai
Zaisei Shimon Kaigi (The Cabinet Office’s Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy –
CEFP, chaired by the Prime Minister himself), led by the Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI), Takenaka Heizō. According to one member of the
CEFP, ‘Koizumi’s reform is hesitantly treading along the path of the Keizai Senryaku
Kaigi (Economic Strategy Council of Japan, hereafter ESC). ‘While progress has
been made in some areas, it continues to be a mere extension of its policy recom-
mendation’ (Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2001).
The ESC, chaired by Higuchi Hirotarō, a key player in Keidanren and the
former president of Asahi Breweries, submitted its final policy recommendation in
February 1999, titled ‘Strategies for Reviving the Japanese Economy’. It concluded
that, in order to revive the economy in the twenty-first century, Japan must totally
transform its social system, ‘which has heretofore placed excessive emphasis on the
equality of results’. The report also refers to the mounting anxiety over Japan’s
future, saying ‘these fears are attributable to [the] eroding sustainability in the
Japanese-style wage and employment systems and the generous social security
system’. It concludes that Japan should aim to build ‘an environment of “creative
competition” by ensuring equality of opportunity to all [those] who wish to enter
into private activities’ under transparent and appropriate rules. To do this, ‘pro-
visions of renewed safety nets are urgently needed’ (ESC 1999a: 17, 3). 
In short, the ESC concludes that in Japan, the equality of results is stressed 
to such an extent that it has become detrimental, and thus assumes Japanese 
society to be fairly egalitarian. Based on these premises, it proposes to use ‘equal
opportunity’ as a lever in order to proceed with an overall reform of the social 
safety nets. Let us call this notion of the Japanese-style social system the concept 
of ‘fair discrepancy’. Thus, can we say that Koizumi’s social reform is ‘an extended
version’ of the plan for Japan’s social reform based on this ‘fair discrepancy’ 
theory?
The ESC recommendation characterized Japan as overly egalitarian and called
for social reform by introducing ‘“small government-type” safety nets rather than
“big government” intervening in private activities and guaranteeing total life’. It
states that ‘ . . . the desirable safety nets are to provide a civil minimum to all citizens
in need who understand self-responsibility, by assisting them to “re-challenge” their
lives’ (ESC 1999a: 25). 
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With regard to social security in particular, the ESC concludes that the pro-
longation of stagnant economic growth, the sharp decline in the birth rate, and 
the rapid ageing of the population have further widened the inequality between
generations and are eroding the sustainability of the social security system itself.
Thus it states, first, that the national minimum should not be set too high for 
social security benefits since ‘too generous a standard will cause moral hazards 
and result in bloated government’, and proposes to limit the social services to ‘the
socially desirable minimum’ (ESC 1999a: 28, 30 my emphasis). Second, the report
is critical of past attempts at social security reform led by the Ministry of Health
and Welfare (from 2001, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare), which the
Council considers as having repeatedly raised the insurance premiums and reduced
the benefits. As a result, ‘households and enterprises have lost confidence in future
sustainable growth. Moreover, they have given less credence to government
policies’ (ESC 1999a: 28).
While criticizing past reform attempts by the former Ministry of Health and
Welfare, the direction that the ESC points at in order to ‘build a sustainable,
confidence-based social security system’ is to ‘actively mobilize private initia-
tives and keep public intervention to a minimum’. In other words, what the ESC
wants is a ‘small, inexpensive government’. Thus the ESC’s emphasis on
privatization, deregulation and liberalization of choice and the way it trusts market
functions and lays stress on ‘self-responsibility’ based on strict selectivity seems 
to allow us to interpret its prescription as a neo-liberal, commodification-oriented
one in both intent and measures. The dichotomy such as commodification versus
de-commodification, efficiency versus equity, or small versus big government,
however, is too simplistic to understand how contested governance is in Japan.
Despite the ESC’s repeated criticism of past reform attempts by the Ministry of
Health and Welfare, it will be clearly shown by a comparative gender analysis that
its proposals have not parted with Japan’s previous model of social policy and the
overall governance of the welfare-employment regime. Even if the ESC proposals
were to materialize, the co-ordinates of Japan’s social policy system and governance
structures dominant since the rapid growth period, i.e. the big-company oriented
‘male breadwinner’ model, would not be easily transformed. 
Although there are some valid criticisms of the notion of ‘fair discrepancy’, few
analyses have been made of the ESC report from the viewpoint of the governance
of welfare-employment regimes in general, and of comparative gender studies in
particular. In this chapter, let us first touch upon the recent debate regarding social
discrepancy and equality in Japan to examine the validity of the conceptualization
of ‘fair discrepancy’ and ‘equality of opportunity’ itself by the ESC (Section 1), 
then analyze the ESC recommendation in view of the Japanese social policy system
and governance structure from a comparative gender analysis (Section 2), and 
re-examine Koizumi’s ‘Robust Policy’, which is called a ‘mere extension’ of the
ESC’s recommendation (Section 3). 
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Blind spots in the debate on inequality
The concept of ‘fair discrepancy’ is not an invention of some academic at the 
ESC. Rather, it is a concept that has been deliberated among various sectors of
society during the latter half of the 1990s, and mainstreamed since. As early as 
the mid-1990s, in fact, employers’ associations such as Nikkeiren were calling for a
‘new Japanese-style management system’ based on multiple tracks, diversification
and increased flexibility in employment. Multiple tracking implied a further widen-
ing of the wage gap between workers through rigid personnel assessment and wage
control upon assessing the professional skill and job performance of each employee.
It is alleged that this kind of differential treatment has now gained popular approval.
For instance, in March 2000, the Sangyō Kōzō Shingikai (Industrial Structure Council)
of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, from 2001 the Ministry
of Economy, Trade and Industry, METI) presented a paper titled Kyōsōryoku aru
Tasankaku Shakai (‘Building a Competitive, Participatory Society’) to set the direction
of the nation’s economic and industrial policy with a view to 2025. It upheld the
vision of a society that offers multiple choices and diverse ways of living, where
‘those who take on challenges will be valued and where appropriate assessment will
generate a “fair discrepancy” between those who do not make effort and those who
create meaningful values’ (Tsūsanshō 2000: 60–1). 
As the ‘fair discrepancy’ theory came into the mainstream from the mid-1990s
onward, arguments about social inequality and the widening of the economic gap
within Japanese society also came into focus, particularly as the Japanese economy
suffered a sharp decline from the latter half of 1997. The two major advocates are
Tachibanaki Toshiaki, whose book Nihon no Keizai Kakusa (Economic disparity in
Japan) won (1998; see also 2000) the 1998 Economist Prize, and Satō Toshiki,
whose book Fubyōdō Shakai Nippon (Japan, the unequal society) (2000b) attracted
substantial attention.
As Tachibanaki pointed out in his 1998 book based on an examination of the
trends in the gini coefficient, the income distribution in Japan has become signifi-
cantly unequal from 1973 onward. While more egalitarian than the US, income
distribution in Japan around 1990 had become equivalent to the United Kingdom,
France and Germany, which are considerably more unequal in comparison to the
Scandinavian nations (Tachibanaki 1998: 5–6). Thus he questions the concept of
‘fair discrepancy’ which posits that Japanese society is placing ‘excessive emphasis
on the equality of results’. 
On the other hand, Satō reviewed the nation-wide survey on Social Stratification
and Social Mobility (hereafter referred to as the SSM Survey) held once every
decade for over fifty years now. The latest survey results of 1995 showed that, in
the white-collar employees bracket, the ratio of sons reaching the father’s occu-
pational status has increased among male employees in professional or managerial
posts grouped as ‘white-collar/employed/managerial (WEM) (born between 1936
and 1955). The index is the ‘odds ratio’ between the father’s main occupation 
and the son’s occupation at the age of 40. In this case, the ‘odds ratio’ refers to the
odds of the son becoming a ‘WEM’ himself if the father is a ‘WEM’, as compared
to sons of ‘non-WEM’ fathers. Until 1985, the ‘odds ratio’ was on the decline at
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around 4.3, but in the 1995 survey, the trends reversed and the odds jumped to 8.
These figures, Satō concludes, come close to that of males born during the last
decade of the Meiji era (Satō 2000a, b).
It should be noted that Satō reassures us that the ‘odds ratio’ of WEM is found
to decrease when measured by the son’s initial occupation or at age thirty (Satō
2000c: 95–6). The point he wants to make is that, while the status of ‘the privi-
leged white collar employee’ has been consistently open to Japanese males in their
20s (an indication of equal opportunity among them) since the Meiji era, this does
not automatically mean that their ‘effort/performance’ will always be duly
compensated. When looking at the occupation a man holds at age 40, ‘the birth
factor’ appears to be increasingly more influential in recent years as compared to
‘individual effort’. Satō expresses his concerns that, if the ‘equality of results’ is
rejected in favour of ‘equality of opportunity’ under these conditions as advocated
by the ‘fair discrepancy’ theorists, what he calls the gambaru kiban or the ‘basis for
making greater effort’ would be a virtual candle in the wind.
Arguments on increased social inequality and the widening of the economic 
gap have already been criticized by various sectors of society. Rebuttals of
Tachibanaki’s theory, to cite an example, were made by the bureaucrats of the
Economic Planning Agency as well as by Ōtake Hideo, professor of labour
economics at the University of Osaka (Ōta 1999, Nihon Rōdō Kenkyū Zasshi 2000), to
which Tachibanaki duly replied (Tachibanaki 2000). Above all, let us look at how
Tachibanaki responded to those who considered the widening of the economic gap
to be a welcoming sign. 
In his rebuttal, Tachibanaki initially points out that inequality of results could
be tolerated as long as equality of opportunity is fully guaranteed. In Japan,
however, where ‘such factors as parent’s occupation and income levels are
becoming increasingly more influential’, a ‘yellow light’ is already flashing for equal
opportunity in general, and a ‘red light’ for Japanese women in particular
(Tachibanaki 2000: 81). Second, he considers the social safety nets to be insufficient,
especially in the fields of unemployment, medical insurance and livelihood
protection (public assistance). This, he argues, ends up in too large an inequality
of results, even if the equality of opportunity is ensured. 
In response to Satō’s argument, Seiyama Kazuo, who was one of the leaders 
of the 1995 SSM Survey, examined the same data and raised some additional 
issues (Seiyama 2000). According to Seiyama, the odds ratio did not rise sharply
in the 1995 survey among professional workers (including the self-employed) and
white-collar employees of large enterprises. Neither does the ‘odds ratio’ rise among
the ‘WEM’ bracket if ‘current occupation’ rather than ‘occupation at age forty’ is
adopted as an index. Thus he concludes that the reality of the so-called ‘erosion of
the middle class’ merely consists of ‘having to apply the principle of competition
to male white-collar college graduates’, and that ‘most high-school graduates and
women have long before been cast into this kind of harsh competition’ (Seiyama
2000: 91).
Referring to the ongoing debate on growing inequality and discrepancy within
Japanese society, Kariya Takehiko compares the Japanese situation with that of
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the US as a way to point out the limitations of Japan’s ‘warped notion of equality’.
According to Kariya, the principle of ‘equality of results’ in the US encompasses
the idea of guaranteeing an opportunity to develop individual skills and talents,
and focuses more on inter-group equality, whereas in Japan, there is no such notion
as ‘equality among groups’. This has led to the uniform treatment of individual
members in such closed circles as corporations, schools or industry in a fairly
obsessive manner. None of the current debate that proposes to transform the
‘equality of results’ into an ‘equality of opportunity’, however, takes this aspect 
into full account. Their mind-set is to simply scrap the ‘keep up with the neighbours’
mentality and practises of uniform treatment within a closed communal sphere
(Kariya 2000). Whichever – the equality of results or opportunity – is in question,
the crucial viewpoint of inter-group equality remains ignored. 
In relation to the above, let me also point out the fact that Satō stresses the
essential difference between the equality of opportunity and that of results. ‘While
equality of results is fairly visible, equality of opportunity is not so . . . until much
later’ (Satō 2000b: 167). With the ‘distribution of status and wealth’ in mind, Satō
goes on to stress the following: ‘Equality of opportunity can only be assessed by
conducting a survey after people have attained a certain social status to see whether
the past situation for which the person is not responsible (i.e. whether or not one’s
father’s occupation is WEM) is related in any way to the status one attains (i.e.
whether or not one is WEM at age forty) (Satō 2000c: 95).
In fact, for the generation born between 1926–45, not much difference was noted
in social status or income whether one’s father was a WEM or not, while among
those born between 1936–55, the mean annual income of a son with a ‘WEM’
father was ¥8.41 million against ¥6.05 million for a son with a ‘non-WEM’ father.
Thus Satō concludes that a discrepancy of 1.4 times has emerged due to attributes
the individual has no control over, such as the father’s occupation (Satō 2000a: 74;
Satō 2000b: 124–5).
Satō goes on to develop his original theory on the social safety net. He advocates
that, in a society that upholds equal opportunity as a principle, we need a
machinery to keep constant watch over unfair practices that are not apparent until
much later on, and a system of compensation (e.g. redistribution of income) in case
unfair practice is spotted, as ‘systems inherent to a society of equal opportunity’
(Satō 2000b: 173–5). By showing that things are not all that simple, Satō’s argument
contains some criticism of the ESC-type mind-set that full enforcement of ‘equality
of opportunity’ should lead to a ‘small government’. 
As we follow the ongoing debate on the issues of economic disparity and 
equality in Japanese society, it becomes apparent that it has taken place within 
a severely limited arena. On the one hand, those who ‘welcome the widening of
fair discrepancy’ ignore the considerable wage disparity between groups based 
on gender, with men earning more than women, and the size of the enterprise,
with the employees of large corporations earning more than those in small-and
medium-sized enterprises, that have long existed in Japan. These advocates tacitly
limit the scope of the debate to the male labour market (and of large enterprises),
which they assume to be a peculiarly non-competitive environment.
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Meanwhile, Satō seems to jump to conclusions when he says that ‘Japan has
turned into a society in which no son can surpass the status of the father’ simply
because the odds ratio of passing on a privileged occupation from father to son has
risen to 8. Seiyama’s comment on the situation of male high school graduates and
women in general is a valid criticism of Satō’s argument. This author still disagrees
with Seiyama’s argument, however, that college-graduate white-collar male
workers ‘who, until now, had been well sheltered by the seniority wage system and
lifetime employment’ are now faced anew with ‘competition and commodification’
(Seiyama 2000: 91) – that is, a struggle for survival and their valuation in market
terms.
Studies on management, corporate society and labour issues have already
revealed that, inside the internal labour ‘market’, Japanese white-collar male college
graduates are indeed subjected to severe ‘competition’ (Iwata 1977; Watanabe
1990; Kumazawa 1997). And there is no sign that either the ‘fair discrepancy’
theorists or Seiyama himself has taken into account these existing studies on the
subject.
The reason Satō focuses on the son’s occupation at age 40, rather than 
their ‘current occupation’ at any age, is precisely because he takes into account 
the harsh on-going competition within the internal labour market. In reply to
Seiyama’s criticism, Satō explains the reason he focuses on the occupation of male
workers at the age of 40, rather than at the age of 20, when about to start their
career, or at the age of 50, just before many in Japan’s large enterprises move 
on to a second career in a smaller company. This, he stipulates, is because, for a
white-collar male college graduate, the outcome of the promotion race is deter-
mined by whether he can reach a managerial post by the age of 40 (Satō 2000:
94, 97). In any event, Satō’s ‘WEM’ bracket only accounts for somewhat over 
20 per cent of all Japanese males born between 1936 and 1955 (Satō 2000b: 73).
How Satō is able to respond to Tachibanaki’s view that a symbolic red light is
flashing for Japanese society with regard to the equality of opportunity for women
remains to be seen. 
‘Thatcherism twenty years late’: the report of the ESC
So far, we have reviewed the current debate over social disparity and equality 
in Japan, along with the different arguments on the provision of ‘social safety 
nets’. It seems clear that the concept of ‘fair discrepancy’ advocated by the ESC is
hardly based on solid data regarding the actual state of inequality in Japan and fails
to analyse in enough depth the notion of ‘equality of results’ versus that of ‘equality
of opportunity’. Meanwhile, both the ‘fair discrepancy’ theory and the ‘social
stratification’ concept advocated by Seiyama and Satō, despite their conflicting
views, share common ground – the data they marshal only apply to male white-
collar college graduates. Neither is there any evidence that they have examined
recent research findings in the field of welfare-employment regimes in formulating
their ‘safety net’ concepts, at a time when comparative gender analysis can provide
the most valid data within the study of comparative social policy. 
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As Esping-Andersen, the author of The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990),
mentions in his ‘Preface to the Japanese Edition’, Japan is a difficult case to classify,
to the extent that it has served as a touchstone for his typology. The Japanese
welfare state, as of 1980, exhibited the lowest expenditure among OECD countries,
and was of a ‘liberalistic’ nature in the sense that its ‘highly selective’ social policy
offered insufficient family support, and that its low degree of ‘de-commodification’
compelled the individual to participate in the labour market. Meanwhile, the
division of its social insurance services by occupation and social stratification (due
to disparity created by the size of the enterprise, etc.) demonstrate its more
‘conservative’ nature. Japan’s similarity to Switzerland, Spain and Greece cannot
be mapped out until such gender index as gender equality in employment is added
on to create a more precise and multi-dimensional measure of their similarity and
difference (Siaroff 1994).
Another typology of welfare state regimes exists, in which gender is used as an
axis to focus on the subject of rights in social policy and the unit of contribution/
benefit, thereby setting off the ‘male breadwinner’ model against the ‘individual’
(Sainsbury 1994). In terms of the burden of taxation/social insurance premiums,
however, dependant/co-residency deductions remain important as a type of unit
of assessment. While Japan’s current taxation system is based on individual units
of assessment, large deductions can be claimed for dependants and co-residency
(Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Kaigi Eikyō Chōsa Senmon Chōsakai 2002: 10–12).
What various sides agree on is that Japan belongs to the ‘male breadwinner’
model characterized by insufficient public support for the family and compelling
participation of the individual male in the labour market (due to a low degree of
‘de-commodification’). As we have seen so far, the viewpoint of comparative gender
studies plays a crucial role in characterizing Japan. In the following section, let us
review the changes that have taken place in Japan during the past two decades –
the 1980s and the 1990s.
Among the several hypotheses on the recent direction taken by welfare state
regimes, Esping-Andersen, who is the primary three-model advocate, emphasizes
their ‘divergence’. As for the first model, the social democratic regime adopted the
‘welfare as investment’ strategy and promoted more balance between work and
family life for both women and men through public family support and vocational
training (the Scandinavian route). In the Anglo-Saxon regime, deregulation in the
labour market was promoted and the selectivity of social services was reinforced
(the neo-liberal route). Finally, the conservative regime intensified the dual structure
of the labour market, and allowed for an overall decline in the labour force rate
(the labour force retrenchment route) (Esping-Andersen 1996, 1999). We share his
view of these three routes as the best way to understand the different type and
trajectory of welfare regimes.
In the case of Japan, which as mentioned above is a difficult case to typify, under
the slogan of ‘building a Japanese-style welfare society’, the Japanese government
made extensive ‘reforms’ in all social security service sectors during the 1980s,
thereby intensifying the big company-centred ‘male breadwinner’ model. These
reforms went against both the ‘de-commodification’ route that regards the security
118 Osawa Mari
of livelihood as an individual’s social right and thus discourages dependency on the
labour market (the employer), and the ‘work/life balance’ route that promotes
equal employment legislation, individuals as the unit of assessment, and support
for double income households. For instance, the annual income ceiling of a spouse
to become eligible for Spouse Tax Deduction was repeatedly raised (in 1984, 1987,
1988 and 1989). There was also the introduction of a Special Tax Deduction for
Spouse (1987), which allowed tax cut/exemption to the household of a worker
whose spouse’s annual income remained below a fixed ceiling. Moreover, the 1985
Pension Reform introduced the ‘third class insured person’ category to the basic
pension system, which exempted a worker’s dependent spouse from insurance
premium payments. The annual income limit to become eligible as a dependant
is equivalent to that of a ‘dependent family’ member, as defined by the Health
Insurance Schemes.
Although financial adjustments have been made since in both pension and
medical security systems in an attempt to bridge the separately formulated social
insurance programmes, there is still a long way to go for Japan to establish a unified
system similar to the Scandinavian states. Moreover, no significant moves have
been made throughout the 1990s to either improve the gender-based wage inequal-
ity or increase the ratio of women in managerial positions. Increase in female
employment has been due to the rising number of non-regular, mostly part-time,
workers (Osawa 1994, 1998).
For Japan, the 1990s may have been the ‘lost decade’ not only in terms of
structural reform and economic growth, but also as far as social security reform is
concerned. Neither the ‘Five-year Plan to create a Lifestyle Superpower’ advocated
by the Miyazawa Kiichi cabinet nor the ‘Welfare Vision for the Twenty-first
Century’ presented by Hosokawa Morihiro’s non-LDP Cabinet went beyond a
mere retouching of the ‘Japanese-style welfare society’ of the 1980s. From the end
of 1996 to early 1997, then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutarō launched the ‘Six
Major Reforms’ (of the administrative, financial and educational systems, and of
economic, fiscal and social security structures). Among them, only administrative
reform (reorganizing of ministries and agencies and de-centralizing power) and
economic structural reform (deregulation of employment/labour) had born some
fruit by the early 2000s. 
Some legislation regarding the promotion of a gender-equal society, however,
deserves our attention. Promoting a gender-equal society was deemed ‘the key’ 
and ‘one of the pillars’ of Hashimoto’s Six Major Reforms (Osawa 2000b). The
Child/Family Care Leave Law was enforced (in 1991, 1995 and 1997), and the
‘ILO 156 Convention regarding the equal opportunity/treatment of women and
men with family responsibilities’ was ratified in 1995. And in 1997, the Long-term
Care Insurance Law was enacted on the one hand (effective as of April 2000), and
on the other hand, ‘Protection Provisions for Women’ were abolished from the
Labour Standards Law with the call for the deregulation of employment, which
thereby led to the Equal Employment Opportunity Law being reformed and
strengthened (effective as of April 1999). The Basic Law for a Gender-Equal
Society, which contained the fundamental philosophy that ‘no person shall be
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discriminated against on the basis of gender’, was enacted in June 1999. These
legislative measures are illustrative of Japan’s social transition towards the ‘Work/
Life Balance’ model by promoting equal opportunity between women and men
and encouraging individuals with family responsibilities to join the labour force.
This, aside from the scale of the budget and the robustness of policy enforcement,
parallels the ‘Scandinavian route’. 
Compared to gender equality laws and anti-discrimination laws on the basis of
sex in other countries, Japan’s ‘Basic Law for a Gender-equal Society’ is significant
in terms of Articles 4, 15 and 17 that highlight gender mainstreaming, and the role
of the Council for Gender Equality of the Cabinet Office, which is the promoting
machinery (Osawa 2000a: 73–83).
Article 4 stipulates that ‘care should be taken so that social systems and practices
have as neutral an impact as possible on the selection of social activities by women
and men’, which is one of the fundamental tenets of the Basic Law. Article 15 states
that ‘the state and local governments, when formulating and implementing policies
recognized as influencing the formation of a gender-equal society, shall consider
formation of a gender-equal society.’ The policies to be considered here potentially
extend over all sectors, for those policies with goals/measures that seem to be quite
unrelated to gender equality or women’s social advancement may, as an outcome,
have considerable effects.
Article 17 stipulates the provisions on handling complaints and redress of 
human rights violations. It declares that ‘the State shall take necessary measures
for handling complaints in regard to policies implemented by the government
which are related to promoting the formation of a gender-equal society or which
are recognized as influencing the formation of a gender-equal society, and,
necessary measures intended for relief of victims whose human rights have been
infringed through factors impeding the formation of a gender-equal society,
including gender-based discriminatory treatment’ (Article 17). Note that the
‘complaints’ here include not only direct policies/measures to promote the forma-
tion of a gender-equal society, but also those ‘policies recognized as influencing’.
As part of the administrative reforms led by Prime Minister Hashimoto, the
central government offices switched over to a new system starting 6 January 2001,
as seen in the reorganization of a range of key ministerial functions. Along with it,
the Council for Gender Equality became the centre in the national machinery of
the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society, and the Bureau for Gender Equality
was set up within the Cabinet Office.
According to Articles 21– 28 of the Basic Law, the Chief Cabinet Secretary heads
the Council, which is composed of twelve relevant cabinet ministers and twelve
academics. Their major tasks are: (1) ‘to monitor how government measures are
being implemented with regard to promoting the formation of a gender-equal
society, (2) to evaluate and assess the impacts of government measures on the
formation of a gender-equal society’.
Meanwhile, within the Council for Gender Equality, five specialist committees
had been set up as of May 2001 on ‘basic issues’, ‘the implementation of measures
to support the balancing of work and child rearing’, ‘violence against women,’
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‘handling/monitoring complaints’, and ‘gender impact evaluation and assess-
ment’. (The Specialist Committee on ‘the implementation of measures to support
the balancing of work and child raising’ was dissolved after submitting a report in
2001.)
While some trace of the Scandinavian route can be found in the above reforms,
changes with regard to social security were far from the Scandinavian strategy 
of ‘welfare as an investment’. As was clear from both the 1993 and 2000 reforms,
the government continued to undermine the credibility of its pension schemes 
by stressing the onset of a fiscal crisis and repeatedly increasing premiums while
reducing benefits. Radical reform of the Medical Insurance System had also been
planned in parallel with the establishment of public Long-term Care Insurance. 
In 1994, the Health Insurance Act was revised for the purpose of ‘raising the
efficiency’ of medical care by expanding such services as in-home medical care.
While several proposals for reform were made between 1995 and 1997, substantial
reform was suspended due to the tenacious objection of the Medical Association,
with the exception of the 1997 revision that reduced the provision to the insured
from 90 to 80 per cent (Tsuboi and Takagi 2000).
In summary, the Long-term Care Insurance Law, enacted in December 1997
and enforced in April 2000, was the only major reform in the social security field
during the 1990s. Despite its many problems, the introduction of public long-term
care insurance for the elderly can be considered a step towards the ‘Scandinavian
route’ or ‘balance of work and family life’ since it is moving in the direction of
‘support by the entire society’ rather than relying on the unpaid care provided by
female members of the family. A revision made by the coalition government parties
in the latter half of fiscal year 1999, however, undermined the very core of the
Long-term Care Insurance system even before it took effect.
More specifically, the Long-term Care Insurance Law had initially been 
designed to provide benefits in services and not in cash payments. Some members
of the Iryō Hoken Fukushi Shingikai (Advisory Council on Medical Insurance and
Welfare), however, repeatedly insisted on providing benefits in cash. In August
1999, conditions for dispensing cash benefits were submitted to the Kaigo Kyūfu
Bukai (Committee on Long-term Care Benefits), allowing family members engaged
in long-term care to be considered as providing in-home visit services. As a 
result, conditions that can quite likely expand the payment of cash benefits were
approved.
In the autumn of 1999, the Liberal Democratic Party’s policy chief, Kamei
Shizuka, contended that long-term care insurance services could destroy ‘Japan’s
admiral (utsukushii) tradition of children taking care of their parents’. Based on this
viewpoint, the government adopted ‘special measures for the smooth imple-
mentation of the long-term care insurance system’ on 5 November 1999. This
exempted people in the Class 1 insured category (65 years and over) from paying
premiums for the first six months, and reduced their payment to 50 per cent for
the following twelve months (Osawa 2000b: 16). Kamei made a further call to
impose restrictions on the provision of housework services for elderly people who
are residing with their family. As of June 2000, the Ministry of Health and Welfare
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adopted a policy to restrict housework assistance when providing in-home visit
services (Nikkei, 20 June, 2000).
As explained above, the fact that Long-term Care Insurance was introduced
under the terms that insurance premiums would not be collected from the insured
was a decision that could jeopardize the very foundation of the social insurance
system in Japan. While the measure was adopted with the primary aim of reducing
the financial burden on the elderly with a view to the general elections to be held
by October 2000 with the ending of the term of the House of Representatives, it
no doubt slowed down the work to build the infrastructure needed to provide
services. This meant the efforts to reduce the actual burden of family caretakers,
who were mostly women, were again put off. In effect, the measure stood in the
way of social transition towards the ‘work/life balance’ model by clinging to
Japanese-style welfare that relied on unpaid family (i.e. female) welfare provision
on the premise of the traditional family model.
To sum up, the governance of the Japanese welfare-employment regime 
as manifest during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s saw the introduction of all three
routes in a partial and indecisive way. First, it adopted elements of the ‘work/life
balance’ model or the ‘Scandinavian route’ by promoting the participation of
women and men in the labour force and socializing long-term care; second, it
adopted elements of the ‘neo-liberal route’ by promoting deregulation of labour;
and third, it adopted elements of the ‘conservative route’ in the sense that the
restructuring and deregulation of employment further deepened the dual struc-
ture of the labour market. Ikegami Takehiko, a specialist in fiscal studies, made a
comparative analysis of the expenditure and burden of taxation/social insurance
premiums in the industrial democracies from 1970 to the latter half of the1990s
(Ikegami 2001), and concluded that Japan is ‘a minimal welfare state’ and ‘a
maximum construction state’. While the ESC Report called Japan’s social security
‘generous’, Japan’s social security system, in reality, is far from being either
‘generous’ or ‘excessive’. 
Against this backdrop, how can we assess the proposals made by the ESC on
social security reform? Its concrete measures of reform were (1) Pension Reform:
restructure public pensions to limit their role to basic pension (and privatize the
earnings-related portion), to be financed solely by tax revenues in the future. Initiate
a defined contribution-type pension scheme for individuals and enterprises. 
(2) Medical Services and Long-term Care Reforms: long-term care and medical
services for the elderly are to be financed solely by tax revenues in the future.
Services should be offered either by publicly set up facilities run by the private
sector, or 100 per cent private enterprises. Introduce a voucher system and encour-
age more market competition in the field of medical services. (3) Measures to 
cope with the declining birth rate: introduction of childcare vouchers to offer a
wider choice of childcare services. Diversify childcare services, make tax cuts in
child rearing, expand child benefits, introduce a more open-door immigration
policy (ESC 1999a: 29–31). 
Above all, privatization of the earnings-related portion of the public pension and
recommendation of personal/corporate pension with a defined contribution plan
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bear a close resemblance to the pension reform carried out by the Thatcher
Government in the UK in the mid-1980s. Thus the ESC proposals were wryly
described as ‘Thatcherism twenty years late’, (available on-line at: http://www.eda-
jp.com/satsuki/2001/010330.html, accessed 30 June 2003), in apt criticism of 
the deregulation as well as of the social security reform belatedly taking place 
in Japan.
What is more problematic, however, than the ‘intent’ and ‘measures’ of these
policies is their ‘outcome’ when we look at the by-products of Thatcher’s 1986
pension reforms. As a result of these reforms, the conditions for contracting-out of
the earnings-related public pension scheme were eased, and the number of insured
decreased by 20 per cent in five years. And it is known that 75 per cent of the new
policyholders of certified personal pensions during these years were male. While a
majority of the policyholders taking out what were viewed at the time as the
advantageous private personal pension plans were men, women remained in the
public pension scheme with reduced terms of provision (information on the current
crisis in UK pensions, available on-line at: http://www.pensionsorter.co.uk/
pensions_in_crisis.html, accessed 2 July 2003). Not only that, but as tax expen-
ditures were granted to various personal pensions in the form of tax breaks, the
total sum of pensions in the early 1990s well exceeded the sum of various income-
tested benefits to the elderly. And there is no doubt that the majority of the elderly
who receive income-tested benefits are women (Sainsbury 1996: 208, 211).
As shown above, as long as social security systems function within a welfare-
employment regime and more broadly a society with gender disparity in terms of
wage and/or years in the labour force, a system of governance that apparently has
no concern for gender issues often widens the gender disparity of income security
for the aged. The ESC Report fails to take systematic gender bias into consideration
and lacks what is needed in order to transform Japan into the ‘work/life balance’
model. Furthermore, the two-year provisional measure to ease the anxiety of unem-
ployment includes a proposal to extend the ‘unemployment benefits to dependants
in a family’ in case ‘the head of a household’ is unemployed. This is blatantly based
on the ‘male breadwinner’ model in the sense that it fails to consider the number
of ‘dependants in a family’ as ‘self-responsibility’. Moreover, it overlooks the fact
that members other than the ‘head of the household’ – overwhelmingly the male
breadwinner – is often responsible for supporting the family to limit the target of
‘expanded provisions’ to only the ‘head of household’. 
While most politicians by no means welcomed the ESC’s recommendation, 
its concrete proposals were studied by relevant government offices from early 
April through the end of May 1999. As a result, ‘most recommendations’ related
to pension, medical care, and long-term care were classified as ‘issues with too many
obstacles to be carried out’, an action which the ESC later called ‘regrettable’ (ESC
1999b). One top bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance allegedly remarked ‘Well,
it’s another one of those academic essays’ available on-line at: http://www.asahi-
net.or.jp, accessed 1 April 1999).
And yet, despite the cold welcome given by the relevant ministries and the 
ESC’s repeated criticism of past reform attempts by the Ministry of Health and
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Welfare, we should not presume that the proposals have parted with Japan’s
traditional model of social policy and the overall governance of the welfare-
employment regime. Even if the ESC proposals were to materialize, the conven-
tional co-ordinates of Japan’s social policy system and governance structures, 
i.e. the big-company oriented ‘male breadwinner’ model with a low degree of 
de-commodification, would not be easily transformed. It is hard for many to believe
that a report advocating individual freedom of choice and self-responsibility should
include blatantly male-centred proposals. 
In contrast, in its proposal released in October 2000 titled ‘Social Security
towards the Twenty-first Century’, ‘The Academic Council on Rethinking the
Future of the Social Security System’ (Shakai Hoshō Seido no Arikata ni tsuite Kangaeru
Yushikisha Kaigi), set up by the Prime Minister, took up the treatment of the spouse
in the taxation/social insurance system and called for a re-examination with a view
to creating ‘a system neutral in view of individual choices’. Also, the coalition
government parties’ Negotiation Committee on Social Security Reform compiled
‘The General Principles of Social Security Reform’ at the end of March 2001. The
paper stated that, in employment and labour, they would duly ‘promote measures
to establish a gender-equal environment by prohibiting gender-based discrimi-
nation and encourage women’s active participation, so that women can make full
use of their ability’. And in regard to the social security system, it clearly calls 
for a ‘re-examination of the system in response to such diversified employment
forms as part-time workers, and create a gender-neutral system that allows room
for individual choice including that of women’s participation in the labour force’.
Apparently, these statements reflect the ‘care to be taken in social systems/practices’
as stipulated in Article 4 of ‘The Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society’. As we
have seen so far, in comparison with other government proposals that indicated
some shift, albeit ambiguously, from the ‘male breadwinner’ model towards a
‘work/life balance’ model, the ESC proposals are far more ‘conservative’ despite
their ‘reformist’ posture. 
A reform friendly to working women? 
In the preceding section we have seen that the ESC Report, which is a prototype
of Koizumi’s 2001 ‘Robust Policy’, is not the type of proposal that would shift
Japan’s conventional stance regarding the social policy system and the overall
governance of the welfare-employment regime. In this next section let us turn 
to examine whether the ‘Robust Policy’ is really moving towards the ‘work/life
balance’ model. 
The ‘seikatsu ishin’ (‘life restoration’) programme presented at the beginning of
the Robust Policy states as follows: (1) In order to create ‘a society friendly to
working women’, we will promote moving to the individual unit of assessment for
computing tax/social insurance premiums and eliminate ‘discrimination on the
basis of sex’ in employment; (2) We will promote a programme to make ‘zero-
waiting’ a reality in nursery/day-care centres, and will establish facilities for 
after-school care of children (Cabinet decision ‘Kongo no Keizai Zaisei Unei oyobi 
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Keizai Shakai no Kōzō Kaikaku ni kansuru Kihon Hōshin’ 2001: 4). But nowhere does it
stipulate in concrete terms how taxation and social security programmes will be 
re-examined.
Chapter 3 of the ‘Robust Policy’ – ‘Reforming the Social Security System’, is
replete with abstract, ambiguous and hard to grasp terminology. The repeated use
of ‘self-support and self-discipline’, ‘efficient’ and ‘private’ implies the aim is one
of reducing public responsibility.
With regard to the pension scheme, the ‘Robust Policy’ does not provide any
blueprint for government reform and simply states that the intention is to ‘establish
a sustainable system’, so how the government intends to redesign the system
remains unclear. Moreover, it has carefully chosen the term ‘eliminate’ in reference
to gender discrimination in employment, rather than ‘prohibit’ as declared in ‘The
Outline of Social Security Reform’ presented in March 2001 by the coalition
government parties’ Advisory Council. Certainly, the government’s intention of
achieving ‘zero-waiting to be accepted in nursery/day-care centres’ can be praised
as a move towards supporting the ‘work/life balance’ model. Yet, the aim is to
promote GOCO (Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated) arrangements
rather than increasing public services. If the government relies on the increase 
of private nurseries/day-care services, without proper regulation and oversight,
tragic incidents of death by child abuse and neglect, as occurred in such day care
facilities as ‘Smile Mom Yamato’, and elsewhere, may no longer be limited to a
few non-certified childcare services (details of the case available on-line at:
http://www.mainichi.co.jp/english/news/archive/200007/21/news03.html,
accessed 1 July 2003).
While not exactly government policy, the ‘Women and Pension System’ Study
Group (chaired by Sodei Takako, Professor of Family Sociology at Ochanomizu
University) under the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, presented a report
in December 2001with regard to pension reform.
Here let me review the more controversial issues regarding women and pensions.
First, basic pension premiums should not be collected from the ‘third class insured
person’, who is a dependent spouse (i.e. a full-time housewife whose annual income
is less than ¥1,300,000). These costs are to be shared collectively by all ‘second
insured persons’ who are employed. In other words, relatively low double-income
households and single households are providing a ‘reverse subsidy’ to a household
with a full-time housewife headed by a well paid salaried worker. This system, along
with the Income Tax Exemption for Spouse, encourages married women to choose
limited labour force participation with an approximate annual income of about
one million yen or less. It not only curbs the supply of labour by married women
and their earning power, but also hinders the improvement of working conditions
for women in general. 
The second issue is related to the Survivor’s Pension. If the husband of a woman
who has been participating in the labour market during her working life dies, the
wife has to ‘give up’ either her own benefits (to receive the Survivor’s Pension) or
the husband’s benefits (to receive her own pension). Moreover, the amount of
Survivor’s Pension benefits is often less than that of a full-time housewife with no
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history of contribution. The 1994 Pension Reform paved a third path for working
women by totalling the Employees’ Pension benefits for the wife and husband, and
making the wives eligible to receive one half of it. Still, 80 per cent of working
women choose to ‘give up’ their own benefit. Third, whereas a wife can receive a
generous Survivor’s Pension in case of separation due to her husband’s death, if
separated by divorce, the ex-spouse is guaranteed no benefits from the husband’s
earnings-related pension. Besides, Survivor’s Pension, which appears advantageous,
is not provided in cases of the spouse’s remarriage, and thus obstructs the freedom
of marriage.
In response to these issues, the ‘Women and Pension’ Study Group under 
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare proposed that the government 
apply the Employees’ Pension to part-time workers (thereby moving some people
from the category of third insured persons to that of second insured person by
lowering the standard working hours and annual income eligible for pension)
(Shakai Hoken Kenkyūjo 2002). While this proposal reflects recent views and is
oriented towards the ‘work/life balance’ model, it has been criticized as a lukewarm
and far from radical solution.
From the end of 2001 to the beginning of 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi
instructed the government’s Tax Commission to study ‘readjustment and cuts in
spouse deductions among others’ from the perspective of a ‘wider and lighter’ share
of the tax burden. It coincided with the time the CEFP also took up taxation reform. 
As a result, in June 2002, both the basic policy of the Tax Commission and ‘the
Robust Policy-Stage Two’ of the CEFP proposed to abolish the ‘special spouse
deduction’ and re-examine the spouse deduction. ‘Robust Policy-Stage Two’
further demanded the establishment of a pension system that ‘met the principles
of a gender equal society’. Concrete measures for pension reform, however, were
not specified, except for ‘the expanded application of social insurance to part-time
workers and the re-examination of the Third Insured Person System’.
Both the CEFP and the Tax Commission advocated a gender equal society as
a point of reference in re-examining the spouse deduction and creating a ‘neutral’
tax system in terms of a ‘non-biased’ policy in sharing the tax burden and labour
force participation. While Koizumi’s ‘Robust Policy’ merely proposed ‘to study it’,
the Council on Tax System took the discussion further.
Indeed, the Council on Tax System came up with a basic policy to abolish the
Special Spouse Deduction as a part of the efforts to ‘simplify and consolidate
dependant deductions’ of personal income tax. The grounds are unfair preferential
treatment in view of ‘care’ given to the taxpayer as well as other dependants, as the
tax deduction system allows the head of a household to apply for double deduction
along with spouse deduction. 
While the intention lies in the expansion of the tax base in order to promote a
‘wider and lighter’ share of the burden, it is epoch-making for the government’s
Council on Tax System to step in for the first time to re-examine the tax system,
which has, until now, embraced the ‘male breadwinner’ model. And yet, the
Council on Tax System remains cautious about abolishing the spouse deduction
system itself, though it is still alive as one of their proposals.
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In May 2001, the ‘specialist committee on gender impact evaluation and assess-
ment’ set up under The Council for Gender Equality began its discussions on
neutral systems of taxation, social security and employment in order to offer more
lifestyle choices to women, including the choice to work. The Committee submitted
a mid-term report on 24 April and a final report on 20 December 2002. The
Committee’s reports can be said to have put pressure on the government to make
a shift in the governance of the welfare-employment regime of Japan.
Conclusion
As the chairperson of this Specialist Committee, let me summarize some of our 
key recommendations. With regard to spouse deduction and special spouse
deduction, our report proposed their reduction or abolishment based on a shift
towards an individual unit of assessment. For academic studies have shown that
these deduction systems had placed restraints on wages, annual income and
working hours, and thus, were not neutral in terms of the choice to participate in
the labour force. With regard to the pension scheme, the proposals made by the
Specialist Committee, based on a shift to an individual unit of assessment, are far
more concrete than those of ‘Robust Policy-Stage Two’. The key proposals are: (1)
To divide the income between wife and husband, require the third insured person
to pay premiums, and provide an earnings-related pension (division of pension
between wife and husband). (2) To eliminate Survivor’s Pension of the Employees’
Pension Scheme by dividing the pension between wife and husband (Danjo Kyōdō
Sankaku Kaigi/Eikyō Chōsa Senmon Chōsakai 2002)
In the studies made by the LDP’s Tax System Research Committee since
November 2002, and with the preparation of the government budget, it was
decided that the special spouse deduction would be abolished as of January 2004.
And since January 2002 heated discussions on pension reform are being held 
by the Pension Group of the Social Security Advisory Council of the Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare. The moment has come for the Koizumi government
to take a clear political stance, resolve the contest over the different ways of
governing the welfare employment regime and make decisive moves to adopt the
‘work/life balance’ model and to part with the ‘lost decade’. It is only in this way
that a shift in the type of governance of the welfare-employment regime in Japan
will take place. 
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7 Japan and global 
environmental governance
Miranda A. Schreurs
For much of the last decade, the environment has been a very important issue in
Japanese foreign policy. During this period numerous changes have been made 
in Japan’s approach to environmental policymaking that have made it a far more
visible and proactive player in matters of global environmental governance. In the
early 1990s, the Japanese government determined that environmental protection
should become an important pillar of its foreign policy. Given that at the time Japan
was being widely criticized by environmentalists for its role in global environmental
degradation, especially in relation to tropical deforestation, depletion of marine
and wildlife resources, and destructive development assistance programmes, the
changes in Japan’s foreign environmental policy deserve attention. This chapter
examines changes in Japan’s environmental foreign policy and its approach to
environmental governance, the reasons behind those changes, and the obstacles
that remain to Japan being recognized as a global environmental leader.
There are many signs of a more proactive Japanese environmental foreign policy.
Japan is now among the world’s largest donors of official development assistance
(ODA) targeted for the environment. It is also a major supporter of the United
Nations Environment Programme, Asian Development Bank, and World Bank
environmental and energy programmes in developing countries. The Japanese
government has established environmental research and training centres and
helped set up environmental monitoring networks across East and Southeast Asia.
Japanese companies lead the world in obtaining the International Standard
Organization (ISO)’s 14001 environmental management certification and are
beginning to require suppliers in developing countries like China to obtain the
certification as well (Welch et al., 2002; Welch and Schreurs forthcoming). Japan
leads the world in the export of air pollution control technologies and large numbers
of Asian scientists and engineers are trained in environmental science and manage-
ment in Japan and abroad. 
The Japanese government is signatory to a wide range of global environmental
agreements, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species, Agenda 21, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, and the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming. Japan is actively promot-
ing greater environmental cooperation with its Asian neighbours by setting up
bilateral environmental cooperative agreements and participating in multilateral
environmental dialogue (Yoon 2001; Schreurs and Pirages 1998). At the World
Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa (hereafter,
the Johannesburg Earth Summit), Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō announced
that Japan would provide 250 billion yen in support of education for sustainable
development in low-income countries (Africa News, 27 September 2002). Japan was
host to the World Water Forum in March 2003 and is promoting the exchange of
best practices among developing nations in an effort to address the water crisis that
environmentalists warn will face many parts of the world this century. 
Yet, despite these many efforts, Japan is still struggling to achieve international
recognition as a leader in environmental protection. While there is wide-spread
admiration of Japan’s success in bringing its energy efficiency levels up to among
the highest of any Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) member (OECD 2002; Jänicke and Weidner 2002) and considerable
interest elsewhere in Asia in how Japan managed to sustain high economic growth
levels while simultaneously reducing air and water pollution levels in its major cities
(Rock 2002), Japan continues to have a mixed environmental image globally. 
In part, this is because of Japan’s continued involvement in controversial activ-
ities, such as whaling (Miyaoka 2004), consumption of hard wood from the tropical
forests of Southeast Asia (Japan is the world’s largest consumer of hard woods)
(Dauvergne 1997; 2001), heavy fishing of the world’s oceans (Japan is the world’s
number two consumer of fish after China), and support for nuclear energy. Within
Southeast Asia, there is also a perception that Japan shifted its most polluting
industries to developing countries, thus, effectively shifting the pollution burden
abroad.
Japan’s perception problems also have much to do with governance issues. 
Japan stands out among industrialized countries for the relatively weak position 
of its environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks in
the policymaking process. Until quite recently, there were sizeable legal and
institutional hurdles making it difficult for environmentalists to organize as NGOs
and there are still substantial restrictions on making tax deductible donations to
NGOs (Pekkanen 2000; Schreurs 2002; Schwartz and Pharr 2003). While the
number of NGOs in Japan has risen dramatically in recent years, only slowly are
these groups being accepted among decision making circles. Japanese NGOs pale
in comparison to their European Union (EU) and United States (US) counterparts
in terms of membership size, administrative resources, personnel and policymaking
experience. As a result, the voice of civil society in decision making in Japan is far
more restricted than is the case in Europe or the US, leaving bureaucrats and
industry to shape policies with only limited input from civil society. The result is
that Japan approaches environmental protection technologically. It is far weaker
in policy areas that require non-technological solutions or that challenge powerful
vested interests, such as the construction industry.
Also problematic is Japan’s international negotiating style. The need to achieve
a degree of consensus among vertically fragmented ministries with contested views
on environmental matters makes it difficult for Japan to present an assertive image
in international negotiations. It is not uncommon for Japan to wait in stating its
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own negotiating position until the positions of both the EU and the US are made
clear and then to seek some kind of middle ground that too often leaves Japan
looking indecisive. This is further complicated by the fact that in the past decade
a rift has emerged between EU and US approaches to international environmental
protection with the EU favouring multilateral approaches and the US selectively
favouring more unilateral or independent approaches. On issues ranging from
climate change to biodiversity preservation and genetically modified organisms,
there are strong differences in policy perspectives across the Atlantic (Vig and Faure
2004). Japan has tried to take on the role of international broker between the 
EU and the US, but at the cost of being criticized in the international press for
failure to exhibit stronger leadership (particularly the case in relation to the Kyoto
protocol). Frequently, the debates between the EU and the US internationally are
mirrored by debates between the Environment Ministry and the Ministry of
Economics, Trade, and Industry (METI) within Japan. The Environment Ministry
tends to take positions closer to that of the Europeans and METI to the position
of the US with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) concerned both with Japan’s
international policy role and its dominant relationship with the US. The division
among key ministerial players results in contested and time-consuming inter-
ministerial policy negotiations that can make it difficult for Japan to take an assertive
stance in international negotiations. 
Finally, Japan is simply not very good at publicizing its policy successes and is
less likely than European countries to present environmental targets internationally
that it will not be able to implement domestically. Combined these differences in
governance styles influence policy outputs and public perceptions. 
Making the environment a foreign policy priority 
For years, Japan has struggled to find ways to enhance its foreign policy visibility.
As the world’s second largest economy, Japan has been under considerable pressure
to do more to contribute to the global community. This pressure was particularly
strong throughout the 1980s when the Japanese economy still appeared invincible.
Yet, constitutional restrictions on the use of the Japanese Self Defence Forces in
military and some peace keeping operations overseas made it difficult for Japan 
to act as a ‘normal’ state in the international arena (Inoguchi 1993; Green 1995).
This reality forced Japan to seek other avenues whereby it could exert greater
international influence. 
At the same time that Japan was being pushed by the United States and other
nations to do more in the foreign policy realm, internationally awareness began to
grow regarding the deteriorating state of the global environment. The dying of
forests and lakes from acid rain in Europe and North America, the discovery of a
‘hole’ in the protective stratospheric ozone layer above Antarctica, suggestions by
scientists that the burning of fossil fuels was causing global warming, large-scale
tropical deforestation, ocean resource depletion, and the rapid loss of biological
diversity, began to garner greater popular and political concern. Initially, Japanese
policymakers were slow to react to this growing international concern about global
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environmental degradation. An analysis of Japan’s Environmental White Papers
in the 1980s shows that there was only very limited attention to international envi-
ronmental matters by the Environment Agency prior to 1987 (Schreurs 1996).
In the late 1980s, Japan was criticized for pursuing policies abroad that badly
damaged the environment in developing countries. Japan had the dual image of
being an international leader in domestic pollution clean up and an international
‘outlaw’ for policies it pursued overseas that contributed to large-scale environ-
mental degradation outside of the Japanese archipelago.
Given that there was no domestic ground swell in support for a change to 
Japan’s environmental policies and none of the opposition parties rose to champion
environmental issues, it is quite remarkable that, at the end of the 1980s, Japanese
policymakers (and in particular, Prime Minister Takeshita Noburu) began to look
at environmental protection in a new way. By the early 1990s environmental
protection was being turned into one of the pillars of Japan’s foreign policy
(Kameyama 2003; Schreurs 1996; 2002). 
There were many reasons for this. The Japanese bureaucracy and industry began
to see the possibility of exporting to the developing world lessons learned both from
Japan’s painful experiences with allowing pollution to get so bad during its high
growth years that it resulted in debilitating diseases and death, and from its belated,
but eventually relatively successful, efforts with urban air and water pollution clean-
up and energy efficiency improvements. The potential for developing new
environmental technology industries was not missed by Japanese industry. Japanese
industry was eager to find a way to improve its image internationally (Imura and
Schreurs forthcoming).
Japan was being heavily criticized in another area marked for foreign policy
leadership – that of ODA. In the early 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro
designated ODA as one of the key pillars of Japanese foreign policy. The huge
growth witnessed by Japanese ODA in the 1980s was supposed to win Japan praise
and to some extent this praise was forthcoming. But the praise was mitigated by
criticism because of the harmful effects of some ODA programmes on the envi-
ronment in developing countries. Japan’s support for large-scale infrastructure
projects, including roads cut through heavily forested areas and dams built in
developing countries that resulted in large-scale population displacement and
environmental damage, resulted in some harsh criticism from the environmental
community and other countries. Indeed, ‘victims’ of a dam project (those that were
forced to relocate) completed in 1996 in Sumatra, Indonesia and funded by
Japanese ODA currently are suing the Japanese government for destroying their
lives (Japan Times, 4 July 2003). Promoting ‘greener’ aid, thus, could help Japan’s
broader ODA image as well.
Japan also became aware and increasingly concerned about being downwind
from China. China’s environmental problems are enormous. During Mao’s reign,
China’s natural resources were plundered and the environment left badly scarred
because of misguided growth campaigns (Shapiro 2000). Economic reform initiated
under Deng Xiaoping and continued by Jeng Zemin has shifted China towards 
a new model of growth that is premised on entrepreneurship. While this has had
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a number of positive environmental effects, such as the shutting down of some of
the most-heavily polluting state-run industries, rising living standards are creating
greater individual demand for resources. As energy demand grows, in the next
twenty years or so, China is expected to be the world’s largest producer of
greenhouse gases. It is already a major source of acid rain in East Asia that causes
not only great damage to Chinese agriculture, but is starting to be felt in neigh-
bouring North and South Korea and Japan as well. In an influential book, Vaclav
Smil (1993) warned that China was facing an ecological crisis that could greatly
restrict its national growth potential. Elizabeth Economy (2004) suggests that
China’s future will depend on how it deals with expanding deserts and rivers that
run black from ecological destruction and pollution. China’s environmental
problems at the beginning of the twenty-first century are of a magnitude even more
serious than those experienced by Japan in the 1960s. For Japan, this is both a
threat and an opportunity. 
Signs of policy change in Japan
In the late 1980s, when the country’s political leaders were considering making
environment a foreign policy priority, Japan had a rather mixed environmen-
tal image. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s the country had achieved
substantial success domestically in improving energy efficiency and making the 
air breathable once again. At the beginning of the 1970s, after more than a decade
of blatant disregard for the environmental degradation and health problems caused
by Japan’s rapid economic growth policies, the Liberal Democratic Party intro-
duced a series of sweeping changes to the country’s environmental laws and
administrative structures. Japan went from having very few protective measures 
to adopting a series of framework environmental regulations that gave it among
the most extensive environmental regulatory requirements for industry of any
industrialized country. Although many of the ideas behind specific laws were
borrowed from the United States and Great Britain, Japan introduced some
innovative regulatory ideas and practices as well – best known among them is the
Pollution Victims Compensation Law. Also of great interest is the extensive use of
voluntary pollution agreements reached at the local level among government and
industries (Matsuno forthcoming). The environmental regulations introduced in
Japan between 1967 and 1974 combined with the impact of the 1973 Organization
for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo helped to transform
Japanese industrial practices, making them far less resource intensive and more
energy efficient. By the end of the decade, Japan’s environment had noticeably
improved. Japan became a world leader in the production of air pollution control
technologies. In the late 1970s the OECD (1977) conducted an assessment of
Japan’s environment. The report concluded that Japan had done much to clean
up its environment and that its success with pollution control should serve as an
example to other developing countries. 
Yet, internationally, in the 1980s Japan was being criticized for its role in the
destruction of the global commons. One target was Japan’s reliance on drift net
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fishing, a practice whereby huge nets are strung between two fishing vessels and
then dragged through the ocean catching everything that comes in their path.
Another was Japan’s catching of several hundred whales each year for ‘scientific’
purposes despite the International Whaling Commission’s moratorium on whaling
(Miyaoka 2004). Environmentalists were quick to point out Japan’s status as the
world’s largest importer of tropical hard woods. Japanese trading companies (sōgo
shōsha) purchased huge quantities of lumber from Southeast Asia for use in the
construction industry and helped line the pockets of officials in the region that were
willing to allow huge swaths of virgin rain forest to be clear cut (Dauvergne 1997;
2001). Japan’s importing of products from endangered species for use in traditional
crafts as well as for purely decorative purposes also attracted environmentalists’ ire.
Examples include the use of ivory from African elephants in hanko (signature seals)
and tortoise shells for making decorative combs (Mofson 1996). The Japanese
government and industries further were accused of exporting their most polluting
industries to countries with weaker environmental standards and foot dragging in
international efforts to regulate ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons. 
If Japan were to be taken seriously as a global environmental leader, it would
have to address the many policies for which it was being criticized. With the 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), or
commonly the Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro as a motivation, the government
agreed to ban the use of drift net fishing and cracked down on the importation of
animals and animal products from species protected under the Convention on
Trade in Endangered Species. The importation of ivory was banned despite its use
in a number of traditional crafts. Other practices, such as clear cutting in tropical
forests, were targeted for study and reform and Japanese trading firms began to
experiment with reforestation efforts.
In 1987, Japan signed the Montreal Protocol on the Protection of the
Stratospheric Ozone Layer and in 1990 agreed to an amendment that would
accelerate the phasing out of the production and use of chlorofluorocarbons. 
In 1990, the government established a non-binding target to stabilize Japan’s
emissions of carbon dioxide (a major greenhouse gas) at 1990 levels by 2000. It 
also added a global climate change division to the Environment Agency and estab-
lished a new portfolio of Minister for Global Environmental Affairs. The Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (from 1991 Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry) launched a Green Aid Plan to promote environmental capacity building
and technology development in (and exports to) neighbouring China and elsewhere
in Southeast Asia. The Environment Agency initiated an Acid Rain Monitoring
Network in East Asia (Brettell and Kawashima 1998; Wilkening 2004). And, at the
UNCED, Japan with much fanfare pledged to spend billions of yen for environ-
mental projects internationally. It also signed Agenda 21, an international action
plan for promoting sustainable development.
Mirroring the changes made to environmental programmes in the early 1970s,
the early 1990s became a period of sweeping changes to Japan’s environmental
laws. The new laws reflected a greater appreciation of the importance of global
perspectives on environmental protection. A new Environmental Basic Law was
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formed replacing the Environment Basic Law of 1967 (as amended in 1970). The
new framework legislation places a responsibility on the government to protect the
global environment. This was followed in 1994 with the passage of an Environment
Basic Plan, which established concrete policies and measures to be taken by the
Japanese government to reduce Japan’s environmental footprint. In 1997, Japan
hosted the Third Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change where the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming was formulated.
Other noteworthy initiatives include Japan’s 1998 Global Warming Prevention
Law, its new Recycling Law, and the extensive revisions made to the Law
Concerning the Rational Use of Energy.1 By the turn of the century, Japan was
also a key player in efforts to improve environmental conditions in China. Kurt
Tong, the Councillor for the Science, Technology, and Environment Division of
the US Embassy in China noted that it is not the US, but Japan and Germany,
which are the biggest foreign players in environmental protection in China
(Lecture, Beijing, 22 January 2003).
By the end of the decade, Japan’s approach to environmental protection
internationally was far more proactive than it had been a decade earlier. In many
ways Japan succeeded in making the environment a pillar of its foreign policy. Its
approach to particular environmental issues, however, still provokes some critical
reactions and the policymaking process is still less open than liberal critics desire. 
Moves to pluralize environmental policymaking in
Japan
When global environmental issues first began to gain more attention internation-
ally in the 1980s, there were few actors in Japan concerned with tackling these 
new kinds of problems. Although Japan had some environmental groups, like the
World Wide Fund for Nature, working on species conservation, and the Citizens’
Alliance for Saving the Atmosphere and the Earth (CASA) working to phase out
chlorofluorocarbons, the number of national environmental groups in Japan was
extremely small. Few groups had more than several dozen members and even the
largest ones only a few tens of thousands (compared with membership sizes in the
hundreds of thousands and even millions for some US and EU groups). Moreover,
because of their very weak financial status what few groups that did exist in Japan
could do little more than focus on environmental education or local environmental
projects, such as the greening of the urban landscape. They were not in a position
to advise policymakers or present policy alternatives on global environmental
pollution issues. Unlike the many environmental think tanks that existed in Europe
and the US, in the 1980s there were no major private environmental research
institutes in Japan and universities had but a handful of scholars focusing on
environmental law or politics. There were also few Japanese scientists engaged 
in research on global resource issues or atmospheric or marine pollution. The
Environment Agency had a largely domestic focus and few employees followed
global environmental matters in any kind of serious way. Only a small number of
politicians had any familiarity with environmental matters. In the 1980s, Japan’s
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environmental policy community was remarkably weak for a nation that had
achieved such notable success with cutting waste and emission flows in production
processes, reducing reliance on oil as a percentage of its total energy supply and
cleaning up health-threatening pollution.
Unlike in many Western European countries where environmental groups and
Green Parties helped to push sustainable development concerns on to national
policy agendas, Japan’s decision to become a major environmental player inter-
nationally was largely a top-down decision made by a conservative leadership.
Because of the West’s vocal criticism of Japan as a free-rider on the international
system, in the late 1980s the LDP was looking for ways to strengthen its foreign
policy contributions. The fact that global environmental issues were suddenly hot
international topics in the late 1980s provided the LDP with a potential new
international role. Japan could take advantage of its domestic expertise in pollution
control and export this know-how to developing countries. This was an idea that
proved amenable to many Japanese industries as they saw the possibility to develop
new markets in environmental protection internationally, to develop greener
images that would be good for sales domestically and internationally, and as a way
of engaging in more philanthropy. Being green internationally was also likely to
win praise rather than the kind of criticism that much Japanese ODA was receiving.
In order to play a larger global environmental role, however, Japan’s leaders
quickly discovered that they needed to strengthen their environmental governance
capacity. Within the bureaucracy, this meant establishing global environmental
departments and offices. Almost overnight all of the major ministries established
offices with a global environmental focus. When the government was restructured
in 2001, the only new ministry to be created was an Environment Ministry. Within
the Diet, politicians also began to go green. A new zoku focused on environmental
issues formed and quickly became popular among both LDP and opposition party
members (Ohta 2000). While their numbers have decreased somewhat in the last
few years, environmentally-oriented politicians can be found in all the political
parties. Japan has a large contingent of politicians involved in the Global Legislators
Organization for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE), an international network of
parliamentarians concerned with environmental matters.
There also were some unintended consequences from Japan’s largely top-
down policy decision to become more engaged in environmental protection
overseas. Most impressive has been the rapid growth of Japan’s environmental
NGO community. Although there is no doubt that social movement groups helped
to transform Japan’s environmental policies and institutions in the early 1970s, by
the end of that decade, the environmental citizens’ movements that had formed to
protest pollution problems and to promote quality of life concerns had dissipated.
Some groups were still active, but they remained focused primarily on local envi-
ronmental concerns, like the damming of Japan’s rivers, the loss of marsh lands,
and the paving over of Japan’s coastlines (Karan and Suginuma forthcoming).
Thus, in comparison with the US and Europe where environmental groups in the
1980s and early 1990s helped to force governments to pay greater attention to
problems of acid rain, marine pollution, tropical deforestation, stratospheric ozone
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depletion, climate change and sustainable development, in Japan there were almost
no groups in a position to force such demands on the Japanese government. Indeed,
when the Japanese government first began to attend international negotiations
dealing with stratospheric ozone depletion and global climate change, it was
embarrassed because it was the only advanced industrialized country that had
almost no NGOs that could participate in the negotiations as observers. Official
delegations from Europe and the US were accompanied by dozens of environ-
mental groups. In contrast, the newly established Green Peace Japan and CASA
were among the only organizations attending the first rounds of negotiations on
these important issues. 
One of the key documents to come out of the 1992 UNCED was a plan for
achieving sustainable development called Agenda 21. A key element of Agenda 21
is promoting the participation of civil society in environmental decision making.
In most advanced industrialized societies, NGO participation is seen as a critical
component of democratic governance as NGOs present societal perspectives into
policy debates. If Japan was to become a global environmental player and be
recognized as such, the government needed to do something to develop an NGO
community. The great irony in this is that government officials had little appre-
ciation for environmental groups and no real desire to open decision making
processes to them. 
There has been considerable attention in the literature to the obstacle course
citizens groups have had to traverse in order to gain legal status as not-for-profit
organizations (NPOs) (e.g. Yamamoto 1999; Schwarz and Pharr 2003). Obstacles
included the need to win ministerial approval to obtain NPO status and sufficient
start up funds (estimated to be in millions of yen). So bad was the situation that
many groups simply did their best to exist without even trying to obtain NPO. Even
with NPO status, most groups were not eligible to receive tax deductible donations
making it difficult to build up any kind of financial basis for their operations. Thus,
the incentive to create an NPO also was not strong.
While Japan’s bid for global environmental leadership status may have been
initiated from above, it did not take long for activists in Japan to recognize that 
a window of opportunity had been opened for them to participate in some way in
environmental governance nationally and internationally. New groups began to
form and to take on global environmental causes. The Japan NGO Center for
International Cooperation and the Japan Tropical Action Network formed in 
1987. Greenpeace Japan and the Rainforest Foundation Japan formed in 1989. 
A Seed Japan and the Japan Association for Greening Deserts formed in 1991. 
These and many other groups dealing with health care, ageing, and education
concerns began to mobilize and to demand change to the laws governing NPOs.
They won some support for their demands from politicians sympathetic to their
cause. Their efforts received a great boost as a result of the efforts of large-scale
citizens’ groups to help victims of the tragic Hanshin earthquake in 1995. Civil
society emerged from this tragedy as the hero while the government was criticized
for its slow and inept response to the disaster. Demands for a change to Japan’s
NPO laws intensified after this time (Pekkanen 2002). 
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The government initially took some small steps to improve the funding oppor-
tunities available to environmental groups in the early 1990s. In 1993, for example,
the Japan Fund for the Global Environment was set up to provide funds for NGO
activities in the fields of environmental protection and sustainable development.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also set up a special assistance fund for NGOs doing
work in developing countries. More significantly, in 1998 the Diet unanimously
approved a new NPO law, which makes it much easier for groups to obtain non-
profit status and in 1999 a Public Information Disclosure Law, similar to the US
Freedom of Information Act, was passed (Schreurs 2002: 225). In August 2002 in
connection with the Johannesburg Earth Summit, the Foreign Ministry budgeted
2 billion yen in support for NGOs working on development assistance. For the first
time, the funds are allowed to be used to cover some NGO administrative expenses,
including personnel expenses, conference costs and leasing and repair fees for
computers and photocopy machines. This is a major policy change since in the
past NGOs had to rely on their own resources to cover overhead expenses. Still,
notes Harada Katsuhiro, ‘the new system requires NGOs to go through cumber-
some procedures, such as filling in time sheets every day, as [a condition] to receive
overhead subsidies’ (The Nikkei Weekly, 26 August 2002). 
Another interesting development has been the creation of environmental
networks that bring together activists from the environmental community with
individuals working in companies and in the bureaucracy to brainstorm policy
alternatives. One such group is Kiko Forum, established in 1995, to critique the
government’s climate change policies and to present policy alternatives (Reimann
2001).
Japanese NGOs recognize the importance of networking to enhance their 
ability to influence the direction of international negotiations. Hayakawa
Mitsutoshi, managing director of CASA, noted that Japanese NGOs have come a
long way since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro when they had little
impact on the inter-governmental negotiations. ‘The network of citizens and
international solidarity has certainly changed from that of before, and the key 
from now on is how to develop that further . . . how to make that network function
to have citizens’ views reflected’ (Kyodo News Service, Japan Economic Newswire,
16 August 2002). Interestingly, NGO networks are beginning to emerge linking
activists in Japan, South Korea, and China (Yoon 2001). The East Asia
Environmental Information Express Messenger launched a web-site (Enviroasia) to
share information among NGOs in the three countries (Nikkei Weekly, 9 December
2002).
While environmental groups are still not well integrated in policy decision
making, they now have at least some voice in the process of environmental gover-
nance. The media also have been strong supporters of Japan’s new environmental
groups and have worked to push governmental acceptance of the positive role 
that can be played by NGOs not only in policy implementation, but also in 
its formulation. Many Japanese journalists with whom I have spoken are not shy
about admitting that they have an agenda with their reporting – they want to help
promote the power of civil society in Japan.
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The changes in the institutional structures governing civil society in Japan 
are quite remarkable and the growth of civil society organizations astounding
(Tsujinaka, 2002). While many of these groups are still very small and their level
of professionalization still far behind that of their western European and North
American counterparts, there is growing acceptance of NGO activities by the
broader public and many young people are eager to be involved in voluntary
groups. Slowly, the Japanese government also is warming to the presence of NGOs. 
At the September 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit, for instance, the govern-
ment set up a liaison office for NGOs near the convention centre in order to support
their activities. Hundreds of NGO representatives attended the meeting. Even more
significantly, in a major change from the past when Japanese government officials
would do their best to avoid Japanese NGOs at international negotiations, five
NGO members were invited to join the Japanese government’s delegation to the
Johannesburg Earth Summit in August 2002. This was the first time that NGOs
officially joined a Japanese governmental delegation to an international event. They
included the executive director of Friends of the Earth Japan, a researcher at the
Kitakyushu Forum on Asian Women, the director of the domestic programme
division of the Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family
Planning, the president of the Africa-Japan Forum, and a member of the Japan
Forum for Johannesburg (Japan Economic Newswire, 31 July 2002). 
Still, the relatively closed culture of decision making in Kasumigaseki remains
the norm. Only a relatively small number of NGOs are invited to participate in
shingikai (government council) or to otherwise advise the ministries. An external
advisory panel on reforming the MOFA recommended in April 2002 that the
ministry deepen its relationship with NGOs and enhance transparency in its 
foreign aid programme (Kyodo News Service, Japan Economic Newswire, 17 April
2002).
Japan’s ministries remain at the centre of international environmental policy-
making. Key ministries in international environmental decision making include
the Environment Ministry; METI; the MOFA; and the Ministry of Agriculture,
Foresty and Fisheries. Depending on the issue, other ministries may also be
involved. Conflicts of interest among the ministries often lead to contest over policy
and policy stalemate. In these instances, prime ministers have been known to apply
pressure on the ministries to reach consensus or to formulate more proactive
environmental positions. Hashimoto Ryūtarō, for example, pressured the ministries
to come to a compromise and announce internationally Japan’s negotiating position
in the lead up to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Environmental groups also have
applied pressure on the ministries to move beyond their traditionally conservative
policy stances.
Comparing Japan with Germany, the EU and the US
In considering Japan’s approach to environmental governance, it is useful to put
Japan into a comparative perspective with other advanced industrialized regions.
Here Germany, the EU and the US are considered. The US is widely regarded as
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the force behind the transformation of environmental policies that occurred
throughout the industrialized world in the 1970s. Although Great Britain was the
first to adopt framework air and water pollution controls, the power of the US
environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s led to sweeping environmental
regulatory changes that not only established new restrictions on polluters, but also
created new institutional rules governing the relationship among government,
industry and civil society. Civil society was greatly empowered through legislative
and judicial rulings that gave NGOs new rights and protections, including
expanded rules of standing in the courts and the right to engage not only in
educational activities, but a degree of lobbying activity as well without losing tax
exempt status. NGOs were similarly greatly empowered by the Freedom of
Information Act. Also important was the introduction of requirements for projects
receiving federal funding to undergo environmental impact assessments. US
leadership in environmental policy formulation continued through the 1970s with
new regulations governing the release of toxic chemicals and efforts to regulate
ozone depleting chemicals. 
Interestingly, while Japan followed the US in the introduction of many pollution
control laws, these mainly dealt with air, water, noise and soil pollution. There were
important initiatives in the US that did not get picked up by Japanese policymakers.
In particular, Japan did not adopt environmental impact assessment legislation, 
a freedom of information act, nor rules empowering civil society groups at this 
time. It took another 30 years before these kinds of legislative changes were 
made in Japan. These differences reflect the power of economic interests in Japan,
which although they were required to accept emissions control standards and to
make energy efficiency improvements, they were able to inhibit for decades the
formulation of laws that would fundamentally alter approaches to governance by
empowering civil society.
Where Japan did excel was in the implementation of the environmental
regulations adopted in the early 1970s. This was done through a combination 
of regulations, incentives, and voluntary agreements that reflected the close rela-
tionship among government and industry and the use of administrative guidance
and national and local government levels. By the end of the 1970s and early 
1980s, European governments that were suddenly being confronted by a need to
address acid rain problems were looking to Japan to learn about its approaches 
to environmental governance, and in particular the practices that led to major
improvements in energy efficiency and air pollution control. More recently,
European governments have taken notice of Japan’s extensive use of voluntary
pollution control agreements at the local level as an innovative form of envi-
ronmental governance that could potentially be applied to global climate change
mitigation.
While US leadership in the formulation of new environmental regulations in 
the 1970s is generally agreed upon, there are many who argue that since the 1990s,
the US has lost its leadership role to the EU (Vig and Faure 2003). In the 1970s,
most EU member states were far behind the US in the introduction of new environ-
mental regulations and environmental protection was not as high on the political
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agenda as it was in the US. In the 1980s that began to change as Green Parties
emerged across continental Europe. By the beginning of the 1990s, it was the 
EU rather than the US or Japan that seemed to be leading the world in pushing
for major changes in approaches to environmental governance. This can be 
seen in terms of EU leadership in relation to climate change, renewable energy
policies, and sustainable development initiatives. In recent years, many of the 
more intriguing new ideas about environmental governance have emanated 
from Europe. These include such ideas as the formation of Green Plans whereby
environmental considerations are brought into all aspects of governmental decision
making, policies to promote ecological modernization such as the shifting of tax
burdens to the heaviest polluters as is being done in Germany, and efforts to bring
concerns about a nation’s ‘ecological footprint’ into planning decisions. The loss
of a US leadership role can be explained in large part by the growth in the influence
of business interests in Washington DC and a Republican agenda to reduce the
size of government, including in the environmental realm. In Japan’s case, the lack
of a substantive role in environmental governance in relation to national and
international issues for Japanese NGOs may explain why in the 1990s the most
innovative environmental governance ideas have emanated from Europe rather
than Japan, despite the government’s intention to play a leadership role globally.
Still, Japan is due some credit as normative change has led to some major policy
changes. Now, for example, it has one of the world’s most complex waste disposal
programmes to enhance recycling levels and reduce waste generation. Similarly,
Japanese government and industry are working to promote a zero emissions society
in which all resource outputs are recycled back into the production process. Japan
has followed the European example of introducing renewable energy portfolios
mandating that utility companies buy a percentage of their electricity from
renewable energy sources.
Japan and the global climate change negotiations:
sandwiched between the EU and the US
The negotiations over climate change have been described in great detail (e.g.
Grubb 1999; Oberthür and Ott 1999; Harris 2000; Schreurs 2002) and thus are
only recounted here to make a point regarding Japan’s environmental negotiating
style and role in international environmental governance. While Japan is far more
proactive than it was during the 1980s in global environmental negotiations,
bureaucratic fragmentation and differences in the policy perspectives and gover-
nance concerns of the Environment Ministry and METI often result in contentious
debates between them over the policy course that Japan should pursue (Ohta 2000;
Kameyama 2003). When there are major differences between ministries in policy
perspectives, it is difficult for Japan to lead during international environmental
negotiations. Such differences are not infrequent. The climate change case is a
fascinating one for observing this phenomenon as well as the role that can be played
by politicians to force bureaucratic compromise. Three particular decision points
are briefly examined: the 1992 Earth Summit; the formulation of the Kyoto
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Protocol in 1997; and the Japanese and EU response to the US decision to pull out
of the Kyoto agreement.
Diplomatic efforts to address global climate change began in the late 1980s in
the preparatory meetings for the 1992 Earth Summit. Already at this early stage
in the international negotiations, rifts emerged between the EU and the US in their
approaches to climate change mitigation. The EU called for the establishment of
concrete targets for carbon dioxide emissions reductions to be included in the
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The US baulked at this initiative and
announced that it was opposed to the establishment of concrete reduction targets
and timetables and instead proposed a ‘no regrets’ policy in which the government
would promote taking action that would not cause any regrets if climate change
turned out to be less serious a problem than what scientists claimed. This meant
promoting only actions that would be good for greenhouse gas emissions reductions
if they were good for other reasons as well (e.g. energy conservation that could be
a cost-cutting measure for industry). 
An inter-ministerial debate raged within Japan about how to react with the
Environment Agency and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI,
now METI) taking different policy positions and winning different policy battles.
The Environment Agency favoured the EU approach and with the backing of
Takeshita Noboru succeeded prior to the Rio meeting in getting MITI to agree to
the idea of a non-binding domestic stabilization target for carbon dioxide emissions
as several European countries had already adopted. They failed at this stage,
however, in convincing MITI to agree to a binding target. MITI was concerned
about isolating the US in the negotiations at Rio and generally was more amenable
to the US approach. Indeed, largely because of the influence of MITI, Japan was
a member of a coalition going into the Earth Summit that was labelled: JUSCANZ,
for Japan, the US, Canada and New Zealand. These were the nations opposing
stringent commitments on carbon dioxide reductions. At the Earth Summit in Rio
de Janeiro a Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was formulated
that recognized the responsibility of developed states to act to address a problem
they had largely created, yet because of US opposition (and Japanese support of
that position) no concrete emissions reduction targets were established.
The negotiations leading up to the formulation of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
exhibited a similar kind of rift between the EU and the US, with Japan again taking
a middle position between the two. By this time, the US position had softened
somewhat and the Clinton administration announced its willingness to consider
concrete targets and timetables but also demanded differentiated targets for
countries as well as maximum flexibility in how states could achieve their reduction
commitments. The US championed the use of market mechanisms (and in
particular, emissions trading) and joint implementation and the clean development
mechanism (mechanisms whereby a nation can gain credit for reducing emissions
in another state since it may be more cost effective to reduce emissions abroad than
at home). The EU argued for a common target for all industrialized nations and
that a cap be placed on how much credit a country could gain for reducing
emissions using these flexible mechanisms and calling upon countries to take action
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at home to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Japan attempted to find compromise
ground between the EU and the US by proposing a plan whereby nations would
be able to set their own reduction emissions targets and timetables but commit
internationally to meeting them.
Several months prior to the start of the negotiations, the EU stated it was
prepared to reduce its 1990 greenhouse gas emissions by 15 per cent by 2008 – 
12 per cent based on a basket of three greenhouse gases. Although Japan was host
to the Third Conference of the Parties to the FCCC where the Kyoto Protocol was
to be worked out, because of inter-ministerial disagreement and a desire to see what
the US negotiating position would be, Japan was slow to announce its position and
had to be urged to hurry up and do so by the Conference Chairman Estrada and
to take on the leadership role expected of a host country of a major international
conference. Japan announced its position and proposed a 5 per cent reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions relative to 1990 levels by 2012 for countries allowing for
differentiation based in their national circumstances. Formulating this position
proved difficult because of a disagreement between the Environment Ministry, the
MOFA, and METI over what Japan could really obtain (METI’s initial negotiating
position was simple stabilization) and it took the intervention of Prime Minister
Hashimoto Ryūtarō to work out a compromise among them. Interestingly, Japan
announced its position still not knowing what the US position would be largely
because of Hashimoto’s intervention.
In early October, the US finally announced its bottom line. The US demanded
that six, not just three gases should be addressed, and argued that a stabilization
target for this basket of six gases at 1990 levels by 2012 was the best it could do. At
the December conference, the US succeeded in getting others to agree to address
six greenhouse gases, rather than the three the EU and Japan originally sought 
to address. As a result, the EU announced that a 15 per cent reduction would 
no longer be feasible. In the end, the EU agreed to an 8 per cent reduction in its
emissions of a basket of six greenhouse gases by 2008 – 12 per cent relative to 1990
levels, the US to a 7 per cent reduction, and Japan to a 6 per cent reduction. MITI
was apparently pushed by Hashimoto to agree to the 6 per cent reduction goal
upon Albert Gore’s urging so that internationally an agreement could be formu-
lated. Decisions on how these reductions were to be met, including decisions
regarding how much of the reductions could be met through the use of flexible
mechanisms, was left for future meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the
FCCC.
When the George W. Bush administration pulled the US out of the Kyoto
Protocol in March 2001, the EU reacted with anger and an intense lobbying
campaign to pull the US back into the agreement. The EU announced soon after
Bush pulled out of the agreement, that they had every intention of moving forward
with ratification of the agreement even without the US. Japan initially sent mixed
signals in reaction to the Bush administration’s pull out. 
On the one hand, it joined the EU in criticizing the US for pulling out of the
agreement without even consulting with other nations about its plans. The Japanese
Upper House passed a resolution in April 2002 urging the US to return to the
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agreement and Environment Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko travelled repeatedly to
the US to urge the White House to change its mind. Yet, at the same time, Prime
Minister Koizumi made statements when he visited the US to meet with President
Bush in April 2002 that raised doubts about whether Japan would move forward
with the Kyoto Protocol without the US being on board. 
In the end, Japan did decide to side with the EU in moving forward with Kyoto.
Japanese public opinion was strongly in favour of staying with the agreement and
with an upcoming election, Koizumi did not want to do something that could
adversely impact the LDP’s performance in the election. Thus, when push came
to shove, Koizumi chose to work with Europe in keeping the Kyoto Protocol alive.
But, at the same time, he tried to influence the direction of negotiations in a way
that would be amenable to the US should the US choose to return to the Kyoto
framework. At the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the FCCC held in Bonn where
the technical details for implementing the Kyoto Protocol were negotiated, Japan
took up the negotiating positions that had been held by the US up until this point
in time calling for maximum flexibility in how states were to achieve their emissions
reduction targets. The EU had little choice but to give in to Japan’s demands or
risk losing Japan’s support for the agreement as well. 
In sum, Japan worked with the EU to help keep the Kyoto Protocol alive. There
are now over 110 states that have ratified the agreement and, if Russia joins, then
there will be sufficient involvement for the agreement to go into force.2 In saving
the agreement, however, Japan did its utmost not to offend the US by sculpting an
agreement that the US might be able to one day join again. Japan remains far more
beholden to the US than European countries. Its decision to move forward without
the US on the Kyoto Protocol, however, suggests that Japan is perhaps interested
in crafting a more independent foreign policy. 
The three decision points examined here suggest several additional impor-
tant points regarding governance in Japan. First, is that bureaucrats are key players
in decision making and that the oft-noted bureaucratic fragmentation in Japan 
is highly evident in the environmental policy realm. METI, which is in close
consultation with industry, tends to favour more conservation policy positions than
the Environment Ministry, which tends to adopt positions more similar to those
supported by European green interests. MOFA wants a strong international
presence for Japan in international negotiations but like METI is wary of alienating
the US. Second, is that politicians are exerting a good deal of influence on Japan’s
foreign policymaking. On numerous occasions politicians weighed in on the
bureaucratic negotiations and influenced policy outcome. Third, as the Japanese
public becomes more and more concerned with global environmental protection
and environmental groups become more active, they are pressuring politicians to
be greener. As a result, environmental governance in Japan is becoming more
pluralistic.
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Conclusion
Environmental policy took on a new importance in Japan beginning in the 
1990s and, despite continued rises and falls in public and policymakers’ attention,
remains an important element of Japanese foreign policy. In the 1990s, Japan
transformed its legal and institutional structures in order to deal more effectively
with global environmental issues. Paralleling or complementing these changes in
the legal framework have been changes in Japanese approaches to environmental
governance. In part intentionally, and in part as a result of forces beyond its control,
by picking up on the environment as a foreign policy priority in the late 1980s, the
LDP unleashed a process that is slowly, but noticeably, changing environmental
governance in Japan. The process has become more open with greater debate and
political input than was the case throughout the 1980s. The environmental policy
changes of the 1990s and early 2000s are in some ways reminiscent of the major
environmental policy changes that occurred in Japan in the early 1970s. What is
different between these two periods is the approach to environmental governance.
In the late 1960s the LDP was unwilling to address pollution issues until it was
forced to do so by public pressures. This was a period of intense citizen mobilization
and a highly contentious political atmosphere in which desperate citizens turned
to the courts for redress. In the early 1990s, it was the LDP that picked up the
environment as a foreign policy issue. By this time, moreover, environmental
decision making already was a regular component of government policymaking.
In fact, in the 1980s it had become highly bureaucratized with little public or
political input. This changed in the 1990s as environmental issues began again to
garner greater societal interest and citizens once more began to show interest in
environmental movements. Furthermore, compared with 30 years earlier, envi-
ronmental issues are far less contested between government and citizen movement
(NGO) and interaction is more consultative and cooperative. 
Despite the many changes of the last decade, it is interesting to note that 
the Japanese public remains highly dissatisfied with the government’s environ-
mental performance. A cross-national survey conducted in 2000 found that 70 
per cent of those surveyed thought that their government did ‘too little’ to protect
the environment (compared with 20 to 50 per cent in most Western European
countries) (Vosse 2002). This public dissatisfaction may mean that, in the future,
as environmental norms become even more deeply embedded in society and envi-
ronmental groups become stronger, there will be even more pressure on Japanese
politicians to pursue environmental protection causes and push the ministries to
go beyond their primarily technologically-oriented approach to pollution control. 
According to the World Economic Forum’s international environmental sus-
tainability ranking, Japan comes in 78th of 142 countries.3 The break down of the
index suggests that Japan is performing relatively well in terms of its social and
institutional capacity for environmental protection and protecting human health
domestically, but its environmental systems are stressed and Japan contributes
significantly to global environmental problems because of its large population, high
population density, and relatively high consumption levels. While progress has been
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made by Japan in environmental protection and Japan is in a position to share
many of its environmental experiences with developing countries in East and
Southeast Asia, clearly Japan must still achieve much if it wants to truly be a global
environmental leader. 
Notes
1 For recent developments in Japanese environmental regulations and policies see the
Ministry of Environment website. Available on-line at: http://www.env.go.jp/en/,
accessed 4 June 2004.
2 The latest status of the Kyoto Protocol is available on-line at:
http://unfccc.int/resource/kpthermo.html., accessed 6 June 2004.
3 See World Economic Forum, Environmental Sustainability Index. Available on-
line at:
http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/rank.html, accessed 6 June 2004.
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8 Governance, Asian 
migrants and the role of 
civil society
Hatsuse Ryūhei
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the governance of Asian migrants in Japan,
focusing on the issue of the unskilled labour force in the period from the 1980s to
the present. The governance of such migrants embraces aspects of both immi-
gration and of residence as well as the contestation between the two. Immigration
and residence are closely connected as the former necessarily leads to problems
with the latter of those migrants who establish residency in a new country. The
illegal residence of unskilled foreign workers forms a particularly important area
of overlap between the governance of immigration and that of residence. In other
words, whether legal or not, as foreigners both come under the legal control of the
Japanese state (see Figure 8.1).
Although a wide variation exists among foreigners resident in Japan in terms 
of their time of arrival, motives for immigration, nationality, lineage, legal status,
status of residence, and so on, foreigners can none the less still be divided into two
basic categories: old comers and new comers. The former are those resident
Koreans and Chinese who came to Japan from the empire’s former colonies or
their descendants. The latter are those who came to this country from Asia and
other parts of the world since the middle of the 1980s, most of whom work in
manufacturing, the manual or service sectors, or study at language schools,
technical training colleges or universities. With nearly two million foreign residents
officially registered at the end of 2002, the number has nearly tripled over the last
three decades. In terms of nationality, until the middle of the 1980s Koreans formed
the overwhelming majority (over 80 per cent), but now account for only a third (33
per cent). Kokusaika (internationalization, or more correctly globalization) has served
to increase the number of foreigners, as entertainers from the Philippines and
Thailand (mid-1980s), manual workers from Pakistan and Bangladesh (late-1980s),
and manual and service workers from China, South Korea, Thailand, Iran, the
Philippines, Malaysia and Sri Lanka (early 1990s), have headed for Japan. Many
of these foreigners have worked illegally. Since the early 1990s, moreover, Nikkeijin
(Brazilians and Peruvians of Japanese ancestry) have entered Japan in the wake of
a change in immigration policy (1990). In this way, the impact of kokusaika has been
to not only increase the number of foreign residents in Japan, both legal and illegal,
but to make their composition much more complex. The Asian migrants referred
to in this chapter belong to the category of new comers. 
Two Japanese laws relate directly to the legal control of foreigners: the
Immigration Control and Refugee-Recognition Act (henceforth abbreviated as
Immigration Control Act), and the Alien Registration Law. The former decides
the legality or illegality of immigrants by stipulating the legal conditions of their
entry and sojourn or residence, and the visa status for sojourners and residents,
while the latter ensures foreign residents are kept under the surveillance of the
Japanese authorities by requiring them to register as aliens when the period of stay
is over ninety days. In addition, laws on nationality, enfranchisement, health
insurance, pension, employment, labour, education and so forth, are indirectly
related to the control of foreigners, as these laws are applied selectively or do not
apply to them. Such an indirect system of legal control may infringe their human
rights, or deprive them of social and economic benefits, thereby devaluing the life
of resident foreigners. 
Immigration and residence control policies, which are based on or derived from
these two laws, are implemented by both the national and local governments. 
At the national level, the Ministry of Justice takes the lead role, with other ministries,
such as the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, dealing with specific issues
within the ministry’s remit; at the local level, sub-national political authorities 
(i.e. ‘local governments’ such as prefectures, cities, municipalities, etc.) enjoy a
degree of autonomy in deciding or implementing policy in respect of foreigners. 
In terms of social policy, for instance, the general principles are decided by the
national government, with the local government being charged with the drafting
and implementation of the practical rules governing foreign residents. In other
cases, local governments often take policy initiatives in advance of the national
government, as with employing foreign residents as civil servants as opposed to no














































Figure 8.1 Governance of immigration and residence.
foreigners being employed in national ministries, offering urgent medical attention
to foreign patients without health insurance, or providing a monthly subsidy –
albeit, far less than the amount of national pension – to foreigners who are over 60
and not eligible for a national pension (Yamada 1993: 142–5; Nakao 1997:
98–100). As residents of their localities, foreigners obviously come into regular
contact with the local government, not least when registering their residency, and
in particular the clerical officers in charge of alien affairs. They have their own
demands at the local level, as in the need for Japanese language education, which
calls for a response by the local authorities.
Apart from these representatives of the Japanese state, both big business
associations as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Non-Profit
Making Organizations (NPOs) play a role in policymaking and implementation
and hence in the governance of foreigners: the former, particularly at the stage of
making national law and policy; the latter, particularly at the stage of imple-
mentation at the local level. As with other advanced industrial democracies, the
treatment of foreigners can emerge as a contested political issue, as when legal and
illegal immigrants capture the national spotlight.
Discrimination and prejudice against foreigners, especially Asians, stubbornly
persists in Japanese society today. Many Japanese still oppose marriage to Asians,
renting them a house or room, or hiring them in big business or the public services.
In this respect, there are numerous social problems that need to be resolved: labour
conditions, social benefits, medical care, legal status, divorce procedures, exploita-
tion of women, education, desertion of children, naturalization, refugee status,
deportation, interpretation at the police station or in court as well as local suffrage,
marriage, habitation and job hunting. In the face of these difficulties, foreign,
mainly Korean activists, along with sympathetic Japanese, have sought to change
government policy. In this way, old comers play an important role in improving
the livelihood of new comers and are thus crucial in their governance. 
The first section in this chapter outlines the system of immigration control as
part of the governance of immigration, paying particular attention to the entry and
overstay of Asians. The second section goes on to analyze the situation of foreigners
who enter the country legally and engage in unskilled labour (or close to unskilled
labour). The third section, focusing on the governance of residence, examines how
the domestic implementation of international human rights regimes and civil
society protect the rights of foreigners in Japan. Finally, in the Conclusion, the
argument as a whole is summarized.
Governance of immigration
Until the mid-1980s, the policies of post-war Japanese governments had in principle
denied entry to unskilled foreign labour at immigration control, on the one hand,
and discriminated against foreign residents, both socially and politically, through
nationality qualification or clauses for various types of public services, infringing
their human rights, on the other. It was at the start of the new decade that these
two principles began to break down domestically. Legally, in terms of immigration
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control, the 1990 amendments to the Immigration Control Act were a response to
the new situation. 
However, looking back, modern Japan has never lived up to the declared
principle of eschewing the use of foreign unskilled labour. Thus, during the Second
World War, to make up for the shortage of labour brought about by the youth of
the land being drafted for military service after the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, the
Japanese government and industry conscripted or rounded up one and a half
million Koreans and forty thousand Chinese in Korea and Taiwan to feed the
homeland war effort. Their forced labour was used in the coal mines of Kyūshū
and the construction sites dotted around Japan. In contrast, the post-war Japanese
state was to profess measures to deny the introduction of unskilled foreign labour.
However, there were between 590,000 and 660,000 Koreans (North and South)
from the former colony living in Japan during the period of rapid economic growth
(from the mid-1960s to the 1970s) (available on-line at http://mindan.org/toukei.
php, accessed 6 July 2004). Excluded from work as civil servants or as teachers 
at public schools, due to the nationality clause, and denied the opportunity to 
join the staff of big companies, they became engaged in unskilled labour, as scrap
merchants, in independent small businesses or in the management of the pachinko
(pin ball) parlour business. It is also even possible to regard the seasonal labour that
migrated to big city areas in Kantō and Kansai from the Tōhoku and Kyūshū
regions in the 1960s and 1970s as having arisen due to the shortage of this Korean
labour. Despite the pivotal role of Korean labour in the nation’s postwar economic
development, many Japanese have come to think that rapid growth in the 1960s
was achieved without the use of foreign labour. From the mid-1980s, as described
above, Chinese, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Iranians, Filipinos, Koreans, Malaysians,
or Nikkeijin from Brazil or Peru, were engaged in unskilled labour. 
Central to the governance of foreigners is immigration control, although a range
of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic actors contest the issue. The objectives of
the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology (MEXT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MOHLW) all differ. The intentions of
big business associations and small-and-medium sized business associations are
similarly at odds with one another, as in the case of the companies these associations
represent. Subcontractors of big companies as well as small-and-medium sized
firms have been more interested in the introduction of Asian unskilled workers than
the giants. NGOs are more concerned with the infringement of the human rights
of foreigners than their introduction into Japan itself. Thus the implementation of
the legal system for immigration control is quite often a product of finding a
balance, or some form of compromise, between and among each these differing
interests. What is more, a significant possibility exists, with the exception of special
permanent residents or permanent residents (mainly Korean and Chinese), of those
on any type of visa staying on after its expiration and becoming illegal residents
(so-called ‘overstayers’). Under the present immigration control system, both illegal
entry by foreigners (relating to landing or entry and effective for three years) and
that of overstaying and illegal residence (with no time limit to effectiveness) is a
Governance, Asian migrants and civil society 155
criminal offence. Both of them carry a prison sentence of up to three years, or a
fine of ¥300,000 or less. As long as no other crimes are involved, however, probation
is normally granted and the offender is handed over to the immigration authorities
and forcibly repatriated. In many cases, the above measures are applied to those
illegal workers, engaged in unskilled labour, who have been detected at work or
who voluntarily declare themselves, although, as discussed below, the treatment is
not uniform. 
Since the 1960s, the government, particularly the MOJ, has grown increasingly
wary of the danger that foreign workers, on having entered the country, might settle
down permanently once their contract has expired, as in the case of the former
West Germany or France, where contract workers from other countries settled
permanently. From January 1989, with the mutual visa-exemption agreements
between Japan and both Bangladesh and Pakistan being temporarily suspended,
and again in April 1992, when the mutual visa-exemption agreement between
Japan and Iran was temporarily suspended, an immediate and sudden fall occurred
in newly-arrived Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Iranian entrants (Sōgō Kenkyū
Kaihatsu Kikō 1993; Yamagishi and Morita 2002). 
While the peak number of new Bangladeshi immigrants was in 1988, with
13,994, this number suddenly decreased to 2,742 in 1989. The peak for Pakistanis
was in the same year, 1988, at 19,106; in1989, this figure dropped to 5,938. In a
similar vein, the peak for new Iranian entries was 47,976 in 1991, dropping to
14,314 in 1992 (Table 8.1). In addition, the requirement for entrance visas from
Malaysia was tightened in June 1993 when prospective entrants were required to
gain permission prior to exiting the country. This change might have had some
impact on the reduction of Malaysian new arrivals from 1993 to 1994. However,
as the peak for Malaysians was 78,019 in 1991, with a drop to 57,245 in 1992,
factors outside Japan probably explain the Malaysian case. 
As the above cases suggest, the suspension of mutual visa-exemption agreements
proved effective in limiting the number of new entrants from Bangladesh, Pakistan
and Iran, although this obviously did not prevent nationals of these countries
already in Japan from becoming overstayers. However, once a passport holder of
one of these countries stepped outside Japan, it removed the prospect of re-entry.
In the short term, then, the government was left with the problem of how to deal
with overstayers – in fact, as Table 8.2 makes clear, it took almost a decade for the
government to reduce the number of overstayers from these countries by half. In
this sense, over the longer term the measures the government adopted in order to
curb immigration has had a certain degree of effect.
If we treat the Peruvian case as an exception, Table 8.2 also shows a sharp
contrast in the rate of decline for overstayers between those countries to which visa-
exemption was temporarily suspended, and others (South Korea, the Philippines,
China, Thailand and Taiwan). This implies that the continuation of mutual visa-
exemption agreements has had a positive effect on the number of overstayers in
the latter group. Conversely, the Peruvian case suggests that the lawful introduction
of unskilled labour from 1990 increased the number of overstayers in the 1990s






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Asian neighbours, overstayers, especially female ‘entertainers’, would have been
dramatically curbed, but this was not attempted (Table 8.2). This implies the
probable shortage of female labour, especially women engaged in the
‘entertainment’ industry. In this sense, although the governance of immigration
can be said to function more or less effectively on the basis of the immigration
control system, the system can be seen to respond to economic needs.
In total, the number of overstayers has doubled between a July 1990 figure of
106,497 (66,851 men and 39,646 women) and 224,067 in January 2002 (118,122
men and 105,945 women), but has recently declined, with the peak of 298,646
(192,114 men and 106,532 women) in May 1993. The number of male overstayers
from those countries with the benefits of mutual visa-exemption agreements have
gradually decreased since the mid-1990s up to the present, while the number of
female overstayers has stayed rather constant during the same period (Table 8.2).
This suggests that factors other than a change in legal measures are influencing the
number of overstayers in Japan. Two spring to mind: first, economic stagnation,
which has reduced the need for the labour supplied by overstayers; and second,
the introduction of legal unskilled workers, who have replaced the illegal overstayers
as part of the labour force. It is no doubt the introduction of Nikkeijin from the 1990s
that explains the stable number of overstayers in recent years, although the increase
in trainees and pre-college students as well as the establishment of technical intern-
ships also have played a role.
Lastly, looking at the breakdown of overstayers in 2002, there are 163,271
temporary sojourners (72.9 per cent of the total), 11,154 entertainers (5.0 per cent),
9,953 pre-college students (4.4 per cent), 4,442 college students (2.0 per cent) and
3,264 trainees (1.4 per cent) (Kokusai Kenshū Kyōryoku Kikō 2002: 109).
However, even if these entertainers, pre-college students, technical trainees, and
technical interns are not in Japan as illegal overstayers, in reality, many of them
are becoming a source of unskilled labour. 
Lawful entry and unskilled labour
Although the Japanese government continues to deny the introduction of unskilled
labour into the country, this has been the de facto policy from the 1970s onwards,
as seen in the case of ‘entertainment’ visas. The gate was also opened slightly as a
result of the 1990 amendments to the Immigration Control Act, when pre-student,
trainee or long-term residence visas were newly established or clarified by the 1990
amendments. In other words, even though the legal status of entry into Japan is
determined by their entertainment, pre-student, or trainee visas, or their status as
Nikkeijin, many of them end up being engaged in unskilled labour. 
Foreigners (excluding long-term resident Koreans and Chinese) who are engaged
in unskilled labour in Japan at present include, (1) people both whose entry and
employment are legal but whose working conditions are humiliating (resident
Filipino women who entered on ‘entertainment’ visas), (2) those whose entry is legal
and who are allowed to work for fixed time periods, but who end up working under
poor labour conditions (pre-college and college students), (3) those who entered
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legally on the condition that they do not work, but who end up working under 
poor labour conditions after entry (technical trainees and interns), (4) people 
both whose entry and employment are legal but whose working conditions are
below what should be expected (Nikkeijin), (5) those who enter on temporary visas
and immediately begin working illegally (illegal workers from the outset), and 
(6) those who work in poor or inferior conditions as overstayers (originally one of
types 2–5 above).
The 1990 amendments established penalties for any employers and/or brokers
involved in introducing or employing illegal foreign workers (up to three years
imprisonment or a fine of two million yen or less). The amendments also ratio-
nalized the visa qualifications for foreigners with a high level of knowledge or
specialism, categorizing them as investors and business managers, legal or
accounting service specialists, engineers, specialist in humanitarian or international
services, or intra-company transferees. As far as pre-college students and trainees
are concerned, the amendments made their status clear-cut, removing them from
the category of ‘miscellaneous’ visas. In addition, the long-term resident’s visa 
was newly established in order to enable those who have ‘links to Japanese society’
and, in particular, ‘blood links to Japanese society’ (HōmushōNyūkoku Kanrikyoku
1998: 96) to be granted such visas. This opened the way for second and third
generation Nikkeijin to stay legally in Japan, and as the government decided not to
impose any restrictions on the kind of work that they could take on, they could
engage in unskilled labour. 
As far as entertainment visas are concerned, many are granted to female singers
or dancers from the Philippines (Ballescas 1992). The annual number of visas
granted fluctuates, but from the late 1980s up until the present the number has
been 20,000–50,000. The problem here is the actual content of the work carried
out: whereas formally these women are employed as hostesses in bars and clubs,
prostitution is often expected of them, and in reality many are actually employed
as prostitutes. Prior to the arrival of Filipino women in the mid-1980s, Japanese
men had visited the Philippines to fill the same needs. From the perspective of the
Filipino women, even though their status in Japan is legitimate, their role in the
entertainment industry means they may be faced with the possibility of becoming
prostitutes. Legal entry leads directly to illicit labour, and indirectly to overstaying.
Both the Japanese and Filipino governments have turned a blind eye to this
problem for the last twenty years: presumably the former, due to an interest in
‘employment’ and hard currency; and the latter, due to interest in ‘entertainment’.
From the perspective of this chapter, this lack of concern for the human rights of
Filipino women displays the limits (or the real intent) of the governance systems of
both countries. Rather than the government, NGOs, as illustrated by the Asian
Women’s Shelter founded in Tokyo in 1986, have actually assisted some of these
women. Many Thai women, engaged in the ‘entertainment’ industry and often
overstayers, face a similar plight (Caouette and Saito 1999).
Second, pre-student visas are issued to high school or Japanese language school
students before entry into university, junior college, or technical college (Asano
1997; Tsuboya 2002). These visas were systematically issued following the 1990
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Amendments, but had been issued before this as a special case under the ‘miscel-
laneous’ residence qualification. The genesis of this type of visa was the plan of
prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to boost the number of exchange students from
10,000 in 1983 to 100,000 by the year 2000. This motivated the MOJ in 1984 to
simplify the procedures for the acquisition of ‘pre-students’ status under the
‘miscellaneous’ visa category (Tsuboya 2002: 140). As a result, the numbers jumped
from around 3,500 new entrants in 1983 to more than 35,000 in 1988, particularly
amongst Chinese students: from 160 in 1983 to 28,256 in 1988. In 2002, the
number of those pre-college students was 47,198 (of which 35,450 were Chinese)
(Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanrikyoku 2003: 180). Although they are presently allowed
to work part-time for up to 28 hours (originally 20 hours) per week, they have
become a source of unskilled labour and often work beyond the legal time limit.
The government recently has begun to tighten the practical requirements for pre-
student and student visas, in part because the goal of 100,000 foreign students was
reached in 2003 (available on-line at http: //www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/
15/11/03111102.html, accessed 24 May 2004) and partly because the government
is trying to prevent the recurrence of crimes committed by foreign, especially
Chinese, students (available on-line at http://www.jpss.jp/news/tuutatu.html,
accessed 24 May 2204).
Third, the government has permitted the introduction of unskilled workers 
in the form of trainees. In 1993, the five ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Industry, Labour, and Construction set up the jointly
managed JITCO to operate the system of foreign trainees. The trainees include (1)
trainees that governmental institutions (such as Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) or the Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS))
have invited from developing countries, (2) trainees who are invited by Japanese
multinational companies mainly from their foreign subsidiaries, or by Japanese
small-and-medium enterprises, and whose acceptance is supported by JITCO, or
(3) trainees who apply directly to the immigration authorities. The total overall
figure for 2001 was 59,064. Breaking the figure down, there were 12,626 (21.4 per
cent) accepted by the government, 37,423 (63.4 per cent) accepted by the private
sector who were supported by JITCO and 9,015 (15.3 per cent) direct applicants
to the immigration authorities.
The number and nationality of the 37,423 trainees supported by JITCO 
is 26,837 (71.7 per cent) Chinese, 4,155 (11.1 per cent) Indonesians, and 2,090 
(5.6 per cent) Filipinos. In terms of age and gender, male aged 25–29 and female
aged 20–24 predominate. Most are being trained for a period of a year or less to
work in textiles and sewing, food processing, mechanics, metal treatment, con-
struction, and agriculture. None receive a salary, but the trainees are provided with
an average of 75,031 yen per month as an allowance. 
In 1993, the government introduced an intern system for technical training. This
is a system in which trainees who have passed an evaluation test (which almost 
no-one fails) are able to work for a limit (set in April 1997) of up to two years after
their training is completed. For fiscal 2001, the number of companies which applied
to switch to technical training internship was 7,459, and the number of applicants,
Governance, Asian migrants and civil society 161
22,268. Their breakdown is 15,846 Chinese (71.2 per cent), 3,355 Indonesians
(15.1 per cent) and 1,891 Vietnamese (8.5 per cent). Looking at the size of the
businesses, up to 70 per cent have less than fifty employees and are overwhelmingly
small-and-medium sized enterprises. The average amount paid is 121,000 yen per
month (the average monthly wage in Japan in 2001 was 351,335 yen, excluding
bonuses. Available on-line at http://www.jil.go.jp/laborinfo-e/q_and_a/costs1.
shtml, accessed 3 July 2003). In spite of being ‘workers’, many of these technical
training interns are not signed up to health insurance, social security pensions,
workmen’s accident compensation insurance, or unemployment insurance – a fact
even pointed out in a JITCO white paper (Kokusai Kenshū Kyōryoku Kikō 2002).
Quite clearly, these interns are merely a source of unskilled and cheap labour 
with a time limit attached that meets the demands of small- and medium-sized
businesses.
Furthermore, the Basic Plans for Immigration Control (2nd edition) of March
2000 proposes the extension of the scope of the definition of trainees or technical
interns (to include hotel staff), and the introduction of foreigners as nursing staff
for the elderly or as highly-skilled experts in information technology. 
Finally and most importantly, as a result of the 1990 Amendments, the increase
in Nikkeijin was most salient among foreign residents in the 1990s. The number of
overwhelmingly Nikkeijin Brazilians has increased markedly from 1987 to 2002
(Table 8.3). In terms of visa category, the number of those Brazilians newly entering
on the ‘spouse or child of a Japanese’ visa qualification clearly dropped from 1992
to 2002, whereas the number of those with a ‘long-term resident’ qualification
rapidly rose from 1992 to 1997, although it then began to fluctuate. The number
of Brazilians resident in Japan on the ‘spouse or child of a Japanese’ visa quali-
fication remained rather constant, whereas the number of Brazilians living in Japan
with ‘long-term resident’ status, increased markedly from 1992 to 2002. Similar
trends can be observed in the Peruvian case (Table 8.4). Of those with the ‘spouse
or child of a Japanese’ visa qualification, many are second generation Nikkeijin, and
of those with ‘long-term resident’ status, many are third-generation Nikkeijin. Among
the latter are those related to Japanese nationals, not through blood, but through
their family membership (spouse, child, dependant, etc.). The second generation
Nikkeijin is starting to be overtaken by the third. This also means that the issue of
fourth generation Nikkeijin will arise in the future.
Whether the long-term resident qualification was established with the aim of
introducing unskilled Nikkeijin labour or not remains unclear (Ninomiya and Tanaka
2004: 128). Publicly, the aims are explained as being elsewhere, as a measure to
bring things into line for Korean special permanent residents in Japan, and those
with a Japanese blood line, such as Nikkeijin or returnee Japanese women and
children left behind in China right after the Second World War. Whatever the
intention, however, the establishment of the ‘long-term resident’ visa and the
‘spouse or child of a Japanese’ visa were politically adroit in two respects. First,
there were 1.2 million Nikkeijin in Brazil, and there seemed to be a fixed limit to the
number. Second, the national belief that the Nikkeijin shared the same blood line










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































which have less ‘Japanese blood’, are going to take over the second. However,
through this unquestioning consensus, attention was turned away from the real
problems of the immigration and permanent settlement of foreigners in Japan. 
In the late 1980s, the pros and cons of either hoisting or lowering the national
drawbridge to foreign labour was, for a time, widely debated in Japanese society.
When the bubble economy burst in the early 1990s, however, social interest in 
the issue of foreign workers waned under the ongoing recession. Behind this was 
a strong feeling that, with the economic downturn, the necessity for labour would
disappear. Nevertheless, as described above, even in the recession, Brazilians,
Chinese, Filipinos and other Asian nationals have not withdrawn from the unskilled
labour market. One of the reasons for this is the reliance of the service industry on
the cheapest possible labour from Asian residents as well as temporary flexible
Japanese workers, and part-time work by students and housewives. 
Another reason is more fundamental. Even though there is an economic
recession, not all categories of business are facing the same dire situation. Nikkeijin
are involved in work in areas such as the car industry and electronic parts manu-
facturing in Ota City, Gunma Prefecture, Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture
and Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture. They are usually employed indirectly by big
businesses through contractors in charge of a certain section in a plant, existing at
the bottom end of Japan’s two-tiered structure of labour. Many Nikkeijin accept
night shifts and are a flexible workforce that satisfies the changing demands of
business. Adult members of the family, as dependants, also work in the factories
that produce packed lunchboxes for convenience stores, agricultural cooperatives,
fisheries cooperatives or industrial-waste disposal units. There are also those among
them who manage ethnic businesses such as restaurants, small shops, or tourist
agencies. In this way, Nikkeijin are now becoming established in local society, and
are gradually beginning to seek more rewarding lives (Ikegami 2001).
In sum, the actual introduction of unskilled labour under the visas discussed
above can best be understood as a political compromise of the government respond-
ing to the economic necessities faced by small- and medium-sized businesses. 
This is the bridge which connects the governance of immigration with that of
residence.
Governance of residence
What inevitably follows international migration is a range of problems in the work
and life of the migrants. Yet in terms of both its legitimacy and capacity the system
of immigration control does not extend as far as jurisdiction over the lives of resident
foreigners. This will emerge, in future, as human rights issues, which will lead to
the necessary introduction of international human rights regimes and the imple-
mentation of a social policy for foreign residents, as discussed below. 
Japan’s decision to join up to the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (1978), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1978), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (1980), and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
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(1981) exerted a major domestic impact on foreign residents in Japan. Here is a case
of the domestic application of international human rights regimes. International
human rights regimes are functioning more or less effectively when it comes to
securing the human rights of foreigners. For that purpose, human rights treaties
have a significant impact in securing those rights through the provisions of Japan’s
legal system. The government, however, has been reluctant to introduce into 
Japan the international legal framework for coping with migrant workers, and,
along with those of other industrially advanced countries, has not so far signed the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families (effective in July 2003).
As far as illegal foreign residents are concerned, the issue is how to improve 
their working and living conditions, and how to rescue certain of them from an
illegal existence. In this case, the problem concerns how to move from an illegal to
a legal status. In general, the problem is one of asylum, but in the case of Japan, it
boils down to the problem of granting a special dispensation in each case. Whatever
the legal status of foreigners on entering Japan, many will establish themselves 
in Japanese society through reunion with their families, which also migrate to join
them, or by creating families with Japanese nationals (through marriage or the birth
of children). Of course, this is not a trend limited only to foreigners resident in
Japan, and can be seen in general amongst foreigners who live in all countries. For
that very reason, the Japanese government has been wary of accepting foreigners
as unskilled workers, although foreigners have started to settle down permanently
in Japan.
As is often pointed out, Japanese society discriminates against foreigners. Under
these circumstances, the Koreans resident in Japan, being old comers, have acted
as the driving force behind the growth of social movements, demanding equal rights
with Japanese, with the support of other foreigners as well as Japanese nationals.
Tracing this history briefly, in the 1970s this campaigning led to a number of
successes: a suit for the employment of a Korean worker at Hitachi Ltd, the opening
up of scholarships to foreign, mostly Korean, residents by the Japan Scholarship
Association, the employment of foreign workers at Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Public Cooperation (now NTT), the acceptance of legal interns at the
Legal Training and Research Institute, and the abolition of nationality clauses in
examinations for employment at local authorities mainly in the Kansai region. 
In the 1980s, beginning with the abolition of the legislative ban on foreigners 
taking up residence in public municipal housing, semi-national public housing, 
and on loans from the People’s Financial Corporation and the Housing Loan
Corporation, the system was changed to allow foreigners to join the national pen-
sion and national health insurance schemes, the provision of children’s allowances,
and the opening up of employment as members of the faculty at national or
municipal universities (Tanaka 1995: 130–49). In the 1990s, the fingerprinting of
permanent foreign residents when registered as aliens was abolished, and, with the
exception of a few firemen’s positions, the legislated ban on foreigners taking up
employment was lifted from almost all positions in big cities. Under the 1999
reforms to the Alien Registration Law, moreover, the fingerprinting system was
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completely abolished. Meanwhile, the all-Japan high-school athletics tournaments
and the Japan high-school baseball championships have been opened up to
international or Korean national schools, which are the equivalent of Japanese
high schools (Hatsuse 2001:183–4). However, in March 2003, MEXT determined
to continue the present system of not permitting students who had graduated from
Korean national schools located in Japan to sit the examination for entry into
Japanese universities, in spite of attempts in 2002 to change the situation. This
decision was reflective of the worsening of the national feeling towards North Korea
following the admission of kidnapping a number of Japanese nationals from Japan
to North Korea decades ago. Eventually, MEXT agreed to allow the qualification
of those students for the entrance examination on an individual academic basis
from the academic year 2004, still refusing to give Asian national schools the
eligibility as an educational institute.
While it should be noted that the above successes resulted from the combined
efforts of resident foreigners and Japanese nationals to promote the rights of for-
eigners, international human rights regimes actually had the greater effect. It was
in line with the signing of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1978), that the legislative ban on foreigners entering public housing and taking 
out housing loans was abolished. As a result of joining up to the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1981), the legislation keeping foreigners out 
of the national pension scheme and preventing their off-spring being granted 
a children’s allowance was repealed. After the introduction of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1981, moreover,
the principle of equality between fathers and mothers concerning Japanese
nationality was established through the 1985 reforms of the Nationality Law. One
of the results of this change is that now the parents of the off-spring of Korean
fathers and Japanese mothers usually opt to give them Japanese nationality, with
the child being able to make the final choice between Japanese and the nationality
of his or her father by 22 years of age (Tanaka 1995: 158–69). The International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was signed
in 1995, and became legally effective within Japan from 1996. The Convention on
the Rights of the Child came into force in 1994, and through the decision on
application for a special resident’s permit described below, can be seen to have
exerted a major impact on the legal judgment made.
Foreign residents can promote their own public campaigns in order to acquire
their own rights, and this is something in which Japanese citizens are also able to
participate. But this only generally holds true for legal immigrants. In the case 
of people who are regarded as illegally resident under the Immigration Control
Act, they are unable to appear in public spaces to promote their own rights. This
is because they fear that, through being seen in public, they will be repatriated 
to their home countries by the authorities. In these instances, the cooperation of
Japanese and legally resident foreign nationals becomes decisive, and the intro-
duction of international human rights regime is essential for the guarantee of the
human rights of such foreigners. 
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On 1 September 1999, twenty-one overstayers, made up of five families 
(four from Iran and one from Myanmar) and two individuals (from Iran and
Bangladesh), voluntarily appeared before the Immigration Bureau in Tokyo seeking
special residents permits, as did seventeen other overstayers from five families 
(all Iranian) on 27 December of the same year, and twenty-six others made up of
seven families (two from Iran and one from the Philippines, Peru, Myanmar,
Columbia and China respectively) and one individual from Bangladesh on 12 and
13 July 2000 (APFS 2002). 
The granting of special residence permits is decided upon approval by the
Minister of Justice. The results of the hearings were that sixteen members of four
families (all Iranian) at the first hearing, four members of one Iranian family at the
second hearing, and twenty-one members of five families (two from Iran and one
from the Philippines, Peru and Myanmar respectively) at the third were granted
special residence permits. In the decisions, special residence permits were to be
granted to families that, even though no blood links with Japanese people existed,
had been resident in Japan for long periods of time, were leading stable lives, and,
as a basic rule, had children enrolled in schools above middle school (Komai et al.
2000). The effect of the children’s rights treaties can be considered to be behind
the approval of the rights of children to an education. In addition, four members
of an Iranian family were judged to be eligible for the permits in September 2003
by the Tokyo district court, having once been refused by the Ministry of Justice
(available on-line at: http://cgi.sainet.or.jp/~ikumi/mishuk/news/03919.html,
accessed 24 May 2004).
Up until now, special residence permits have been granted, on the whole, to two
types of foreigners. One of these, which until the 1980s made up about 80–90 per
cent (from several hundred to one thousand per year) of the successful applicants,
were resident Koreans. A significant proportion of these Koreans were people who
had received special consideration from a ‘humanitarian standpoint’ when on the
point of being forcibly repatriated after violating punishable laws. The other type
is that of overstayers who, since the 1990s, have been granted special residence
permits because of a real relationship through marriage with a Japanese or
permanent resident. Their numbers have increased from 1,281 (84.8 per cent), of
a total 1,511, for 1996, and 1,251 (87.4 per cent) of a total 1,431, for 1997, to 2,267
(90.8 per cent), of a total 2,497, for 1998 (available on-line at: http://www.isc.
meiji.ac.jp/~yamawaki/yamawaki1.htm, accessed 26 May 2003). Moreover, the
fact that the enforcement of the deportation of special permanent residents has
been significantly eased has led to a dramatic decrease in the cases of resident
Koreans.
It was the NGO, Asian People’s Friendship Society (APSF), that gave practical
support to these foreigners in pursuing their legal cases, and a group of researchers
with interest in the rights of foreigners and issues of immigration (one of whom 
was Professor Komai Hiroshi of Tsukuba University), that supported the NGO.
The group supported the overstayers who were seeking special resident’s permits
and penned a joint declaration which it submitted to the Minister of Justice on 
11 November 1999. The names of 112 researchers from outside Japan and 481
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from Japan itself had been added to the declaration in a month. In summary, the
declaration stated that those appearing, (1) had already created a basis for their life
in Japanese society and established bonds with Japanese society as upright citizens,
and were members of their workplace and of local society, (2) that with eight
children included among those appearing, measures based on the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child were necessary, and (3) that the children could speak
only Japanese, and had established friendships with Japanese children (Komai 
et al. 2000).
The policy of the Basic Plans for Immigration Control (2nd edition) states 
that (1) because, even with a one-off amnesty policy, an influx of illegal residents
and a lengthening of the time period of that residence can be expected, it is not an
effective solution for dealing with the problem, (2) foreigners who have been granted
special dispensations are those who have ‘intimate social relations with Japanese
or others’ (actual marital relationships) and have established the basis for life in
Japan, (3) that dispensations be granted in cases where it is accepted that, with deep
links between the foreigner and Japanese society, there are major issues from a
‘humanitarian standpoint’ in forcibly repatriating him or her, and (4) in the case
of illegal residence where ‘intimate social relations with a Japanese citizen, per-
manent resident, or special permanent resident’ exist, and it is accepted that there
are sufficient ‘links between the foreigner and Japanese society’, the matter should
be dealt with appropriately, sufficiently taking into account that ‘humanitarian
standpoint’.
These policies are in line with the results of rulings up until the 1990s. However,
it is not clear whether or not the rights of the child are to be included in ‘links
between the foreigner and Japanese society’. In spite of this, the decision of the
MOJ on the foreigners discussed above was interpreted as an acceptance of 
the rights of children at junior high school and above to continue receiving 
an education (denied to elementary children of the sixth grade and below). In this
way, the dispensations are gradually changing from a form of general asylum to
one of partial asylum. Here, the effects of international human rights regimes,
beginning with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, have begun to take hold.
Meanwhile, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination can in the future be expected to increase in effectiveness in
Japan. Finally, the Japanese government can be expected at some point to follow
South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand in offering general amnesty (Komai et al. 2000:
57; Hayase 2001: 10, 12).
The fact that overstayers who are also illegal workers are suffering in terms of
labour conditions, the non-receipt of salary, serious work-related injuries, and in
terms of treatment for injuries or illness, has become a social problem since the
1980s. From the late 1980s onwards, these overstayers have been helped by NGOs
such as Asian Women’s Shelter HELP (Tokyo), Karabaw No Kai (Yokohama),
Arusu No Kai (Nagoya), Asian Friends (Osaka), Asian People’s Friendship Society
(APFS, Tokyo), and The Forum on Asian Migrant Workers (Tokyo), and, since
1995, The Foreigners’ Earthquake Information Center (Osaka, established at the
time of the Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake and later changed to The Center for
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Multicultural Information and Assistance) (Ōshima and Francis 1988; Gaikokujin
Jishin Jōhō Sentā 1996; NGO-katsudō Shien Sentā 1998). There are now innu-
merable groups from all over the country involved in giving one form of assistance
or another to these foreigners. There are also a significant number of instances 
in which cooperation with overstayers on human rights, daily life and medical 
care has occurred at local municipalities and regional international centres. Some
local governments (villages and towns) have implemented social policies in order
to assist Asian brides to settle down smoothly in the region by assuring them of a
good social life, language services, and medical care (Kuwayama 1993; Shibata
1997).
Of course, prejudice and discrimination towards foreigners have not disappeared
from Japanese society. Even Nikkeijin are foreigners. Taking Hamamatsu City 
as an example, there were 11,716 Nikkeijin in 2001 (out of a total population 
of 590,000). They are said to be ‘faceless’, because they have little contact with
local people in everyday life. There is a significant mental and social rift between
them and local society. In a large apartment-house complex in Toyota City in 
May 1999, there was even an incident in which a major confrontation unfolded
between Japanese and Brazilian residents. Recently, relations between Brazilians
and Japanese have, however, become routine and normalized in both Hamamatsu
City and Toyota City (Ikegami 2001). Newly arrived Chinese and Koreans have
started settling in the Shinjuku and Ikebukuro wards of central Tokyo, due to the
cheap housing or proximity to their workplaces. This has led to the revitalization
of depopulated metropolitan centres. Many Japanese nationals are becoming
attracted by the ethnic atmosphere of the restaurants opened there. Thus, newly
created ethnic networks, in addition to bringing together people from similar
ethnicities, can also attract more Japanese to the same area (Tajima 1998). 
Demands for greater political rights, coming mostly from Korean residents, are
also now on the agenda. A representative example is the campaign to gain voting
rights for foreigners in municipal elections. In 1993, Kishiwada city council (in
Osaka) passed a resolution to ask the national Diet to extend the right to vote to
foreigners settled in the municipalities. By July 2002 the city councils of 1,503 local
municipalities had passed the same resolution to extend the franchise (available
on-line at: http://www.mindan.org/sidemenu/sm_sansei27.php, accessed 25 May
2003). In the background is the Supreme Court decision of 1995 stating that the
granting of local suffrage to (settled) resident foreigners was not forbidden by the
Constitution. However, for the last year or two, the atmosphere in the National
Diet has prevented amendment to the Local Election Law. 
A recent example that has caught public attention is the approval, through local
referendum ordinances, of the participation of permanently settled foreign residents
in referenda concerning the amalgamation of cities, towns or villages. This has
occurred in Maibara Town, Shiga Prefecture, Iwaki Town, Akita Prefecture,
Matsuoka Town, Fukui Prefecture, Kitagata Town, Gifu Prefecture, Nabari City,
Mie Prefecture, Nagi Town, Okayama Prefecture, Takaishi City, Osaka Prefecture
and Kitano Town, Fukuoka Prefecture. In Takahama City, Aichi a local refer-
endum ordinance (effective September 2002) was passed which sought to approve
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the standing participation of permanent foreign residents in all referenda, not only
those concerning the amalgamation of municipalities. 
In summing up, the domestic application of international human rights regimes
has resulted from human rights movement of resident Koreans, supported by
Japanese nationals and other foreigners. In the governance of residence, human
rights specialists and activists, NGOs, and NPOs play such a significant role as to
bring together international human rights regimes with the actual realization of an
individual’s human rights. This indicates a clear role for civil society in the
governance of international migration. For that purpose, the vitalization of civil
society through the activities of NGOs and NPOs is essential.
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the employment of unskilled labour provided by Asian
residents in Japan from two perspectives: the governance of immigration and the
governance of residence. What we have learned about the Japanese governance of
these Asian immigrants can be summarized as follows.
First, the governance of immigration functions through the immigration control
system, but the effects are somewhat limited due to the contested nature of
governing immigrants. Especially the temporary lift of mutual visa-exemption
treaties has proven very effective in stopping the increase in overstaying, but its use
is limited to a few countries. The measure cannot be generalized as a way to curb
illegal overstaying, and besides, overstaying can in a sense be considered to be a
way to respond to social demands from Japanese government and society. This
contradiction illustrates the way the governance of immigration is contested in
Japan.
Second, while officially denying the introduction of an unskilled labour force,
the Japanese government is in actual fact promoting its introduction as a way to
meet the wider needs of the Japanese economy. In this way, the governance of
immigration is in tension with the wider needs of the Japanese political economy. 
Third, international human rights regimes have profound implications for
domestic governance in Japan: indeed, through the governance of residence, these
regimes can be said to repair the gap in the governance of immigration. From the
late 1990s, the crack in the immigration control system seems to have begun to be
filled through these governance regimes. What is more, the role of Japanese civil
society has grown in importance and is itself becoming part of the governance
system.
Fourth, once the domestic implication of international human rights regimes
become clear, NGOs and other civil actors can function even more effectively as
part of the overall governance regime for foreigners. Without cooperation between
Japanese citizens and foreigners in promoting human rights, this role would be left
in the incomplete hands of the state.
Finally, two points become clear from the above analysis. First, the governance
of immigration and the governance of residence are complementary in terms of
function. Second, human rights regimes are necessary in order for the Japanese
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immigration system to function in the future. It is in this that the connection
between the international and the domestic can be seen in the governance of
immigrants and foreign residents in Japan.
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9 Corruption and 
governance in Japan 
J. Babb
We can never know the full ‘truth’ about the issue of corruption in Japan or
anywhere else. Past and present cases that have been revealed to public scrutiny
may not be the only nor the most significant cases. Even the pursuit of allegations
of corruption may be insufficient to supplement empirical data on those cases
brought to trial. The alternative to a purely empirical study is a hermeneutic and
perspectival (though expressly not a cultural relativist) approach which aims at
understanding the internal logic of corruption. That is, concretely, this chapter
examines the theoretical and pragmatic perspectives of corruption as the basis for
understanding the issue of corruption in Japanese governance.
There is an inherent perspectivism (Poellner 2001: 85–117) in any analysis of
corruption because some may view certain practices as corrupt that others view as
simple interest intermediation or a rationally calculated choice. What is legally
defined as corrupt practices varies from one historical period to another and one
country to another. Even if one accepts that there may be certain fixed notions of
what is corrupt, the degree to which this inhibits corrupt practices also varies
according to perceptions of the situation by the individuals, organizations and
institutions involved. Thus, it would be a mistake to judge Japan using seemingly
objective but instead flawed empirical models or economic arguments over the
rationality and costs of corruption.
This chapter suggests that it is best to try to look at the manner in which the
Japanese themselves have constructed their political understanding of and attempts
to cope with corruption. In doing so, the political must be highlighted as a contrast
to fixed notions of culture and/or ‘good governance’. In the end, it is possible that
the changing nature of political corruption may be as much a part of Japanese
governance as the attempts to eliminate it.
Judging corruption and governance
The considerable writing on corruption in Japan by outsiders seeks to explain and
critique Japan while implicitly holding the absent discussion of Western political
ethics as a higher standard. This must provoke a variety of feelings in those who
read this literature: salutary warning, reassurance that it is possible to comprehend
corrupt behaviour and other such sentiments. A consciously non-judgemental
narrative of Japanese political practice, in this context, would be seen as ‘failing to
engage the relevant literature’ or ‘not providing a coherent narrative strand to aid
the Western reader’. It is easier to disdain, attack or even whitewash corrupt
practices because it is the best way to be seen as relevant, coherent and engaging
the subject in an accepted and predictable manner.
We cannot avoid looking at the existing literature on corruption, but this chapter
will also contemplate the possibility that corruption is secondary, a distraction or
even necessary and desirable. This should not be seen as a relativist argument
though it may be necessary to ‘bracket’ the implicit negative connotation of corrup-
tion to reveal the other possibilities of such practices. This can be accomplished
through a hermeneutic exploration of the meaning of corruption in Japan. What
we hope to show is that corruption can be interpreted as part of a constellation 
of fate, moral character and democratic action that escapes our conventional
understanding of the issue.
To view the issue in the context of governance discourse is to raise and reveal
key problems. Governance as a concept is loaded with a range of implications. 
In some sense, it seems to embody the hope of drawing attention to a wider range
of actors, sites of contestation and processes than are often accommodated by
conventional theories. At the same time, governance discourse may lead to a
realization of the archaic meaning of the word: to control.
The origin of the recent revival of governance as a word can be found mainly
in the notion of corporate governance. This has been extended by international
organizations in a bid to legitimize rule-creation at the international level in a
manner that would be understood and acceptable to business which has adopted
governance rhetoric. Adoption of the term by international relations scholars seeks
to expand this legitimizing process further to embrace the exploration of a range
of related issues while at the same time subtly (or not so subtly) contesting or
subverting the concept.
The corporate governance provenance of the concept immediately raises
problems. Unspoken or not, corporate governance suggests norms and rules to
modify the behaviour of the range of actors involved with the corporation, including
executives, managers, workers, stockholders, consumers and those affected by the
‘externalities’ of corporate actions. Corporate governance is created for the benefit
of the corporation as a whole. It inculcates ethics and social norms to help the
corporation avoid obvious pitfalls to the corporation’s long-term benefit. In doing
so, it avoids divisive and damaging confrontation, and diffuses and manages social
and political claims on the corporation (see Chapter 11).
In a generic notion of governance, it is unclear who (or what) the beneficiary 
is. The removal of clearly drawn lines of conflict, desirable to profit-making 
entities, threatens the de-politicization of politics by making it a question of ‘good’
management. The attempts to diffuse norms raises the potential for the inter-
nalization of norms that both makes citizens into subjects and invades their personal
self-definition with externally imposed norms to be internalized as appropriate to
the governance structure.
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The issues raised in a discussion of corruption in Japan challenge the easy notion
of established norms simply in need of adoption and/or internalization. None the
less, placing a consideration of corruption in the context of thinking about
governance potentially aids our understanding of both concepts. This chapter will
focus primarily on thinking about corruption before turning to its relation to
governance in the conclusion. It will first review conventional scholarly thinking
on the subject, but given the above discussion, the main focus must be the sources
of Japanese understanding of the concept. 
The conventional approaches
There are several literatures on corruption. The largest and growing body of
literature focuses on the economic rationality of corruption. It is also a literature
that closely approximates the concerns of conventional definitions of governance
with its implicit assumptions about the value of economic rationality. The relation-
ship of economic rationality to ethics is complex. The implicit assumption of the
literature is an a priori moral argument that corruption is inefficient, economically
harmful and, thus, bad. Of course, these studies are backed by impressive empirical
evidence (Treisman 2000; Jain 2001; Mo 2001), though operationalization of
measures of corruption are complex (Lancaster and Montinola 2001), and the
validity and universality of indicators are epistemologically contentious. Moreover,
this literature has been criticized for its implicit assumptions about the ideal model
of modernity and efficiency on which it is based (Theobald 1999). It is possible that
corruption might be politically necessary or even beneficial in some ways. On the
contrary, it may be those actors whose ideals most closely approximate the model
of economic rationality that are most prone to corruption (Hopkin 1997; Frank
and Schulze 2000).
There is also an implicit democratic ethical argument in much of the commen-
tary on corruption that must also be addressed. ‘Undue’ influence, especially as a
result of unseen and unmonitored influence, the sale of influence and distortions
of public priorities, are all contrary to the egalitarian ethics of democracy. Of
course, this unequal influence exists even in situations not considered to be corrupt.
Those who are wealthy, organized, and even passionate, for example, can exert a
disproportionate influence on the democratic political process. This is a perennial
debate in democratic theory and one that has been practically resolved, for
example, by an emphasis on transparency in political finance or the prohibition of
contributions of a specific type. This process of transparency laws and prohibitions
creates new crimes and criminals, however, as the violation of the transparency
maintaining laws and blanket prohibitions, rather than the undue influence, are
criminalized. Indeed, Japanese electoral and campaign finance law contains strict
reporting requirements, limits on contributions and spending and even a prohi-
bition on door-to-door canvassing and severely limited use of the posters and the
mass media that would seem unnecessarily restrictive elsewhere.
At its worst, corruption involves a diversion of public funds for narrow private
purposes, or in effect, embezzlement against the people and a distortion of
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democratically determined priorities. There must be a sense, however, that the
public is harmed by this diversion rather than benefits from it. For the narrowest
gain accruing to an individual or limited group of people, the criminal law is in
theory brought to bear. In the case of diversion to a social group or coalition of
interests in society, the decision over the appropriateness of the use of funds is
largely political and not one for the law and the criminal prosecution service. If 
the public objects to systematic diversion of funds, then the only recourse is a
political one: vote those responsible out of office. In Japan, they have very often
not done so, though the law and political action has had to respond to ‘public
opinion’. Moreover, systematic corruption, in public works for example, has had
redistribution effects that make their impact more similar to public policy than
corruption.
Western social science research on Japan has tried to grapple with the paradox
of both seemingly high levels of democracy and corruption for many years. One
solution is to deny that Japan has a real democracy with part of the evidence being
the existence of corruption itself (Hertzog 1993). One of the earliest solutions,
however, was to attribute the problem to the traditions of Japanese political culture.
Bradley Richardson’s (1974) early work, for example, used public opinion surveys
to explore the attitudes of the Japanese which led them to fail to reach the norm
of civic culture as exemplified by the US and the UK drawn from the seminal work
of Almond and Verba on the civic culture (1965). The focus was often on Japan
‘particularism’ where the democracy was based on personal exchange (as in
clientelism) rather than the more open, universalistic West. The problem is that
the categories used in this research are inevitably misleading because they are
created by the social scientist themselves for their own theoretical purposes. They
do not provide a very deep insight into the internal logic of the Japanese, especially
Japanese politicians, in terms of how they construct their understanding of
corruption. In addition, they posit a static notion of culture where change only can
come as a result of the modernization of the culture.
Institutional arguments are often used in contrast to cultural arguments. Curtis
has made the clearest institutional arguments: this is implicit in his earlier work
(1988: 160–9) but explicit in his most recent. ‘Although an image of Japanese
politics as hopelessly corrupt is widespread, there is far less corruption now than
there was in the past. . . . Experience suggests that the way to reduce corruption 
is to pass and enforce laws that are targeted directly at corrupt practices rather 
than by changing the electoral system’ (1999: 165). Similar arguments have been
presented by this author, but these were less optimistic: ‘any laws are enacted based
on the assumption that the authorities have the will to enforce them’ (Babb 2001:
63, 47–63). Enforcement is difficult due to the political control of the judicial
institutions by the corrupt politicians they are meant to monitor and prosecute.
Therefore, institutions matter but only insofar as they are created and used effec-
tively, and that is not always politically possible.
In recent years, a rational choice approach to Japanese politics has become
popular. In many ways rational choice arguments are also institutionalist arguments
but with a greater emphasis on simple relationships. Interestingly, corruption in
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Japan is not identified as a focus for research given that it is absent from indexes
of the key works in the field, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1997) and Kohno (1997).
In these volumes, fundraising and even scandal are raised as part of the narrative
but corruption is not considered to be a phenomenon that must be explained. At
the same time, there is an implicit justification of corruption as a process of
exchange and ‘side payments’ that fits well with models of rationality. As with all
rational models, however, the values (matrixes of payoffs) are created ex post facto
as consistent with the predictive power of the models in terms of how they
accommodate the data. Indeed, given the complexity of the values involved – which
in any case are not explored in any depth – it is easy for researchers to pick and
choose data (statements and actions) that confirm the models.
What is the existing data on corruption? Surprisingly, few scholars working on
the subject seem to be operating with anything approaching a comprehensive
database. Of course, a truly comprehensive database is impossible given that some
corruption successfully evades detection because those involved are determined
not to get caught. Even so, not all the allegations in the literature are used by
scholars researching the subject. The tables in this chapter are probably not
complete, but they are the most comprehensive available to date. From these
known cases, certain patterns do emerge.
First of all, the cases have been divided into those in which prosecution was
initiated (Table 9.1) and those in which it was not (Table 9.2). In both cases, a
significant number of cases of bureaucrats and local government officials implicated
or prosecuted for corruption have been omitted to place the focus on members 
of parliament (MPs). There are slightly more cases of allegations of corruption 
(41) than those which have resulted in the prosecution of an MP (35). The clusters
of prosecutions and gaps between them are telling in themselves. There are many
cases in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but there is a large gap between 1968 and
1976. The reason was not a sudden decline in corruption but simply that the career
of one individual prosecutor was so severely damaged by his pursuit of the Kyōwa
Sugar case that subsequent prosecutors became wary of pursing cases involving
government politicians (Uozumi 1997: 67–9).
The data in Table 9.1 indicate those cases in which the prosecution was
successful and those in which it led to the removal of the MP from office. This 
is an issue because political control of the judicial system and the unwillingness of
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to use parliamentary means to expel
indicted MPs has meant those implicated are able to avoid removal from office
indefinitely. This is noticeable in the cases in which the defendant dies prior to 
the outcome of the appeal, most famously in the case of former Prime Minister
Tanaka Kakuei in the Lockheed scandal. It is interesting, however, that in recent
years more MPs have begun to resign and two have taken their lives. Either the
will or ability of politicians to fight corruption cases and remain in office may have
declined. The current exception is Nakamura Yoshirō who was convicted as part
of one of the Zenecon construction scandals but still refuses to resign. This may be
one of the reasons that prosecutors have begun to pursue politicians for tax evasion
because it is often easier and more damaging to be convicted for not having
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Table 9.1 Postwar prosecutions for corruption involving MPs (1945–2003)
Year Scandal Prosecuted? Convicted? Removed?
1947 Tsuji Karoku yes (2) no no
1948 Showa Denkō yes (8) yes (2) died (2)* 
Coal Nationalisation yes (8) yes (3) no 1 died
Tōyō Seifun yes yes** no
1950 Kyoto Keirinjō yes no died
1951 Excise Tax Law yes yes nk
Kanonji Kyorinj yes no died*
1954   Shipbuilding yes (3)  no (3) no
Rikuun Transport yes (2) no no
Nikkōren yes (2) yes (2) yes (1)   
Workers Fund Misuse yes yes nk
1956 School Library Law yes no died
1957 Marine Products yes yes nk
Prostitution Law yes (3) yes (2) nk
Shintsūkawa Dam yes yes* no
1961 Bushū Tetsudō yes yes died
1966 Tanaka Shōji yes yes yes
Construction Gift yes no no
1967 Kyōwa Sugar yes yes died
Osaka Taxi yes (2) yes (1)† died
1968 Nittsū yes (2) yes (1)†† yes
1976 Lockheed yes (3) yes no†††
1986 Yoriitokōren yes (2) yes (2) yes (2)
1988 Zenjiren yes yes yes
1989 Recruit yes (2) yes (1) yes (1)
1991 Kyōwa yes yes yes
Zenecon yes yes no
1995 Two Credit Associations yes yes yes
1997 Orange Kyōsai Kumiai yes yes yes
1998 Nisshō Securities yes no yes (suicide)
Defence Agency yes yes yes (suicide)
2000 Construction yes yes yes
KDS yes (2) yes (2) yes (2)
2001 P.O. Managers yes on-going yes
Foreign Ministry yes yes yes
Sources: Fujita (1980), Murobushi, (1981), Iwai (1990), Gendai Seijika Jinmei Jiten (1998)
Notes:
nk = not known 
*MP being prosecuted died during appeal.
** no on appeal. 
† The second politician died during the trial.
†† One politician died during trial. Second was first conviction upheld against a sitting MP.
††† Two died before appeal completed.
reported suspicious contributions as income than the mere allegation of receiving
them. Such cases have been isolated in Table 9.3.
We have been forced to omit important recent cases of scandal involving
secretaries of MPs (affecting former Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Minister
Ōshima Tadamori and former Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko among the most
prominent cases) due to the fact they do not fit into an established category. The
use of both public and private secretaries in questionable activities has been a
frequent issue in political reform, but space limitations do not permit a detailed
discussion in this chapter. Moreover, minor prosecutions of MPs from such things
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Table 9.2 Postwar allegations of corruption involving MPs (no prosecution) (1945–2003)
Year Scandal Year Scandal
1949 MCI Textiles 1966 Banokon 
1950 Goi Industries Shinanogawa Kasenjiki
Nippon Hassōden Sahkalin Smuggling
1953 Reiyūkai Tokyo Taishō
1954 Hōzen Keizaikai Arafune Transport Minister
Nisshoku 1968 Next Generation 
Nippei Badge System 
1955 E. German Imports 1987 Land Co.Finance 
1957 Zenkōren 1974 Tanaka Kakuei Finances 
1958 Chiba Bank 1977 Seoul Underground 
Grumman 1979 Airliner
1959 Indonesia Reparations 1980 Zeiseiren
1961 New Tōkaidō Line KDD
1962 Bullet Train Land 1984 Sankō Steamship
1964 Kōmeigaike 1986 Marcos Rebate 
Toranomon Land Sale Peace Mutual Bank
1965 Kutoryū Dam 1992 Sagawa Kyūbin*†
Fukuhara 1997 Fuji HI
Second Airport Land 2000 Uzui Donation
Sources: Fujita (1980), Murobushi, (1981), Iwai (1990), Gendai Seijika Jinmei Jiten (1998)
Notes:
* (MP tried on other charges)
† The allegations that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Hosokawa in 1994 were indirectly
connected to this case.
Table 9.3 Postwar prosecutions for tax evasion involving MPs (1945–2003)
Year Scandal Prosecuted? Convicted? Removed?
1990 Inemura Tax Evasion yes yes yes
1993 Kanemaru Tax Evasion yes no (died) yes*
1994 Ōtani Tax Evasion yes yes yes
Kondō Tax Evasion yes yes yes
Sources: Fujita (1980), Murobushi (1981), Iwai (1990), Gendai Seijika Jinmei Jiten (1998)
Note:
*Resigned before died.
as minor election law violations have been also omitted because they generally
result only in a small fine being paid despite being much more numerous than well-
known cases of serious allegations of corruption.
The existence of a continuing number of cases of corruption despite changes
strengthening the laws in 1975 and 1994 may mean that corruption is detected and
dealt with more effectively rather than that the laws have no effect. It is difficult to
say given we can never know the true data set of corruption incidents given their
nature. Anecdotal evidence suggests that little changed after 1975. Indeed, the
situation may have become worse at the height of the bubble economy in the late
1980s and early 1990. None the less, the persistence of corruption scandals after
changes in the law in 1994 may only be indicative of a lower tolerance of corrupt
practices, and therefore, a higher likelihood that it is revealed. Again, we can never
know.
There is a limit to all the theories and empirical evidence. All these approaches
define the problem of corruption in Japan from without. The economic approach
seems to make simplifying assumptions that, at best, are simplistic, and beg the
question of the origin of values and implicit moral assumptions or consequences.
Even the cultural approach, with some claim to be exploring the Japanese definition
of politics, is so dependent on assumptions and categories drawn from the Western
social science tradition that it is less than useful. Rational choice models accept 
the priority of value preferences but then also arbitrarily simplify them to fit 
their models. Institutional approaches, where sufficiently historical, can begin 
to enhance our understanding and there is much that can be learned from a 
review of the empirical evidence which can be collected. None the less, it is the
richness of the lived experience of Japanese with corruption that must be revealed
in its full complexity before we can begin to understand what corruption means to
governance. Therefore, it is the broader Japanese hermeneutic context itself 
to which we must now turn.
Hermeneutics and the genealogy of corruption in
eastern tradition
The alternative to the social science model for studying corruption can be found
in a hermeneutic approach such as that advocated by Gadamer (1989). Gadamer
argues that we cannot avoid our pre-judging of concepts and situations because we
are too influenced conceptually by them in how we approach a problem. Indeed,
the literature review above suggests that our theoretical starting point often
determines in advance the conclusions. As an alternative, Gadamer embraces the
idea of the influences of tradition on the thinking of the researcher and the research.
His exploration of the hermeneutics itself suggests that an exploration of the 
rich traditions of use and change in use of a concept is one way to approach the
problem.
The problem in the Japanese case is that the tradition is not Western and this
would imply a larger gap between the Western observer and Japanese thought.
However, Japanese thought is not simply non-Western either. There should be 
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no false dichotomy between non-Western and Western. Japan has a deeply 
rooted and rich non-Western or East Asian heritage but has also confronted
Westernization and assimilated Western thought in many areas. We cannot avoid
examining all forms of thought in the Japanese tradition as they impinge on this
issue.
It is best to start with the deepest layer of hermeneutic understanding which is
bounded by language. Without intending to bog down the discussion in philology,
the words used to denote corruption in Japanese, drawn primarily from Chinese,
are instructive of the conceptualization of the concept(s). The most commonly used
words are oshoku, fuhai and wairo. The words are old but do not appear in the earliest
Chinese classics in their current form. A full discussion of how these words have
come to be used in Japanese and applied to the situations we now describe as
corruption is beyond the scope of this chapter, but there are two important points
to be made none the less.
One is that corruption as a dirty but necessary task, as action leading to dire
consequences and as a way to get special treatment all remain in the discourse 
of corruption. Second, none of these words is used in any of the classic Chinese
texts that form the basis of Japanese political thought – which instead focuses on
fair taxation and the correct behaviour of rulers in ritual and custom. Funds were
raised by officials in various ways for both private and public uses. The methods
of fund-raising and the use of these funds for gifts is a secondary issue in the classic
literature but is made the main focus by a modern reader looking for corruption
as we conceive it today. The level of taxation and the giving of gifts to officials did
not violate any law except a sense of propriety. A state that heavily taxes is in moral
and physical danger (of revolt and the attentions of predatory states) and not one
in which officials receive ‘gifts’ per se.
In fact, all histories and conceptual analyses of corruption have been written 
to have an effect on an audience. Authors have intended to moralize, and thus
often to titillate as well as explain and isolate the subject. The terminology of cor-
ruption in both English and Japanese is filled with religious implications.
Corruption is a chief characteristic of this sinful world in Christianity, but the 
filth and decay of Japanese terms for corruption also resonate with Buddhist 
and Shintoist implications. As a result, discussion of corruption is immediately
involved in moral considerations. It is important to note, however, that these innate
implications of terminology and judgement emerge slowly and fitfully in the
historical process. Even today, the meaning can be seen as in the process of being
revealed rather than as a fixed truth.
As we approach Japan, we must be aware that the Tokugawa regime
(1603–1868) domesticated Buddhism and promoted Confucianism as the alter-
native moral order to support the political order. There was no independent 
church as in Europe to impose exacting moral standards independent of political
leaders and Confucian scholarship was initially constrained by dependence on 
the Tokugawa house and that of local daimyō. In any case, corruption by officials,
in the sense of diversion of tax resources, would be seen as theft against the daimyō
or bakufu and punished as such. None the less, it was exploitation of peasants, not
182 J. Babb
corruption that was the primary concern due to the increased danger of revolt and
thus invoking the pragmatic prohibitions of exploitation in the classic Chinese
literature.
The rise of a Tokugawa merchant class raised new and difficult problems,
however. To the extent that they profited from transactions involving daimyō and
bakufu authorities, they were in danger of being accused of theft. Corruption in the
modern sense of the word is not a concern of the political theorists of the Tokugawa
era. For example, the main focus of Sorai Ogyū’s Seidan (Discourse on Government)
(1987), one of the most direct treatments of political economy in the period, is the
role of money, including the quality and quantity of the money supply. As Najita
writes: ‘It is important to note here that while these commentators saw the money
economy as falling squarely within the vision of the ancient sages, especially the
idea that cash was a necessary ingredient in the maintenance of social well-being,
they also couched their views in such a way that the usurious handling of money
by merchants was seen as a corruptive influence that undermined society’ (Najita
1987: 228).
Care must be taken not to fall into the trap of viewing contemporary depictions
of Tokugawa corruption on Japanese television as similar to that of today because
these programmes are made as a not-too-subtle commentary on modern problems.
The problem for Tokugawa merchants was that even charging interest on loans
could be construed as usurious in a way that is perfectly legal today. Any profit,
especially profits that led to ostentatious wealth, would be viewed as a theft from
society. These beliefs among Japanese, elite and common alike, meant that the
existence and role of merchants in any form was questionable and the formation
of merchant academies in the Tokugawa era was intended precisely to grapple with
this problem and create an appropriate ethics to justify the merchant’s role (Najita
1987).
This situation changed with the Meiji Restoration (1868) which led to the
formation of a modern state in Japan. The new imperial Japanese state was formed
based on laws that were recognizable to the Western powers to facilitate trade and
Japan’s acceptance into the family of nations. Yet, even in this period the focus 
was not corruption but the powers of the aristocracy versus merit in government.
In Nakae Chōmin’s Discourse of Three Drunkards on Government, the focus of playful
discussion is the extreme contrast between a hereditary aristocracy, in Japan the
samurai class, and popular government. Nakae recognizes that the samurai have
given up their swords, but long to have a chance to use them again (Nakae 1984:
109). None the less, ambitious samurai took up the cause of political struggle
through democratic (or popular) means. In fact, Meiji politicians and merchants
were among the first to adopt the old samurai values as a standard for all gentlemen,
high born or not. The values of these individuals focused on discipline, compassion
and decisiveness but with no mention of corruption as something to be avoided.
The lack of democracy and the domination of political power by an unaccountable
elite was more of an issue than corruption.
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Corruption and democracy in Japan
It was only when dissenting groups, including disgruntled former samurai, were
incorporated into politics through the representative institutions of imperial Japan
that the problem of corruption became prominent. Scalapino cites corruption as
a major problem and cause of the failure of prewar democracy and party politics
but it may be that corruption and democracy were inseparable (1953: 247).
Democratic governance is more likely to be associated with corruption than with
the conditions that militate against it. It would not be surprising if this is also the
period in which the discourse of corruption has its beginnings in Japan. It is easy
to forget that democracy is also associated with corruption in Jacksonian democracy
in the United States, and that corruption became more of an issue in Regency
England with rising demands for political reform. In fact, bribery itself is a relatively
new notion that is associated with modern political practice (Noonan 1984).
In response to the rise of the idea of corruption, there were various strands of
opposition to corruption in prewar Japan. One not often noted was the female
suffrage movement. For example, in 1928 on the occasion of the first general
election under universal manhood suffrage, a Vote for Women Alliance issued a
demand that those with the right to ‘vote cleanly for true representatives without
being misled into inappropriate behaviour such as selling votes and abstaining’
(Ichikawa 1980: 194). The key role played by Christians and Christian church
organizations in this alliance suggests why it might have helped to introduce moral
discourse into the debate on corruption in Japan
New laws had been implemented prior to the passage of universal manhood
suffrage legislation in anticipation of problems involving corruption, but the extent
of the expansion of corruption in the first election under universal manhood suf-
frage exceeded all predictions. One response from the Hamaguchi government
(1930–1) was the establishment of a special parliamentary commission to study the
problem which concluded that greater education of voters was required. However,
one member of the commission, the constitutional scholar Minobe Tachikichi,
dissented by arguing that it was flaws in the electoral law rather than ethics of voters
that gave rise to corruption. The problem could only be solved by shifting the focus
of elections away from voting for individual candidates towards a party-based
system of proportional representation (Fujita 1980: 45–6). The problem was that
institutional solutions were not only politically difficult to implement, but also many
groups gained politically from their attacks on party government corruption.
One important source of vocal opposition to corruption in politics came from
violent groups and those associated with the military. Military radicals advocated
a ‘Showa Restoration’ to revive a decaying Japan and explicitly raised ideals of
purity in politics and contrasted them with corruption scandals that undermined
public trust in politicians. This approach took its most violent form when Prime
Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated in 1932 by terrorists claiming to be
fighting political corruption. Importantly, these individuals were strongly influenced
by Nichiren Buddhism, which not only is traditionally nationalistic, but this sect’s
scriptures also contain powerful images of decay caused by misrule, and these can
easily be transformed into anti-corruption arguments.
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Yet, it was not just oppositional and extremist forces in prewar Japan which
made these arguments. The Saitō cabinet formed in the wake of the Inukai assassi-
nation made the issue of political corruption a key issue to be addressed by the
government. It gave the legal reform commission (hōsei shingikai) headed by a leading
politician, Hiranuma Kiichirō, the responsibility for examining the issue. This
commission immediately dropped the issue of electoral system reform. It has been
suggested that this was the beginning of an emphasis on spiritual enlightenment 
as the solution to corruption rather than institutional solutions (Fujita 1980: 47–55).
This view is supported by the role the right-wing Hiranuma later played behind
the scenes in the prosecution of the Teijin Incident of 1934. The Teijin Incident
involved the sale of shares in Teijin Ltd, a rayon manufacturer, which appeared
to have been manipulated for the benefit of key politicians, including cabinet
ministers. Saitō decided to dissolve his cabinet prior to any arrests, but sixteen men
were charged with corruption. Even though the defendants were found not guilty
of wrong-doing, the image of widespread party political corruption lingered. This
image was fed by groups such as the National Foundation Society (Kokuhonsha)
formed by Hiranuma who were suspicious of democracy (people-based or minpon
rule) and advocated nation-based (kokuhon) spiritual ideals. 
Even after right-wing approaches to politics were discredited by Japan’s defeat
in 1945, the connection between party politics and corruption persisted. Indeed,
the war and immediate postwar chaos expanded opportunities and experience 
in corrupt practices. Democracy and corruption once again seem to have been
positively related. The main legacy of the Allied occupation may have been more
democracy, but also more corruption, and more moralizing over the problem 
of corruption. Commentary by journalists, former occupation officials and US
scholars formed the early discourse on corruption in Japan which in turn informed
later scholarship in Japan and abroad.
Corruption became an obsession not just of foreign commentators but also 
the Japanese media and the major organizations of civil society. Everyone was
against corruption. In the wake of a number of scandals in 1954, the Clean Election
Alliance (Kōmei Senkyō Renmei) was formed by a coalition of forty-one organizations
including business, women’s, local government organisations (Fujita 1980: 160).
The Alliance gathered together the leaders of the four main parties in late 1954
and had them pledge to clean up election practices. Immediately afterward, 112
media organizations including all the major and local newspapers, news agencies
and broadcasters announced their support for the Alliance movement. For the
media, which enjoyed their role as an informal opposition and were keen to protect
their newly won freedoms, corruption was a useful subject to critique those in
power, though they were careful not to directly alienate politicians who could
provide individual reporters with access to information. 
The importance of the Alliance in promoting a set of ideals and suspicions in
early postwar Japan should not be underestimated. It monitored campaign
violations and the attitudes of the Japanese towards democracy and corruption,
and issued reports with its results which were duly reported by the media and taken
up by scholars. The surveys of the Alliance formed the basis for the political cultural
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analysis of Richardson (1974: 23–5). The political attractiveness of the movement
can be demonstrated by the fact that when the Buddhist religious lay organization,
Sōkagakkai, established its political party, it appropriated the Kōmei name for the
party. As the largest group in the Nichiren sect, Sōkagakkai and Kōmeitō, continued
the Nichiren prophetic and apocalyptic tradition of criticism of the failure of
leadership in the Age of Mappō (Decline of Law) in Buddhist thought. In order to
put these ideals into practice in a largely democratic context, an image of opposition
to political corruption was natural.
In fact, corruption was a useful issue for the opposition and the media to attract
attention and support though this occasionally backfired when one of their own
was also implicated in scandal. The fact that one can openly criticize and pursue
the corrupt practices of ruling politicians must count as one of the key features of
Japanese democracy. It continues to be important in Japanese politics as Stockwin’s
chapter in this volume demonstrates. The problem is that all that remains in the
public perception from years of political debate on the issue is the belief that
Japanese politics is inherently corrupt, and thus potentially undermines democratic
practice. Any attempt to substitute notions of ‘good governance’ for existing
political practice, however, will also have its own problems. This is because criticism
of corruption stands in stark contrast to how the problem of corruption has come
to be understood in Japan by those who engage in politics in the post-war period.
It is important to see how past history and political ideals are taken by and used by
politicians because it will also help to explain the persistence of what is commonly
perceived to be corrupt behaviour.
The political virtues of corruption
Corruption has been a persistent problem in Japan throughout the postwar period.
It has dogged the major factions in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and as
noted above, it has also involved MPs from the opposition parties – the Japanese
Socialist Party, Kōmeitō and the Democratic Socialist Party – with only the Japan
Communist Party relatively untouched by serious allegations of corruption. As part
of the party in power, LDP politicians have enjoyed more opportunity to engage
in graft compared to their opposition counterparts. Moreover, the corruption has
been directed at general political fundraising and the protection of a traditional
way of life that might have been threatened by post-war economic growth and
modernization.
Most seemingly corrupt politicians could argue that they have acted in ways that
were completely honourable. They could dismiss criticism of their methods by
arguing that they were a necessary evil, and stressed their loyalty to their supporters
and to Japan itself. Not only did scandal not damage their self-understanding 
of their roles and values, it may in fact have reinforced it and certainly did not 
stop them from teaching their methods and justifications to others. The main
evidence for the discussion used in this section in order to obtain an understanding
of Japanese politicians’ views on corruption are the words used by the politicians
themselves, and that of their biographers and the main pundits who construct the
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wider understanding of their ideals. A careful reading of Japanese political texts
would be more useful to the understanding of corruption in Japanese governance
than any number of interviews, ethnographic or otherwise, given the difficulties
inherent in the study of corruption.
In these texts, politicians and their supporters are not oblivious to the problem
and confront it in their autobiographies and the biographies that seek to promote
them. Many of these sentiments are consistent with, if not derivative of, classical
thought on the appropriate behaviour for political leaders: benevolence, loyalty
and determination. Note that these virtues are not inconsistent with what may be
seen as corrupt practices. Of course, there is both the influence of Japanese
conceptualization drawn from customary social relations and a heavy dose of self-
justification. None the less, their ethics have sustained their behaviour against vocal
and persistent criticism. The sincerity and strength of these convictions should
perhaps not be doubted.
While politicians rarely overtly defend corrupt behaviour, the use of the
corruption issue is often seen as politically motivated, especially the most celebrated
cases. One of the earliest and most important, the Showa Denkō scandal (1948),
was used by the Liberal Party under Yoshida Shigeru to attack the Socialist and
Democratic Parties coalition policies associated with a controlled economy. A
similar furore arose in the ship-building scandal (1954) when a senior government
politician, Satō Eisaku, was implicated but given immunity from prosecution by
his fellow cabinet ministers. Opponents used the situation to vigorously attack the
government and certainly damaged its reputation. Not surprisingly, corruption
became an issue again when Satō became prime minister in the 1960s, with the
so-called ‘black mist’ scandals creating the atmosphere of widespread corruption
but with few actual prosecutions. Even the Lockheed scandal is not defended by
supporters of former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei but seen as a plot against him
by the United States which is alleged never to have forgiven his independent foreign
policy, especially in the Middle East.
The most recent scandals (i.e. since 1990) were also used politically by govern-
ment opponents but with more success. It might be argued that the most important
reason for this is the unravelling of the political machine created by former Prime
Minister Tanaka and sustained by his successors until 1992. The main financial
brain behind the machine, Kanemaru Shin, was arrested in that year and his
supporters within the LDP, particularly those MPs associated with Ozawa Ichirō,
were isolated within the party. Ozawa choice was to bolt the party and attack it
from the outside on the very issue of corruption that had been the main source of
his influence. Even when the LDP returned to power under Prime Minister
Hashimoto Ryūtarō, also a former Tanaka faction member, the attempt was made
to divert attention from politicians by making an issue of corrupt bureaucrats which
was an effective if cynical political move by a politician who had taken full advan-
tage of these tendencies in the bureaucracy in the recent past.1 The political use of
the corruption did not change but the stakes were now higher.
Since recent trends in corruption and Japanese governance in general seem to
turn crucially on the arrest of Kanemaru in 1992, it might be worth ending with 
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a discussion of the case. It is crucial to remember that at first only Kanemaru’s
personal secretary, Haibara Masahisa, was implicated in the Sagawa scandal.
However, rather than allow him to take the blame, Kanemaru called Haibara and
insisted that he needed to tell the truth: ‘I do not want you to end the same as Aoki’,
referring to Takeshita’s personal secretary who committed suicide after he and
Takeshita, among others, were implicated in the Recruit scandal. He continued,
‘you saw what happened to Miyazawa [Kiichi] when he tried to lie during the
Recruit scandal’ and so, he concluded ‘We must be honest’ (Mukaidani 1993:
146–8). Those who focus on Kanemaru’s decision not to let his personal secretary
take the blame could be seen as compassionate because a more cynical approach
might have saved his political career and prevented the fall of the LDP from power
in 1993.
Kanemaru’s reasons for obtaining the money are also important. He was the
financial brains behind the Tanaka-Takeshita political machine that effectively ran
Japan, many might say successfully, for twenty years. The benefits provided by
Tanaka, his successors and allies to supporters throughout Japan were warmly
received and created intense political loyalty, especially in rural areas of Japan,
such as Kanemaru’s home prefecture of Yamanashi, where the economic benefits
of years of high levels of economic growth had not come directly. Even Kanemaru’s
political intrigues in the years prior to his resignation were spent in trying to break
down the old political divisions in Japanese politics to unite the country in an effort
to deal with the rise of Japan as an economic superpower. It is difficult to see
Kanemaru as an evil figure. Indeed, his fate is somewhat tragic. One might also
contrast the respect given to Takeshita when he died in 2000 to the treatment of
Kanemaru who died in disgrace and whose memory has not been rehabilitated.
Could one really say that Kanemaru was more culpable than Takeshita in the
corruption that characterized politics under the influence of the Takeshita faction?
The moral lessons are multitudinous and depend on the perspective you want 
to adopt.
Therefore, politicians such as Kanemaru do not think they are bad but they 
have needed money to get things done. When they are caught obtaining the money
in questionable ways, they can explain it away or try to divert attention by focusing
on their role as a loyal superior, friend, colleague and patron. They are simply
doing what they need to do to get things done, and to get things done in Japanese
politics requires money. It is a dirty business but someone has to do it. The amounts
of money that Japanese politicians handle are enormous but they see very little 
of it personally. Indeed, it might be useful to contrast corruption for the gain of
particular individuals and fundraising for general political purposes. The least
celebrated cases of corruption in the Tables most often involve individual politicians
seeking what might be perceived to be personal gain. The most celebrated suggest
the presence of deeper rooted ‘structural’ corruption at the heart of the Japanese
system of governance. However, since these scandals are involved with their need
to raise money to act effectively as politicians, it is seen as simply an occupational
hazard to be caught in the act.
Second, seemingly corrupt politicians are engaged in constituency service,
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particularly the protection of groups that are potentially disadvantaged. In Japan,
it has been the rural communities at the heart of the LDP support base which have
benefited from corruption. In a sense, this process has distorted democratic
priorities as the flow of funds to rural constituencies has enabled the LDP to remain
in power, but it could also be seen as a response to democratic priorities that the
LDP has remained in power as a series of democratically elected governments who
systematically used the powers of government to enhance their interests and the
interests of their supporters. The process is suspect to many because the defence
given for their practices by the politicians themselves focuses on maintaining a
network of what would be described in the political literature as patrons and clients.
In contrast, they perceive it as a network of those who can help others and those
who need help. Seemingly corrupt politicians have been known for their fundraising
abilities and the power to get things done by those in need. The two aspects are
intimately connected. Wealthy and urban Japan complains most vigorously about
corruption but it is also the least in need of assistance and protection in the same
sense.
Conclusion
Competing conceptions of political virtue have not and perhaps will not go away.
As we have seen, the meaning of corruption is contested and malleable. To
demonize corruption in the context of a discussion of governance could also create
new problems. In fact, it is interesting that corruption is intimately connected with
the growth of democratic governance in Japan, and one could even argue corrupt
politicians are engaged in governance of a sort. Moreover, models of economic
rationality implicit in established notions of governance may themselves promote
questionable ethical standards.
In its positive sense, governance focuses on decentralization of control and
valorization of difference. At the same time, governance can be viewed as negative
in that it holds out the danger of a newer and subtler form of control. Ironically, 
it is possible to conceive of corrupt behaviour as consistent with the positive 
and negative meanings of governance. On the positive side, corruption has often
been engaged in as a means to keep politicians in power primarily based on the
protection of potentially disadvantaged groups in Japanese society. On the other
hand, side payments can be and have been used to diffuse political confrontation
and ‘manage’ problems rather than confront them. Decentralization and recog-
nition of the claims of those fighting modernization and globalization can easily
serve as the justification for corrupt practices in the absence of an alternative form
of ethics.
Indeed, human feelings in politics are not unethical by themselves and protecting
people from the ravages of modernism is often laudable. If the ‘corrupt’ methods
of political bargaining and adjustment in Japan were to be replaced by formal and
efficient methods which ignored fears of threatened groups and refused to permit
inefficiency in the name of a particular style of life, then the corrupt methods might
still seem attractive. Political ethical ideals will be interpreted in a way that
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accommodates corruption so long as there is dirty business that needs to be taken
care of and that one must find a route to the powerful to exercise influence. This
can even further be justified if it can be argued that it helps the nation avoid decay
or defeat by protecting important social groups.
These arguments are not intended to be a ‘defence’ of corruption. It is simply
that an unreflexive ‘governance’ approach to politics is also unattractive and may
be even more bereft of virtue. Governance is often set up as a panacea but it is
more likely to be a means of legitimizing the definition of social and political reality
of the scholars, politicians, officials and powerful organizations that attempt to
control the concept. None the less, precisely because governance is contested, those
who engage in and benefit from systemic corruption will resist these norms,
especially when they conflict with other ideals they hold dear, even at the price of
a moral battle within themselves and with society, not to mention the rule making
and enforcing institutions of the state. It is useful to go beyond blame in order to
understand politicians when they make and remake their own norms, and attempt
to manipulate the institutions and laws of the state to protect their supporters, which
is exactly what Japanese conservative politicians have done. Redefining politics as
governance would not remove this problem and might even make it worse.
Note
1 This chapter has avoided a discussion of bureaucratic corruption because it raises a
slightly different set of issues, but those who suggest that bureaucratic corruption is 
a new phenomenon are incorrect. Bureaucrats have been prosecuted and convicted in
a number of scandals throughout the postwar period, including most of the scandals
involving politicians listed in Table 9.1. See Murobushi 1981: 211–14 for post-war data
up to 1981.
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Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1989) Truth and Method, 2nd ed. London: Sheed and Ward.
Hertzog, Peter (1993) Japan’s Pseudo-Democracy, Folkstone: Japan Library.
Hopkin, Jonathan (1997) ‘Political parties, political corruption and the economic theory of
democracy’, Crime Law and Social Change 27, 3–4: 255–74.
Ichikawa, Fusae (1980) Sutopu Za Oshoku Giin! Tokyo: Shinjuku Shobō.
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10 Whose problem?
Japan’s homeless people as an 
issue of local and central 
governance
Tom Gill
Japan is often portrayed as a highly centralized state, in which national government
tends to dictate policy to the regions (Johnson 1995). This view has been contested,
for example by Muramatsu Michio (1997), whose reassessment of relations between
central and local governments lays particular stress on the importance of welfare
programmes as manifestations of that relationship (1997: 90). This study of recent
homeless policy broadly supports Muramatsu’s position on Japanese-style gover-
nance: here is an awkward issue that the central government has traditionally been
more than happy to leave to cities and prefectures to sort out, but which now
demands a national response.
Background 
Until about 1999 the government of Japan largely ignored the issue of home-
lessness. Article 25 of the national constitution, backed up by the 1950 Livelihood
Protection Law (Seikatsu Hogo-hō ), guaranteed every citizen of Japan a ‘minimum
standard of civilized living’.1 The government’s position was that anyone unable
to provide for themselves was eligible for livelihood protection (seikatsu hogo) and
that consequently there was no need for anyone to become homeless. Faced with
the steadily mounting evidence of tents, shacks and cardboard boxes around the
major cities, the government would argue that homeless people fell into one of two
categories: (1) people who had not applied for welfare, out of pride or ignorance
of the benefits available; and (2) people who had applied for welfare but had been
turned down on the judgement of their local welfare office. Hence the problem was
transferred to the individuals themselves or to local authorities.
In the last few years, however, homelessness has risen high enough to trigger 
a modest media boom.2 The TV and print media have tended to focus on ‘new
homeless’ – laid-off white-collar workers, young people, women, and so on.
However, it has been argued elsewhere (Gill 2001b) that the media’s search for
novelty has obscured the fact that even today most homeless people are in fact of
the ‘old homeless’ type – middle-aged to elderly working-class men. This perception
is regularly confirmed by quantitative research (Kanagawa-ken 2001; Tamaki and
Yamaguchi 2001), and most recently by the national government survey of 2003,
briefly discussed below.
Why does the livelihood protection programme not cover these people? Usually
because of rules invented at ground level by the officials implementing the pro-
gramme. In many cities applications are still turned down unless the applicant can
prove that s/he is (1) over the age of 65; or (2) too ill or injured to work. Just being
unemployed is not enough. In some districts, too, applicants must have a bank
account and a permanent address – the latter a particularly harsh requirement for
a homeless person.
Violent attacks on homeless people have become a regular occurrence, and
people are clearly becoming desensitized to them. Murders get four or five para-
graphs in the newspaper and lesser incidents barely merit a paragraph. According
to my own coverage of the Japanese press, the two years from 1 July 2001–30 June
2003 saw at least twenty murders of homeless people, eight of them by fellow
homeless people. These incidents have strengthened negative associations with
homeless people and fuelled ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) opposition to any
attempt to construct homeless shelters near the homes of ‘ordinary folk’.
In 1998, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW; Kōseishō) at last acknowl-
edged the problem, issuing an estimate for Japan’s national homeless population:
16,000. Subsequent surveys in 2000 and 2001 generated headline figures of 20,000
and 24,000 (Table 10.1). These figures were totalled from a haphazard collection
of regional counts. In early 2003, the first attempt at a co-ordinated national survey
generated a figure of 25,296. This included 20,661 men, 749 women and 3,886
people of ‘unclear’ gender (reflecting sloppy counting practices, especially in Osaka).
Homelessness remains a predominantly male phenomenon in Japan.
Trends in government homeless statistics do not necessarily have anything to do
with trends in the actual number of homeless people. Until 2003 a large part of the
statistical increase was directly attributable to more cities, towns and villages making
counts; while the relatively small increase shown in the first unified national count
in 2003 must be treated with scepticism, since the count was held in winter, whereas
most of the cities had until then been counting in summer months, when warmer
weather tends to swell the visible homeless population. Counting methods have not
been consistent either. Note also that these statistics cover only narrowly-defined
street homelessness, omitting the growing numbers living in shelters. Activists and
social workers often say that a truer figure would be roughly double the official
figure.
Recent developments in homeless policy
Launch of countermeasures; expansion of budget
The year 2000 saw a significant development as the Ministry of Health and Welfare
announced a formal policy for the support of homeless people (hōmuresu jiritsu
shiensaku), consisting mainly of a shelter construction programme and deployment
of employment counsellors from the public employment exchange at the shelters.
For the first time, too, a specific item on homeless support was included in the
national budget. The policy continues to hold prefectures and the thirteen major
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metropolises designated as special cities (shitei toshi) responsible for their own home-
less people, but guarantees 50 per cent of the necessary funding from the national
coffer. Since then the policy has been expanded and budget appropriations have
risen accordingly (Table 10.2).
The 2002 Homeless Self-reliance Support Act
The doubling of the budget in FY 2003 reflected another important development:
the passing of the Homeless Self-reliance Support Act on 31 July 2002.3 This
is Japan’s first piece of legislation designed specifically to deal with homeless-
ness. Officially entitled the ‘Special Law on Temporary Measures to Support the
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Table 10.1 Statistics on homelessness in Japan
Location 1998 1999 2001 2003 (Jan/Feb)
Tokyo (23 wards) 4,300 (Aug) 5,800 (Aug) 5,600 (Aug 5,927
Yokohama 439 (Aug) 794 (Aug) 602 (Aug) 470
Kawasaki 746 (Aug) 901 (Jul) 901 (Jul) 829
Nagoya 758 (May–Jul) 1,019 (May) 1,318 (May) 1,788
Osaka ‘8,660’ 8,660 (Aug) ‘8,660’ 6,603
(Not surveyed) (Not surveyed)
Sapporo 18 (Dec) 43 (Nov) 68 (Dec 2000) 88
Sendai 53 (Mar) 111 (Oct) 131 (Aug) 203
Chiba 104 (Aug) 113 (Aug) 123 (Aug) 126
Kyoto 200 (Mar 99) 300 (Oct) 492 (Jun) 624
Kobe 229 (Aug) 335 (Aug) 341 (Aug) 323
Hiroshima 98 (Feb) 115 (Nov) 207 (Feb) 156
Kitakyūshū 80 (Mar 97) 166 (Nov) 197 (Aug) 421
Fukuoka 174 (Oct) 269 (Aug) 341 (Aug) 607
Major provincial 288 (numbers 706 1,684 1,476 
cities and dates (24 reports) (38 reports) (30 reports)
unclear)
Other towns Not surveyed 1,119 3,425 5,655*
and villages (73 reports) (347 reports)
Total 16,247 20,451 24,090 25,296
Source: MHLW statistics.
Most recent surveys available on-line at: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2003/03/h0326-5.html,
accessed 28 June 2004.
Notes:
* The 2003 survey did not give this figure. It was generated by subtracting the other sub-totals from
the grand total. Apart from major cities, the data was presented by prefecture.
Self-Reliance of Homeless People’ (Hōmuresu no Jiritsu no Shien na do ni kan suru
Tokubetsu Sochi-hō ), it was drafted by a team of young Dietmen in the Democratic
Party of Japan, submitted as a private member’s bill, accepted by the governing
coalition headed by the Liberal Democratic Party and passed unanimously on 
31 July 2002 – the last day of the ordinary Diet session. It was promulgated a week
later, on 7 August.
The key items in the new law are as follows:
1 The government recognizes that many people have become homeless 
through no fault of their own and that this is ‘causing friction with local society’
(Art. 1).
2 The act sets an objective of providing housing and stable employment to
homeless people and those at risk of becoming homeless to enable them 
to maintain personal autonomy (Arts 3, 5) and pledges adequate funding 
(Art. 10).
3 People in charge of parks and other public spaces are empowered to remove
homeless people’s dwellings where ‘appropriate use of the facilities is being
obstructed’ (Art. 11).
4 The government pledges to carry out a unified national census of the homeless
population (Art. 14).4
5 All the provisions are temporary and will lapse after ten years.
Reaction to the new law among homeless people and activists has been sharply
divided. Some welcome the law as a long-overdue public commitment to act on
homelessness; others condemn it as an underhand way of enabling the government
to evade its constitutional duty to provide livelihood protection to all who need 
it. Critics point out that the cost of housing people in homeless shelters is far less
than putting them on livelihood protection, which entails paying the rent on a small
apartment and supplying cash for independent everyday living. Livelihood pro-
tection payments vary with individual circumstances and region, but usually a single
person can hope to receive around 80–90,000 yen a month plus up to 40,000 yen
in rent support – 130,000 yen a month is an often quoted all-in figure. By contrast,
even if the government figure of 25,000 homeless happened to be accurate, the
expanded budget of FY2003 works out at roughly 100,000 yen per capita – about
6 per cent of the cost of putting all those people on seikatsu hogo. So there is a risk
that the new law could lower the bar as to what constitutes a ‘minimum standard
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Table 10.2 National budget for homeless support measures (2000–2004)
FY2000 0.97 billion yen –
FY2001 1.08 billion yen + 11%
FY2002 1.35 billion yen + 25%
FY2003 2.70 billion yen +100%
FY2004 3.00 billion yen + 11%
Source: MHLW statistics.
of civilized living’ in Japan. Article 11, on ‘returning public spaces to their proper
uses’ is particularly hated, out of concern that it could eventually become a pretext
for mass expulsions of people living in tents and shacks from parks in urban areas.
Against this, supporters of the law and neutrals argue pragmatically that the sad
fact of the matter is that the national and local authorities simply are not going to
put everyone on livelihood protection, and that under the circumstances as they
are, the provisions of the new law are better than nothing.
Ultimately the positive or negative impact of the new law will depend on how 
it is implemented – and particularly on the entrance and exit strategies of shelters
in the various cities. How many people, chosen on what basis, will be able to use,
or want to use, the shelters; and where will they go after leaving the shelters? These
key issues are discussed below.
National bureaucratic structures
The MHW was merged with the Ministry of Labour (MOL; Rōdōshō ) on 6 January
2001, to form the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW; Kōsei Rōdōshō ).
In the long term this should be a good thing for homeless policy, since welfare used
to be handled by the MHW and employment by the MOL, and these two central
pillars of homeless policy are now handled by the same ministry.5 However, a look
at how the budget for homeless support breaks down (Table 10.3) shows that a
bureaucratic fault-line remains. Of the seven items covered, the first three are 
ex-MHW policies and the last four are ex-MOL policies. In terms of personnel,
too, as of late 2002 there were nine MHLW officials detailed to homeless policy,
of whom four were in the Regional Welfare Section of the Social Support Bureau
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Table 10.3 Homeless support budget breakdown, FY2002 and FY2003 (Unit: millions of 
yen).
Item FY2002 FY2003 (request)
1. General consultation – 306 (382)
2. Self-reliance support 837 1,204 (1,035)
3. Emergency shelters 180 446 (983)
4. Activating homeless people’s abilities 8 44 (44)
5. Employment counselling 114 – (206)
6. Training for day labourers, etc. 212 463 (463)
7. Test employment – 240 (240)
Total 1,351 2,703 (3,353)
Source: MHLW home page available on-line at: 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/2003/bukyoku/syakai/1-j2.html, accessed 24 June 2004.
Notes:
1 In FY2003 the ‘employment counselling’ item was incorporated into the ‘self-reliance support’
item – hence the rarity of an allocation figure higher than the amount requested.
2 In addition to the above, 500 million yen was allocated to homeless policy in a supplementary
budget for FY 2002: 300 million yen for emergency shelters and 200 million yen for ‘emergency
support enterprises’ (kinkyō enjo jigyō), defined as ‘provision of everyday necessaries to homeless
people in a condition of deteriorating health’.
(Shakai Enjo-kyoku Chiiki Fukushi-ka; ex-MHW) and five were in the Planning
Department of the Elderly and Handicapped People’s Employment Counter-
measures Section (Kōrei Shōgaisha Koyō Taisaku bu Kikaku ka; ex MOL). There is 
a working group that combines members from both departments but it remains to
be seen how effective this cohabitation will be. The restructuring of the budget 
in 2003, to shift employment counselling costs to the self-reliance support 
budget (Table 10.3 note 1) represents a first small erosion of the old bureaucratic
barriers, with a traditional MOL item being moved to a budget sector associated
with the MHW.
A second fault-line may be discerned within the ex-MHW part of the budget,
between items 2 and 3 – which between them accounted for 60 per cent of the
2003 budget. Both items essentially are money for building and running shelters
for homeless people, but ‘homeless self-reliance support projects’ (hōmuresu jiritsu
shien jigyō ) involve shelters which are supposed to be staging places on the way back
to mainstream society, generally known as self-reliance support centres (jiritsu shien
sentā; SSCs) whereas ‘emergency shelter projects’ (hōmuresu kinkyū ichiji shukuhaku
[sherutā] jigyō ) are supposed to provide temporary havens in extremis. These shelters
are most frequently referred to as emergency temporary shelters (kinkyū ichiji hinanjo;
ETSs). Hence we have the germ of a two-tier system here. As we shall see, how in
practice these two kinds of shelter should relate to each other is an issue now being
contested in Japan’s major metropolises.
Elsewhere in the budget, the new item for ‘general consultation’ means
counselling to inform homeless people of the various services available to them,
including an element of outreach work, a relatively new concept for Japan, though
well established in other industrialized countries (Rowe 1999). Item 4, which
translates in full as ‘projects for activating homeless people’s abilities’ (hōmuresu
nōryoku katsuyō suishin jigyō ) means employment projects using task forces of homeless
people to carry out tasks such as cleaning, weeding, recycling of magazines and so
on. There were two such projects in operation as of July 2003, and three more were
provided for in the FY2003 budget. Still, this important aspect of homeless policy
looks remarkably under-funded at just 44 million yen, less than 2 per cent of the
budget.
Two further items reflect the close relationship between homelessness and the
declining Japanese tradition of day labouring (hiyatoi rōdō ). As discussed elsewhere
(Gill 2001b), casual labour markets called yoseba have traditionally served as a last-
resort place of employment preventing many men without regular employment
from slipping into homelessness. In the last two decades, factors such as economic
recession, the decline of the construction industry and increasing automation of
work once done by unskilled labour have crippled the casual labour market, and
the yoseba have gradually changed from ‘workers’ towns’ to ‘welfare towns’ (Stevens
1997). In Osaka, Tokyo and Yokohama, many homeless shelters tend to be located
near one of the three famous yoseba – Kamagasaki (Osaka), San’ya (Tokyo; see
Fowler 1996) and Kotobuki (Yokohama; see Stevens 1997; Gill 2001b). Hence item
6: training for day labourers. The idea is to get men away from the uncertain
lifestyle of the day labourer by imparting skills. As for item 7, early experiments
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with putting homeless men in employment have often failed as a result of men
inured to casual employment quitting shortly after starting a regular job. Hence
the idea of paying employers to take a chance on such men for a trial period of
employment.
Homeless policy as applied in major cities
We will now examine how various themes discussed above play out at ground level
by taking a look at the operation of homeless support policy in the five major cities
of Osaka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kawasaki and Tokyo.6 The FY2003 budget
statement called for increasing the number of homeless SSCs from eleven (with a
combined capacity of 1,400) to sixteen (1,900); and for increasing ETSs from nine
(2,500) to eleven (3,100). However, as of June 2004, there were only nine SSCs
(944) and five ETSs (1,050) actually in operation (Table 10.4). These are early days,
but so far bureaucratic inertia in some cities and intense NIMBY opposition from
residents in all cities has kept actual provision lagging some considerable way
behind the central government blueprint. The struggle to appease the citizenship
has also led city governments to specify time limits for homeless facilities – three
years in Osaka, five in Tokyo and Kawasaki, and ten in Nagoya. Osaka would
actually have had to start closing shelters at the end of 2003 in order to keep that
promise. In fact, when the deadline came, the city Welfare Office (Fukushi Jimusho)
made an informal decision to keep the shelters open ‘for the time being’. According
to a city official, consent was obtained from local citizens’ groups.7
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Table 10.4 SSCs and ETSs operating and planned as of June 2004
Except for the SSC in Yokohama, all facilities are for men only.
Tokyo
Location Capacity Status
Self-reliance Support Centres (Jiritsu Shien Sentā )
Taitō ward 104 Open since FY2001
Shinjuku ward 52 Open since FY2001
Toshima ward 80 Open since May 2001
Sumida ward 110 Open since March 2002
Shibuya ward 72 Open since March 2004
Emergency Temporary Shelters (Kinkyū Ichiji Hogo Sentā )
Ota ward 300 Open since December 2001
Itabashi ward 100 Open since March 2003
Edogawa ward 100 Open since March 2004
Chiyoda ward 100 Scheduled to open FY2004
Arakawa ward 100 Scheduled to open FY2004






Self-reliance Support Centres (Jiritsu Shien Sentā )
Ōyodo (Kita ward) 80 Open since October 2000
Nishinari (Nishinari ward) 100 Open since November 2000
Yodogawa (Higashi-Yodogawa ward) 100 Open since December 2000
Emergency Temporary Shelters (Kasetsu Ichiji Hinanjo)
Nishinari Park 200 Opened December 2001
Osaka Castle Park 300 Opened November 2002
Another temporary shelter, in Nagai Park, opened in December 2000 and was closed in
March 2003. All Osaka facilities were scheduled to close three years after opening, but
when the three-year period for the SSCs expired in late 2003, the city government made
an informal decision to keep them open ‘for the time being’.
Nagoya
Location Capacity Status
Self-reliance Support Centre (Jiritsu Shien Sentā )
Atsuta ward 92 Opened November 2002
Emergency Temporary Shelter (Kinkyū Ichiji Shukuhaku Shisetsu)
Wakamiya Ōdori Park 150 Opened November 2002
Nagoya facilities are temporary structures but with no scheduled closing date.
Theoretically they will last as long as the 2002 Homeless Support Law (10 years).
Yokohama
Location Capacity Status
Self-reliance Support Centre (Jiritsu Shien Sentā )
Kotobuki-chō (Naka ward) 226 (206 men, Permanent facility opened May 
20 women) 2003, replacing temporary facility 
operational since 1993 with 
capacity of 204.
Emergency Temporary Shelters: None
Kawasaki
Location Capacity Status
Self-reliance Support Centre (Jiritsu Shien Sentā ): None. One planned for FY2005
Emergency Temporary Shelter
Tsutsumine-chō (Kawasaki ward) 250 Temporary facility opened May 
2004.
Administrative structures
This fault-line between housing policy and employment policy is also very much
in evidence in local government: traditionally, housing and welfare have been
handled by cities, but employment by prefectures. Communication does not appear
to be very good. In Nagoya, for instance, Nagoya City Hall and Aichi Prefectural
Hall are on opposite sides of the same road, yet a city official ruefully admitted that
it was very difficult to get prefectural officials to pay much attention to what the
latter tended to view as a strictly city issue.
Tokyo has a unique administrative structure: since 2000, homeless policy has
been handled by the city’s ‘Special Ward’ (tokubetsu-ku), sometimes called ‘the 24th
ward of Tokyo’. This is a kind of ‘virtual ward’ – it has no geographical existence,
but manages facilities that are the responsibility of the wards but are too large and
expensive for each ward to have one of its own. The twenty-three wards have been
divided into five blocs, and each bloc is supposed to have one SSC and one ETS.
Every five years both types of facility are supposed to be closed and replaced with
equivalent facilities in another ward in the same bloc.
A second important feature of regional homeless administration – one shared
with many other branches of welfare provision – is the apparently universal practice
of farming out projects (itaku jigyō ) to ‘external organizations’ (gaikaku dantai). These
are usually Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), funded by the city and/or prefectural
government but not technically part of the government. Most of them have the
status of shakai fukushi hōjin (‘social welfare juridical person’). Some have surprisingly
long histories: management of the Nishinari SSC is entrusted to Osaka Jikyōkan,
a sizeable welfare corporation with ninety years of history that also runs a dozen
other welfare facilities. The Yokohama SSC (called Hamakaze – ‘Yokohama Breeze’)
is run by an NPO called the Keiseikai, which was founded in 1918, initially to help
out down-on-their-luck sailors, and which also runs a range of welfare institutions.
By contrast, the Nagoya facilities are run by a brand-new NPO – the Hōryū
Welfare Association – established for that particular purpose.
Arrangements that seem similar at first glance often prove to be very different
on closer inspection. Thus, for example, the other two SSCs in Osaka, and both
the ETSs there, are run by an NPO called the Miotsukushi Welfare Association
(Miotsukushi Fukushi-kai). Many members of this NPO’s staff are serving or retired
members of the city government. The Nishinari ETS has a staff of fifteen, of whom
four, including the director, are on secondment from the city government’s Public
Welfare Bureau (Minseikyoku), one is recently retired from the same bureau, and 
the other ten are temporary staff (rinji), hired from the general public through
recruitment advertising. Hence it is really only on paper that the city government
is entrusting management of the shelter to the Miotsukushi-kai. In fact there is 
not a single officer of that welfare corporation on the staff, which instead consists
of present and former city officials and temps hired from outside the Miotsukushi-
kai. The latter appears to be providing little more than a cost-saving flag of
convenience.
The extensive use of NPOs has many advantages for regional governments:8
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1 Their staff need not be paid as highly as government officials, nor need they
be given the same job security, pension rights, and so on. Hence NPOs are a
cheaper and more flexible way of providing welfare than direct government
provision.
2 Sometimes the NPO can be jointly funded by city and prefecture, neatly
hopping over the bureaucratic rift mentioned above.
3 If anything goes wrong, blame can generally be attached to the NPO, and the
government can respond by canceling the contract and getting a new NPO to
take over the project.
4 The NPOs often have more specialized know-how in their field than
government officials, who are often moved to totally different responsibilities
in personnel reshuffles before they have a chance to build up experience.
5 Since they are not officially part of the government, the NPOs are slightly 
less bound by the formal rules and informal customs that hamper much
government activity.
6 The NPOs can in some cases be a useful source of amakudari and secondment
postings for retired or surplus government officials.
The two-tier system
The bipartite system of Self-reliance Support Centres and Emergency Temporary
Shelters seems to be a fairly recent development, although a similar pattern may
be observed in other branches of welfare policy, such as treatment of single-parent
families and victims of domestic violence.
Self-reliance Support Centres
‘Self-reliance support’ (jiritsu shien) has become a popular welfare buzzword in 
Japan in recent years. The term is included in all government policy documents
on homelessness and in the title of the new homeless support law. It has a pleasantly
progressive ring to it, implying that recipients are not hopeless social failures but
are merely in need of a helping hand to regain their self-reliance. At the same time
it creates a third conceptual category, in between the traditional ones of ‘self-reliant’
(with a living income) and ‘dependent’ (in need of livelihood protection payments),
which may have ominous implications depending on how it is interpreted in
practice.
The first SSCs opened in Osaka in autumn 2000. Tokyo followed suit in 2001
and Nagoya in 2002. The Yokohama shelter opened in May 2003 is officially
designated an SSC today, although its predecessor had opened in 1993 before the
term had been coined. The shared objective of all SSCs is to take homeless people
off the street, sort out their health and hygiene problems, restore a spirit of self-
respect, and help them to return to mainstream life: through employment and
independent living where possible; by arranging livelihood protection payments
where that is not possible.
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The Nishinari SSC in Osaka is a two-storey brick building (formerly a nursing
home) on the outskirts of Kamagasaki, surrounded by a high wall with three strings
of barbed wire above. The only door in the wall is permanently locked and access
may only be gained by requesting admission through an interphone linked to the
shelter’s office. The shelter’s name is written in tiny characters on a small card
pinned to the door.
The Nishinari Centre has eighty beds and a full-time staff of eight supplemented
by two part-timers. Twice a week three employment counsellors come to the Centre
from the nearby public employment exchange. There are also weekly visits from
nurses and legal advisers. The former conduct examinations for a range of health
problems, of which tuberculosis is the most feared and alcohol disorders the most
common. The latter provide legal advice on debt rescheduling and declaration of
personal bankruptcy for those who have got into financial trouble, often with sarakin
loan sharks.
In principle users are allowed to stay for three months, extendable to a maximum
of six or occasionally seven. Getting the extra months is conditional on finding
regular employment: the idea is to use the three months to recover one’s health,
composure and appearance, attend job interviews and get a job. Then one can stay
three or four more months, commuting to work from the SSC, in order to earn
and save enough money to leave the shelter and move into an apartment. One
culture-specific aspect of homelessness in Japan is the high cost of rejoining main-
stream society: the need to pay roughly six months’ worth of rent upfront means
that there is usually a considerable time lag between finding employment and being
able to move into an apartment. The time schedule at the Nishinari SSC reflects
this fact of life.
One of the Tokyo SSCs is Taitōryō, located very close to Ueno Park, facing the
famous Kan’ei-ji temple. It has 104 beds and an annual budget of 180 million yen.
There was powerful NIMBY opposition to opening the Centre. Consequently it
has no nameplate to reveal its function, is surrounded by fences, and outside stairs
are concealed behind plastic covers. As one of the staff dryly remarked, people do
not want to be reminded of gloomy matters like homelessness when attending
funerals at the temple.
There are two crucial differences between this SSC and its counterparts in
Osaka. First, the permitted stay is shorter: two months in principle, and a maximum
of four if work is obtained (against three and six in Osaka). Residents are strongly
encouraged to attend job interviews in their first three weeks at the Centre, which
assists by keeping a wardrobe of interview suits and an ironing board for loan, and
by taking photos to put on job application forms. The aim is to get the resident in
a job within a month or so, leaving three months to build up savings.
The second crucial difference is that SSCs in Tokyo provide a considerable
amount of financial support to residents who get jobs and move into apartments.
On receipt of a letter confirming employment the SSC will pay 31,000 yen to buy
work clothes and tools; the SSC will also pay half the initial costs of moving into
an apartment (key money, deposit, realtors’ fees, etc.), up to a maximum of 139,200
yen; plus 19,800 yen to buy a futon and 25,000 yen to buy household necessaries.
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The men also get a modest allowance of 400 yen a day while they are still in the
Centre. To the best of my knowledge no other city will hand over sums of cash,
large or small, to homeless people. The Taito SSC staff estimate that even with this
assistance, the project of rejoining mainstream society requires the man himself to
save at least 300–350,000 yen.
Officials spoken with in Osaka were deeply sceptical of the Tokyo approach.
Homeless men were generally irresponsible with money, and handing them cash
was only likely to cause more trouble – like giving booze to an alcoholic. The men
would be better off with the extra time in the SSC, which was the advantage offered
by the Osaka system in lieu of the Tokyo cash handouts. Tokyo officials admitted
that there had been quite a few cases where the cash handouts had been abused,
but pointed out that they maintain a strict one-chance-only policy: people who
squander the goodies from the SSC are not allowed to use the SSC a second time.
The restriction is resented: on 9 April 2003, a coalition of homeless support activists
submitted a petition to the Tokyo authorities whose demands included permission
for repeat visits to SSCs.
The newly opened SSC at Atsuta in Nagoya is based closely on the Osaka
approach; the Yokohama SSC, named Hamakaze, resembles the Osaka model in
having a six-month maximum stay and not providing financial support, but should
properly be regarded as a hybrid institution, including some elements of the ETS
(see below). It is located in the middle of the Kotobuki yoseba, and there is a
pragmatic recognition that many homeless men are career day labourers who are
unlikely to settle down in permanent employment. Many men cycle between the
SSC and the street at intervals of about one month – the maximum stay if one does
not find employment – and this is tolerated. If a man does succeed in getting a job,
he is transferred to a different room on the top floor of the seven-storey building
and his stay is extended to six months.
Nearly all homeless shelters in Japan are male-only institutions, reflecting the
overwhelmingly male homeless population. However, Hakamaze does have twenty
places for women. Elsewhere, women tend to be categorized outside the homeless
care system – as single parents if they have children, or as victims of domestic
violence. Also women tend to be far more successful than men at applying for
livelihood protection: a homeless woman is viewed as considerably more shocking
than a homeless man, and so patriarchal attitudes tend to work in women’s favour
in this particular instance.
Emergency temporary shelters
The emergence of the ETS as a bureaucratic category stemmed from the success
of the first of its kind, opened in Nagai Park, Osaka in December 2000 and closed
in March 2003. In what will be called the ‘Osaka Model’, the SSCs are classified
under ‘Self-reliance Support Centre Enterprises’ (Jiritsu Shien Sentā Jigyō ), and the
ETSs under ‘Park Normalization Policy’ (Kōen Tekiseika Taisaku). This two-sided
policy reflects the contrasting concerns of homeless people and non-homeless park-
users respectively.
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Over the last decade, large shanty-towns have developed in major metropolitan
parks around Japan. The one in Nagai Park had 458 assorted shacks and tents in
it when the ETS opened at the end of 2000, and by August 2002 only eight tents
and shacks were left.9 These impressive figures encouraged the Osaka authorities
to open the Nishinari and Osaka Castle Park ETSs, and Nagoya followed suit.
However, a look at the official data for the Nagai Park shelter reveals some
underlying problems. In the twenty months from December 2000 to August 2002,
206 men entered the shelter, of whom 184 exited, leaving twenty-two still in
residence at that time. Clearly then, not all the 450 tents and shacks were vacated
because of the shelter. Out of the 184 who left the shelter, some 45 per cent went
into livelihood protection institutions, 20 per cent went to an SSC, and 10 per cent
into hospital. Only 7 per cent exited to jobs, while 18 per cent voluntarily
discharged themselves (jishu taisho), probably to return to homelessness. In short,
three-quarters left the shelter only to enter some other welfare institution. Ironically,
people who had been living self-reliantly – often in quite well-constructed shacks,
some with petrol-driven electricity generators, often with incomes from recycling
tin cans or magazines – emerged from the shelter to state-dependent lifestyles in
various welfare institutions.10
The figures for the Nishinari Park shelter are rather different. By the end of
October 2002, after nine months of operation, 142 tents and shacks were still
standing in the park out of the 251 counted in December 2001, and the shelter was
more than half empty, with just seventy-five men in residence. Just eighteen men
had used and then left the shelter in those nine months, and half of them were
voluntary discharges. By the end of April 2004, the city government still counted
ninety-six improvised dwellings in Nishinari Park.11
This is hardly surprising if one looks at the situation in Nishinari Park. The
makeshift dwellings of the homeless people are shabby but sometimes quite
comfortable-looking. Many of the men there have pet cats or dogs, and have
acquired quite a large collection of personal possessions over the years. Moving
into the shelter means abandoning communal park life and a lot of the possessions
and animals. In exchange you get 2 jō (6.6 square metres) of personal space in a
bunk bed, which you are supposed to vacate after six months.12 Moreover, unlike
the SSC where you get three meals a day, at the shelter you get just the rice for the
evening meal – you must supply your own accompanying dishes, and all the food
for breakfast and lunch. This aspect of shelter life, particularly resented by residents,
is supposed to point up the strictly temporary nature of the accommodation. Nor
are there any legal or employment counsellors at the shelter.
On the other hand, the shelter is extremely clean and hygienic; showers and
laundry are free; there are plenty of televisions; and there is no ban on drinking.
This last, along with the non-enforcement of the six-month limit, is on the initiative
of the director, who has also thought up several modest income-generating schemes
for residents. Even so, the question of what happens after you leave the shelter
remains without a convincing answer. The director tends not to refer them to the
Nishinari SSC because he feels that their background and personality would make
it difficult for them to fit in with the more controlled regime there. He points out
204 Tom Gill
that the shelter’s proximity to Kamagasaki, the great Osaka yoseba, means that a
lot of hardy men, used to periods of unemployment and homelessness, are sleeping
in the park.
The Nagoya ETS is closely modelled on the Osaka pattern, being located inside
a major city park, and with a very similar regime, including the provision of just
rice for the evening meal. In Tokyo, by contrast, the ETSs are formally portrayed
as feeder institutions for the SSCs. They are not located in parks; they supply three
meals a day; and conduct regular assessments of the physical and mental condition
of inmates, before deciding whether to pass them on to an SSC, put them on
livelihood protection, or send them to hospital. The stay is limited to one month
in principle and two months at most. Only three of the five planned were actually
open at the time of writing, however, in Ōta, Itabashi and Edogawa wards. Of 
these the one in Ōta ward (called Ōta-ryō, or Ōta Lodge) is by some way the biggest
homeless shelter in Japan, with a capacity of 300. It has an annual budget of 480
million yen, and is run by a welfare corporation called the Yūrin Kyōkai. Before
the launch of the homeless support policy, it had been used for twenty-five years
as a temporary shelter for San’ya day labourers during the New Year holidays
(when conventional welfare facilities are closed). It is located on a large piece of
otherwise unused land in a warehouse district far from any residence, factors
making this a natural site for the shelter. Whether it will really be relocated to
affluent Setagaya ward in five years as planned under Tokyo’s bloc-rotation system
is rather doubtful.
Staff at Ōtaryō say that in practice roughly 50 per cent of residents exit to SSCs,
25 per cent to livelihood protection, and 25 per cent fail to make progress and go
back to the streets.
Another variation in ETS management emerged in May 2004, when the city of
Kawasaki finally opened its Wan Naito Sherutā (One Night Shelter), after a lengthy
battle against NIMBY-minded citizens. This shelter uses a registration system; men
who register can apply every night for permission to use the centre, being admitted
at 6 p.m. and expelled at 6 a.m. This seems to be the first case of an American-
style night shelter in Japan. A month after opening, the shelter had 140 registered
users, of whom roughly half were sleeping there on the average night.13
Entrance and exit strategies
Getting In
One of the key differences between ETSs and SSCs is in admission policy. In the
park-based ETSs of Osaka and Nagoya, anyone showing a willingness to abandon
his shack or tent can be admitted to the ETS, and indeed easy admission is part of
the park clearance strategy. By contrast, people cannot enter an SSC without 
a referral from the local welfare office (fukushi jimusho). Usually this is obtained by
the homeless person visiting a welfare office and persuading a caseworker that he
would be a suitable candidate for an SSC. In addition some referrals are made by
outreach workers who tour homeless districts looking for suitable people.
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The situation in Tokyo is rather different. In theory at least, ETSs are supposed
to lead to SSCs, and SSCs to a job or livelihood protection. Hence getting into the
system carries rather more significance – especially in view of the tempting cash
benefits available to those who can last the course. The downside of this is that
wards are reluctant to refer people to the SSCs, since they know from experience
that few of them will get a job and many will end up on livelihood protection – part
of the costs of which must be borne by the referring ward. Hence Tokyo SSCs are
often operating well below capacity, and those who do get referred tend to be ‘elite
homeless’ with a better than average chance of getting employed. Even the ETSs
operate a referral system, reflecting their feeder role for the SSCs and their
geographical distance from homeless districts.
Getting out
As mentioned above, the Osaka and Nagoya ETSs have no clear exit strategy,
which is a major disincentive to abandoning an ad hoc residence in a park to enter
one. In Tokyo the ETS is supposed to lead to the SSC, then – perhaps via a third
institution, the ‘group home’, a shared group residence in which lifestyle skills 
and employment training are provided – to independent living and a steady job.
A simplified version of the Tokyo government’s flow diagram is shown in Figure
10.1; unfortunately, at the time of writing the ‘group homes’ still do not physically
exist14 and the final transition to independent living is proving hard to make. The





































Step 1 (ETS) Step 2 (SSC) Step 3 (Group home) Step 4 (Return to society)
The ‘Tokyo System’ (2002)
Figure 10.1 The ‘Tokyo System’ of homeless governance.
Note: Simplified translation of Tokyo Metropolitan Government Welfare Dept. press release at
http://www.fukushi.metro.tokyo.jp/press_reles/2002/pr0221.htm, accessed 24 June 2004.
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Formidable barriers face formerly homeless people seeking employment. With
unemployment around 5.5 per cent there are plenty of non-homeless people ahead
of them in the queue. Social prejudice is strong, and the question of how honestly
to answer questions on application forms about ‘current place of residence’ is a
tricky one since admitting to living in a shelter will often ruin one’s chances of being
taken on. Inevitably the kinds of job that ex-homeless people do acquire tend to be
tough and badly paid, making it very hard to stick at it, especially if one has been
away from regular employment for many years, as with many of the day labourers
in the Yoseba districts. Men used to earning their living by the day are often
habitually or even ideologically disinclined to work regularly or save money, yet
the ‘return to mainstream society’ requires them to do just that. SSCs attempt to
overcome these problems through employment and lifestyle counselling, but seldom
with much success.
For example, in its first twenty-one months of operation (to the end of August
2002) the Nishinari SSC ‘graduated’ 356 men (it is a male-only institution). Of those
356,140 (about 40 per cent) got jobs, fourteen went into hospital, thirty-four entered
other institutions (mostly livelihood protection hostels), and 168 were listed as ‘other’,
which SSC staff said generally meant they had failed to get work and gone back to
the street. Unfortunately, as SSC staff themselves admit, the true figure for successful
employment is nowhere near the 40 per cent officially claimed. Men are listed as
entering employment on their own say-so, and many who really do get work are
known to quit very quickly. The one method used to confirm continued employment
is the sending of a questionnaire a few months after the man has departed. Further
inquiries are ruled out on privacy grounds. Staff tentatively stated that no more than
30 per cent of the cards came back. Similar admissions were heard of gross
discrepancies between statistics and reality at SSCs in Tokyo and Yokohama.
Role of the private sector
With a total capacity of around 2,500, the system is clearly inadequate as it stands
– an inadequacy that represents a business opportunity for private enterprise. The
biggest and most notorious ‘homeless business’ is SSS (Social Security Service),
which is now housing far more formerly homeless people in the Tokyo area than
the public system.
The SSS approach is very simple. The firm – officially a non-profit organization
under the 1998 NPO Law – contracts with a homeless person to supply an
apartment or at least a bed in some shared accommodation, along with meals and
other daily necessities. Once the homeless person has moved in, SSS helps him to
apply for livelihood protection. Now that he has a bona fide permanent address, the
homeless person tends to succeed. Once the payments start coming, SSS charges
the person a monthly sum that amounts to almost the entire livelihood protection
payment, to cover rent, meals, utilities, and so on. The man is left with a token
amount of pocket money. SSS is based in Tokyo, where it is said to have over 100
hostels and apartment buildings, housing some 3,000 people, and is moving into
other areas with varying degrees of success.
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SSS and its activities provoke very mixed reactions from activists and social
workers. On the one hand, they strongly suspect that this organization that enjoys
NPO status is in fact making profits out of the welfare payments of people who are
often poor and weak. On the other hand, there is no denying that without SSS
there would be several thousand more homeless people on the streets of Tokyo.
Essentially, SSS and similar outfits are forcing city governments to meet their
constitutional obligation to provide livelihood protection payments to those who
cannot support themselves – an obligation that the emerging public shelter system
sometimes seems designed to evade.
Hence some activists are trying a new approach to housing homeless people that
may briefly be described as ‘SSS minus the exploitation’. An early pioneering
example is the Tabidachi no Ie (Journey’s Start House), a communal dwelling at
Chigasaki, Kanagawa prefecture, run by a Christian NPO that has rented a disused
company dormitory to house forty formerly homeless people.15 It assists in making
livelihood protection claims, and leaves them a much larger proportion of the
monthly payment after deducting rent and other expenses. It opened in 2002 and
has had a successful first two years. A similar enterprise in Ichikawa, Chiba
prefecture, is also up and running. A hospice recently opened in San’ya using the
same principle (Mainichi Shimbun, 3 June 2003). In the long run, projects like this
may prove very significant for homeless people in Japan.
Conclusion: everyone’s problem, no-one’s problem
What does the case of homelessness policy tell us about governance in Japan? 
First of all it sheds light on relations between central and local government. In
contrast to the highly centralized, top-down style of governance described in many
studies, this case shows a negligent central government, keen to leave the issue to
the regions but reluctantly drawn into the fray as the issue escalates. Even now, the
national policy largely boils down to providing matching funds for local initiatives
– which vary considerably across the country.
Second, the administrative structures implementing homeless policy appear not
as a smoothly contoured chain of command but as a threadbare patchwork of
systems, with responsibility contested, divided and diffused at every level – between
ministries, between bureaux, between prefectures, cities and wards, and between
welfare officials and park/public space officials at every level. The net result is to
make it radically unclear who is in charge. Here Japan may have something to
learn from the British experience, where the Blair government’s 1999 appointment
of Louise Casey as ‘homeless tsar’ appears to have been quite effective in reducing
homelessness (Casey’s Rough Sleepers’ Unit claimed on 3 December 2001 to have
reduced the number of people sleeping to about 550 from 1,850 in 1998). At any
rate in Britain it has been possible to answer the question ‘who is in charge?’ with
a single person’s name, whereas in Japan the same question can only be answered
by a lengthy academic paper like this one. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō has
shown some interest in the concept of policy tsars in other fields, and perhaps
something similar would be effective here.
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Third, any analysis of governance in action must take account not only of the
big administrative structures but also of the individual personnel who work within
those structures and the processes by which they are appointed, rotated and
promoted. My impression is that the officers who deal directly with homeless
people, such as the managers of shelters, are often seasoned veterans with a good
understanding of the issue. By contrast, those based higher up the chain of com-
mand, in city halls and the MHLW, tend to be relatively young and inexperienced
men who will be switched to some other appointment before they can acquire much
experience dealing with the issue. Indeed, one official at the MHLW told me that
his introduction to homeless policy had taken the form of a couple of hours’
conversation with his predecessor.
Japan is in urgent need of bold thinking that can rapidly translate into action.
The present system of governance holds out little prospect of such a thing
happening. The ultimate answer to the question in this chapter’s title is that right
now, while homelessness may well be ‘everybody’s problem’ in a philosophical
sense, it is not clearly any particular person or organization’s problem in the sense
of administrative responsibility. Ironically, cities that make an effort to combat
homelessness attract more homeless people, while those that shirk their respon-
sibilities are rewarded with smaller homeless populations as those at threat move
away to cities with better provision.16 Clearly this is one social problem that needs
to be tackled at the national level.
Notes
1 An earlier version of this Occupation-era law was passed in 1946. The 1946 version
excluded applicants deemed able but not willing to work, those who had people (e.g.
spouse, parents) responsible for their welfare, etc. These exclusions were removed from
the 1950 version.
2 For example, a May 2004 search of the Amazon Japan home page found sixty-five books
with the word hōmuresu in the title, of which thirty-six had been published in the three
years from April 2001 to April 2004. Documentaries about homeless people have
become a mainstay of early evening TV.
3 An unofficial English translation of the law is available on-line at: 
http://member.nifty.ne.jp/nojuku/english/eng_idx.html, accessed 24 June 2004.
4 This was duly carried out in Jan/Feb 2003, generating the figure of 25,296 mentioned
earlier.
5 Another branch of the central bureaucracy is also concerned with homeless people in
a different way: the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (Kokudō Kōtsūshō ),
which is in charge of policy on national parks and public spaces. For the MLIT the ad
hoc dwellings of homeless people represent an obstacle to running parks for the general
public.
6 The field-trips were made to Osaka and Nagoya in October 2002, Tokyo in November
2002, and several in Yokohama up to June 2004. A total of five shelters have been visited
and numerous local and national officials interviewed.
7 Telephone interview with Yamada Yoshiro, Homeless Independence Support section,
Osaka City Welfare Department, 10 June 2004.
8 See Nakamura (2002) for a perceptive account of the tactical game between NPOs and
government in another welfare field – provision of services to deaf people.
9 By the end of April 2004, the number of improvised dwellings had crept back up to 20.
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10 Note, too, that Nagai Park had one exceptional factor at play – the use of the stadium
located in the park as the venue for several matches during the 2002 World Cup.
Concern to avoid football fans from around the world seeing the Nagai Park shanty
town may well have encouraged the local authorities to accept applications for livelihood
protection from the Nagai ETS.
11 Available on-line at: http://www.city.osaka.jp/kenkoufukushi/sonota/sonota_20.html,
accessed 24 June 2004.
12 In practice the six-month rule is not enforced, in view of the low level of demand for
places in the shelter, but even so the prospect of the shelter being closed after three years
means that life there is still correctly viewed as temporary.
13 Telephone interview with Inoue Hideomi of the Kawasaki City Regional Welfare
Bureau, 10 June 2004.
14 Two group homes, each with twenty places, are planned. Formally they are called ‘self-
reliance training homes’ (jiritsu kunren hōmu).
15 The facility opened in November 2001. Available on-line at
http://www.cam.hi-ho.ne.jp/noguchi/tabi.html, accessed 24 June 2004.
16 The situation in the Kansai is a good case in point. Kyoto’s relatively small homeless
population partly reflects the fact that Kyoto provides very poor services for homeless
people, who therefore tend to drift to Osaka with its gradually expanding system of
shelters, employment programmes, etc.
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11 The political economy 
of Japanese ‘corporate 
governance’
A metaphor for capitalist 
rationalization 
Hasegawa Harukiyo
This chapter aims to shed light upon ‘corporate governance’ as an issue in 
the rationalization of Japanese capitalism. Its focus is on the current domestic
debate on how Japanese corporate governance should be reformed. While the focus
of attention in this debate is the improvement of governance based on the
strengthening of ‘external’ monitoring, there is no guarantee that this will solve
most current corporate problems. The reason for this is straightforward: the current
debate ignores an important aspect of Japanese capitalism, namely, corporate
restructuring. Indeed, this chapter argues that in the current debate ‘corporate
governance’ is actually a metaphor for large-scale corporate restructuring in
response to the ‘external’ constraints of globalization. That is, the real strategy of
corporations is to carry out large-scale restructuring taking advantage of the debate
on corporate governance. Such restructuring may be taken as a response of capital
to the combined forces of the internal logic and necessity of Japanese capitalism
and of the pressure from the United States and other members of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).1
Thus, in contrast to the functional approach of the existing ‘corporate
governance’ literature (Fukao and Morita 1997; Keizai Kikakuchō 1998; Kubori
et al., 1998; Keidanren 2000; Lorsch 2000), the approach adopted here is related
more to political economy – that is, it aims to examine structural change in Japanese
capitalism and redefine the issue of ‘corporate governance’ as reforms in top
management and hence as part of a major restructuring of Japanese capitalism. By
addressing the issue from this perspective we can go directly to the heart of the
problem and locate the discourse of ‘corporate governance’ in a broader context
– that of the governance of an enterprise. We also thereby place the discussion
firmly in the context of how governance has been contested in the Japanese political
economy.
The major part of this chapter rests on data compiled in 1999 and interviews
conducted in the same year, when the debate was at its most intense among
journalists and academics, and major companies were engaged in large-scale
restructuring. Of course, various reforms have been made since then and are still
in progress. The year 1999, however, remains a crucial turning point in the
corporate restructuring scenario; and although the information in Figure 11.1 and
the interviews come from that year, the overall discussion herein derives from
information collected both before and after that time. 
The chapter consists of three sections. The first considers the meaning of
‘corporate governance’ and governance in an enterprise. We classify governance
into types, actors, objectives, methods and relationships. The second section looks
at the scope and extent of top management reform, and discusses the issue of
‘corporate governance’ in relation to ‘internal’ necessity. This section pays
particular attention to the correlation, if any, between the degree of reform,
industrial sectors and ownership structure. The third section examines more specific
cases of corporate restructuring, and explains why so-called ‘corporate governance’
reforms can be understood as part of large-scale corporate restructuring. The
changes in governance taking place, however, do not necessarily emulate the Anglo-
American model;2 rather their aim is to ‘redefine’ existing management, namely
to take advantage of ‘external’ constraints and deal with internal necessity, thus
pursuing capitalist rationalization. 
Meaning of governance and ‘corporate governance’ 
When ‘corporate governance’ is discussed as an issue of ‘transparency’ and
‘accountability’ (Hamada 2002; Nikkei, 24 October 2002; Nikkei, 13 and 15
November 2002) or ‘responsibility’ and the ‘function’ of top management (Osano
2001; Nikkei, 23 and 24 October 2002), two issues tend to be conflated and the real
meaning of ‘corporate governance’ remains opaque. 
The first, rooted in a shareholder approach, is the demand from institutional
investors for profitability and market capitalization (Committee on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance 1992; OECD 1999; Harvard Business Review
2000; Keidanren 2000). The second issue is democracy in general, more specifically
a questioning of whether or not top management is taking proper account of the
needs for welfare and justice in society in carrying out its business operations
(Carroll and Buchholtz 2002; Wheeler and Sillanpaa 1997; Rengō 1999; Jacoby
2001; Post et al. 2002; Rahman et al. 2002; ). This harks back to a stakeholder
approach. Though contested, these two issues are frequently conflated in discussion
of ‘corporate governance’ in Japan. 
A political economy approach, however, alerts us to the diverse genesis of 
these two approaches. The shareholder approach views a company as a means for
private profit based upon private ownership, which gains ultimate legitimacy from
the tenets of capitalist society. The stakeholder approach, in contrast, regards a
company as a public institution serving the broader needs of society, and as such
adopts a socio-democratic perspective. The advocates of the shareholder approach
consider ‘external monitoring’ to be both effective and necessary, and view the
internal monitoring unique to Japan as being in need of replacement by an Anglo-
American style of external monitoring. We ask here whether this is the case or not;
and if there are changes, how should they be understood?
A survey by Japan’s leading economic newspaper, the Nikkei (26 July 1999), which
was published at the time the debate on ‘corporate governance’ was at its peak in
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the journalistic and academic worlds, indicated a correlation between the scale 
of corporate reforms, the size of corporations and the increase of their market
capitalization. It reported that, of the top twenty-four companies with the largest
corporate reforms, twenty-one recorded an increase in market capitalization in
June 1999 compared to the previous year, despite a virtual lack of correlation with
current profitability or other performance indicators. In effect, the Nikkei legitimized
large-scale reforms as effective for corporate governance. 
The basic logic of this approach is the structure–function–performance
hypothesis; more specifically, the ownership–control–performance hypothesis.
Under this logic, the assumption is that external monitoring (the Anglo-American
model) is more effective than the internal monitoring characteristic of Japanese
companies. Reforms are thus necessary to replace Japan’s traditional ‘corporate
governance’ with that type in place under Anglo-American capitalism. The
discussion then proceeds to the question of how and to what extent top manage-
ment systems in Japan should be reformed. 
Before we go into the detail of the reforms now taking place, let us first define
‘governance’ as an order between two parties in an organization. Thus, the issue
of who governs whom, and to what end, needs to be clarified. In a capitalist
economy, enterprise governance is an issue of order, which implies it is a system
of control as well as a process to achieve capital accumulation. Owners of capital,
either directly or indirectly, delegate the authority of capital to govern the whole
process of capital accumulation to various categories of employees: first to hired
directors, next to managers, and finally down to the staff. In this sense, employees
in business are agents working at different levels of governance in order to optimize
capital accumulation. The authority of capital is manifest as the power to govern,
which is transformed into a control and management system and the subsequent
relationships binding employees to the corporate order set in place under
capitalism.
Table 11.1 shows how the authority of capital is manifest as power from
shareholders to the board/chief executive officer (CEO); from management to
employees; from management to trade unions; and from management to
community. The authority of capital is embedded in relationships throughout
business, as shown by the various levels of order in business organizations. The
boardroom and CEO is where shareholder benefit is discussed, while for stake-
holders ‘corporate governance’ is part of the whole governance of an enterprise
and includes community relations. The methods of governance, however, differ
according to the level, such as ‘monitoring’, ‘human resource management
(HRM)’, ‘industrial relations’ and ‘corporate citizenship’.
As this hierarchical logic of capital is not always compatible with the interests of
labour and the community, ‘corporate governance’ is contested by the counter-
balancing forces of labour and the community, i.e. the forces of stakeholders in and
around the company. Owners of capital will assert their rights of private ownership,
and exert authority in order to enhance their own system of governance, while
labour and society may confront it and seek instead a more socially oriented type
of governance through the influence of unions, government policies and sometimes
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citizen movements. In this case, rather than the tenets of capitalism, the authority
of labour and the community is derived from and is legitimized by universalistic
human rights and the shared values of the community. 
As Table 11.1 suggests, governance is thus essentially an issue of order or the
social relations that exist between capital and labour, which is manifest in terms of
various types, actors, objectives, methods and relationships. ‘Corporate governance’
can thus be understood as a crucial element in the holistic functioning of capitalism,
though the countervailing dynamics arising from labour and the community also
need to be taken into account. 
Let us now turn to the origins of the current debate on ‘corporate governance’.
It dates back to Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
Their major finding and point of debate was the ‘divorce of ownership from
control’, which provides the foundation for the current debate – that a company
must govern itself in a way that will satisfy shareholders.3 This discussion sought
an ideal relationship between shareholders and board members; the central
concerns being efficiency, profitability and market capitalization. 
More recently, in the US, the 1980s saw attention given to these issues against
a backdrop of changes in US capitalism in the previous decade – in particular, the
increasing influence of institutional investors (such as pension funds) upon corporate
boards and CEOs and their accountability to shareholders. Peter Drucker
commented as early as the mid-1970s on this new phenomenon, calling it ‘pension-
fund capitalism’ (Drucker 1993: 74). This change in the structure of capitalism 
was a focus of academic attention, for it was seen as having important implica-
tions for American democracy, reflecting as it did the pension funds of ordinary
citizens. It also had important academic implications for major issues affecting the
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Table 11.1 Governance in enterprise: types, actors, objective, methods and relations 
Types of Actors Objective of Methods of Relationship 
governance governance governance
Governance Shareholders, Profitability, External/internal Shareholders 
of board and governing accountability monitoring vs. board and 
CEO board and CEO CEO
Governance Management, Efficiency Management Management 
of employees governing methods vs. employees
employees (HRM)
Governance Management, Assimilation/ Industrial Management 
of industrial governing trade compliance relations vs. labour 
relations unions management unions
Governance Management, Symbiosis Company as Management 
of community governing member of the vs. community 
relations community community 
(corporate
citizen)
corporation, such as ‘ownership’, ‘control’ and ‘governance’ (Yoshimori 1996; Scott
1997; Shibuya 1999; Uetake and Nakata 1999). The work of Shibuya (1999), in
particular, deserves mention, as his investigation of the detailed discussions held 
in the US Senate committee on the operation of governance in 1974 was important
in highlighting how this structural mechanism of ownership, control and gover-
nance has much to do with the current issue of ‘corporate governance’. 
These discussions of ‘corporate governance’ expanded into a debate on how to
reform corporations in the US and wider afield. Mostly this was in order to increase
profitability, productivity and market value, and was in this sense an effective
discourse for enhancing ‘shareholder value’. It was especially so in Japan, which
was faced with US-led globalization and the long recession of the 1990s (Keizai
Kikakuchō 1998; Keidanren 2000; Harvard Business Review 2000). 
Such discussions have of course been supported by neo-classical principles
(market orientation), while the stakeholder approach, which includes the interests
of various shareholders such as employees, suppliers, trade unions, and commu-
nities, is supported by those who regard companies as answering social need, 
in other words, those who hold social democratic values (Drucker 1993; Kelly 
et al. 1997; Scott 1997; Wheeler and Sillanpaa 1997; Korten 1999; Rengō 1999).
Although ‘corporate governance’ as discussed in the US can be dealt with as an
issue of democracy, in essence this would be no more than ‘sophistry’, simply
because institutional investors never act with democratic intent, but rather on behalf
of a small number of investors playing a major role in such pension funds. 
When the discussion emerged in Japan as a means of enhancing market
capitalization, reforms in top management took place; but, more fundamentally,
the discourse was used to legitimize large-scale restructuring. Various proposals
and reports, as listed below, were issued in the latter half of the 1990s, spurred on
by frequent corporate corruption scandals and encouraged by various reports
issued in the US and Britain:4
• 8 September 1997: ‘Draft plan for a revision of the Commercial Law
concerning ‘corporate governance’, offered by the Sub-committee for
Commercial Law, the Committee of Legislation in the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP);
• 10 September 1997: ‘Urgent Proposal on methods of ‘corporate governance’
by a special committee on ‘corporate governance’, Keidanren;
• 30 October 1997: ‘Principles of corporate governance: to consider new
Japanese-style corporate governance, by the Japan ‘corporate governance’
forum of the Japan Committee for Economic Development;
• February 1998: ‘Report from the Committee on Corporate Systems in the
21st century’ by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
However, if we examine the content of these reports we see differences in emphasis
depending on the objectives of the respective institutions (Takahashi 1999). Each
report expresses its own role and position. For example, Keidanren and the LDP
put emphasis on the function of auditors and legal procedures to sue directors,
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while the use of external directors (for transparent and sound business operations),
the increased independence of external auditors and the adequate provision of 
an infrastructure for the effective functioning of markets are put forward by 
MITI (from 2001 METI, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry). Comparing
these Japanese reports with that of the OECD (1999), we can see how the latter
acknowledges the necessity of keeping a balance between various stakeholder
interests, while the Japanese reports are more shareholder-oriented. Of course, the
extent to which the balance proclaimed by the OECD can be realized in reality
remains to be seen. 
‘Corporate governance’ as a metaphor for corporate
restructuring 
The above examined the current discussions on ‘corporate governance’ in the US
and Japan, and defined ‘corporate governance’ as an issue of relations between
capital and labour. We now come to analyze the structural change in Japanese
capitalism and consider its relationship to top management reforms, which is an
issue of ‘corporate governance’. 
Table 11.2 shows that Japanese capitalism has indeed gone through a trajectory
of structural change from the high to the stable and the low growth periods. This
structural change also implies a shift in capital accumulation, namely, from labour-
intensive to capital-intensive industries, manufacturing to services, and then from
exports to foreign direct investment (FDI).
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Table 11.2 Economic growth, ‘corporate governance’ and paradigm of technology 
Period Average Pattern of Model (ethos) of ‘corporate Paradigm of 
percentage growth governance’ technology
GDP growth
1956–73 9.2 High Top management: internal Mass 




1974–91 3.9 Stable Top management: internal Mass/multi 




1992 – 2001 0.9 Stagnant Top management: internal/ Mass 
(10 years) (–3.0) growth ‘redefined’ internal production/ 




Source: GDP growth rates from National Accounts and Economic Planning Agency.
This change in the structure of capitalism went hand in hand with different
models of ‘corporate governance’ as well as technological paradigms. In essence,
the change was from an internal/collective/conflictual model in the high-growth
period to a ‘redefined’ internal/individual/accommodation model of ‘corporate
governance’ today. The technological paradigms also shifted from mass production
to information technology. 
Table 11.2 also shows that governance in an enterprise consists of top manage-
ment, employee management and industrial relations management. Organizational
adjustment is inevitable to accommodate external constraints. It is for this reason
that governance at each level has changed. ‘Corporate governance’ has changed
– but not to an ‘external’ governance model – i.e. convergence, so much as a
‘redefined’ model of existing ‘internal’ governance. The governance of employees
has undergone a more drastic and real change from a ‘collective’ –  to a more
‘individual’ – oriented model, as shown by the case studies below. The governance
of industrial relations has also changed from a conflictual/compromise model 
to one based on cooperation/accommodation, and then to accommodation/
dissatisfaction. Thus, although journalists and academics have discussed ‘corporate
governance’, reforms at top management level seem somewhat modest compared
to the other levels of enterprise governance. 
Tables 11.3 and 11.4 show a report from the Tokyo Stock Exchange on reforms
in top management by listed large companies. Almost 60 per cent claim to have
made some reform to their top management system. The breakdown of such
reforms is shown in Table 11.4. As can be seen, the biggest reform is the reduction
in the number of board members (contrary to our case studies). In many cases this
was achieved by the introduction of a system of Executive Officers (Shikko Yakuin-
Sei). External Board Directors were also introduced and reviews of remuneration
systems were carried out, but such measures were less in evidence than board
downsizing. External Board Directors have been mostly introduced not for the
purpose of external monitoring, but to complement the functions of existing board
members. It is therefore difficult to conclude that a large shift is emerging from
‘internal’ to ‘external’ ‘corporate governance’. Rather, the real import of reform
at the level of top management is the rationalization of board membership, which
became too large during the high-growth period. To a certain extent rationalization
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Table 11.3 Reforms designed to enhance the function of the board
Number of companies Percentage (%)
‘Reforms already made’ 785 59.9
Reforms not made 520 39.7
No reply 5 0.4
Total 1,310 100.0
Source: Arata ‘Kōporeito Gabanansu Reitingu’ (Rating of ‘corporate governance’), in Nissei Kiso
Ken Report, 2002/6, p. 8. 
Note: Total companies surveyed was 785.
of directors may lead to speedy and individual decision-making, but this has nothing
to do with ‘external’-oriented ‘corporate governance’. 
The Nikkei survey of July 1999 on corporate reforms in 910 major Japanese
companies (excluding financial institutions) (Nikkei, 26 July 1999) showed that the
so-called reform of ‘corporate governance’ is actually only a part of general com-
pany restructuring. Figure 11.1 was compiled by the author based upon the Nikkei
survey, which shows the degree of reform by industrial sector – it is noteworthy
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Table 11.4 Specific reforms carried out by companies who responded ‘reforms 
already made’ 
Specific reforms Number of companies Percentage (%)
Introduction of external directors 261 33.2
Reduction of board members 363 46.2
Introduction of Shikko Yakuin-Sei 279 35.5
Review of remuneration system 131 16.7
Others 219 27.9
Source: Arata ‘Kōporeito Gabanansu Reitingu’ (Rating of ‘corporate governance’), in Nissei Kiso
Ken Report, 2002/6, p. 8. 
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Figure 11.1 Degree of corporate reforms by industrial sector.
Source: Compiled from the Nikkei Corporate Reforms Survey (Nikkei, 26 July 1999)
that the most extensively restructured industrial sectors are concentrated in
manufacturing, where companies are well known for their proactive stance 
in responding to global competition. 
The criteria for ‘corporate restructuring’ were degree of merger and acquisition
(M&A) activity, reform of organization, reform of employment practices, use of
information technology (IT), and reform in attitudes and corporate values. Sony,
Fujitsu, Honda, Canon, Komatsu, Toshiba, Matsushita Denkō, Matsushita 
Denki Sangyō, Ricoh and Asahigarasu were assessed as having achieved the most
corporate restructuring, including top management reforms. 
A non-manufacturing exception is the electricity and gas industries; but the
electric industry is now facing government pressure to de-regulate and thus faces
potential global competition. Conversely, fisheries/agriculture, transport-related,
construction, wholesale and retail, services and others, non-bank financials and
real estate are among the least reformed sectors.
We can see from Figure 11.1 that only a handful (about 100–150 companies) of
listed companies are pursuing large-scale restructuring. In this context, reform in
‘corporate governance’ cannot be said to have been achieved in both scope and
depth among all Japanese companies. 
Many proposals and reports have been made, as shown in the previous section,
and usually the US model is taken as a universal model for ‘corporate governance’,
but in reality it is a metaphor for large-scale restructuring to deal with the
competitive global market. This may imply that corporate restructuring for global
companies like Sony has created governance closer to the Anglo-American model,
but as detailed later, even Sony remains a Japanese model in many respects. As in
the case of Matsushita, Honda and others, their restructuring can be seen as a
‘redefined’ Japanese model. 
This is not to deny the potential for institutional convergence. Indeed, one 
factor which points in the direction of convergence towards the Anglo-American
model is the change in the composition of ownership. Japan’s ‘internal’-oriented
‘corporate governance’ was created by mutual/aligned ownership among major
conglomerates (keiretsu) and main banks, i.e. the system of Japanese keiretsu. How
far has this been undermined by the forces of globalization? Table 11.5 shows 
the decline in the number of individual owners, while financial institutions and
corporations remain the dominant shareholders (59.9 per cent). The relative impor-
tance of foreign owners has, however, increased to 18.5 per cent as a consequence
of globalization and also pension funds. On the other hand, that of non-financial
corporations has decreased noticeably from 30.0 per cent to 22.3 per cent, reflecting
a dissolution of mutual holdings (i.e. sales of shares) among non-financial
corporations.
Also, if we compare the composition of major shareholders between Japan and
the United States, institutional investors claiming the need for effective ‘corporate
governance’ account for 71.7 per cent in the United States, but only 12.9 per cent
in Japan. However, so-called keiretsu shareholding (main banks and affiliated
corporations) is much smaller for the US, accounting for only 3.8 per cent, as
against 66.3 per cent for Japan (Fukao 1999). 
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A conceptual consideration of ownership-control-governance of capitalist firms
suggests that major shareholders have the right to a ‘voice’, i.e. a ‘monitoring’ role.
In the US it is external institutional investors and in Japan it has been internal
keiretsu shareowners which have performed this role. This characteristic has not yet
changed much, although some say that the increased percentage of foreign
shareholders may play the role of increasing ‘external’ monitoring. It may be true
to some extent, as in the case of Sony and some other corporations, but they are
still far off the Anglo-American model. 
Cases of corporate restructuring 
This section investigates individual cases of corporate restructuring in two industrial
groups, manufacturing and services. These two groups were chosen in order to
compare the scope and extent of corporate restructuring and reforms in terms of
the Anglo-American model of ‘corporate governance’. In the manufacturing
industry two companies from each of the electro-electric and automobile companies
– Sony and Matsushita, and Toyota and Honda – were chosen as typical cases for
such comparison. In the service industry, Tokyo Electric, Mitsubishi Estate,
Sumitomo Bank and Kinki Nippon Tourist were also deemed representative of
their respective service industries. Globalization in the service industry is much less
than in manufacturing, suggesting a lower perceived need for restructuring in the
Anglo-American direction.5
While these specific cases may not necessarily exemplify the typical circumstances
of Japanese corporate reform activities overall, they do provide information of value
in assessing the issue of ‘corporate governance’ and its meaning to Japanese
companies, since the selected companies are themselves broadly representative of
major industries. The survey was conducted in September 1999 using semi-guided
interviews. The information on the state of restructuring for each company is
therefore as of September 1999. Interview results show some reforms had already
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Table 11.5 Recent changes in ownership of listed companies (per cent)
2000 1990
Financial institutions 36.8 42.7
Deposit dealing banks (11.8) (14.8)
Life insurance (7.7) (9.3)
Non-life insurance (2.7) (3.8)
Pension funds (7.2) (3.7)
Investment funds (3.0) (3.8)
Dealer/broker 0.8 1.7




Source: Adapted from Shimada (2003).
been made, while others were either in process or scheduled, depending upon 
the company. Table 11.6 shows a summary of such reforms identified from the
interviews and compares these representative companies in six major areas in order
to show the degree and scope of the reforms. Although further restructuring has
occurred since the interviews, the author is of the opinion that the direction and
type of restructuring made in this period was crucial in determining the path of
major corporations for the ongoing restructuring. In this regard the information
presented below remains of crucial importance for understanding the issue of
corporate governance and its relation to restructuring. 
Corporate restructuring in manufacturing: Sony, Matsushita,
Honda and Toyota
Sony Corporation 
Sony is said to be the most modern of Japanese companies in the sense that it is
the closest to the Anglo-American model of ‘corporate governance’. The board has
become relatively small with ten directors (seven internal and two external directors)
compared to average large Japanese corporations; external board members do not
function as external monitors, so stock options are just an additional bonus for top
management. HRM is individualized and rationalized, but the hierarchical
management structure remains traditional. 
At least in appearance, Sony is the Japanese company that has moved closest 
to the Anglo-American model. It has a global strategy, taking into account the
pressures of globalization, and continues to grow, even while many others are
struggling. Sony is unique in that it does not belong to any kigyō-shūdan (keiretsu
group). Seventy per cent of sales are now overseas and foreigners own as much as
45 per cent of the total number of issued shares. Head office organization has been
rationalized and the concept of networking introduced into management. The style
of management has shifted towards greater attention to ‘market capitalization’. 
It declares itself to be a ‘shareholder active investor’ as well as a ‘stakeholder active
agent’. The headquarters acts as a cost centre, while the affiliated companies,
located throughout the world, are profit centres. 
Sony’s total workforce increased from 173,000 to 177,000 employees in 1998–9.
Affiliated companies have now exceeded 1,000, and human resources for top
management in the US and Europe are being localized. 
As strategies for developing a global business, they seek network-oriented
business, digitalization and a global supply of parts from the most appropriate
markets. Parts numbering is now standard all over the world. Sony’s research and
development (R&D) centres are located in the US, India and Europe, with a
division of labour and functional co-ordination. A sophisticated information
architecture is in use for global production and sales, and analysis of global infor-
mation is available on-line. 
In finance, capital is supplied through the US financial market and the pro-
cedures of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are being used. The
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company seeks to enhance corporate value in the stock market. M&A is not
considered as a means for growth and development. 
Employment has shifted towards a more individual and diversified style. There
are twice-annual recruitments of new graduates and also mid-term recruitment
whenever necessary. An annual salary system is in place for all employees above
deputy section chief. Seventy per cent of the annual salary is determined by 
basic pay, with the remaining 30 per cent performance related. In-enterprise
recruitment/transfer is practised, with about 200 employees changing jobs annually.
There are short-term contract employees and also about fifty foreign employees
working on a contract basis in Japan. There are, however, no part-time workers.
The company has a stock option scheme for board members and has also
introduced Shikko Yakuin-Sei, a system practised on an annual contract basis. The
hierarchy of positions, however, remains very traditional, with position titles such
as general manager, deputy general manager, section chief, deputy section chief,
assistant section chief, group chief and deputy group chief, staff. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Company Limited 
Matsushita is a global company, with certain key differences to Sony, in that it is
still ‘traditional’, which may derive from its lower dependence upon ownership and
financial structures. 
Although no great change has occurred in the number of Matsushita employees,
there has been re-organization within the company. Sales break down into 50 per
cent domestic and 50 per cent overseas. Production shifted in 2001 to 70 per cent
domestic and 30 per cent overseas. The overseas transfer of labour-intensive work
has led to a relative decline in the numbers of female employees. 
The style of management, in particular in decision-making, has shifted to a more
individual-oriented style, although in keeping with existing Matsushita custom.
Significantly, more attention is now paid to profitability than overall market 
share.
As a business strategy, the evolution of DVD and a shift from analogue to digital
products is now well underway at Matsushita. In this sense, ‘thin’, ‘related’ and
‘less energy’ are concepts being translated into product development. Matsushita
also now needs to factor social and environmental costs into product cost, to comply
with legislation on recycling industrial products in effect since 2001. The division
of labour between Japan and Asia has shifted from a vertical mode, in which Japan
provided materials and parts and Asia carried out manufacturing or assembly, to
a horizontal mode, in which each region or locality produces the most appropriate
products, representing a shift towards symbiotic development. 
In finance, Matsushita does not depend upon capital markets like bonds markets.
The standards of SEC are applied and CCM (Capital Cost Management) is used
to assess the performance of each business division. 
In employment, job-oriented employment has become more popular. Mid-
career/term employment has been introduced and employees in managerial
positions are all on an annual salary system. The percentage of the salary
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determined by seniority is now 30 per cent, with the rest being determined by job
and other individual-oriented elements, thus creating a pay difference of about 3
million yen per annum at section chief level and 4–5 million yen at that of general
manager. There are contract employees as well as part-time employees. There are
still social gatherings, including parties, trips, and so on. 
The top management organization has not changed in number (32 board
members) and there is no Shikko Yakuin-Sei, although there is a stock option scheme
and some external members were invited onto the board. 
Honda Motor Company Limited
Profitability is considered most important and reforms in HRM have been made,
but Honda’s ‘corporate governance’ per se remains traditional. 
Honda’s business as a whole has made good progress since 1993, but shifted
from expansion of market share to profit-orientation with a return on equity (ROE)
rate of 18.1 per cent in 1999. Overseas now exceed domestic sales and, since 1999,
production has reflected this change in the pattern of sales.
The style of management is characterized by seniority orientation in the
workplace, but other parts of the company focus on ability and job performance.
The decision-making style has shifted from Wai Gaya culture (Japanese-style
collectivism) to ‘top-down’ individual orientation. However, meetings remain as
numerous as before. 
In terms of business strategies, independence, technology and product
marketability are considered sources of competitiveness. Strategies to enhance the
integrated strength of R&D, production and sales, and improvement in cost and
design, are seen to be vital. Japan is the R&D centre and products are made
wherever consumer demand exists. Seventy per cent of materials and parts are now
procured from outside the company. 
In finance the standards of the SEC are applied and the relative importance of
funding capital in the US has increased. 
Employment style is characterized by individual orientation, in that employees
are supposed to work not for the company but for themselves. No internal recruit-
ment system exists and ability and performance determine salary. The volume of
dispatched labour has increased. The same wage system is applied to both direct
and indirect workers.
There is no Shikko Yakuin-Sei and board members number forty. External board
members exist, but do not represent institutional investors. There are no stock
options and no holding company. There is some relationship with Mitsubishi but
this is limited to consultation and an exchange of views. 
Toyota Motor Corporation 
Toyota is an outstanding company in terms of performance and profitability, but
its structure is far from what may be called the ideal Anglo-American model of
‘corporate governance’. 
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Toyota has been forced to scale back automobile production from 4 to 3 million
units following the collapse of the bubble economy and is suffering from over-
capacity. Competition in both market and R&D has increased since then. There
have, however, been no plant closures or organizational changes in departments
and sections. Since the bursting of the bubble economy, sales of high-value cars
have declined, but an increase in the production of low-cost cars has helped to
offset this. Management aims to create a global image of the company by
strengthening technological alliances rather than by increasing M&A and capital
alliance.
Business strategies are shifting from export orientation to production wherever
there exists a market for localization. The company aims at a 10 per cent share 
of the world market of 60 million cars. In terms of sales, it aims to sell 2.5 million
in the domestic market and 3.5 million in overseas markets. R&D is centred in
Japan (10,000 employees), while R&D in the US is focused on areas relevant to
marketing (485 employees), and in Europe on design and market research (fifty
employees).
In finance, global funding is pursued, such as the issue of Euro bonds and stock
market listing in New York and London. However, the relative emphasis is not on
drumming up extra cash, but on strengthening corporate power/ability. Toyota
has decreased its own stock and is paying more attention to investor relations. The
ownership of shares by foreigners is around 7–8 per cent and the possibility exists
of an increase in institutional investors. 
In employment, individual ability is more than ever considered important.
Reflecting this, two types of recruitment, regular and mid-career, are utilized.
Employment still involves entering the company and receiving in-enterprise
education and training to become a professional staff member. The use of female
workers on production lines has increased, and the emphasis is on the creation of
specialist, rather than generalist, staff, and individual ability assessment is applied.
An annual salary system has not been introduced. In-enterprise recruitment is 
not in use, while interviews are used for the assessment of promotion. Position 
titles have not changed, but two types exist, one for external purposes and the other
for internal purposes. Externally, there are general managers, deputy general
managers, managers, section chiefs, deputy section chiefs and staff, and internally
there are general managers, room chiefs and staff leaders. 
The company has no affiliation with kigyō shūdan (keiretsu group), which creates
its organizational character. Toyota’s division system is not absolute, as each
division tends to share parts and equipment. Parts are commissioned from the most
suitable suppliers around the world, but affiliated suppliers are committed to the
design of these parts. Parts specification is determined by first acquiring a global
standard, either in Japan or abroad, as shown in the case of the battery used for
electric cars.6
The board structure has not changed, but stock options were introduced in 1997.
Internal seniority is in principle maintained. There is no system of external board
members but there are external advisers. No institutional investors are major
shareholders.
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Corporate reforms in non-manufacturing industry
The Tokyo Electric Power Company Incorporated 
The company seems to be restructuring without change to the so called ‘corporate
governance’. Company objectives are currently to reduce costs and pursue ratio-
nalization of the organization, establishments and personnel, and to develop new
areas of business. 
In management style, this company pays more attention to shareholders,
investors, customers and communities, rather than operate based on its own
internal logic. Decision-making has shifted from bottom-up to top-down style and
individual responsibility is now emphasized. 
The company aims to develop overseas business, such as consulting services for
electric-related projects, the development of uranium mines and the establishment
of finance companies to supply funds for overseas business, in order to deal with
economic stagnation at home and increased competition. Reduction of excess
human resources, debts and equipment, while increasing returns to investors, is a
particular focus of attention. A typical overseas business project is its participation
in optical communications with Softbank and Microsoft. 
In finance, Tokyo Electric aims to raise funds by issuing bonds overseas. Foreign
ownership has increased and investor relations (IR) is of greater concern. The time
may come when some investors start to exert their rights at the annual shareholders’
meeting, but this has not yet occurred. The percentage of shares owned by banks
is decreasing.
In employment, assessment of individual ability and performance is to be
enhanced in the area of employment management. The scope of the annual salary
scheme is to be expanded. Diversified employment schemes, such as part-timers,
mid-career recruitment and in-enterprise recruitment (transfer), have now been
introduced.
With regard to organization, the company is moving towards the network
business paradigm, transferring authority to create autonomous management at 
a lower level. In-enterprise accounting, business divisions and in-enterprise com-
panies have been adopted and authority is now delegated to these units. Two
external members and two external auditors have been invited to join the board.
A report on environmental issues has been published and was evaluated highly as
a good example of the company’s social awareness.7 Positions in the managerial
hierarchy have been reduced to general manager, deputy manager and group
manager. The number of board members has not, however, changed, and neither
Shikko Yakuin-Sei nor a stock option scheme have been introduced. 
Mitsubishi Estate Company Limited 
In contrast to what is said and Mitsubishi’s own desire, the company remains 
quite conservative and the change was made but remains small in scale. There 
has been no variation in the number of and seniority order among board members
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and external board members, except for the purpose of ‘internal’ ‘corporate gov-
ernance’.
With its corruption problems (as manifest by the sōkaiya and Umino Ie incidents)8
the company has determined to break with its old practices and culture. The
number of businesses and employees has decreased and the focus of business has
shifted from land ownership to ‘fee business (management business)’, due to the
collapse of the so-called ‘land myth’. 
Management style is changing from traditional to market-oriented. However,
group cohesion is strong and the maintenance and protection of the ‘Mitsubishi
brand’ is considered very important. Decision-making is still slow and the bottom-
up style remains. There are many meetings and the scope of individual respon-
sibility is small. As a means to diversify ‘risks’, globalization is pursued and overseas
businesses are being developed jointly with overseas capital. Management of
apartments and outsourcings have become more important and are becoming the
core business.
Financially, the company has not been accustomed to raising capital overseas,
but for the last eight years has had to devise strategies to satisfy the scrutiny of stock
market analysts. The percentage of foreign ownership now accounts for 15 per
cent, but the company has not yet adopted global accounting standards. 
In employment, performance pay and objective management have been
introduced. The company depends only upon the recruitment of new graduates
and they are recruited not by job criteria but as general staff. Annual salary schemes
have not been introduced and promotion is determined by a combination of the
assessment of personnel management and self-assessment. Part-timers are used as
regular human resources. 
The company is considering restructuring towards a ‘company’-based division
system, but there is no intention of establishing a holding company. The man-
agerial hierarchy was even previously rather simple, consisting only of general
mangers, deputy managers and staff. There are six qualifications for grading
employees. The number of board members has not changed and there is no stock
option scheme. Seniority is maintained among board members and external
directors are from companies of the Mitsubishi group, such as Meiji Life Insurance
and Mitsubishi Bank. 
The Sumitomo Bank Limited 9
Although a necessity for change is felt to exist, the company remains traditional.
The need for change has been seriously perceived, but the speed of change has
been rather slow. Rationalization of overseas and domestic businesses and human
resources has been carried out. 
Management style has shifted to market-orientation and the evaluation of
individual performance. The company’s annual athletics meeting was abolished.
A review was made of old business practice and awareness of profitability increased.
Decision-making remains ‘bottom-up’ and meetings still involve a large number of
people.
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Business strategy has shifted to regional strategies. An active approach to IR 
and the promotion of IT are now considered important. The number of external
board members has risen to three and that of monitoring members to two. 
The Shikko Yakuin-Sei was adopted and business policies are now more domestic-
oriented.
In finance, the accounting system has become more internationalized. 
In employment, some change has been made, but the basic principle of
promotion based on seniority has not altered. Competition among those of the
same year entry has intensified, but among board members reverse promotion 
is never seen, and thus the seniority custom remains unchanged. Annual salary 
and in-enterprise recruitment schemes have not been introduced. Part-timers are
recruited from subsidiary companies and more than half of clerical employees are
now part-timers. 
Kinki Nippon Tourist 
This company faces the most serious situation of all those interviewed and has
undertaken the most radical restructuring, replacing regular employees with
contract workers on a large scale. Kinki Nippon recorded a deficit in 1998 and
large-scale rationalization is now in progress. Rationalization at head office and in
personnel sought to lower numbers from 7,200 in 1998 to 6,878 in 1999. Early
retirement for those over 50 is in progress and will be stepped up to those over 
45 years of age. 
Management style needs to cope with increased competition, lower prices, the
continued recession and a shift from group to individual travel. Internet-based
business operations have gained in importance. Business performance in consoli-
dated accounting has been pursued and decision-making has speeded up. 
As a business strategy emphasis is laid upon the replacement of as many regular
employees as possible with less costly contracted employees, for terms of one year,
extendable up to five years. The administration of payment accounts has been
outsourced and a scrap-and-build policy implemented in all companies in the
group. Products are now more individualized and targeted at middle-aged and
older customers. The business has become more profit-oriented than before and
domestic and overseas sales account for 64 and 33 per cent respectively.
Neither an employee share nor stock option scheme has been introduced and
there is no foreign ownership of shares. 
In employment, seniority-based pay increments were terminated and the
principle of market and individual orientation adopted, with higher rewards going
to those generating more profits. Each branch is now regarded as a company and
the head of the company is a regular full-time employee, while all others are
contract employees. For regular employees, seniority promotion applies only for
the first three years and then promotion becomes more individualized, with large
differentials among those who entered the company in the same year. Objective
management has been introduced and those who are in management are paid
based on an annual salary scheme. Some in-enterprise recruitment has been
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introduced. Part-timers currently account for 1 per cent, and contract employees
for 16 per cent, of all employees. 
The organization was rationalized through scrap-and-build: the number of
general managers decreased from thirty-one to twenty-four at head office, and
section chiefs from fifty-two to thirty-seven. The organization became flatter in
shape. A Shikko Yakuin-Sei was introduced with a one-year period of service. The
merit of this scheme is to make executives exempt from litigation by investors. The
number of meetings between sections has increased and seniority among board
members remains. An external board member is dispatched from the parent
company, Kinki Nippon Tetsudō and Japan Railways. 
As seen in Table 11.6 all the above companies agree on three areas of ‘corporate
governance’; profitability, HRM and external board members. The relative
importance of profitability has increased for two reasons, one being ‘corporate gov-
ernance’ (market capitalization) and the other the sheer survival of the company.
The latter would seem to have more weight, since companies need to secure
profitability in order to survive the increased competition in situations of no macro
economic growth. This internal necessity is being achieved by the introduction 
of individual-oriented HRM, of which the foremost objective is to reduce the total
labour cost of non-managerial employees, with an annual salary scheme as its
counterpart for managers. External board members were introduced not for
‘external monitoring’ but to ‘strengthen’ existing board functions. Some companies
have introduced Shikko Yakuin-Sei in order to reduce the number of board members
and deter investors from suing the board. It is, however, only Sony that has reduced
the actual number of board members by the introduction of Shikko Yakuin-Sei.
In all other companies interviewed the number of board members and seniority
among them remain the same. They may say they are creating a new business
paradigm, but the reality is still traditional in most of the companies, even Sony.
Clearly, however, HRM is the most important target for restructuring, with the
aim of redefining enterprise governance. 
Conclusion
The dynamics of capitalist development are uneven, requiring constant corrective
measures if a company wishes to maintain or improve its position under conditions
of global competition. The flux of fortune between countries competing against
each other inevitably leads to emulative activity. The process is one of corrective
rationalization in the appropriate sphere, either production systems, ‘corporate
governance’ and/or more dynamic corporate restructuring. ‘Corporate gover-
nance’ discourse is also a phenomenon of, and a metaphor used to improve, the
workings of the logic of capitalist accumulation. How far such logic is generating
dynamics of ‘convergence’ of different forms of capitalisms along Anglo-American
lines remains to be seen. 
However, looking at structural change in Japanese capitalism and the specific
cases of corporate restructuring detailed above, ‘good governance’ for Japanese
















































































































































































































































































‘internal’ to ‘external’ ‘corporate governance’. The continuous growth of the
company is considered evidence of good ‘corporate governance’, leading to less
corruption, more investment, greater employee satisfaction and more contribution
to various stakeholders. For example, both Toyota and Honda, or Sony and
Matsushita, are enjoying sound governance with different style/structures of
‘corporate governance’. In fact, there seems no ‘corporate governance’ problem
in these companies. 
Rather, the issue of ‘corporate governance’ in Japan can be taken as a catalyst
and metaphor for large-scale corporate restructuring in the 1990s and beyond.
Indeed, the real content of ‘corporate governance’ was not so much emulation of
the Anglo-American model as the ‘re-definition’ and ‘modification’ of existing
enterprise governance. ‘Corporate governance’ in Japan also has no relevance to
‘fictitious’ industrial democracy as has emerged in the United States as an excuse
for ‘corporate governance’. Indeed, the democratic governance of an enterprise as
a reflection of labour and the community remains an important consideration for
the Japanese people, ensuring any attempt to impose a ‘one-size-fits all’ mode of
corporate governance will be contested.
Notes
1 US pressure emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of trade conflicts, but
thereafter continued in the form of globalization, and is exemplified in the Structural
Impediments Initiatives (1989) and the US–Japan Framework Talks on Bilateral
Trade (1994–7), as well as the OECD agreement (1994) on labour flexibility. Other
aspects of ‘external’ constraints are global standards for accounting and environmental
protection.
2 The term Anglo-American model is defined in this chapter broadly as a governance
system which is controlled by external forces (shareholders and external directors), in
contrast to the Japanese system, which is governed by mutual holdings, main banks
and internally promoted directors. This kind of generalization is made expressly for the
sake of our analysis and we regard reality as naturally more varied, both in Anglo-
American and Japanese capitalism. 
3 This implies that a company is the means by which its owners make profit, but more
specifically highlights Berle and Means’ suggestion that ‘the two attributes of owner-
ship – risking collective wealth in profit-seeking enterprise and ultimate management
of responsibility for that enterprise – had become divorced’ (Berle and Means 1932:
viii).
4 In Britain the Report from the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance (1992), the Greenbury Report (1995) and the OECD Paper (1997) were
published, while in the United States there was a report on the principles of corporate
governance issued by the American Bar Association (1992) and various statements by
the Business Roundtable (Monks and Minow 2001). 
5 The restructuring in service industries, which experience less necessity for glob-
alization, offers evidence that the need for restructuring in ‘corporate governance’
varies from industry to industry reflecting the degree of competitive pressures from
globalization.
6 There are two major global groups competing in the fuel cell electric vehicle project;
one is the Ford/Daimler Chrysler group and the other Toyota/GM group. This
system, if achieved, will become a revolution in the fuel system of the automobile and
it will make a 100 per cent environmentally friendly car. It is assumed that the global
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standard will be formed by either of these two groups, which will then be able to enjoy
a dominant position in the global market. 
7 Contrary to this official report, the company was accused on 29 August 2002 of
repeatedly compiling false reports on the condition of their seventeen nuclear plants.
Thirteen had been kept in operation without repairs and even at the time of this
revelation eight such plants were in operation. This was exposed by General Electric
inspectors as a classic case of whistle-blowing. As a result of this scandal, five top-
ranking management figures, including the then-current chairman and president,
resigned. Although this has obvious relevance to issues of corporate governance, such
as transparency in business and management, it would also seem to have deeper
implications in relation to Japan’s future energy policies in terms of the political
relationship between industry and civil bureaucracy. (see Yoshioka Hitoshi, available
on-line at: http://www/hansen-jp.com/217yoshioka.htm, accessed 22 June 2004). 
8 This is a symbolic case revealed in 1997 of corporate corruption, in which major
corporations of Mitsubishi Group including Mitsubishi Estate Co. Ltd., Mitsubishi
Motors, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Hitachi Ltd., and Toshiba Corporation were
involved. They were using and paying Sōkai-ya (racketeers) in order to run the general
meeting of shareholders in their favour. 
9 The survey was conducted in September 1999, while in October of the same year the
merger plan with Sakura Bank was announced and these two banks were merged in
April 2001 forming Sumitomo Mitsui Bank. 
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12 Governance through 
the family
The political function of the 
domestic in Japan
Takeda Hiroko
Describing the transition of the concept of ‘governing’ from the sixteenth century
to the eighteenth century in Europe, Foucault commented that,
The art of government . . . is essentially concerned with answering the question
of how to introduce economy – that is to say, the correct manner of managing
individuals, goods and wealth within the family.
(Foucault 1991: 92) 
The Foucauldian usage of governing – governing linked with the family via economy
– seems to be increasingly focused upon by politicians and other policymaking
agents in the new millennium Japan. As rapid demographic changes in the 1990s,
in particular, ever-falling birthrates,1 unprecedented ageing and an increase in the
single population, was generally posited as destabilizing the standard profile of 
the family in Japan, people were inundated with discourse on ‘the correct manner
of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family’. This demographic
and familial transition was associated with economic stagnation following the
bursting of the ‘economic bubble’, and was viewed as a sign of the dysfunction 
of the Japanese political, economic and social systems. In order to cope with this
situation, the government implemented a series of policies aimed at promoting
gender-equality, which would possibly alter the existing familial relations as well
as popular recognition of the familial (Ōsawa 2002). This political process in late
1990s Japan suggests that the ‘economy’ of the family was the very object of
national governing, and in this sense, the governance of the family in 1990s Japan
appears to be the antithesis of the assumption of the private/public distinction, in
which the family, economy and the conduct of governing have been analyzed
respectively in different disciplines within the social sciences. 
Yet, the view that regards the family as domestic space has also been countered
by theoretical developments in the study of governance.2 First, the development of
feminist scholarship within political economy has criticized the gendered
assumption of the social sciences which underestimates the role of the family as a
site of governance. For instance, a pioneer of feminist political economy, Folbre,
argues that neither neoclassical nor Marxian (including socialist-feminist) economic
theory has effectively analysed gender issues, in particular, the family as a unit of
social reproduction. Accordingly, theories of women’s disadvantaged positions in
the family and women’s disproportionate engagement in household activities,
which result in their economic and political disempowerment, have remained
underdeveloped (Folbre 1994: 88–90). Responding to the dilemma posited by
Folbre, Elson locates the household, along with firms and governments, as an
integral part of the macro-economy, in terms of its function in consumption and
social reproduction (Elson 2000: 78–80). Such research elucidates how the multi-
dimensional reproductive activities play a crucial role in the global and national
political economy, and in so doing, makes the family visible in the system of
governance. In other words, by critically reviewing the existing paradigms at the
base of gendered social science, new insights into the role of the family as a site of
governance have been achieved. 3
Second, such research on the transition in the ways of governing draws attention
to the neglected question of political power. Inspired by Foucault’s discussion of
biopolitics, politics regarding our bodies, subjectivities, sexualities and even the
‘politics of life itself’ (Rose 2001) have started to be addressed.4 The area in which
biopolitics functions is in the management of the population. More specifically,
biopolitics is concerned with, first, the ‘discipline of human bodies’, namely,
internalizing norms and patterns of behaviour through institutional disciplines, and
second, the calibration of the health, body and sexuality of the population (Foucault
1978: 139–41). Foucault argued that biopolitics has been incorporated into the
governing system of modern states as the quintessential principle of governing, 
and he calls this process the ‘governmentalization of the state’. In this governing
system, the governing monitors, instructs and takes care of the governed, rather
than suppresses the governed as happened in the pre-modern era. By so doing, the
governing encourages the governed to ‘autonomously’ conduct their everyday lives
in ways suited to the maintenance and growth of the modern, liberal capitalist state.
The family here appears as an essential unit for biopolitics. In the family, various
reproductive activities – such as monitoring and taking care of each member of the
family – are carried out in cooperation with various ‘medium apparatuses’, namely
schools, medical organizations and social services, and through these activities,
biopolitics functions. In Dean’s words, ‘[t]he family is a reality to be taken into
account as an instrument and objective of government, rather than the very a priori
of government itself’ (Dean 1999: 108).
The discussion of both feminist political economy and biopolitics suggests that
the family is not a politically and economically free zone but is rather a contested
site of governance. In fact, the family functions through reproductive activities as
a part of the governing system of the national political economy. Within the family,
children are procreated, raised and trained, while workers are revitalized for the
next day’s work, in cooperation with other actors in the political economy. 
Through these activities, it is not only the family but also national economies and
states that are reproduced, sustained and developed. In this respect, if ‘in much of
the public and political debate, governance refers to sustaining co-ordination and
coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives
such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and
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transnational organizations’ (Pierre 2000: 3–4), it seems that the reproductive
function that the family plays in the political economy calls for an analysis of the
family and governance. 
The purpose of this chapter is thus to locate the family in an analysis of the
political economy of governance in Japan, by taking the 1990s political situation
into account. In order to do so, the chapter focuses upon household economy
management as an issue at the heart of the intersection of the activities of the family
and those of the Japanese political economy. The household economy management
of each family initially controls the micro-economy within the family, yet, it is 
also a part of the national economy that influences and is influenced by trends 
in the current economy as well as the particular historical conditions of the time
(Nakamura 1993: 2–3). Because of the implications of household economy man-
agement, the Japanese government and government-related organizations have
been conducting numerous surveys on household economy since the 1920s.
Furthermore, reacting to the enduring economic setback of the 1990s and ongoing
deflation, household economy management seems to be coming to the attention
of both policymakers and the Japanese ‘middle-class’. Below, the chapter will look
in detail at the functions of the household economy in modern and contemporary
Japan and the implications for the Japanese political economy. More specifically,
the first part of the chapter provides a concise history of household economy
management and governmental activities relating to it. The second part examines
contemporary Japanese household economy management since the economic
setback of the 1990s. Finally, the chapter discusses a case in which household
economy management stretched out into the ‘public sphere’ and channelled some
women into the arena of local politics. 
Good household management and Japanese families
The political and economic importance and benefit of a well-managed household
was already acknowledged by the founding fathers of the Meiji state. In order to
achieve the top-priority agenda of ‘enrich the country, strengthen the military’
(fukoku kyōhei), the family was located in the state governing system as part of the
foundation of the state. It was the women, wives and mothers of the household,
who appeared to be the agents carrying out all of the work within the Meiji
household, in contrast to household management in the previous Edo period that
was mainly conducted by men. Meiji enlightenment writers such as Fukuzawa
Yukichi and Mori Arinori even argued for ‘equal rights’ for women and the
promotion of women’s education, in order to turn women into competent agents
of household management (Kaneko 1999: 23–40; Koyama 1999: 24).
The statist concern with the good management of the family and household
eventually resulted in a variety of governmental interventions into the household
economy management of each family. These governmental interventions were
conducted through many different channels. First, household economy manage-
ment was included in female state education. Since its establishment in 1885, the
Tokyo Women’s Normal School (Joshi Shihan Gakkō ) taught its students bookkeeping
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and home economics. Yet, it was in the mid-1890s that an academic subject
equivalent to contemporary ‘domestic science’ began to take shape and the first
comprehensive textbook on household economy management was published
(Miyokawa 1997: 63). Also, in 1901, a graduate of the Normal School, Ōe Sumi,
was sent to Britain for three years in order to study ‘domestic science’, which was
emerging as an independent academic discipline at the time. After she returned
from Britain, Ōe was appointed as a tutor in the Normal School, and engaged in
the training of future teachers of domestic science and developed the curricula for
a new Japanese domestic science education which was based on the natural and
social sciences. According to Kashiwagi, the new domestic science education that
Ōe promoted was synchronized with the statist policy on national female education
that emphasized women’s role as competent agents of household management in
building a well-governed state (Kashiwagi 1995: 94). Teachers trained by Ōe taught
the new ‘domestic science’ including the management of household economy across
Japan.
Second, responding to the serious economic hardship experienced among the
working class after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), the government embarked
on conducting official surveys of the actual situation of each household by keeping
track of housekeeping books. Inflation after the war brought about severe hardship
for low and middle income families, in particular, those who were tied to a fixed
wage such as lower-class bureaucrats, police officers, school teachers and company
employees. This ‘living expense’ issue (seikatsuhi mondai) was raised in the Diet, as 
a potential source of social disorder and public disturbance, and the Ministry of
Agriculture and Commerce conducted a series of national surveys on family living
expenses in order to provide concrete data for the discussion (Tada 1989: 39–66).
The concern with economic hardship among low-income families became more
acute during the First World War, and this situation led the national government,
subnational political authorities and large private corporations to carry out
numerous surveys on the household economy (Tada 1989: 101–8). The first nation-
wide survey of household economy, a prototype of the present Family Income and
Expenditure Survey, was conducted by the Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet Office
(Naikaku Tōkeikyoku) in 1926 (Tada 1989: 212). 
Third, the government also began to organize a variety of semi-governmental
movements, activities and events aimed at the ‘improvement of everyday life’.
These governmental initiatives, from the holding of national exhibitions to training
courses in housework skills for housewives, were meant, again, to educate and train
Japanese women to be competent agents within their homes, that is, ‘housewives’.
The most high-profile example of these attempts was perhaps the Everyday Life
Improvement Movement (Seikatsu Kaizen Undō) initiated in 1919, in which Ōe Sumi
played a central role. This enlightenment movement was to ‘introduce science into
everyday life at home’ and to ‘promote the rationalization and streamlining of
everyday life’ (Koyama 1999: 101). In cooperation with the Ministry of Education,
the movement dealt with a variety of issues from time management or economizing
to the modernization and westernization of everyday life, and the management of
household economy was a particular point of focus. Topics such as budgeting and
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rationalized consumption were taught through lectures and exhibitions themed on
household economy (Koyama 1999: 163–4). Garon maintains that the Everyday
Life Improvement Movement was the ‘final element in the evolving savings
campaigns’ in the growing atmosphere of democratization and consumer culture
(Garon 2000: 48). According to him, the first governmental savings drive started
just after the Russo-Japanese War in order to ‘retire foreign debt and finance
Japan’s military build-up and other projects’, and for that purpose, ‘diligence’ and
‘thrift’ were promoted (Garon 2000: 46).5 Yet, the management of household
economy promoted by the Everyday Life Improvement Movement emphasized
the importance of building up savings, as Koyama also argues, not only through
economizing but also through budgeting and ‘wise’ consumption (Koyama 1999:
195–206). In this sense, the drives for the improvement of everyday life were derived
from not only the statist concern with household economy management but also
the desire of each family for a ‘better life’.
Indeed, the Everyday Life Improvement Movement was a nationwide 
semi-governmental movement, not a mere governmental campaign, and in this
sense, it is important to note the private and grass-roots desires and efforts for
improving everyday life evident at the time. In particular, demands for ‘tips’ on
household economy management were acute among low and lower-middle class
housewives, and women’s magazines, for instance Fujin no Tomo (Women’s Friend)
established in 1908 and Shufu no Tomo (Housewife’s Friend) established in 1917,
swiftly responded to such demands. Reflecting the strong Protestant faith of its main
editors, Hani Motoko and her husband Hani Yoshikazu, Fujin no Tomo enthu-
siastically promoted the rationalization and economizing of everyday life based 
on stoicism. Also, Hani Motoko’s writing on household economy management,
Kaji Kakei Hen (On Housework and Household Economy), circulated widely and
became the bible of household management for upper-middle class housewives. 
In her magazine and book, Hani stressed the budgeting and planning of the
household economy and the need for keeping housekeeping books. The Hanis’
venture eventually went beyond publishing the magazine, and they organized
readers’ associations (Fujin no Tomo Zenkoku Tomo no Kai) across Japan with support
from domestic science professionals. According to Kashiwagi, these ventures intro-
duced modern ideas of engineering, namely, the technologies of planning and
management, into Japanese family lives that were facing contradictions brought
about by the capitalist economy; namely low income, unemployment, redundancy
and other hardships (Kashiwagi 1997: 33). In contrast to the upper-middle-class
orientated Fujin no Tomo, Shufu no Tomo targeted the mass market and lower-middle
class housewives, and promoted the economizing and rationalization of everyday
life through providing practical housework tips and suggestions on how to man-
age the household economy. Also, Shufu no Tomo and other magazines started a
common trend in Japanese women’s magazines that can be still seen today, namely,
that of providing readers with housekeeping books as an annual supplement.6
Faced as they were with the economic difficulties caused by inflation,7 Japanese
housewives welcomed these articles regarding housework and household economy
management. Through these practices housewives became agents of household
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economy management and housekeeping books penetrated into Japanese families
as a tool of good household economy management (Koyama 1999: 42–9). 
The Everyday Life Movement and ventures of women’s magazines during the
period of Taishō democracy in the 1920s were eventually absorbed into the total
war project. As the expense of the war and colonization burgeoned, the purpose
of the savings campaign was to mobilize people’s small savings to finance the
empire’s expense: ‘[t]he nation’s capacity to sacrifice and save was touted as Japan’s
secret weapon’ (Garon 2002: 107). Ōe Sumi and Hani Motoko joined in the
government’s savings promotion campaign as members of the National Savings
Promotion Council in 1938. During the next year, the National Saving Promotion
Bureau appointed thirty-one women ‘saving lecturers’ including Ōe, Hani, and
Oku Mumeo, who founded the Housewives Confederation (Shufu Rengō Kai,
abbreviated to Shufuren) after the war (Garon 2002: 65). Moreover, Hani’s daughter,
Hani Setsuko, was appointed to a plurality of posts in the war-support organi-
zations, which included the directorship of the Great Japan Women’s Association
(Dai Nippon Fujin Kai), a subordinate organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance
Association (Taisei Yokusan Kai). The readers’ associations of the Fujin no Tomo were
utilized for the wartime efforts of ‘innovation of life’ (seikatsu kakushin). Limits on
resources during the total war period put economic pressure on each Japanese
family, and housewives were forced to conduct further rationalization and econ-
omization in everyday life. Existing organizations aiming at the rationalization of
everyday life such as Fujin no Tomo readers’ association were highly useful for the
then government that was ‘troubled with the planning of guidance on everyday life
at home in the wartime’ (Suzuki 1997: 77; 76–94 passim). 
It is important to note that defeat in the Second World War and occupation by
the Allies did not bring about a genuinely ‘radical’ change to the relationship
between household economy management and the government. Domestic science
remained a subject taught at primary and secondary schools as well as an academic
discipline offered at the tertiary education level, higher education now being open
to women, and household economy management was a quintessential part of the
course. Domestic science was taught at schools to both male and female students
until 1962, and thereafter only female students were assigned to study domestic
science at secondary school level until the curriculum change introduced in 1994.
At high school, domestic science became a compulsory subject after the change in
the 1960 curriculum guideline of the Ministry of Education (Hisatake et al. 1997:
109; Yokoyama 2002: 31–4). 
The economic hardship resulting from the war also increased demands for
accurate sets of data on household economy and consumption, and numerous
surveys on household economy and consumer prices were conducted by the
Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku Tōkeikyoku). Such governmental
surveys on the household economy were systematized from the 1950s to 1960s.
Two major national surveys on household economy, the Family Income and
Expenditure Survey and the National Survey of Family Income Expenditure took
shape, respectively in 1953 and 1959, and still continue today (Sōmushō
Tōkeikyoku 2002). 
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Finally, the difficulties experienced in everyday life led Japanese housewives to
organize voluntary activities and consumer movements aimed at ‘protection 
of everyday life’. In 1946, for instance, readers of the Fujin no Tomo gathered in
order to set up the ‘Housekeeping Books Federation’ (Kakeibo o Tsuketōsu Dōmei) that
still publishes data collected from its members’ housekeeping books in every issue
of Fujin no Tomo. According to the article celebrating the 52nd anniversary of the
Federation, housewives joined the venture in order to ‘encourage each other and
learn from others’ housekeeping books’ in a situation where economic devastation
and inflation drove their household economies into crisis (Asu no Tomo 116, 1998:
33). In 1948, two years after the establishment of the Housekeeping Books
Federation, one of the largest and most powerful consumer organizations, the
Housewives Confederation, was organized under the leadership of Oku in order
to tackle the difficulties faced by families in everyday life (Shufu Rengōkai 1998:
29–30).
Furthermore, governmental interventions in household economy manage-
ment continued through the postwar version of the Everyday Life Improvement
Movement, namely the New Life Movement (Shinseikatsu Undō). The New Life
Movement got underway in the early 1950s. It received encouragement and
endorsement from the then government, and in 1955 Prime Minister Hatoyama
Ichirō invited 150 guests to the Prime minister’s residence to ask for cooperation
in the promotion of the movement (Tokyo-to Shinseikatsu Undō Kyōkai 1973: 119–21).
Just as its prewar predecessor did, the New Life Movement promoted the ratio-
nalization of everyday life. In particular, it stressed the importance of family
planning and life planning including budgeting and the promotion of savings
(Takeda 2005: 132–6). Importantly, many large corporations such as Toyota,
Nippon Kōkan, Toshiba Denki, Tokyo Denryoku, and Sumitomo Kinzoku, 
to name but a few, introduced the New Life Movement into companies’ welfare 
policy and encouraged employees’ housewives to join in its activities. Through the
activities of the New Life Movement, housewives developed their skills and
increased their knowledge of good housekeeping, which included budgeting,
keeping housekeeping books and boosting household savings. 
The New Life Movement in the 1950s and 1960s was closely related to the major
actors in the state’s policies, and as regards the management of household economy,
the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan and the Central Council for Savings
Promotion (Chochiku Zōkyō Iinkai) made significant inputs, and lectures and training
courses on savings and management of household economy were often organized
in cooperation with these actors. Responding to the implementation of the 1949
Dodge line, which sought to stimulate the Japanese economy, the governmental
savings promotion campaign was quickly restored, in order to accumulate financial
resources for the reconstruction and growth of the Japanese economy: in other
words, in order to serve what Garon calls ‘economic nationalism’ in postwar Japan
(Garon 2002: 109–14).8 The importance of building household savings and the
usefulness of housekeeping books for savings purposes were zealously promoted by
the New Life Movement, through training courses, public lectures and the mass-
media (Tama 1996: 168–76). Large women’s organizations such as the Housewives
Governance through the family 239
Confederation and National Federation of Regional Women’s Organizations
(hereafter NFRWO) led by Yamataka Shigeri enthusiastically took part in the New
Life Movement. In fact, Oku and Yamataka were members of the directors’ board
of the New Life Movement Association (Takeda 2005: 237), and their organizations
made significant contributions to the promotion of the ‘rational management of
household economy’ through budgeting and housekeeping books.9
The New Life Movement changed direction in the 1970s, distancing itself from
the strong emphasis on family planning and life planning laid down by policy-
makers, and initiated activities closely related to local communities through
organizing ‘everyday life schools’ (seikatsu gakkō). Everyday life schools run by local
housewives were initially study groups dealing with consumer problems and other
life-related issues. However, they eventually developed into civil movements aimed
at preserving the local ecology (Takeda 2005: 135–6).10 By this time, the economic
boom led to rising family incomes, and consequently, economizing lost its sense of
urgency in Japanese household economy management. The rate of keeping
housekeeping books, according to surveys conducted by the Saving Increment
Central Committee, has declined since the 1970s. Yet, the negative consequences
of economic growth created another set of problems in everyday life, represented
by environmental disasters and the destruction of local communities. These new
situations added a fresh political dimension to household economy management.
In order to challenge governmental policies, for instance, women political activists
used their housekeeping books as evidence at judicial cases on consumer issues and
ecological protection (Miyazaki 1984: 36).11
The management of household economy has been, therefore, an issue at the
heart of governmental intervention into the domestic world since the modernization
of the Japanese state was initiated in the late nineteenth century. Positing that 
well-organized households and families are the foundation of a prosperous state,
the prewar and postwar governments provided housewives with numerous
incentives and opportunities to obtain skills and knowledge of ‘better’ household
economy management, and the modus operandi of such governmental interventions
remained similar up until the 1970s. In doing this, on the one hand, the Japanese
state could access sufficient financial resources to wage either military or economic
war/competition with other industriously advanced countries, while, on the other
hand, each family ‘autonomously’ survived economic difficulties and crises in
everyday life. On the whole, the reproduction of the Japanese state was secured
through housewives’ conduct of household economy management.
Household account management in the ‘lost decade’
In the economic stagnation following the bursting of the ‘economic bubble’ in 
the early 1990s, not only the national economy and large Japanese corporations
but also the household economy has been facing the pressing needs of ‘restruc-
turing’ and ‘downsizing’, and this situation has shed a new light on household
economy management. The economic events of the late 1990s, in particular, the
‘destabilization’ of the lifetime employment system in large corporations and
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increase in ‘social costs’, acted as a red alert for the families of Japanese white-
collar workers. First, the sudden down-fall of the Hokkaidō Takushoku Bank 
and the Yamaichi Stock Company in 1997 shook the confidence of Japanese 
white-collar workers over their employment security. Both companies occupied
leading positions in their sectors, providing their mainstream employees with life-
time employment and a good standard of pay. The collapse of such companies
signified a fundamental transition in the Japanese employment system of large
corporations, and brought about profound anxieties. These anxieties were further
deepened, first, when the struggles of ex-employees in their 40s and 50s to obtain
new employment were widely reported in the mass-media, and second, when many
large corporations implemented downsizing at a time of ongoing economic
stagnation in which the unemployment rate was at its highest level in the postwar
period.12
Second, in 1997, the expenses of each household increased through the rise in
the consumption tax, social security contributions and the patient’s share of medical
expenses. The sum of the increase in this ‘social cost’ totalled approximately 
7.9 trillion yen, which was almost equivalent to 3 per cent of the total income 
of company employees (Yamada and Itō 1998: 65). Importantly, the increased
burden of the social cost in 1997 not only reduced the real disposable income of
each white-collar worker’s household, but also was recognized as presaging a 
long-term trend in increases in the social cost of the ‘ageing’ and ‘childless’ society.
The demographic changes in the 1990s mentioned earlier mean that the Japanese
pension and medical insurance system based on inter-generational transfer will 
be forced either to increase the financial burdens on the workforce or to reduce the
welfare standard. In fact, from the Year 2000, the Elderly Care Insurance Law
called for an increase in medical insurance on average to 2,500 yen per person per
month for those over 40 years old (Yamada and Itō 1998: 89), and insurance
payments were raised by an average 13.1 per cent in May 2003 (Mainichi Shimbun,
25 May 2003). Furthermore, the starting age for receiving a state pension was raised
from 60 to 65 in the revision of the pension system in 2000, and the spouse special
tax deduction benefit for company employees’ was abolished from FY 2004,
thereby increasing the tax burden on households.13
The anxieties and uncertainty over the security of employment and the future
social security system engendered a sense of ‘risk’ amongst families of white-
collar workers, and resulted in self-imposed restraints in consumer spending 
and maintaining household savings, despite the unprecedented low interest rate
and governmental appeals for the ‘promotion of consumption’ (Nakagawa 1999:
71–5; Niimi 2001: 27–8; Ide 2002: 20–1).14 In other words, the situation in the
macro-economy in the late 1990s was translated into each household, particularly
those of white-collar workers, as a necessity to run a tight household economy.
Responding to this, economizing and housekeeping books again appeared as 
an essential part of household management. Many women’s magazines, both 
old names such as Fuji no Tomo and Shufu no Tomo and newcomers such as Suteki na
Okusan (Mrs Nice) and Orenji Pē ji (Orange Page) started to feature economizing tips,
while the activities of the Central Council for Financial Services, a renamed
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organization of the ex-Central Council for Savings Promotion, 15 were brought to
popular attention. Yet, despite the apparent similarities, the revival of economizing
and household account books in the late 1990s shows significant difference from
the early postwar situation, in particular in terms of their relationship with gover-
nance. Reading articles on household economy management in popular magazines,
the following five points need to be noted in this regard.
First and foremost, good management of the household economy is regarded 
as essential to building a good home, as the prewar and early postwar discourses
on the household economy management posited. Hani Motoko wrote in the early
twentieth century that the well-organized and planned management of the
household economy was the foundation for the happiness of the family (Hani 1927:
1–12). Similarly, Yamazaki Eriko, whose book on economizing and savings became
a best-seller in 1998 and made the author a media celebrity, also stresses that
economizing and a rationally-planned life is a life style that leads to good health
and psychological satisfaction, i.e. ‘happiness’ (Yamazaki 1998: 3–7). Importantly,
the ‘good’ household economy management of the late 1990s also refers to con-
trolling all the dimensions of everyday life, including controlling childbirth, as it
did in the activities of the New Life Movement (Tōyō Keizai 5656, 2000: 46-7).
Furthermore, the moral importance of household economy management has 
been extended to public ‘happiness’ through ecological causes. Yamazaki’s book
also provides a good example of this point. Having lived in Germany, Yamazaki
claims the German style ecologically-friendly ‘simple life’ is the inspiration for 
her management of the household economy, through which she has managed to 
pay back a twenty million yen mortgage within seven years (Yamazaki 1998:
48–61). Ecology is a preferred theme for the members of Fujin no Tomo’s readers’
associations. Since the 1980s, the ‘ecology housekeeping books’ (kankyō kakeibo) that
record all the ecological impact of everyday activities as well as expenses have been
promoted by the (then) Environment Agency and subnational political authorities.
Inspired by the approaching Kyoto International Environmental Forum in 1998,
some readers’ associations introduced ecology housekeeping books into their
activities, claiming a link between their everyday practices and global ecology (Fujin
no Tomo, December 1997: 54–67).
Second, the promotion of savings and housekeeping books since the late 1990s
is, however, primarily recognized as a practical measure for the ‘protection of
everyday life’, in which families that are facing crises in everyday life are forced to
adopt. Articles in women’s magazines as well as business magazines (usually meant
for male white-collar workers) such as Purejidento (President), Tōyō Keizai (Eastern
Economics), Ekonomisuto (Economist) regularly ran articles on families in economic
crises, including families suffering due to redundancy resulting from the ‘restruc-
turing’ or even the collapse of companies, those affected by a reduction in salary,
changes of jobs and early retirement. These stories are used as incentives for readers
to start economizing and keeping housekeeping books. Yamazaki also notes the
disabling of her husband in an accident as the turning point which changed their
lifestyle from wasteful to stoic (Yamazaki 1998: 4–6). Moreover, as mentioned
above, the 1990s economic setback and crisis experienced by Japanese families are
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recognized not only in contemporary terms but also as a long-term trend that brings
about enduring effects. In particular, anxieties and ‘risk’ over post-retirement life
are predominant. For example, the magazine Arujan (Argent, meaning ‘money’ in
French) published by a major information service publisher, Recruit, repeatedly
appealed to its readers in their 30s that the sum of one hundred million yen would
be needed for a ‘comfortable’ retirement life, presuming you live until 84 years of
age (Arujan, January 2001: 55–67). Post-retirement life, as a motif of savings, seems
now to be prioritized over paying for children’s education or buying a family home,
goals which used to be the primary purposes of household savings (Tōyō Keizai, 5764
2002: 30–4). Echoing the rhetoric of ‘self-responsibility’ (jiko sekinin) promoted by
the government, Japanese white-collar worker families are attempting to survive
the present economic difficulty and future risk due to uncertainty through the tight
management of the household economy. 
Third, the government’s inputs today seem more ‘subtle’ than in the past, as
Garon suggests (Garon 2002: 214). On the surface, today’s popular practices of
household management seem to contradict the official governmental discourse 
of ‘consumption promotion’ for boosting the Japanese economy. Furthermore,
compared to the prewar and early postwar period in which the governmental
organizations and semi-governmental movements played an enlightening role, the
contemporary savings promotion is, at first glance, carried out by mainly private
actors (popular magazines, voluntary associations, and individuals), and the role of
governmental actors, in particular that of the Central Council for Financial
Services, has been reduced to holding some public lectures16 and an annual public
essay competition organized through local branches of the Bank of Japan, a
competition which generally collects only around 800 entries.17 As an effect of the
reorganization of the Japanese administrative system in 2001, the ‘encouragement
of savings’ was deleted from the agenda of the new Financial Services Agency
(Kinyūchō), and this resulted in the reconstruction of the committee as an organi-
zation to promote the ‘spread of knowledge regarding finance’ (Kurashi to Okane
212, 2001: 10). Yet, despite its organizational scaleback, the committee seems to
retain wide but indirect influence through a number of channels. First, household
financial advisers and specialists who frequently contributed to the activities of the
committee, for example, Ogiwara Hiroko and Takahashi Nobuko, are also regular
contributors to TV programmes and articles on the household economy in the
mass media. Second, the annual essay competition held by the committee has
become a reservoir for non-professional advisers of the household economy in 
the mass media. Yamazaki Eriko mentioned above was one of the winners of the
1997 competition, which eventually gave her the opportunity to publish books.
Also, other winners often receive media attention. For example, the business
magazine Purejidento interviewed two 1999 winners in articles themed on survival
tips after sudden redundancy (Purejidento, 15 October 2001: 102).18 Finally, the close
partnership between the committee and the Housewives Confederation and
NFRWO, both of which have firmly established political and social influence as
women’s lobby groups, remained, and this provided the committee with access to
the members and activities of those women’s organizations. Furthermore, the
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committee also keeps a close relationship with organizations such as the Japan
Association for Financial Planners, which supervises qualifications and activities of
financial planners that provide advice on household economy management, both
in the mass media and on a private basis. 
Fourth, gender relations in the discourse on the management of the household
economy are ambivalent. Household economy management had been considered
primarily as a part of housework assigned to women since the late nineteenth
century. On the one hand, the 1990s economic setback shook this gendered
framework. For example, such major business magazines whose readers are
generally white-collar male workers as Purejidento, Ekonomisuto and Tōyō Keizai started
to run features on household economy management in order to cope with the
contemporary trend of company ‘restructuring’, pay reduction, early retirement
and the other economic uncertainties of the 1990s. Along with the financial
information magazine Arujan, these newcomers stress the importance of sharing the
responsibility of household economy management. On the flip side of male
participation in household economy management, women’s engagement in paid
work is encouraged as a measure to disperse the economic risks that contemporary
Japanese white-collar families are facing. By maximizing ‘mama’s income’ (Tōyō
Keizai 5764, 2002: 34), the bread-winning responsibility can be shared between a
couple, along with household economy management responsibility, and in so doing,
families can obtain economic security. In an article in Purejidento entitled ‘Solutions
to All the Fifty Five Problems of Businessmen in 2001’, an ‘economic analyst’
advises readers, namely male white-collar workers, to share the responsibility of
bread-winning and household economy management in order to build a ‘good
home’ (Purejidento, 29 January 2001: 88–99). As such, the conventional image of the
nuclear family has become irrelevant, at least for the majority of white-collar worker
families, and in this respect, gender relationships within Japanese families have
been forced to change due to the economic situation. On the other hand, however,
discourses encouraging male participation in household economy management
and female participation in paid work seem to simultaneously enhance conven-
tional gender relationships. For instance, male participation is often described as
a solution to the shortcomings and problems in the existing household economy
run by housewives, as men can introduce accounting and management methods
practised at their companies (Purejidento,1 January 2001: 84–91; Ekonomisuto 22 June
1998: 8–13; Tōyō Keizai, 8 June 2002, 5764: 31–5). While men are coming back
home with their specialist skills obtained outside the home in order to ‘protect their
families in crisis’, women’s participation in paid work is generally supposed to be
a part-time commitment, reflecting the dominant trend in the Japanese labour
market and reproductive work. Although some discourses encourage women to
earn over the limit of the spouse tax deduction (1.03 million yen per year), no
concrete strategies or episodes in which a woman regains a full-time job are
discussed, apart from advice to ‘keep the present full-time job if you have one’ (Tōyō
Keizai, 8 June 2002, 5764: 33). This suggests that the power relationship in the
family has remained as before, in the sense that men are dominant in the control
of major issues, decision-making and access to financial resources. 
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Finally and most importantly, household economy management in the ‘lost-
decade’ after the bursting of the bubble has produced double-edged consequences
for the Japanese government. On the one hand, through tight household economy
management, Japanese families have autonomously been surviving a time of
economic difficulty by economizing, maintaining savings and planning their lives,
while even taking care of ecological issues. This suggests that household economy
management is still functioning to stabilize the everyday lives of Japanese families,
and consequently, allows the government to concentrate economic resources on
the recovery of the national economy at the expense of economizing and life
planning for those it governs. On the other hand, however, practices of household
economy management often appear to be at loggerheads with the government’s
appeal for an expansion of consumption to ameliorate the present economic
deflation. The rational behaviour of Japanese white-collar families to survive the
present and future crisis and ‘risks’ by holding back on consumer spending has
caused stagnation in the macro-economy, leading to a delay in economic recovery. 
Summarizing the above points, household economy management in the 1990s,
therefore, can be seen to be playing a certain role in the contemporary system 
of governance in Japan. The practice of household economy management has
contributed to making Japanese white-collar families autonomous enough to
survive economic crises. Yet, such autonomy appears to be at odds with the gov-
erning of the national economy, and consequently destabilizes national governance.
This function of household economy management countering the governing 
bodies has been, however, displayed in the most evident way in women’s grass-
roots activities. Development in local politics since the 1980s demonstrates that
household economy management can contribute to governance in an alternative
way, one that appears, sometimes, to be antagonistic to public policies. The next
section will examine a case in which civil movements have grown out of housewives’
practices of household economy management. 
Breaking into politics via the domestic
Since the 1980s, Japanese local politics have witnessed the participation of
housewives through issues related to problems in everyday life (Takabatake 1993:
150; Shindō 1996: 209–16). Perhaps, the most well-known example of these cases
is the activities of the Seikatsu Club Cooperative. The Seikatsusha Net, the political
organization of the Seikatsu Club Cooperative, deployed very effective election
campaigns and sent their ‘proxies’ to local assemblies in order to channel their
claims on consumer and ecological issues to the political arena. It was a new type
of women’s movement that exercised a certain influence in Japanese local politics
(LeBlanc 1999; Ogai 1999).
The groundwater protection movement in Ōno city in Fukui prefecture led by
Noda Yoshie is also a new type of housewives’ movement that has had a major
impact in the local political arena.19 Located in Hokuriku, which is known for 
its heavy snow, Ōno is a place blessed with abundant groundwater that is still used
by households as drinking water, as well as being used for industrial production.
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In the mid 1960s, the local political authority introduced a policy of using ground-
water for melting snow. This policy resulted in an increase in water usage, and
hence the exhaustion of household wells, which added to the burden in everyday
housework. One housewife, for example, claimed her baby’s dirty nappies could
not be dealt with. The groundwater protection movement was initiated, first from
a small private gathering of readers of Fujin no Tomo (Noda 2002). One day, Noda
read a short newspaper article on the groundwater level and its connection with
the land subsidence in the Hokuriku region, and realized that the problem of the
exhaustion of local wells in Ōno was caused by the overuse of groundwater. She
raised the issue in the readers’ group, and embarked on studying the groundwater
problem. Cooperating with local women’s and consumer’s organizations including
the everyday life school of the New Life Movement,20 Noda eventually organized
the Groundwater Protection Association in Ōno (Ōno no Chikasui o Mamoru Kai)
to protect the groundwater (Fukuiken Ōno no Mizu o Kangaeru Kai 2000: 3–14). The
movement in Ōno resulted in Noda running for election to the local assembly. She
served as a member of the assembly for sixteen years until 1999, and engaged in
water and other ecological issues in Ōno. After Noda’s retirement, her two succes-
sors from the Groundwater Protection Association are currently working as
members of the assembly (Fukuiken Ōno no Mizu o Kangaeru Kai 2000: 276–8). 
Interestingly, household economy management played a crucial role in the
groundwater protection movement in Ōno. Noda has been a reader of Fujin no
Tomo since 1955. She sympathizes with Hani Motoko’s thoughts on household
economy management, and also enthusiastically keeps her own housekeeping
books. As mentioned above, the gatherings of readers of Fujin no Tomo provided
her with the first opportunity to discuss the groundwater problem. Moreover 
the methods that she had learnt through keeping the Fujin no Tomo’s housekeeping
books became the basis for the collection and analysis of data by the Groundwater
Protection Association, and hence influenced the legislation for ground water
protection. According to email exchanges with her, Noda explains that the
influence of the Fujin no Tomo’s activities regarding housekeeping books was twofold.
First, through keeping housekeeping books, she learnt the importance of accu-
mulating concrete quantified data for making a convincing case. Second, the
housekeeping books provided her with practice in analysing data. In her words, 
‘I would say that my long-term attitude of starting to practice ideas from close
surroundings and thinking about issues by collecting data [note: that Noda learned
from Fujin no Tomo and Hani Motoko’s thoughts] helped me in winning people’s
trust. I have kept this methodology in working for the local water protection
movement. Making counter-arguments based on data collected from actual
situations was the best method for a housewife, who is neither a professional nor
specialist, to contest and persuade the local political authority’ (Noda 2002). 
As such, the groundwater protection movement in Ōno was profoundly rooted
in everyday practices of household economy management. Issues were raised from
situations in everyday lives and housewives’ practices, and furthermore, domestic
skills of household economy management were adopted to create a new set of
regulations to which local male politicians, administrative bodies and industries
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were opposed. In this sense, household economy management conducted within
family life contributed to transforming local governance in Ōno, a town which as
a result now offers a more adequate environment in which to conduct the repro-
ductive activities of everyday life.
Conclusion
In a sense, both the revival of economizing and housekeeping books in the 
late 1990s, along with the groundwater protection movement, evolved around
different levels of reproduction. On the one hand, the contemporary attention to
household economy management is a measure for Japanese families autonomously
to survive the present economic crisis and continue their reproductive activities,
and a concomitant of this is that those people who fail to successfully implement
household economy management are being marginalized through the prevailing
rhetoric of self-responsibility. On the other hand, the self-protective reproductive
practices of white-collar workers and their families created a negative impact 
on the national governing of the economy that aims at boosting the economy
through the expansion of consumption. Furthermore, the groundwater protection
movement in Ōno was designed to recreate a local community in which people’s
everyday lives had come under severe pressure, in order to secure a sustainable
environment for reproductive activities. These cases certainly share common
ground in terms of seeking ‘protection of everyday life’, or, in other words, in
seeking the ‘security of reproductive activities’. Through these processes, it is not
only the reproduction of the family but also that of the Japanese economy and
nation-state that are maintained, whilst being modified through a process of con-
testation. Thus, once the political and economic system turns against reproductive
activities, ‘autonomous’ Japanese families have manoeuvred to survive or even
challenge the existing governance system by resorting to the skills of household
economy management. That is to say, families and household economy manage-
ment are still functioning to sustain and develop the national political economy 
of Japan as part of the governance of the Japanese political economy, but
simultaneously, they provide opportunities to alter the system of governance. 
Indeed, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, rational household
economy management in the contemporary era is posing a fundamental threat to
the reproduction of the Japanese economy and nation-state due to the falling birth
rates. The increasing cost of childcare, particularly the cost of education, and
uncertainty over the future, dissuade many Japanese couples from having children
or even forming a new family. Furthermore, as Suzuki points out, in a situation
where children are not expected to be responsible for the post-retirement life of
their parents, the cost performance of children has been reduced, and children
have become a ‘luxurious commodity’ restricted to those who can afford to take
some risks to have them (Suzuki 2000: 31–47). In fact, a sociologist specialized in
the family, Yamada Masahiro, even argues that forming a family has become a
‘risk’ in contemporary Japan (Yamada: 2001). While it is certainly a ‘rational
choice’ for an individual person to postpone and indeed give up having children
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in such a situation, this reproductive practice, rooted in the New Life Movement,
undermines fundamentally the foundation of the governing system in Japan. Faced
with this new situation, the Japanese government is seeking measures to cope with
this reproductive problem. In this sense, governing the family is still a focus point
of negotiations and contestation over survival between state, economy and
individuals. The connection between household management and governance in
modern and contemporary Japan offers a good case study to analyse the entangled
relationships between the art of governance, the economy and the family. 
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Notes
1 Total fertility rate, representing the number of children that a woman is supposed to
bear during her reproductive life, has constantly fallen, and the 2002 figure (1.32) again
reached its worst record (available on-line at: http://www.1.ipss.go.jp/tokei/Data/
Popular2004/4_3_2.gif, accessed 3 June 2004). In order to sustain the size of the popu-
lation, the total fertility rate needs to be above 2.08 (the population reproduction level). 
2 For example, Pierre and Peters discuss the importance of the ‘role of society’ in
governance, in particular, in terms of public/private interactions. While they comment
that ‘[t]he most important thing to do if one wants to improve the capacity for steering
and management for the government, therefore, would be to strengthen the self-
governing capacities of segments of society’, in a later part of the paragraph they
develop their notion to ‘what matters is the generation of organizational capacity and
the movement of interest and identification beyond the family’ (Pierre and Peters 2000:
33). There is no reason specified why such capacity needs to be ‘beyond the family’,
though the family falls within the term ‘segments of society’. 
3 Feminist economists such as Folbre and Elson tend to use the term ‘social repro-
duction’. I would argue, however, that the concept of ‘reproduction’ needs to be better
articulated and detailed in order to discuss the function of the family in the political
economy. Numerous works on the different levels of reproduction, from childbirth to
political socialization, are widely evident in the range of social science disciplines, and
their implications for the maintenance and growth of economies and nation-states
deserve a more integrated analysis. For the multiple levels of reproduction and their
implications and functions in the case of the Japanese political economy, see Takeda
(2005).
4 Foucault coined the term ‘governmentality’ to refer to a governing system in which
biopolitics comprises the rationality of governing. Rose suggests that the analytics of
governmentality is differentiated from the sociologies of governance in two senses.
Firstly, ‘analyses of governmentalities are empirical, but not realist’, as ‘they are not
studies of actual organizations and operation of systems of rule’, but ‘of a particular
“stratum” of knowing and acting’. In other words, ‘[t]hey are concerned, that is to say,
with conditions of possibility and intelligibility for certain ways of seeking to act upon
the conduct of others, or oneself, to achieve a certain end’. Second, the roles of the
analytics of government are diagnostic rather than descriptive’ and they ‘seek an open
and critical relation to strategies for governing’, and ‘open a space of critical thought’
(Rose 1999: 19). 
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The term govermentality is translated as ‘tōchi-sei’ in Japanese. The first part of the
term, ‘tōchi’ is a Japanese word used as a translation of the English term ‘governance’,
while the second part ‘sei’ signifies the nature or tendency. Also see the introductory
chapter.
5 Garon notes that bureaucrats who organized the early Japanese ‘savings campaign’
‘studied the “Thrift Campaign” in the United States’, and ‘were directly inspired by
the model of Britain’s National War Savings Committee’ (Garon 2000: 46). 
6 Prior to this, Hani Motoko had already published her own version of household
account books in 1904.
7 The economic difficulties after the First World War culminated in the rice riots of
1918, initiated by wives and mothers in a fishing village in Toyama prefecture in order
to protect their family lives.
8 Ikeda Hayato, the Minister of Finance on a number of occasions and the Prime
Minister (1960–4) who implemented the income-doubling policy, played a key role in
the implementation of the postwar savings campaign. 
9 For example, the Housewife Confederation organized public exhibitions on household
economy and savings. The NFRWO supervised the activities of local women’s
association (fujinkai), in which training courses for keeping household account books
were often held.
10 For example, the everyday life school in Suginami ward in Tokyo played a central role
in tackling garbage disposal and smog, both predominant environmental issues in
1970’s Japanese cities (Takeda 2005: 150)
11 As Miyazaki also points out, unions used the household account books in their
activities. Even today, unions publish data on the household economy collected from
their members’ household account books every February, just before the annual
Spring Labour Offensive (Shuntō). This is in order to use them to support their nego-
tiations for securing a family wage. 
12 The number of unemployed has increased constantly since the late 1990s. According
to surveys conducted by the Statistic Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications (Sōmushō) published in April 2003, the number of unemployment
amounted to 3.59 million, which was the worst on record. The number of unemployed
among bread-winners also recorded its worst level of approximately 1.00 million
(Available on-line at: http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/2.htm, accessed 28 May
2003).
13 The abolition of the spouse tax special deduction was officially advised by the Tax
Commission to Prime Minster Koizumi Junichirō in November 2002, and included
the FY2003 Tax Reform published by the ministry of Finance, in December 2002
(Available on-line at: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tax/tax2003/tax2003_tr.htm,
accessed 16 May 2003)
14 In order to relieve banks which have been in trouble with accumulated non-
performing loans, the Japanese official interest rate has been kept at a record-breaking
low level since 1999 as the official policy of the Bank of Japan.
15 The Central Council for Savings Promotion was renamed as the Central Council for
Savings Information in 1988, and again as the Central Council for Financial Services
Information in 2001 (available on-line at:
http://www.saveinfo.or.jp/save/what.html/, accessed 28 May 2003). 
16 It is interesting to note that the annual public lecture held by the council for its ‘savings
and life planning promoters’ and members of women’s organizations such as the
Housewives Confederations and the NFRWO kept its title the ‘New Life and Women’
up until 2003. This lecture has been a tradition since the time the council functioned as
part of the New Life Movement in the 1950s (Kurashi to Okane 214, 2002: 6). 
17 The results of the annual essay competition were published in the journal, Seikatsu no
Sekkei (Life Planning), and are now published in its successor from 2001 Kurashi to Okane
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(Everyday Life and Money) by the Central Council for Financial Services Information.
According to the former, the number of total entries since the inception of the
competition in 1954 had reached 64,000 by the year 2000 (Seikatsu no Sekkei 209,
2000: 54).
18 One of these winners runs a website which provides economizing tips as well as a long
list of her media appearances (available on-line at: http://www.hi-ho.ne.jp/hasidate/
kakei/, accessed 28 May 03). 
19 The information regarding Ōno discussed here is based on two sources; first on private
email exchanges between Noda and her successor, Yonemura Teruko, who is also 
a member of the Groundwater Protection Movement and Ōno City Assembly.
Second, it is also based on the publications of the movement by the Groundwater
Protection Association (Ōno no Mizu o Kangaeru Kai 1988; Fukuiken Ōno no Mizu o Kangaeru
Kai 2000).
20 The New Life Movement was introduced in Fukui prefecture through the activities of
local women’s associations in the early 1950s. In 1975, the Fukui New Life Movement
Association selected Ōno city as a region of ‘community planning’ (Yoshida 1982: 26).
Some actors engaged in community planning in Ōno also joined the Groundwater
Protection Association (Fukuiken Ōno no Mizu o Kangaeru Kai 2000: 348). 
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Bunken kenkyūkai (Association for the
Decentralization of Authority) 74
Bureau for Gender Equality 120
bureaucracy 1, 66, 97, 136
Bush Administration 98
Bush, George W. 147
Business and Industry Advisory
Committee 22
Cabinet Office’s Council on Economic and
Fiscal Policy (CEFP) 112, 126
Caouette, T. and Saito, Y. 160
capital cost management (CCM) 222
Carlile, L.E. and Tilton, M.C. 95, 96
Index
Carroll, A.B. and Buchholtz, A. 211
Casey, Louise 208
Center for Multicultural Information and
Assistance 169–70
Central Council for Financial Services
241–2, 243
Central Council for Savings Promotion
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Hōryū Welfare Association 200
Hodges, M.R. 20
homeless people 11; administrative
structures 200–1; application of 
policy in major cities 198–208;
background 192–3; emergency
temporary shelters 203–5; entrance
strategies 205–6; everyone’s
problem/no-one’s problem 208–9; exit
strategies 206–7; expansion of budget
for 193–4; government position on 192;
launch of countermeasures 193–4;
media interest in 192; national
bureaucratic structures 196–8; recent
policy developments 193–6; and role of
private sector 207–8; Self-Reliance
Support Act (2002) 194–6; self-reliance
support centres 201–3; surveys of 193;
two-tier system 201–5; violent attacks
on 193
Homeless Self-reliance Support Act (2002)
194–6
Honda Motor Company Limited 223
Hook, G.D. 40; et al. 27, 36, 44; and
Breslin, S. 37; and Kearns, I. 36
Hopkin, J. 176
Hori, H. 63
Horne, J. 95, 99
Hosokawa Morihiro 6, 119
household economy see family
Housekeeping Books Federation (Kakeibo
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